Preferences for tax schemes in OECD countries,self-interest and ideology

Abstract

In this article we analyze preferences for tax schemes, using data on subjective evaluations of the taxes paid by different income groups. We estimate multilevel models to test the effect of socio-economic status and political ideology on individual preferences. We find that both self-interest motivations and political ideology are important factors in explaining preferences for tax schemes. At the national level, it is found that the fiscal burden shapes preferences for tax schemes (especially direct taxation) and it has an interacting effect with both self-interest and ideological variables. At higher levels of direct taxation, probabilities of supporting redistribution toward the poor and the rich become highly polarized along political affiliations. This suggests a mobilization effect. As direct taxation increases, left-wing parties strengthen their ability to mobilize their electorates to pursue further their redistributive interests, while right-wing voters increase their resistance to taxing the rich.