This article explores the mechanisms used by the creators of Russian political talk shows to turn public discussion into a propaganda display. Analysis of three popular shows demonstrates that informational selectiveness combined with an illusion of equal representation among guests with opposing views are the main mechanisms in the process of pre-production. The roles chosen by talk show hosts demonstrate the various communicative techniques used to achieve propaganda objectives, while the major propagandistic tool is discrediting opponents of the Russian authorities. The reactions of the audience are framed to create a fictitious background of ‘nationwide support’ for the propaganda discourse.
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