This article analyzes the importance of system-level features, such as political and economic development, and individual-level factors for the support of liberal democracy. Using multilevel modeling, the study explicitly distinguishes between the role of subjective evaluations at the individual level and objective facts at the system level. The findings obtained using a sample of 36 countries indicate that objective economic performance is the most important system-level factor for system support. Improvements in the degree of democracy do not affect public support. Individual subjective perception is predominant for determining specific support. Contrary to previous studies, there is no evidence that the liberal-democratic society reaches a degree of acceptance that immunizes it from economic developments. Nor is there evidence that citizens of non-democratic regime types will urge for democratic change when the regime performs well in economic terms.
Alesina A. and Wacziarg R. ( 2000) The economics of civil trust. In: Pharr SJ and Putnam RD (eds) Disaffected Democracies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 149-170.
2.
Almond GA and Verba S. ( 1963) The Civic Culture. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
3.
Anderson CJ and Guillory CA ( 1997) Political institutions and satisfaction with democracy: a cross-national analysis of consensus and majoritarian systems. American Political Science Review91(1): 66-81.
4.
Anderson CJ and Tverdova YV ( 2003) Corruption, political allegiances, and attitudes toward government in contemporary democracies. American Journal of Political Science47(1): 91-109.
5.
Boix C. and Posner DN ( 1998) Social capital: explaining its origins and effects on government performance. British Journal of Political Science28(4): 686-693.
6.
Bowler S. and Donovan T. ( 2002) Democracy, institutions and attitudes about citizen influence on government. British Journal of Political Science32(2): 371-390.
7.
Bowler S. and Karp JA ( 2004) Politicians, scandals, and trust in government. Political Behavior26(3): 271-287.
8.
Bratton M. and Mattes R. ( 2001) Support for democracy in Africa: intrinsic or instrumental ? British Journal of Political Science31(3): 447-474.
9.
Carothers T. ( 1999) Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
10.
Catterberg G. and Moreno A. ( 2005) The individual bases of political trust: trends in new and established democracies. International Journal of Public Opinion Research18(2): 31-48.
11.
Chanley VA ( 2002) Trust in government in the aftermath of 9/11: determinants and consequences. Political Psychology23(3): 469-483.
12.
Chu Y.-H, Bratton M., Lagos Cruz-Coke M., Shastri S. and Tessler MA ( 2008) Public opinion and democratic legitimacy. Journal of Democracy19(2): 74-87.
13.
Clarke HD, Dutt N. and Kronberg A. ( 1993) The political economy of attitudes toward polity and society in westernEuropean democracies. Journal of Politics55(4): 998-1021.
14.
Criado H. and Herreros F. ( 2007) Political support taking into account the institutional context. Comparative Political Studies40(12): 1511-1532.
15.
della Porta D. ( 2000) Social capital, beliefs in government, and political corruption . In: Pharr SJ and Putnam RD (eds) Disaffected Democracies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 202-228.
16.
Easton D. ( 1965) A System Analysis of Political Life. New York: Wiley.
17.
Evans G. and Whitefield S. ( 1995) The politics and economics of democratic commitment: support for democracy in transition societies. British Journal of Political Science25(4): 485-514.
18.
Finkel SE ( 1987) The effects of participation on political efficacy and political support: evidence from a West German panel. Journal of Politics49(2): 441-464.
19.
Freedom House ( 2003) Freedom in the World. Available at: http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=1 (accessed June 2008).
20.
Fukuyama F. ( 1992) The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press.
21.
Hadenius A. and Teorell J. ( 2005) Cultural and economic prerequisites of democracy: reassessing recent evidence. Studies in Comparative International Development39(1): 87-106.
22.
Herreros F. and Criado H. ( 2008) The state and the development of social trust. International Political Science Review29(1): 53-71.
23.
Huang M.-H, Chang, Y-T. and Chu Y.-H (2008) Identifying sources of democratic legitimacy: a multilevel analysis. Electoral Studies27(1): 45-62.
24.
Inglehart RF ( 1999) Postmodernization erodes respect for authority, but increases support for democracy. In: Norris P (ed.) Critical Citizens. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 236-256.
25.
Inglehart RF ( 1988) The renaissance of political culture. American Political Science Review82(4): 1203-1230.
26.
Kaase M. ( 1988) Political alienation and protest. In: Dogan M (ed.) Comparing Pluralist Democracies: Strains on Legitimacy. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 114-142.
27.
Kinder DR and Kiewiet DR ( 1979) Economic discontent and political behavior: the role of personal grievances and collective economic judgments in congressional voting . American Journal of Political Science23(3): 495-527.
28.
Kluegel JR and Mason DS ( 2004) Fairness matters: social justice and political legitimacy in post-communist Europe. Europe-Asia Studies56(6): 813-834.
29.
Lewis-Beck MS and Stegmaier M. ( 2000) Economic determinants of electoral outcomes. Annual Review of Political Science3: 183-219.
30.
Linde J. and Ekman J. ( 2003) Satisfaction with democracy: a note on a frequently used indicator in comparative politics. European Journal of Political Research42(3): 391-408.
31.
Lipset SM ( 1959) Some social requisites of democracy: economic development and political legitimacy. American Political Science Review53(1): 69-105.
32.
Lipset SM and Schneider W. ( 1987) The confidence gap during the Reagan years, 1981-1987 . Political Science Quarterly102(1): 1-23.
33.
Macedo S. (ed.) (2005) Democracy at Risk. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.
34.
Merkel W., Puhle H.-J, Croissant A., Eicher C. and Thiery P. ( 2003) Defekte Demokratie. Band 1: Theorie. Opladen: Leske & Budrich.
35.
Miller AH ( 1974) Political issues and trust in government: 1964-1970. American Political Science Review68(3): 951-972.
36.
Mishler W. and Rose R. ( 1997) Trust, distrust and skepticism: popular evaluations of civil and political institutions in post-communist societies. Journal of Politics59(2): 418-451.
37.
Mishler W. and Rose R. ( 2001a) What are the origins of political trust? Testing institutional and cultural theories in post-communist societies. Comparative Political Studies34(1): 30-62.
38.
Mishler W. and Rose R. ( 2001b) Political support for incomplete democracies: realist vs. idealist theories and measures. International Political Science Review22(4): 303-320.
39.
Mishler W. and Rose R. ( 2002) Learning and re-learning regime support: the dynamics of post-communist regimes. European Journal of Political Research41(1): 5-36.
40.
Mishler W. and Rose R. ( 2005) What are the political consequences of trust? A test of cultural and institutional theories in Russia. Comparative Political Studies38(9): 1050-1078.
41.
Muller EN and Jukam TO ( 1977) On the meaning of political support. American Political Science Review71(4): 1561-1595.
42.
Muller EN, Jukam TO and Seligson MA ( 1982) Diffuse support and anti-system political-behavior - a comparative analysis. American Journal of Political Science26(2): 240-264.
43.
Newton K. ( 2006) Political support: social capital, civil society and political and economic performance. Political Studies54(4): 846-864.
44.
Newton K. and Norris P. ( 2000) Confidence in public institutions: faith, culture, or performance?. In: Pharr SJ and Putnam RD (eds) Disaffected Democracies . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 52-73.
45.
Norpoth H. ( 1987) Guns and butter and government popularity in Britain. American Political Science Review81(3): 949-959.
46.
Norris P (ed.) (1999a) Critical Citizens. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
47.
Norris P. ( 1999b) Institutional explanations for political support. In: Norris P (ed.) Critical Citizens . Oxford: Oxford University Press , 217-235.
48.
Norris P. ( 2000) The impact of television on civic malaise. In: Pharr SJ and Putnam RD (eds) Disaffected Democracies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 231-251.
49.
Pharr SJ ( 2000) Officials’ misconduct and public distrust: Japan and the trilateral democracies. In: Pharr SJ and Putnam RD (eds) Disaffected Democracies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 173-201.
50.
Pharr SJ and Putnam RD (eds) (2000) Disaffected Democracies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
51.
Przeworski A. ( 2005) Democracy as an equilibrium. Public Choice123(3-4): 253-273.
52.
Putnam RD ( 1993) Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
53.
Rabe-Hesketh S., Skrondal A. and Pickles A. ( 2004) GLLAMM Manual. UC Berkeley Division of Biostatistics Working Paper Series. Working Paper 160. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
54.
Rose R. and Shin DC ( 2001) Democratization backwards: the problem of third-wave democracies . British Journal of Political Science31(2): 331-354.
55.
Rothstein B. and Uslaner EM ( 2005) All for all: Equality, corruption, and social trust. World Politics58: 41-72.
56.
Seligson MA and Booth JA ( 1993) Political culture and regime type: evidence from Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Journal of Politics55(3): 777-792.
57.
Snijders TA and Bosker RJ ( 1999) Multilevel Analysis. London: SAGE.
58.
Steenbergen MR and Jones BS ( 2002) Modeling multilevel data structures. American Journal of Political Science46(1): 218-237.
59.
Transparency International (n.d.) Corruption perceptions index (CPI). Available at: http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi (accessed June 2008).
60.
Tyler TR ( 2006) Psychological perspectives on legitimacy and legitimation . Annual Review of Psychology57: 375-400.
61.
UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) (various years) Human Development Report. New York: Oxford University Press.
62.
Van Deth JW and Elff M. ( 2004) Politicization, economic development and political interest in Europe. European Journal of Political Research43(3): 477-508.
63.
Vanhanen T. ( 1997) Prospects of Democracy. London: Routledge.
64.
Waldron-Moore P. ( 1999) Eastern Europe at the crossroads of democratic transition: evaluating support for democratic institutions, satisfaction with democratic government, and consolidation of democratic regimes. Comparative Political Studies32(1): 32-62.
65.
Weatherford MS ( 1984) Economic stagflation and public support for the political system. British Journal of Political Science14(2): 187-205.
66.
Weil FD ( 1989) The sources and structure of legitimation in western democracies: a consolidated model tested with time-series data in six countries since World War II. American Sociological Review54(5): 682-706.
67.
Welzel C. ( 2007) Are levels of democracy affected by mass attitudes? Testing attainment and sustainment effects on democracy. International Political Science Review28(4): 397-424.
68.
Welzel C., Inglehart RF and Klingemann H-D ( 2003) The theory of human development: a cross-cultural analysis . European Journal of Political Research42(3): 341-379.
69.
Whitefield S. and Evans G. ( 1999) Political culture versus rational choice: explaining responses to transition in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. British Journal of Political Science29(1): 129-154.
70.
World Values Survey (1995) World Values Surveys, Second Round 1995. Aggregate File Producers: ASEP/JDS, Madrid, Spain/Tilburg University, Tilburg, the Netherlands. Aggregate File Distributors: ASEP/JDS and ZA, Cologne, Germany. The European Values Study Foundation and World Values Survey Association.
