What matters in the structural dynamics of any political or economic system is the contradiction between absolute and relative trends. The “single dynamic” of power and role, of state and system, encodes the “perspective of statecraft” in the trends and shifting trends of relative share. The “tides of history” shift counter-intuitively, creating enormous uncertainty, inverting future expectations about role and security, and disrupting the normal stability of statecraft. Power cycle theory reconciles realism and idealism in conceptualizing foreign policy role as coequal in significance with power in a legitimate world order. A “dynamic equilibrium” requires reciprocal adaptation to structural change, and it is explicitly non-hegemonic. This article establishes the philosophical foundations of power cycle theory as a theory of competition actualized in productive interaction.
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