The fluidity of political legitimacy: On Michelman’s C onstitutional E ssentials

Abstract

What can constitutional law contribute to the justification of political power? Quite a lot, Frank Michelman argues in Constitutional Essentials. It can establish a publicly known framework for addressing the deep disagreements that are inevitable in any free society. Michelman’s analysis has powerful attractions, but he overclaims the clarity with which rights can be defended within the Rawlsian framework he contemplates. The interests that courts must defend will vary from one society to another, depending on what the locals happen to value. They cannot therefore be derived abstractly from the moral powers. In John Rawls’s four-stage sequence, writers of constitutions, legislatures, and courts necessarily consider contestable ideas of the good. Deep disagreement even about political fundamentals is a permanent condition of political life in a free society. Social unity is possible, but it is a more unstable unity than Rawls and Michelman imagine.

Keywords

Frank Michelman John Rawls liberalism political philosophy religious freedom

Get full access to this article

View all access options for this article.

References

Balkin

Jack M.

2011. Constitutional Redemption: Political Faith in an Unjust World. Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press.

Fallon

Richard H.

Jr.

2019. The Nature of Constitutional Rights: The Invention and Logic of Strict Judicial Scrutiny. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Freeman

Samuel

. 2001. “Illiberal Libertarians: Why Libertarianism is Not a Liberal View.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 30, no. 2: 105–151.

Freeman

Samuel

. 2006. “Frontiers of Justice: The Capabilities Approach vs. Contractarianism.” Texas Law Review 85, no. 2: 385–430.

Freeman

Samuel

. 2007. Rawls. London: Routledge.

Gowder

Paul

. 2016. The Rule of Law in the Real World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kaplan

Margo

. 2014. “Sex-Positive Law.” New York University Law Review 89. no. 1: 89–164.

Koppelman

Andrew

. 2004. “The Fluidity of Neutrality.” Review of Politics 66. no. 4: 633–648.

Koppelman

Andrew

. 2009. “The Limits of Constructivism: Can Rawls Condemn Female Genital Mutilation?” Review of Politics 71, no. 3: 459–482.

10.

Koppelman

Andrew

. 2012a. “Originalism, Abortion and the Thirteenth Amendment.” Columbia Law Review 112. no. 7: 1917–1945.

11.

Koppelman

Andrew

. 2012b. “Respect and Contempt in Constitutional Law, or, Is Jack Balkin Heartbreaking?” Maryland Law Review 71, no. 4: 1126–1143.

12.

Koppelman

Andrew

. 2013a. Defending American Religious Neutrality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

13.

Koppelman

Andrew

. 2013b. The Tough Luck Constitution and the Assault on Health Care Reform. New York: Oxford University Press.

14.

Koppelman

Andrew

. 2017. “Why Rawls Can’t Support Liberal Neutrality: The Case of Special Treatment for Religion.” Review of Politics 79, no. 2: 287–288.

15.

Koppelman

Andrew

. 2018. “How Could Religious Liberty Be a Human Right?” International Journal of Constitutional Law 16, no. 3: 985–1005.

16.

Koppelman

Andrew

. 2022a. Burning Down the House: How Libertarian Philosophy Was Corrupted by Delusion and Greed. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

17.

Koppelman

Andrew

. 2022b. “Rawls and the Market Economy.” National Affairs 51: 130–149.

18.

Michelman

Frank I.

2003. “Ida’s Way: Constructing the Respect-Worthy Governmental System.” Fordham Law Review 72, no. 2: 345–365.

19.

Michelman

Frank I.

2015. “The Priority of Liberty: Rawls and ‘Tiers of Scrutiny.” In Rawls’s Political Liberalism, edited by Thom

Brooks

Nussbaum

Martha C.

, 175–202. New York: Columbia University Press.

20.

Michelman

Frank I.

2022. Constitutional Essentials: On the Constitutional Theory of Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.

21.

Rawls

John

. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

22.

Rawls

John

. 1999. A Theory of Justice. Revised ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

23.

Rawls

John

. 1996. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.

24.

Rawls

John

. 2001. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

25.

Scheppele

Kim Lane

. 2003. “Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism: The Case for Studying Cross-Constitutional Influence Through Negative Models.” International Journal of Constitutional Law 1, no.2: 296–324.

26.

Singer

Joseph William

. 1984. “The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory.” Yale Law Journal 94, no. 1: 1–70.

27.

Sinnott

Gillian

. 2020 “Constitutional Law and the Limits of Rawlsian Liberty.” Legal Theory 26, no. 2: 124–155.

28.

Waldron

Jeremy

. 1988. The Right to Private Property. New York: Oxford University Press.

29.

Winter

Steven

(2021) Who’ or ‘What’ Is the Rule of Law? Philosophy & Social Criticism 48(5): 655–673.