Is it possible to form a rational identity? A critical reading of Habermas’ account of social identity

Abstract

Habermas’ account of social identity is the most sophisticated among various deliberative and expansive democratic models and aligns with his long-standing theoretical commitment to communicative rationality that is tailored to the democratic organization of society. Taking a normative stance, he proposes a procedural account of social identity within communicative rationality, achievable only in modernity and deliberative democracy. We argue that his formulation of social identity is inadequate, given a problematic stage-based framework in his historical account of societal evolution and the insubstantial nature of social identity in his linguistic and procedural accounts of social identity. Nonetheless, Habermas’ approach can serve as a starting point to develop a more inclusive and empirically defensible conceptual framework for collective identity, grounded in robust institutional foundations and a substantive account of the political. Finally, by challenging Habermas’ separation of system and lifeworld, we argue that a rational social identity should be rooted in both domains.

Introduction

The question of identity has been a subject of discussion in various theories of democracy; however, the way identity is conceptualized varies significantly between classic or traditional democratic theories and the newer expansive and deliberative models of democracy. In classic theories of liberal democracy, the individual is considered the fundamental unit of analysis, with each person possessing distinct preferences, interests and rights that should be respected within a democratic framework. In this context, democracy serves to limit government interference with individuals’ interests, preferences and choices (for a review, see Warren 1992). In other words, individuals’ identities are seen as pre-political, defined by their own interests and preferences, with democracy’s role being to limit political interference and allow individuals to pursue their pre-political interests freely. In contrast, expansive or deliberative models of democracy tend to move away from the individualistic focus of classical theories and prioritize collective engagement and deliberation, positing that individuals’ interests and preferences are not pre-political but rather shaped through their active participation in the political process (Thompson 2008).

Despite the strong theoretical foundations that classical theories of democracy provide for discussing individual identities based on personal interests and their integration in economics and political science (e.g., rational choice theory), the expansive models of democracy lack a solid theoretical framework to support its account of identity (apart from Habermas account, see Norval 2006; Warren 1992, 1993). This implies that the constitution of individuals’ identities and preferences – which are expected to emerge through deliberation and engagement within the broader polity – has often been taken for granted or neglected, lacking a robust theoretical foundation for individuals and collective identities. Furthermore, deliberative democrats have generally been reluctant to incorporate collective identity into their democratic theory since they predominantly emphasize the rules of deliberation and rationality of procedures that ensure the legitimacy of the democratic process; hence, collective identity is often dismissed altogether or, at best, neglected (Barker 2017). Many deliberative democrats prescribe setting aside local and group affiliation as a precondition for forming a deliberating public and ensuring the impartiality and objectivity of deliberation (Young 2002).

Jürgen Habermas is one of the few theorists within the expansive models of democracy who substantiates an account of identity and self-transformation (Warren 1992). From the beginning of his scholarly works, Habermas grapples with the following question: ‘can complex societies form a rational identity?’ (Habermas 1974, 91). His various accounts of social identity are connected to the possibility of forming a rational identity within the context of a broader polity. While Habermas agrees with setting aside the pre-defined bases for identity, his theory is able to account for a basis for development of a rational social identity.

Nevertheless, Habermas’ account of self and rational identity, as the most sophisticated account in expansive models of democracy, is not systematic; rather, it is dispersed throughout his extensive corpus of social and philosophical writings, with the exception of his 1974 article entitled ‘On Social Identity’. In addition, there is a lack of secondary scholarship on his exploration of rational collective identity. It is important to examine Habermas’ account of rational social identity because his major theories of communicative action and deliberative democracy are predicated on the development of rational identity.

In this article, we would like to address several issues. First, we systematize the development of Habermas’ reflections on social identity, which, according to our review, progresses through three phases. Initially, in his earlier works in the 1960s and 70s, there is a historical account for the development of identity. In this phase, Habermas adopts a descriptive and diagnostic approach based on his philosophy of history, identifying the various developmental phases of human identity across history and their associated pathological aspects. This is followed by a focus on the linguistic prerequisites required for the development of a rational identity in his works on communicative action during the late 1970s and early 80s. In this phase, he presents a normative account of what a rational identity should look like. Finally, at the late 80s, his reflections take a political turn when he addresses notions of national and European identity in the form of constitutional patriotism. We argue that Habermas' account of constitutional patriotism still aims to provide a normative account of identity but shifts the basis of equal participation to construct rational identity from earlier discourse ethics to a position rooted in political discourse.

Second, after presenting Habermas’ accounts of identity across the three phases – historical, linguistic and political phases – we present our critique. We argue that his historical account relies on a problematic stage-based framework akin to developmental theories in cognitive psychology. Additionally, his linguistic and political accounts lack empirical validity, are too rationalistic and idealistic, and focus primarily on procedural aspects, hence lacking substance. We contend that Habermas’ treatment of social identity is unable to explain current political developments and fails to adequately account for the contentious political nature of identity. Finally, we propose some potential solutions to overcome the shortcomings identified in Habermas’ theory, including the integration of his account of rational social identity with an institutional basis, an empirically informed account of deliberation that encompasses both work domain and lifeworld, and a more substantial account of the political.

Historical evolution of rational identity in modern society

In his early works, Habermas adopts both a descriptive and a normative stance on social identity. Descriptively, he examines the historical evolution of social identity, using an approach that McCarthy characterizes as an ‘empirical philosophy of history with a practical (political) intent’ (McCarthy 1979, ix). In his social philosophy of history, Habermas (1979) cautiously draws parallels between individual cognitive and moral development and broader societal evolution, between ego development of individuals and collective identities of groups or societies. He states that ‘the reproduction of society and the socialization of its members are two aspects of the same process’ (p. 99). By explicating such a dual developmental process, he shows ‘homologous structures of consciousness in ego development and social evolution’ (Habermas 1979, 116), wherein both individuals and societies undergo a formative developmental process characterized by hierarchically ordered stages (Habermas 1979).

Inspired by the empirical social and behavioral sciences, notably Piaget and Kohlberg, Habermas (1979) views human development as stage-based and hierarchically structured, encompassing concrete/preconventional (children’s reasoning based on reward, punishment and self-interest), conventional (early adolescents’ adhering to societal norms and laws) and postconventional (reasoning based on autonomy and competence for thoughtful principles) stages of cognitive and moral development.

Drawing on Hegel, Habermas outlines four historical stages that chart the evolving nature of social or collective identity. These historical stages start with archaic communities with tribal and kinship ties, moving to the polytheistic religious communities, then to the monotheistic religions such as Judaism and Christianity, and culminating in the most recent stage with Protestantism, the inception of nation-states, the enlightenment and the rise of secularism. The development to later stages dissolves the preceding identity framework: ‘the transition to societies organized through a state required the relativization of tribal identities and the construction of a more abstract identity that is no longer based on membership of individuals of common descent but on belonging in common to a territorial organization’ (Habermas 1979, 112). While early historical stages represent identity as just a mirror image of nature or tribe, later stages distinguish between nature and subjectivity in which identity formation is a product of individual creation, critical reflection and participation in communicative action to create an agreed-upon norm (Habermas 1984).

According to Habermas’ (1979) taxonomy of identity development, each stage (both at individual and historical levels) has its own ‘developmental logic’, crises and resolutions (p. 98). For instance, in Habermas’ fourth historical stage, the form of purposive rationality that emerged with the onset of the capitalist mode of production, there has been a noticeable decline in traditional sources of legitimization of identities such as religion and myth. Consequently, the identities associated with these sources have also become less effective in maintaining social integration (Habermas 1976). Habermas argues that this reliance on reason and individual reflection for identity creation in modernity is irreversible, akin to his belief that an individual’s development toward postconventional abstract thinking is irreversible (Habermas 1979, 73). Drawing on Weber’s theory of rationalization, Habermas argues that with rise of capitalism the social elements that were governing social and economic life come under the pressure and necessities of capitalist mode of production and circulation (Habermas 1969); hence, old forms of collective identity become obsolete in light of the expansion of instrumental rationality.

Normatively, according to Habermas, the events of the 19th and 20th centuries testify to the limits of identities based on nationalities, religions, races, or tradition: identities that are ‘derived from the context of civilization, centered around the state, and articulated as well as fixated in particular traditions and world images has become outdated and thereby irrelevant’ (Habermas 1974, 99). Accordingly, there should be normative justifications for how individuals develop a social identity: ‘Collective identity… can today only be grounded in the consciousness of universal and equal chances to participate in the kind of communication processes by which identity formation becomes a continuous learning process’ (Habermas 1974, 99).

Such a normative stance on rational social identity has several key elements. First, Habermas proposes a procedural account of identity, suggesting that a rational identity ‘no longer requires fixed content… is open to counterarguments and revisions at any time’ (Habermas 1974, 100). Second, he views rational identity as the intersection of a universalistic principle that ensures participation in rational discourse and the structure of individual ego identity. The ego structure pertains not only to individuals' socialization within society and their development of cognitive competence but also to the formative process of self-knowledge that has taken a very critical form in enlightenment, by moving from Kant to Hegel, Marx and contemporary philosophy (Habermas 1972). Third, rational identity is neither past-oriented nor future-oriented, rather it is indeterminate and open within a communicative process in which individuals ought to engage (Habermas 1974, 101). Thus, his account of rational identity in modernity is procedural and strongly normative. Similar to principle-based reasoning in Kohlberg’s moral theory and abstract critical thinking ability in adulthood, which he considers universal ego structure, one can also envision a reflective rational organization of society to form a collective identity:

For the first time, the universalistic potential already contained in the rationalized world views could be set free. The unity of the world could no longer be secured objectively, through hypostasizing unifying principles (God, Being, or Nature); henceforth it could be asserted only reflectively, through the unity of reason (or through a rational organization of the world, the actualization of reason). (Habermas 1979, 105)

Thus, according to Habermas, any pre-defined identity is problematic as it obstructs rational communication, suggesting that we need alternative frameworks for collective identities that are more ethical and universal. Going beyond individual’s particularistic interests, Habermas (1974, 1979) seeks to ground one’s social identity on agreed-upon shared norms and values within a ‘linguistically established intersubjectivity’ (Habermas 1979, 109). Hence, he develops Universal Pragmatics that establishes the groundwork for realizing a rational social identity.

Normative conditions for developing a rational identity in communicative rationality

Presenting a procedural account of identity, Habermas (1984, 1985) grounds social identity in deliberation. He argues that rational identity can only be developed within communicative rationality in lifeworld, which is oriented toward shared understanding, and not in the realm of work and systems where strategic and instrumental rationalities dominate, which are oriented to success and effectiveness. Since rational identity is developed in the lifeworld and through communicative rationality, it is accompanied by social and political consciousness, with social participation playing a constitutive role in fostering rational identity in a critical and enlightened way (Habermas 1972, 1985).

Habermas emphasizes the importance of grounding arguments and examining various validity claims in speech acts and utterances (Habermas 1979). He posits that the pragmatic rules governing utterances are universal, aiming at situating and contextualizing utterances in speech acts in relation to external reality (the truth of the claims regarding the objective world or events, i.e., external validity), internal reality (the speaker’s intentional experiences, truthfulness and sincerity of utterances, i.e., the internal validity) and the normative reality of society (the social lifeworld, shared values and norms, i.e., the normative validity) (Habermas 1979). Therefore, the basis for rejecting or accepting statements or utterances lies in validity claims concerning three worlds: the objective/external world, the subjective/internal world and the social/normative world, which account for truth, sincerity and the correctness of utterances, respectively (Habermas 1984).

To reach understanding – as the purpose of communication action – two conditions need to be fulfilled: (a) the strength of an argument in a given context hinging on ‘the soundness of the reasons’ and its effectiveness to persuade participants in a communicative discourse, and (b) being prone to a learning process, allowing individuals to accept or reject an utterance, correct mistakes and change their position when presented with superior arguments (Habermas 1984). The emphasis on the robustness of arguments implies that dialogue, or communicative action, should occur within what Habermas refers to as an ‘ideal speech situation, where no power dynamics or external forces sway the direction of the communicative action “except the force of the better argument”’ (Habermas 1984, 25).

Habermas (1984) argues that while communicative processes may lead to consensus, the outcome is less important than the process of reaching agreement itself, which creates shared understanding necessary for the development of rational identity. Reaching understanding is the primary purpose of communicative action and consensus serves as the regulative ideal for deliberative processes and rational discourse. However, achieving consensus can be very challenging in diverse societies and is not necessarily essential for reaching understanding.

A major precondition for communicative action for Habermas (1984) is that all members must be recognized as equal participants. The recognition of equal participation is based on an ethical principle known as the principle of universalizability (Principle U). Rather than being a moral norm per se, Principle U serves as a test for the universal application of a moral principle.

Importantly, the reason people engage in communicative action is the interdependence of interests among society members (Habermas 1979, 1985). It is the interdependence of interests in public domain that Warren (1992, 1993) sees the potentiality of Habermas account to substantiate a productive account of identity within expansive democratic theories, elucidating a transformative account of the self through communicative actions and its potentiality to develop a rational collective identity.

Habermas justifies equal participation to communicative action based on his discursive ethics and moral obligations. Moral principles, such as human rights, can foster cosmopolitan solidarity that connects individuals regardless of their backgrounds based on a shared concept of humanity (Habermas 1996, 1999). However, he contends that this approach falls short of providing civic solidarity, which necessitates a sense of community and collective identity that can only be established within a specific political entity (Habermas 2001). This leads to what we refer to as Habermas’ political turn at the end of 1980s in offering a political framework for forming rational collective identity.

Social identity within a political realm: Constitutional patriotism

According to Habermas (1999), creating a nation-state has been a solution to address the historical contingency of political communities in achieving social integration. Regardless of the paths taken during their formation or their current forms – be it republicanism, nationalism and deliberate nation-building by postcolonial nations after liberation – nation-states require social glues to establish their legitimacy and foster a common social and political life among their citizens. Legal framework has not been able to fulfill the promise of political community. Nationalism, while questionable normatively, has been one such effective form of collective identity that frames a political community around the idea of an organic nation with the right to self-determination (Habermas 1999). In modernity, a democratic potential has opened up for nations for a ‘new mode of legitimation based on a new, more abstract form of social integration’ (Habermas 1999, 111). In this form, culture, language and other markers of identity can only provide a background for political activity of the citizens in the new form of state, but it is his idea of constitutionalism patriotism that seems to guarantee equal participation in political processes, provide a minimal basis for social identity and offset the negative effects of other basis of identities such as ethnicities, religion and nationalism.

The concept of constitutional patriotism, as first proposed by the political scientist Dolf Sternberger (1979), characterizes a form of passionate rationality and a form of affective identification with the state whose aim is to uphold the rule of law. Sternberger’s account of constitutional patriotism represents a vertical and affective tie between citizens and the state rather than a horizontal affective attachment among citizens themselves (Müller 2008). During the first Historikerstreit (historians’ dispute) of 1986, which was a controversy among German intellectuals regarding the uniqueness of National Socialism compared to other closed political systems like Stalinism, and the need for a foundation for a collective identity in newly unified Germany, Habermas presented his own account of constitutional patriotism. In contrast to Sternberger, Habermas’ account is not so much about the attachment to the state than it is a basis for equal participation of citizens in a public sphere and the affirmation of their right to partake in rational communicative discourse in society.

Habermas (1999) argued for constitutional patriotism as a permissible and defensible basis form of collective identity that could unite both right and left, as well as West and East Germans, and is suitable for multicultural and diverse societies. In addition, he sees the project of constitutional patriotism as a democratic project in line with the revolutionary political project started by the French revolution in 1789 and continuing it to a postnational level such as a new form of normatively justifiable European identity (Habermas 1994).

According to Habermas, nationalism can be seen as a reaction to globalization, but retreating to nationalism is not only ineffective against the flexible and adaptable globalized economic forces but also destructive given the diversity in current societies (Habermas 1999). He argues that only postnational political forces can be an effective response to economic and technological globalization that tend to colonize the lifeworld across all national states (Habermas 2001).

Furthermore, the fundamental requirement for engaging in communicative action is the recognition of each individual’s rights, equality and autonomy as equal interlocutors, free from prejudice, domination and unequal power relations (Habermas 1999, 2001). The constitution can serve as an ethically substantiated yet culturally neutral basis for collective identity, simultaneously ensuring political integration and equal opportunities for participation within society. Finally, the concept of constitutional patriotism addresses the emotional aspect of collective identity. It is designed to situate these ethically justifiable political norms within the experience and concerns of citizens in a way that would protect the present democratic system against anti-democratic forces, making affect safe for democracy (Markell 2000).

Criticism of Habermas accounts of collective identity

The three interrelated yet distinct historical, linguistic and political accounts of rational social identity by Habermas have significant shortcomings that make them unsuitable as a basis for identity. However, we argue that his overall theory of identity – which is procedural and relational, rooted in linguistically grounded intersubjectivity – has merit, and we propose ways to address its shortcomings.

Habermas’ problematic historical account of identity development

There are two main problems with Habermas’ historical account of the development of collective identity. First, his uncritical adoption of Piaget’s and Kohlberg’s universal stage-based models of human development and taking it to be a framework to interpret historical development of identity is problematic. Second, by adopting a Hegelian philosophy of history and assumption of linear progress in history from earlier primitive stages to a more inclusive and normatively defensible ones, he neglects contingent historical processes that shape identity, viewing the historical evolution of collective identity from the vantagepoint of the present.

The recent insights in developmental psychology highlight inconsistencies and heterogeneities in developmental stages across individuals as well as the cultural, social and environmental factors that significantly influence developmental trajectories (Brainerd 1978; Syed 2016). More precisely, research in various domains of developmental psychology such as problem-solving, decision-making, reasoning and argumentation, judgment, metacognition and epistemic cognition challenges the traditional views of cognitive development as a series of universal and/or discontinuous hierarchical stages (Jacobs and Klaczynski 2006; Moshman 2011). Evidence seem to cautiously suggest just one qualitative shift in children’s cognitive ability around the age of 12 or 13, in which they begin to display formal operational competencies and reasoning that differ from earlier years (Moshman 2020), yet the application of these competencies remains inconsistent even in later adult years and is influenced by various contextual factors, social processes and individual differences (Moshman 2011). Hence, cognitive development progresses at varying rates in multiple directions and the utility of a stage-based developmental model beyond the age of 12 neither consistently predict behavior nor competence.

Habermas criticizes the subjectivist and individualistic accounts of rationality prevalent in most philosophical traditions, emphasizing a rationality that is intersubjective and communicative. Yet, he relies on Piaget’s theory of cognitive development, using it as a model to understand human evolution despite its neglect of the social aspects of development (e.g., Matusov and Hayes 2000). Interestingly, Piaget’s somewhat overlooked approach to the origin of knowledge may be more relevant to Habermas’ theory than his more controversial stage-based cognitive development model. According to Piaget, our knowledge fundamentally results from our actions in the social world, our interactions with others and the regulation of internalized models of the social world (Bidell and Fischer 1992). Within a constructivist framework, Piaget aimed to explore the process of children’s internalization of the social world, the regulation of the internalized schemata of social actions and interactions, and the ontogenetic emergence of new forms of thinking and the regulation of cognitive schemata (Bidell and Fischer 1992).

On the other hand, Habermas’ historically linear account of progressive societal evolution and the corresponding formation of social identity is problematic. First, Habermas’ historically linear account of societal evolution and his stage-based evolutionary trajectory for identity development is inconsistent, as it fails to capture the intricate struggles, return of identities he ascribed to previous stages, and historical contexts that are essential in forming identities (Dean 2002). For example, the current contentious struggles for national identity encompass a range of dimensions, including ethnic, multicultural, political and other sociocultural factors, all of which have found their way into political discourse with their intended and unintended consequences. Take the example of the Hippie movement that emerged in the 1960s, challenging mainstream societal consumeristic norms and advocating for alternative lifestyles, peace, love, freedom and return to nature. In addition to their obvious opposition to mainstream society, they also had unintended consequences, as their criticism of big government resonated with the rationale of neoliberal and libertarian political discourse (Foucault 2008).

One reason for a linear account of social evolution in Habermas might be that he views the rationalization of society as irreversible in which uncritical acceptance of pre-defined set of identities and framework has become obsolete, privileging a normative stance in favor of a deliberative way of forming identity in modernity. However, the recent resurgence of ethnic, national, regional, religious and other traditional identities casts doubts on Habermas’ supposition of the irrelevance of pre-defined set of identities. It is perhaps not surprising to see Habermas’ recent theological turn, where he incorporates elements of religious narratives into his communicative rationality framework to understand moral consciousness, public discourse, and the use of reason (Habermas 2008) and its implication for collective identity (Pierce 2018).

Additionally, he views the past through the lens of the present, projecting contemporary values onto historical periods without adequately addressing the conditions under which these values emerged (Garland 2014). That means that Habermas’ normative stance includes a teleological element, wherein his review of various historical phases serves as a philosophical justification for the emergence of the current enlightened age (Dean 2002). Similar to Kant and Hegel, Habermas sees the historical development of identity as the unfolding of human rational capacities, culminating in Europe with the aim of achieving a fully rational human being with a rational identity. While Kant accompanies such a history with a critique of pure reason, Habermas frames it within a rational-pathological continuum, suggesting that the pathological side effects can be overcome with a European model of postnational community. Such teleological and rationalistic perspective have been criticized for being Eurocentric and universalistic (Delanty 1997; Hoy 2005). It also does not account for the contested nature of political identity, which aligns more with various visions of different political parties, making identity formation as part of the struggle in multi-party political system. Finally, it closes off possibilities for envisaging societies that are central to party politics.

In short, Habermas views alternative ways of self and social understanding as inferior in his evolutionary model of societal development, which progresses from earlier societies to a late postnational European political community. This perspective locks him into a current self-interpretation of a singular, universal understanding of social identity (Hoy 2005), which is misguided and unsuitable for diverse, global south and multicultural communities (Benhabib 2020; Tully 1995).

Criticism of Habermas’ account of the linguistic requirement for a rational identity

There are several concerns regarding Habermas’ normative account of social identity within his universal pragmatism, including the inability to guarantee equal participation, the lack of empirical validity in his framework, and issues related to validity of a procedural account of identity and its universality.

Habermas fails to substantiate the condition for equal participation within his universal pragmatism and discourse ethics. He views equal participation as a presumed precondition in a communicative rationality, often taken for granted, and argues that people would affirm it if it becomes a topic of discussion. The mere act of participating in discussion presupposes equality because, without the presupposition of equal participation, one would commit a performative contradiction (Habermas 1990). This, in turn, relies on an ontological assumption about language in which the original function of language is to reach an understanding, while instrumental use of language is parasitic (Habermas 1984, 288). Habermas states that performative contradiction applies only to communicative actions, but not to the instrumental action generally oriented toward success.

The problem is that, while this analytical distinction between the original and parasitic use of language may hold theoretically, it is not practically possible to differentiate between these two usages in everyday and political communication. Take the example of a political party that not only aims to provide a programmatic understanding of society among their supporters but also plans to succeed in their political agenda.

Furthermore, Habermas’ reasoning appears circular, falling into the fallacy of begging the question (petitio principii), as individuals assume equal participation while engaging in communicative action aimed at reaching understanding about equal participation.

Those who disagree with equal participation may be less likely to engage in discussions about it, resorting to other means in the political sphere, and deliberation is usually not effective in changing their minds or reaching consensus (Thompson 2008). Because Habermas’ account of identity is procedural, any consensus reached at the end of the communicative action regarding equal participation becomes irrelevant. Finally, Principle U provides an ethical justification for equal participation, yet it remains unclear how this can be extended to political domains. He himself attests to the limits of such moral basis for equal participation to create a sense of identity and solidarity: ‘But even a worldview consensus on human rights could not serve as the basis for a strong equivalent to the civic solidarity that emerged in the framework of the nation-state. Civic solidarity is rooted in particular collective identities; cosmopolitan solidarity has to support itself on the moral universalism of human rights alone’ (Habermas 2001, 108).

Apart from the equal participation prerequisite, it is not clear whether deliberation on its own can create a rational social identity. There is some empirical evidence suggesting that engagement in communicative rationality has the potential to foster a rational collective identity. For example, current research on mini-public events indicates that deliberative processes can help participants develop a better understanding of their adversaries, foster more inclusive social identities, and encourage more rational and tolerant views on social issues (Myers 2022). However, the effect of social identities developed in mini-publics and deliberative contexts on politics is fluid and context-dependent, and other social, political and economic forces influence forming identities and the link between deliberation and identity formation is not straightforward (Myers 2022).

One major reason Habermas does not account for the impact of broader social, structural and economic issues on identity formation and their potential conflict with the deliberative and communicative model is his differentiation between system and lifeworld in his theory of communicative action. Habermas restricts his account of rational identity to the lifeworld sphere, excluding the potentiality of system and workplace sphere in constructing identities. However, this dualism, along with the neglect of the system’s contribution to identity, is problematic. For instance, neoliberal economic theories conceptualize individual identities in terms of human capital, viewing individuals as units of enterprise in constant competition with others, and society as a collection of enterprises. The form of identity that economic rationality in work domain constitutes leaves its imprint on individuals’ lives in their lifeworld. For instance, the current neoliberal market economy is grounded in economic rationality of efficiency, optimization and subjective utility and expected return of one’s investment in various skills, a rationality that has become possible by reconfiguring the society as such in which individuals need to constantly invest in their human capital, develop skills and engage in competitions for valuable resources. While this does not contradict Habermas’ emphasis on the normative privilege of deliberation and idealizing away from such problematic cases, it highlights the limitations of his separation of system rationality and lifeworld rationality. Recent philosophical debates advocate for democracy at work such that the workplace can be a building block for preparing participants for public and political participation (see Frega et al. 2019 for democracy at workplace debate).

At the macro level, he views deliberation in communicative action as following moral codes and rules, rooted not merely in abstract normative theory but also in individuals’ everyday linguistic competences and historical processes (Barker 2017; Habermas 1984). However, he acknowledges that current institutional forces, conceptualized as the colonization of the lifeworld by corporate power and electoral politics, undermine this deliberative model, leading to a legitimacy crisis and limiting the motivational basis for people to implement his deliberative model. It remains unclear whether deliberation offers any benefit when the lifeworld is pressured by system rationality (instrumental and purposive rationality). Psychologically, while deliberative processes can foster shared group identity by promoting understanding, perspective-taking, empathy and tolerance, they may also inadvertently increase support for the status quo, regardless of its normative legitimacy (Batalha et al. 2019).

There are also micro-level concerns when implementing the deliberative and procedural account of identity. Empirically, deliberation is more likely a byproduct of an existing sense of identity rather than its consequence (Does 2023). That is, those who already identify with the collective are more likely to engage in deliberation than vice versa. This, however, does not rule out the potentiality of deliberation for developing a sense of collective identity. Additionally, the depolarizing effect of deliberation or its path to developing consensus is much more effective in intra-group contexts, such as within a political party, rather than in intergroup contexts and it is significantly more effective when it adheres to deliberative democratic frameworks and principles than when it does not (Caluwaerts et al. 2023; Does 2023).

Finally, Habermas’ universal pragmatism for developing a rational identity privileges the role of deliberation, yet it does not fully account for the range of constitutive elements of identity, particularly for those who lack access to deliberative processes. As Honneth (1982) points out, public discussions are often confined to the experiences of specific social classes: ‘...those excerpts from the horizon of individual experience which consist of class-specific deprivations and injuries are thereby largely excluded from public discussion; even at the individual level they can be expressed only with effort’ (p. 19). This suggests that deliberative articulation may be more suitable for certain groups in society and has at times been described as elitist. It may not capture the diversity of ways in which political claims and experiences of injustice and exclusion are expressed, particularly in the case of individuals and groups from lower strata of society: ‘When we look specifically at the class-specific conditions for the formulation of social norms, we see that empirically effective claims to morality often acquire only the form of a relatively firm consciousness of injustice, which is close to concrete experience and rests upon unarticulated and uncoordinated ideas of justice’ (Honneth 1982, 20). These unarticulated yet significant struggles of the lower classes resonate with Scott’s (2016) concept of everyday resistance and Bayat’s (2013) description of collective nonmovement, as the ‘weapon of the weak’ against oppression. Such unarticulated claims to express one’s ideas of justice and identity may not be limited to class-specific issues alone. Studies on resistance and feminism demonstrate that individuals express their political identity in diverse ways on various issues, with the body serving as a significant site for political expression and resistance (Orazani and Teymoori 2024). Hence, Habermas’ emphasis on deliberative potential for creating collective identity does not fully capture the bodily or performative dimensions of political expression.

It is important to note that prioritizing deliberation tends to overlook the affective dimension of identity. Perhaps recognizing this limitation, and more importantly in the context of German unification following the fall of Berlin Wall, Habermas includes affective belonging into the concept of constitutional patriotism, albeit with very little success, as discussed in the next section.

Problems associated with constitutional patriotism

Partly due to the limitations of moral and ethical discourse in providing a basis for the deliberative processes he advocated in the early 1980s, and partly due to his political turn at the end of 1980s and early 1990s, Habermas slightly revised his position on collective identity while retaining the core of communicative action in his theorizing. Habermas (2006) critiques the legitimacy of electoral democracy and seeks a normative theory of public will-formation that goes beyond mere compromise among competing interests. He also rejects the republican model, associated with Rousseau’s social contract and the general will, as unworkable due to its overly unitary conception of collective identity, which is incompatible with the deep value disagreements in liberal societies. Instead, Habermas advocates for legitimacy stemming from a deliberative process, which provides a more flexible sense of solidarity without requiring prior agreement on the common good or consensus at the end of deliberation (Barker 2017; Habermas 2006). Thus, he maintains his procedural account of identity, distinguishing it from liberal and republican models of democracy, while aiming to provide a minimal identity framework to engage people in the deliberative process. Constitutional patriotism fits this purpose by fostering a basic sense of belonging and commitment to democratic principles.

Although constitutional patriotism substantiates the affective dimension of identity, provides a basis for equal participation and facilitates deliberative processes among competing interests while accounting for their disagreements, it still suffers from several shortcomings. First, constitutional patriotism is often considered a thin basis for identity, being too universalistic, insufficiently constitutive and disconnected from everyday reality, hence failing to provide loyalty to a specific polity or provide a meaningful sense of identity (Hayward 2007). Second, it has also been criticized for being too restrictive, offering an elitist understanding of identity that reflects the dominant majority’s ability to shape the constitution and polity. This perpetuates inequality and further marginalizes minorities and disadvantaged groups in society (Laborde 2002; Markell 2000). A strong example of this is the dissatisfaction of East Germans, for whom the post-unification constitution was imposed without their participation in its formation, an issue that Habermas himself warned against during the unification. This implies that there might be no consensus on the constitution itself; however, theoretically, this should not challenge Habermas’ concept, as he views consensus as a regulative ideal. Nonetheless, in a contradictory way to his idea regarding regulatory role of consensus, Habermas assumes agreement on constitution as a principle, considering it a basis for minimal collective identity, without taking into account the lack of role of marginalized and minority groups in its formation. Moreover, while constitutional patriotism may have suited a divided Germany (Laborde 2002) – though this is debatable – doubts persist about its applicability as a framework for other countries (Müller 2008). Finally, constitutional patriotism is arguably not fully able to account for the variety of ways in which affective elements manifest in political identities and actions, as evident in recent literature on affective politics.

Importantly, one must also consider the function Habermas attributes to constitutional patriotism and evaluate to what extent the concept serves its intended purpose. Habermas (2001) contends that constitutional patriotism has the potential to cultivate civic solidarity, in contrast to the cosmopolitan solidarity grounded in ethical understanding and centered around human rights, as promoted by international institutions like Amnesty International and the United Nations, which is insufficient to counter the dominant globalized economic and technological forces that undermine political and national institutions. Constitutional patriotism, on the other hand, seeks to ground solidarity in shared democratic values and constitutional norms, providing a more robust political foundation for civic engagement and national cohesion. Habermas even extends the applicability of constitutional patriotism to European Union, aiming to counter the global economy at a postnational public sphere with a normatively justifiable basis for social and rational identity and civic solidarity. However, as reviewed, its abstract and universalistic nature, questionable relevance and application outside of the German context, and the risk of marginalizing minorities and disadvantaged groups/countries in larger communities of nations cast doubt on its applicability. Therefore, its capacity to truly serve its intended purpose of forming a cohesive civic identity is debatable. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that Habermas shifted the basis of social and rational identity from the ethical domain to the political realm. In the following discussion, we will explore how to salvage Habermas’ account of rational identity in light of this political turn.

Overcoming the shortcomings of Habermas deliberative account of rational identity

In addressing historical evolution of social identities in modernity, perhaps one might need to employ critical and effective histories, revealing both continuities and discontinuities in identities across different historical phases, examining the contested nature of various ways of self and social understanding, analyzing whether each way of social understanding lives up to its own normative ideals, and exploring what possibilities have opened up for societies to define and redefine themselves (e.g., see Dean 2002). What we deal with in this section is the potentiality of Habermas account of identity in deliberation and communicative actions in fostering rational social identities and how to overcome its current shortcomings. We propose an integrative approach to establish a normatively defensible form of social identity within a broader democratic society. Our evaluation focuses on the overall role of deliberation in communicative rationality, which has the potential for creating social identity. We focus on three key areas for improvement: (a) Not only emphasizing plurality and multiple public spaces (Benhabib 2020; Fraser 1994; Tully 1995) but also establishing a strong institutional basis for deliberation to extend beyond the intra-group sphere and become more pluralistic, (b) combining Habermas’ procedural account of identity with a robust account of the political (Mouffe 2013) and (c) integrating deliberation into the work and system sphere, or democratization of work sphere (Frega et al. 2019), to provide a solid foundation for a radically deliberative and participatory democratic society.

First, establishing a strong institutional basis for deliberative democracy is crucial to ensure that deliberation extends beyond its current intra-group spheres and becomes truly pluralistic. From a more fundamental perspective, as democratic institutionalism posits, one can speak of the mutual dependence between deliberation and institutions: institutions are necessary to enable deliberation, while simultaneously deliberation is essential for institutions to maintain their functionality and relevance over time (Herzog 2023). From a more practical point of view, empirical data suggests that deliberation is more likely to occur within intra-group contexts in which pre-existing identities are crucial for their engagement (Does 2023). Therefore, without an institutional framework that brings individuals from different backgrounds together, deliberation remains limited to those who already share a common identity. Institutional support can facilitate cross-group interactions, promoting a more inclusive and comprehensive deliberative democracy where diverse voices are heard and considered. Example of an existing institutional basis for a deliberative democratic project is some mini-publics that extend beyond intra-group boundaries such as the Citizens’ Assembly model in Ireland, in which through a formal mechanism ordinary citizens involve in making important policy decisions, which made a major role in constitutional amendments or other important policy matters such as 2018 referendum on the legalization of abortion in Ireland (O’Flynn 2022). However, one limitation of existing lottocratic deliberation models such as Citizens’ Assembly in Ireland is the low participation rate in each policy deliberation, potentially with limited impact on collective identity at a societal level. Hence, other institutional adjustment is needed to promote deliberation among diverse groups, such as mini-publics across various institutions and democratic decision-making processes in the workplace, which we will discuss shortly.

Second, Habermas’ emphasis on the procedural nature of social identity renders his theory substantively thin. While he acknowledges that disagreement is integral to a deliberative democratic society, this disagreement does not appear to influence his conception of social identity. For him, social identity does not require differentiation from other groups. He asserts that group identity is not really dependent on ‘intersubjective recognition by another group; an I that identifies itself as we can be confirmed through another I that identifies with the same we. The reciprocal recognition of group members requires I-thou-we relations’ (1979, 108). According to this reasoning, the existence of an outgroup is not necessary for group formation; rather, interpersonal relations within the group suffice to create a sense of collective identity. This perspective may stem from his focus on disagreement occurring between individuals rather than between groups. However, in the political realm, disagreement has a collective dimension and often leads to ingroup and outgroup distinctions. These distinctions need not manifest as animosity, which Habermas rightly finds problematic, but rather as variations of agreement and disagreement that are inherent to political discourse.

Although multi-party systems can provide a solid foundation for a substantive account of the political identity, it should not be taken for granted. Recent political culture – partially driven by globalization and partially by shifting of party policies to the center (aka extreme center) – has shifted party systems toward a technical role primarily serving economic purposes. For example, major political parties in France have lifespans of less than 20 years, with traditional parties moved to the center and increasingly becoming irrelevant to the political ideals of the populace, with new parties may adopt exclusionary agendas tied to pre-existing national, ethnic and cultural identities. In a pluralistic society, political parties and institutions should serve as arenas for diverse and conflicting identities to engage in constructive dialogue and negotiation with potentiality for meaningful change. The rise of exclusionary ideals among new parties underscores the failure of traditional establishment politics to provide a substantive basis for identity.

Social identity encompasses one’s position within political discourse, and managing disagreement or reaching consensus should not merely be regulatory ideals; they should also provide substantive content to people’s identities alongside the procedural account. To account for both procedural and substantive aspects of individuals’ identity, we believe two levels of identity are necessary. First, on a general macro-political level, the Habermasian framework of constitutional patriotism can be redefined as a thin, inclusive framework that all groups can recognize and accept as common ground. Consensus on a general framework of the constitution is necessary to guarantee the equal participation of all members of society; hence, it should remain open to challenge when certain groups are marginalized or when modifications are needed to guarantee further provision of equal participation in social and political life. This minimal base only guarantees equal participation to allow the democratic processes to function effectively. Second, at the meso- and micro-level, where political parties and various groups strive to materialize their ideals and policies within the political community, there is a substantive account of the political in which members of polity across the political spectrum, from left to right, seek to persuade others that their model of governance is better than other groups (Mouffe 2013). In this regard, unlike Habermas, we acknowledge that the distinction between ingroup and outgroup is part of one’s identity – not in the Schmidtian sense of a friend-enemy dichotomy, but rather implicitly within the Habermasian framework of agreement and disagreement. Introducing a substantive account of identity strengthens the affective dimension such that one identifies with the members and ideals of their political party or group and engages in deliberation and defense of one’s political convictions and community.

Finally, work alongside the lifeworld should be considered essential for the development of social identity. Habermas distinction between lifeworld and system and restriction of rational social identity to lifeworld and communicative rationality limits the horizon of possibility of developing a rational identity across diverse domains. Technological design within the system shapes both the social and political structures of modern societies and the everyday lives of individuals, challenging Habermas’ distinction between system and lifeworld and highlighting the role of technology in shaping social and political identity (Feenberg 2012). That means, the technological and economic sphere already shapes individuals’ psychic life and identity and there are ways to integrate that sphere in the development of rational social identity. Integration of individuals into deliberative practices within workplace organizations influences their epistemic capacities, which are crucial for democratic participation (Herzog 2023). For instance, recent literature on workplace democracy extends the deliberative framework to include the work sphere (Frega et al. 2019), such that the workplace becomes a microcosm for engaging in deliberative practices and participating in decision-making and further internalize the values of democratic and deliberative participation in the social and political realm.

Our approach is integrative and more comprehensive compared to both Habermas and existing extensions of his account. There are several criticisms and extensions of Habermas’ communicative rationality highlighting issues of plurality and the diverse, multicultural nature of modern societies (e.g., Benhabib 2020; Tully 1995) – a concern that we also share – but they do not emphasize the importance of intergroup deliberation and rarely consider the workplace as a distinct sphere for deliberation with its own normative significance to bring people from diverse background together and potentially facilitate intergroup deliberations. Conversely, proponents of workplace democracy emphasize the role of work in normalizing deliberative and participative practices but often fail to contextualize this within a framework of rational social identity development, focusing instead on macro societal features and the general relation of democracy and economy.

For instance, Benhabib (2020) rightly criticizes Habermas and other normative political theories for being ‘gender blind’. These theories perpetuate the dominant distinction between public and private spheres, taking various aspects of the private domain – such as moral/religious beliefs, economic liberties and intimate matters related to the household, reproduction and care – at face value, hence ignoring ‘difference’ – specifically, the divergent experiences of different genders across all areas of life. This oversight leads to the exclusion of issues such as women’s unpaid labor in households from the public sphere and deliberation, which may have contributed to sustaining or even legitimizing women’s oppression in the private sphere. While this highlights the issue of multiplicity and difference and problematizes the distinction between public and private spheres, it does not extend to the analysis to problematize the distinction between system and lifeworld, nor does it place the issue of labor market and new forms of labor within the sphere of public deliberation.

There is an underestimation of the influence of work on identity formation in the writings of other social theorists such as Tully, Mouffe and Fraser. For example, Fraser (1994) critiques the concept of a singular public sphere, arguing that social inequality hinders equal participation and advantages dominant groups, leaving members of disadvantaged groups with ‘no arenas for deliberation among themselves about their needs, objectives, and strategies’ (p. 66). To address this issue, she proposes that institutional arrangements should accommodate contestation among different public spheres and acknowledge the multiplicity of cultural identities. At the same time, she asserts that there must be common ground for different publics to deliberate toward reaching an agreement. However, she considers this an empirical question rather than a conceptual one (p. 69). While all of these normative theories highlight the importance of multiplicity and diversity, and at times the importance of institutional framework to broaden the scope of deliberation across diverse identity claims as in Fraser and Mouffe’s accounts, they do not consider work sphere as an existing institution that can be tailored toward a more deliberative model. Although Fraser focuses on redistribution rather than recognition as a basis for addressing identity claims across different social groups in society in her other works, she still does not specifically examine work as a distinct basis for identity formation, aside from class identification among workers alongside other identity claims.

We believe it is crucial to place greater emphasis on the sphere of work as a basis for identity for several reasons. First, the workplace typically includes a diverse array of ethnicities, cultures and genders, which can help mitigate exclusion and encourage intergroup deliberation, making it less vulnerable to potentially normatively problematic groupings that could lead to exclusion. While Fraser argues that cultural and ethnic minorities forming counterpublics can enhance overall deliberation, creating publics primarily based on ethnicity or cultural background may inadvertently reinforce exclusionary trends within the dominant group, further marginalizing minorities. We do not dismiss the formation of publics based on the criteria Fraser suggests. Instead, we argue that such mini-public formations can be significantly enhanced within the sphere of work and subsequently integrated into work-based deliberation across diverse groups. However, one needs to beware that the existing labor market has structural problems and at time problematic divisions of labor, such as the higher proportion of migrants in precarious platform work. Second, work-based deliberation directly addresses the question of deliberation at the societal level of society and across diverse groups and publics. Hence, the existing labor market can be modified to be an institutional platform with wide outreach for deliberation. Interdependence within the economic sphere can be transformed into a shared understanding through deliberation and a basis for development of rational social identity.

The literature on workplace democracy emphasizes the importance of work as a site for practicing deliberation and democratic engagement but rarely connects it to the formation of rational identity for citizens. The central ideas in the democratization of workplace highlight the increasing meaning of work, greater equality, preparation for deliberative participation in broader society, and the strengthening of civic engagement and democracy (see Frega et al. 2019). However, similar to expansive theories of democracy, they consider it only in terms of the epistemic capacity that deliberative practices at workplace can foster and rarely consider how workplace democracy can form rational social identity. In general, the arguments by proponents of workplace democracy either point to meaning of work or the broader relationship between democracy and the economy. We believe that the influence of work is much more fundamental, work is a formative domain for identity and has dramatic consequences for political agency. When work is precarious, oppressive and primarily profit-driven, it undermines individuals’ basic understanding of themselves and others (e.g., Hjelle et al. 2024). Therefore, neglecting the work domain as a significant source of identity formation can limit deliberative democrats’ understanding of the citizens they expect to engage in deliberative practices.

Hence, in our modification of Habermasian approach to identity, social identity exhibits three distinct features. First, at a broad level, a thin and normatively justifiable framework of identity is necessary to engage in a political community and participatory action. We believe that the constitutional patriotism proposed by Habermas achieves this, although it should not be regarded as final. Second, rational social identity encompasses both procedural and substantive elements. Disagreement at the group level can provide a substantive account of identity. The contested nature of party systems and their inherent organization of disagreement play a constitutive role in identity formation (Mouffe 2013). Third, rational and political identity should encompass both lifeworld and work spheres. The spheres of system or work are equally vital for identity creation and political agency. Given the diversity of individuals in the workplace, identity formation based on work can serve as an antidote to the resurgence of ethnic nationalism and other forms of exclusionary identities.

Concluding thoughts on the possibility of rational social identity

Habermas’ framework of rational social identity is based on his theory of communicative action, highlighting the role of rational communicative action in identity formation. However, an analysis of how he conceptualizes the constitutive role of deliberation in his procedural approach to identity raises several critical questions. We argue that his stage-based linear approach to societal evolution of social identity is empirically contested and normatively biased and his procedural account is insufficient and requires a substantive account of the political beyond constitutional patriotism to accommodate organized disagreement within society for identity formation. Political identities are inherently contested and dynamic, and reducing them to purely rational and procedural terms neglects the substantive and affective dimensions of identity that fuel democratic engagement. Finally, we believe that Habermas does not fully account for full potentiality of his deliberative model for identity creation, as he restricts it to the lifeworld and exempts the system or work sphere from his communicative rationality model and its potential contribution to identity formation, a shortcoming that can be addressed by advocating workplace democracy or by accounting for system role in shaping identity and political life. In short, Habermas’ account of rational social identity through communicative action needs to incorporate affective dimensions, the contested nature of politics and empirical evidence, along with extending deliberative principles to the work sphere, to create a more robust account of social identity suitable for contemporary societies.