Existing research on the political-economic determinants of coup d’état events has not explored the role of property rights protection in decreasing the likelihood of their global and regional incidence. Case studies confirm that the military institutions of the developing world began to represent elite class values that reacted adversely to state attempts at the redistribution of wealth and the expropriation of property after the 1970s. Thus far, no empirical analysis has tested the assertions made by these cases. Using Binary Times Series Cross-Section models from the period 1970—90, this article investigates the impact of the Contract Intensive Money ratio and International Country Risk Guide measures, which are tapped as property rights proxy variables, on decreasing the likelihood of a coup. The findings show that developing states that secure their property rights (as a function of these measures) are more likely to experience a decreased likelihood of a coup. The effect of property rights protection on the decreased likelihood of a coup shows statistical significance in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The results hold true even when the global model is subjected to a sensitivity analysis where lagged coup events over a six-year period are included as a control variable.
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