Abstract
I begin my address by identifying three vertical directions of reductionism (upward, horizontal, and downward) with ontological (descriptive) and epistemological (explanatory) forms. Following a brief discussion of horizontal reductionism, I deal with upward reductionism in terms of postmodernist thought and its influence on social scientists. In my discussion of downward reductionism, I reject ontological (descriptive) reductionism while embracing a qualified version of epistemological (explanatory) reductionism. While admitting psychological and biological variables to explanation of social phenomena, this qualified version of explanatory reductionism maintains that individual-level variables cannot explain social phenomena without residue because such phenomena have emergent properties. I support my argument by discussing the perceived threat of neuroscience by psychologists and the lesson it holds for sociology and social psychology with respect to employing individual-level explanatory variables. Following a discussion of affect control theory and cultural sociology as examples of the qualified version of explanatory reductionism advanced in this address, I present a model of an integrative social psychology, locating different kinds of reductionism and social psychological theories in this model.
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