This article explores the conditions of successful electoral system change. It develops four hypotheses on the conditions of the successful implementation of proposals to modify electoral laws. The first hypothesis reflects partisan self-interest and assumes that larger parties are better able to impose their preferred electoral institutions. The second and third hypotheses presume that electoral system design is motivated by instrumental considerations that can either reflect consensual or majoritarian visions of democracy. A fourth hypothesis draws on the timing of reforms and states that successful reform is possible only in relative temporal proximity to extraordinary historical circumstances. A macro, quantitative comparative analysis shows that both the control of larger seat shares and high levels of fragmentation in conjunction explain the successful implementation of electoral laws in 11 new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. This result is corroborated by four case studies.
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