Addressing Councillor-Perpetrated Sexual Violence in Local Governments: A Case Study of Ontario,Canada

Abstract

Reports of councillors committing sexual violence are rampant worldwide. In this paper, we examine municipal codes of conduct that address sexual violence when perpetrated by an elected official in Ontario, Canada. Ontario requires all councils to adopt codes of conduct; it is therefore a global leader at responding to this problem. Using a mixed-methods approach, we collect and analyze all province-wide municipal codes and engage in an in-depth analysis of how the codes have been interpreted in three municipalities. The paper contributes to research on gendered political violence, revealing the need for standalone rules to address councillor-perpetrated sexual violence.

Introduction

In 2020, multiple women in Ottawa, Canada came forward and reported to the media that an elected local councillor had committed sexual violence against them. Allegations, which were later substantiated by independent investigations, included that the councillor had repeatedly asked them deeply personal questions about their sex life during job interviews, created a highly sexualized work atmosphere by stating his preference for women to go “bra-less” in the office, and frequently shared sexually explicit stories with them at work. When asked why they decided to speak publicly about their experiences, survivors described their frustration with existing municipal laws that do not allow for a councillor to be fired for engaging in non-criminal sexual misconduct. They also expressed their desire to ensure no other woman has to endure the same traumatic experience in the future (Chianello 2020a [July 13]). ¹

These examples of sexual violence in politics are not unique in Canada nor, indeed, most parts of the world. In a recent study, the Council of European Municipalities and Regions found that violence against women is becoming more commonplace in local politics and is driven by increasing political polarization, misogyny, and discrimination worldwide (Coessens 2024; Zamfir 2024). It is the purpose of this paper to advance scholarly understandings of how local governments can better address sexual violence when it is perpetrated by an elected official. In order to promote and uphold good governance practices, we argue that local governments need separate, standalone ethics rules to prevent and address violence when it is committed by local councillors.

Prior research on gendered political violence has examined its scope and the impacts on women politicians, as well as its democratic consequences on gender representation and policy effectiveness (Håkansson 2024; Krook 2020; Raney and Collier 2024). Looking at Danish municipalities, Kosiara-Pedersen (2023) found that sexual violence has impeded women’s descriptive and substantive political representation. Despite its prevalence in local politics, however, most scholarship on this topic has tended to focus on the national level of office (see Collier and Raney 2018; Krook 2020; Raney and Collier 2024).

Our paper seeks to fill this knowledge gap by focusing on the ethics rules that address sexual violence when it is perpetrated by elected local politicians. We also consider sexual violence that is targeted at actors other than politicians, including municipal and political staff as well as members of the public. To date, there has been insufficient attention paid to the representative and reputational costs to local governments of councillor-perpetrated sexual violence that is committed against this broader set of actors. Our central research question is therefore: how do municipal rules address sexual violence when it is perpetrated by an elected local official? We answer this question using a mixed-methods approach: first, we searched for the presence or absence of rules concerning sexual misconduct in municipal codes of conduct in Ontario, Canada. Through this process we incorporated key details of each municipality’s integrity regime into a database. We then noted whether there were sexual misconduct violations investigated by the Integrity Commissioner and, if so, we recorded details about those investigations and their subsequent outcomes. We then chose three of the most illustrative cases from our database in order to offer them as in-depth case studies of councillor-perpetrated sexual violence in Ontario. Our analysis reveals significant gaps and shortcomings in the province’s approach to address this problem inside local governments.

The Ontario context is relevant for scholars and practitioners interested in addressing sexual violence in municipal councils. Over the past decade, Ontario’s provincial government has made several advancements in its municipal integrity regime, evolving from a permissive system where municipalities could voluntarily adopt a code of conduct and hire an independent integrity commissioner (IC), to one where having an IC and code is now mandatory across the province. While municipal ethics rules in Ontario remain mostly focused on financial crimes and corruption, debate about how to address sexual violence when it is perpetrated by an elected official is ongoing, making the province a fruitful comparator for other jurisdictions. We describe the setting and context further below, but, in short, Ontario provides an excellent example of some of the more advanced integrity regime components that other jurisdictions might aspire to implement. Despite these advancements, however, we find that Ontario’s approach to dealing with councillor-perpetrated sexual violence has many shortcomings. Compared to typical conflict-of-interest (COI) rules, those rules that purport to address sexual violence are far less prescriptive, leaving considerable interpretative leeway for each of Ontario’s 444 municipal councils.

Our paper makes a substantive contribution to the growing literature on gendered political violence by being the first study to focus on the rules that address councillor-perpetrated violence in local government contexts. Ontario’s approach highlights the hazards of not recognizing the inherently gendered nature of sexual violence, and how using COI rules as a template is an insufficient way to combat this problem. Stand-alone provisions in codes of conduct are needed to address councillor-perpetrated sexual violence in local governments. These findings have global significance. As the public has become more aware of sexual misconduct since the #MeToo movement that emerged in 2017, reports of sexual violence in various industries and workplaces have become more commonplace. Consequently, municipalities around the world are under increasing pressure to develop robust rules that tackle councillor-perpetrated sexual violence. In responding to this pressure, we argue that all municipalities ought to develop and enact codes of conduct that are transparent, provide for independent investigation processes, and offer enforceable, proportional penalties for councillors who engage in sexual violence. These requirements would help bolster the legitimacy and credibility of local governance structures and improve the representation and voice of women political actors (e.g., politicians, municipal/political staff, and members of the public) in municipal governments.

Theoretical Framework

Researchers have identified gendered political violence as a threat to democracies globally (Bardall, Piscopo, and Bjarnegård 2020; Bjarnegård and Zetterberg 2023; Krook 2020). When violence is directed at political actors because they are women, the goal is to punish them for violating masculinized political norms and, ultimately, to push them out of these male-dominated spaces (Krook and Restrepo Sanín 2020). Gender-based violence encompasses a spectrum of behaviors that target a person due to their gender, gender identity, or gender expression, including acts of sex discrimination, sexual harassment, gendered bullying, stalking, sexual assault, and femicide (Raney and Collier 2024). Drawing on this research, we focus on one type of gender-based violence in local politics—sexual violence—which is comprised of a variety of unwanted behaviors that target a person’s sexuality and sexual characteristics, including rape, sexual assault, rape insults and threats, and sexual harassment (Krook 2020, 154). Although sexual violence is not always perpetrated by men against women, it is more commonly experienced by women and is therefore a form of gender-based violence rooted in gender inequities and injustices (Canada Women’s Foundation 2024).

In the municipal realm, survey research indicates that violence is a significant problem in municipal politics, and that it is gendered (Herrick and Franklin 2019; Håkansson 2021; Thomas et al. 2019). Research on the United States and Sweden reveals that women local politicians face more physical and psychological violence compared to men, particularly when they are highly visible in the media (Håkansson 2021, 2024; Herrick and Franklin 2019; Thomas et al. 2019). Looking at U.S. states, Herrick, Thomas, and Bartholomy (2022) similarly find that women who served in senates with higher, or growing, percentages of women were more likely to report colleague aggression compared to other women.

Previous research has additionally documented the detrimental impact of gender-based violence on women’s political representation (Krook 2020). In Australian local politics, for example, gender-based online and offline incivility have contributed to women politicians leaving local politics (Carson et al. 2023). In order to enhance their representative capacities, municipal governments must do more to tackle all forms of gender-based violence in politics. Globally, women’s representation is at just 36% of seats in municipal councils; in Ontario, the percentage is just 31% (United Nations Women 2022; Association of Municipalities of Ontario 2022). As male-dominated workplaces, sexual violence against women councillors is likely to stymy efforts to make elected local councils more representative.

Building on this scholarship, we suggest that councillor-perpetrated sexual violence impedes gender representation in local governments in other ways, particularly when it is committed against municipal/political staffers, or members of the public. When confronted by a sexually violent elected official, rather than file a formal complaint some staffers may opt to leave their respective local government job in search of other work, shrinking the talent pool of municipal employees and making it potentially less diverse. Citizens who encounter violent or harassing politicians may similarly disengage from local government processes, limiting the types of policy input municipal governments receive. This study therefore seeks to generate new understandings of the impacts of councillor-perpetrated sexual violence on representative diversity in local governments beyond elected office, including in the public service and citizen engagement spaces where additional -- and less considered -- representational costs to local governments are incurred.

Our paper also contributes to research on good governance in local governments (Jepson 2018; Taylor 2019) and shows how councillor-perpetrated sexual violence reduces public trust in municipal institutions and in politicians who engage in this behavior. Particularly since 2017 when the visibility of workplace sexual misconduct increased due to the #MeToo movement, members of the public have become more aware and supportive of efforts to curb this problem in the political process. Canadian public opinion research, for example, demonstrates that citizens strongly support sanctioning local councillors who engage in sexual misconduct. In their study, Raney, McGregor, and Anderson (2024) find that citizens want councillors who have been found through an independent investigation to have committed sexual harassment to be held accountable for their actions, up to and including being potentially removed from office for the most egregious acts of sexual violence. Globally, recent incidents of politicians engaging in sexual misconduct have sparked calls for strong codes of conduct that can address these issues and help improve public confidence in local governments (Williams, Gottlieb, and Lee 2022).

In some cases, however, these acts persist despite the presence of anti-violence policies and point to limitations in how such policies are written and implemented. Initiated more than a decade ago after attacks against local council women, Bolivia has not yet resolved this issue despite having adopted the world’s first law prohibiting violence and political harassment (Yujra Quispe and Ari Condori 2023, 300). In the United Kingdom, where local councillors face mounting harassment and intimidation, codes of conduct are widespread, vary substantially, and many are inadequate at addressing these problems (Committee on Standards in Public Life 2019, 10). In Ottawa, Canada, a code of conduct has been in place since 2018, yet a 2023 audit found that many employees did not feel comfortable reporting workplace violence, citing their mistrust of management and fears of retaliation (Office of the Auditor General of Ottawa 2023). Raney and Collier’s (2021) comparative examination of anti-harassment rules in the U.S. Congress, British and Canadian Houses of Commons demonstrates that such rules are frequently undermined by embedded sexist cultures and strong partisanship. To our knowledge, there have been no studies that investigate how and whether municipal governments have sought to address this problem as a matter of good governance. This paper offers an initial foray to fill this void with an examination of municipal codes of conduct in Ontario, Canada.

Ontario’s Legislative Context and Ongoing Debates

Canada’s Constitution Act, 1867 assigns legislative power over “Municipal Institutions” to the individual provinces. Ontario is the province that has the largest number of municipalities (444), each of which is subject to the rules that have been set out in the Municipal Act, 2001 (the Act). ² The Act governs how municipalities operate, how council meetings will be conducted, fiscal and budgetary requirements, and ethical matters related to accountability and transparency (Spicer, Lyons, and Graham 2019). ³

Further to its size, Ontario also has a developed conflict-of-interest (COI) regime aimed at addressing both personal/professional conflicts and outright financial corruption. The Municipal Conflict of Interest Act (MCIA) was passed in 1983, requiring members of council to remove themselves from any discussion about a matter in which they could have a pecuniary interest (Sypnowich 1991). Ontario then passed amendments to the MCIA in 2017, broadly requiring councillors to prioritize integrity, independence and accountability in their decision-making, and reinforcing the importance of putting public duties over private pecuniary interests. Ontario’s size and robust history of advancing its COI and anti-corruption rules make it an instructive comparator for other local governments, globally.

Among the most progressive aspects of Ontario’s MCIA is that it requires each of the province’s municipal councils to appoint an Integrity Commissioner (“IC”). These ICs act under the authority prescribed to them by the MCIA, which includes handling COI complaints. They apply ethical conduct rules (to their respective municipal council and local boards) and provide advice and education about those rules. The MCIA also allows ICs to conduct investigations and, if a COI has been found, to apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to impose a disciplinary action, which could be a reprimand, suspension of pay for up to ninety days, and/or removal of a councillor from office and disqualification from running for municipal office again for up to 7 years (Sypnowich 1991).

While Ontario has a robust set of rules to address financial COIs, there is no similarly comprehensive framework for addressing sexual violence. This discrepancy is problematic for good municipal governance. As Bjarnegård et al. (2024) argue, even though financial and sexual corruption both entail an abuse of entrusted authority that undermines public trust, sexual misconduct is rarely recognized as a matter of corruption when compared to financial misconduct. To be clear, this reality is not because violence and harassment are non-existent or even recent problems in the political realm. The historical blindness of legislative ethics regimes to address sexual violence is instead attributed to the male-dominance of legislatures globally, wherein highly masculinized behaviors like aggression, displays of dominance, and even harassment have been largely normalized in legislative settings (Collier and Raney 2018). It was not until the #MeToo movement in 2017 when more survivors began to share their experiences publicly, both inside and outside of the political realm (Raney and Collier 2024).

More recent attention to the problem of sexual violence in politics has resulted in several observed policy gaps in Ontario’s municipal ethics regime. When hearing complaints about a potential code of conduct or sexual violence policy breach, an IC may elect to conduct an inquiry and investigate the matter, or they may choose to hire an external investigator, yet there are no requirements that either must have gender-based violence or trauma-informed training. ⁴ In instances where an IC finds a code of conduct violation, the sanctioning scheme is much less prescriptive than it is for financial violations. In these cases, the most significant sanctions that can be imposed on a councillor by an IC are a reprimand or the suspension of their remuneration for up to 90 days. A council can also, if it so chooses, reject the IC’s findings and recommendation and decide to not impose any penalty whatsoever. By comparison, and as explained above, an IC finding that a councillor has engaged in a financial COI could result in their removal from office for up to seven years, thus creating a lower ethical bar for councillors who have engaged in sexual misconduct where the maximum penalty that can be imposed is far less serious.

Ontario’s reluctance to regulate municipal accountability matters beyond financial misconduct has resulted in other policy gaps, most notably in the evolving laws on codes of conduct. At the time the Act was passed, for example, the legislation was silent on the matter of codes of conduct. In 2006, the Act was amended to authorize municipalities to establish codes of conduct for councillors, yet the discretion to determine whether and what would be adopted was left to individual councils. In 2017, the province finally required local councils to adopt a code, with a subsequent regulation being published to require codes to address four key issues: gifts and benefits, handling of confidential information, use of municipal property, and “respectful conduct, including conduct towards officers and employees” (Government of Ontario 2017). ⁵ While the latter provision was a step forward, the regulation was silent on what “respectful conduct” should entail, leaving it for each municipality to interpret the expression for themselves.

Many municipalities have now adopted their own anti-violence policies (some of which exist outside of their codes of conduct), but these are governed by either workplace health and safety or human rights legislation, not by municipal law. This situation has resulted in a patchwork of codes that purport to address violence in local governments with significant variations across the province. Recognizing the inconsistencies and gaps across the province, Ontario’s government tabled a legislative bill in May 2025 that includes a province-wide strategy to address sexual violence and harassment perpetrated by councillors. The bill proposes to allow municipal ICs to refer a matter to the provincial IC who could, if specified conditions are met, recommend a councillor’s removal from office. The conditions include that the member has committed a serious contravention that has “resulted in harm to the health, safety or well-being of any person” and that other pre-existing penalties would be inadequate (Legislative Assembly of Ontario 2025).

Methods

Our study includes a mixed-methods approach to evaluate municipal codes of conduct in the province of Ontario, Canada. First, we gathered data to collect and analyze the relevant codes in every municipality across the province, examining whether and how they address sexual violence. We then used the large-N data to guide our selection of a small number of case studies for in-depth qualitative examination (Rayment 2024, 108). Specifically, three municipal case studies were selected for in-depth analysis: Ottawa, Barrie, and Brampton. These cases were chosen because they included recent public allegations of sexual violence against sitting councillors and because the status of the survivor varied as being a municipal administrative worker, a political staffer, or a member of the public (rather than a fellow councillor). Our goal in selecting cases where the status of the survivor varies is to demonstrate the gaps and inconsistencies in existing provincial legislation that applies to cases when an elected official has engaged in sexual violence.

We then use a gendered lens to analyze each case study in order to illuminate the underlying gendered effects that are produced from the existing municipal ethics regime in Ontario. To do so, we draw on the feminist policy analysis work of Bacchi’s (2012) “What’s the problem represented to be?” (“WPR”) approach. This framework aims to identify how problems are represented in policies and then critically interrogates what remains, or is left unproblematic, in these representations (Bacchi 2012). A central objective of the WPR framework is therefore to “make politics visible,” or, in our case, to reveal how existing policy gaps advantage councillors accused of sexual violence, while disadvantaging those who are targeted by sexual violence. Since most (although not all) instances of sexual violence are perpetrated by men against women, the WPR framework is therefore useful in revealing the underlying gendered consequences of sexual violence ethical rules. As such, we use it here for the first time to evaluate how municipal codes of conduct were interpreted and applied in ways that reinforce male privilege in a municipal government context. This stage of the analysis relies on the collection and analysis of primary documents including Integrity Commissioner (IC) reports, council meeting minutes, and media reports, where we identify underlying gendered blind spots that need to be addressed to strengthen existing rules.

Municipal Rules and Case Studies

In our analysis of Ontario’s local government codes of conduct, we find that provincially-mandated legislative requirements have resulted in a patchwork of rules that purport to address sexual violence in municipal governments. Across the province, less than half of Ontario’s municipalities (151 of 444) have included language on sexual violence (e.g., sexual assault or harassment) in their codes of conduct. Of those municipalities, only 13 had an IC investigation into alleged violations of those sections of their code. Importantly, the relatively low number of formal sexual violence investigations should not be interpreted as constituting the entire universe of instances of sexual violence perpetrated by councillors in the province. As Krook (2020, 105) notes, for a variety of reasons (e.g., fear of retribution or concerns about being perceived as weak or incompetent), violence against women remains highly under-reported in the political realm as it is in most other contexts.

Our findings also reveal that 58 individuals or firms provided services to all the province’s 444 municipalities. Some of these ICs serve a single municipality; others serve over a dozen. The role of ICs—which are responsible for overseeing formal complaints related to sexual violence—is also dominated by men across the province, with just 34% (20 of 58) women holding the position. Since men hold 69% of elected municipal positions in Ontario, the male dominance of ICs across the province further reinforces the gendered power dynamics present in local governments. Given the significant variation in how individual councils have interpreted the provincial law regarding municipal codes of conduct, we next examine how these rules have been interpreted and applied in three recent councillor-perpetrated sexual violence cases.

Case: Ottawa, Ontario

Between September 2019 and August 2022, Ottawa’s IC received multiple complaints from municipal employees and members of the public alleging that the municipality’s longest serving councillor had perpetrated gender-based violence against them. Allegations included that during a job interview the councillor in question had asked them whether they would be willing to “go bra-less” in the office, whether they would consider stripping, and whether they had ever participated in “World Orgasm Day.” (Marleau 2020a [Jul], 1). One complainant stated that after she was hired and working as his employee, the councillor tried to convince her to have sex with men. Another political staffer reported that the councillor provided her with a sheer and revealing shirt and requested she change into it before offering to pay her to perform sexual acts on random men that he instructed her to approach at night clubs (Marleau 2020b [Nov]); Shepherd 2022, 3–4).

Three separate external investigations into these allegations were conducted over four years, with their results informing three IC inquiry reports. The external investigators were contracted because they had relevant legal expertise in harassment (law firm names were not publicly released). Relying on these investigations, the IC concluded that the councillor had on multiple occasions breached two sections of the municipality’s code of conduct: section four, which requires members of council to perform their duties with “integrity, accountability and transparency” at all times, and section seven, which states that all council members have a duty to “treat members of the public, one another and staff with respect and without abuse, bullying or intimidation, and to ensure that their work environment is free from discrimination and harassment.” (Marleau 2020b [Nov]). In the cases that involved employees, the IC also found that the councillor had breached Ottawa’s Council Staff policy. In all cases, the councillor denied all allegations against him.

Despite multiple findings of sexual violence however, the most severe punishment the councillor faced was a 90-day suspension of his pay, which council creatively imposed consecutively for each survivor who came forward. The council also requested that the councillor apologize for his conduct and resign from his seat, both of which he refused to do. Instead, he gave an impassioned speech during a council meeting when he cited a long list of what he perceived to be his major accomplishments over 30 years in public office. He also sought judicial review regarding the IC inquiry process, arguing it was biased against him. ⁶

As a result of the investigation and its outcome, some of the survivors left the municipality and now work in other sectors. Others have publicly expressed their disappointment, sorrow, fear and anger. Speaking to the media about the procedural delays and lack of justice she experienced, one survivor stated: “It’s upsetting to know that he can’t lose his job at all . . . I hope that city council apologizes to these women, myself included. I would expect an apology from all of them.” (Chianello 2020b [Nov 23]). Another survivor filed a lawsuit against the municipality for creating an unsafe work environment, while others organized public petitions and launched an awareness campaign calling for the province to change the Municipal Act, 2001 (The “Women of Ontario Say No” campaign). These actions highlight the detrimental psychological effects and financial toll placed on survivors, who have had to seek justice through other avenues, including the media and the judicial system.

Case: Barrie, Ontario

In 2019, a Barrie municipal employee reported her experiences of sexual violence perpetrated by an elected councillor. Because she was an employee and not a sitting councillor or member of the public, council did not formally engage the IC. Instead, it hired an external human resources (HR) firm to investigate the allegations and report its findings to council in a closed-door session. It is unclear if the HR firm had prior expertise related to gender-based violence. The confidential HR report concluded that the complainant’s allegations against an unnamed “respondent” were substantiated and that the councillor in question had engaged in conduct that was inappropriate and demeaning. It was additionally reported by the media that the councillor told the survivor he could “make or break [her] career” and that he became enraged when she rejected his sexual advances, making her feel re-traumatized (Arsalides 2022). Like the Ottawa councillor, the Barrie councillor refused to participate in the investigation.

After receiving the confidential HR report, council voted to take various measures, including requiring that the “unnamed” councillor: take anti-violence workplace training paid for by the municipality, be directed to interact with employees only through their manager, and, if requested to do so, write an apology letter to the complainant staff member. More serious penalties were not contemplated simply because the decision was made to not refer the complaint to the IC.

The survivor in Barrie was driven to take medical leave because of her experience. Then, when the councillor publicly denied all the allegations against him through his legal counsel, she went public and shared further details about how the councillor had harassed her. She also filed a civil lawsuit against him for $200,000 in damages, upon which Barrie council approved a motion to finalize a confidential settlement agreement using public funds. In 2024, the councillor (who is no longer in office after a failed 2022 mayoral bid) launched his own lawsuit against the municipality for damages and against an unnamed “John Doe” (who is either another councillor or staff member) for misfeasance in public office causing mental suffering.

The Barrie case reveals problems with transparency and public accountability regarding how sexual violence complaints are handled by the city. Most of the decisions taken by council in the above case, including the hiring of an HR firm, the concealment of the investigation’s findings, the weak sanctions imposed upon the councillor, and the settlement details were not publicly disclosed, preventing scrutiny of council’s actions. It is important to note here that the requirement for transparency differs in cases where sexual, as opposed to financial, misconduct is at issue. A typical COI case, for example, rarely involves a “victim” whose identity needs to be protected; whereas survivors of sexual violence often face shame and stigma when reporting their experiences and there is a stronger need for confidentiality to be assured in such cases. At the same time, research indicates that sexual violence survivors frequently express a desire for some transparency in how their complaint is addressed. This need arises from the fact that sexual violence frequently occurs behind closed doors, and some element of transparency would ensure that the abuse will no longer remain hidden, which can be an important part of the healing process for some survivors (Burnett 2022, 23).

Case: Brampton, Ontario

In 2019, a member of the public alleged that a Brampton elected councillor committed sexual violence against her on a business trip to Turkey. In a two minute and fifty-seven second audio recording provided to Brampton’s IC, the councillor can be heard using the word “no” seventy-four times in response to sexual advances made against her by the councillor in a hotel room (Sheikh 2020, 29). After confirming that the matter was not being investigated by the police, the IC proceeded to investigate the matter herself. It is unclear whether the IC had received prior training on issues relating to sexual violence, although it is clear that the councillor chose not to participate. The IC concluded that the councillor had violated four provisions in Brampton’s Respectful Workplace policy, related to harassment, discreditable conduct, failure to adhere to council policies/procedures, and reprisals and obstructions. In particular, rule 15 in Brampton’s “Workplace Policy” states of elected officials: “As leaders in the community, members are held to a higher standard of behavior and conduct, and accordingly their behavior should be exemplary.” (Sheikh 2020, Appendix 37). The councillor denied all allegations against him.

Similar to the Ottawa case, the maximum penalty imposed upon the councillor was a 90-day suspension of pay. Council also required the councillor to apologize, removed him from committees and banned him from municipal-related travel outside the province. He was further barred from Brampton’s municipal offices and permitted to communicate with the public using only his municipal email address (not by phone). Council also passed a motion resolving that it would provide its full support to the victim, along the lines of what is made available to municipal staff. Like the other councillors, the Brampton councillor refused to apologize for his actions and instead, filed an application for judicial review with the Ontario Superior Court, alleging that the IC did not properly commence the investigation. The councillor submitted that under s.223.4(5) of the Municipal Act, the actions taken against him were not remedial in nature, but rather, were punitive and therefore fell outside council’s disciplinary powers. In its decision (Dhillon v. The Corporation of the City of Brampton [2021]), the court found that the measures imposed upon the councillor were permissible, with one exception. The exception was that the councillor could not be restricted from communicating with members of the public other than via email. The court concluded that this provision interfered with the councillor’s ability to represent his constituents and discharge his duties. It further ordered the councillor to pay costs to the municipality and the IC in the amount of $20,000 each.

After the investigation concluded, along with five other members of Brampton’s eleven-member council, the councillor voted to amend Brampton’s Code of Conduct for Members of Council. The amendment allowed council to terminate the IC by a majority vote, rather than the pre-existing rule of a two-thirds majority. Council voted two days later to end the services of the IC who had conducted the investigation, with the councillor in question voting in favor of terminating her contract. The IC subsequently sued the municipality (and the individual councillors who voted to fire her) for 20 million dollars in damages, arguing that her termination was retaliatory. The Brampton survivor also brought a lawsuit against the councillor and the municipality, seeking 2 million dollars in damages. The case settled before the judge released a decision, but local media reported that the council used taxpayers’ money to settle the lawsuit and negotiated a non-disclosure agreement that bound the survivor and other parties from disclosing the details of the settlement.

In response to media and public pressure, the mayor subsequently brought a series of motions forward that would have released the survivor from the non-disclosure agreement and forced the councillor to pay the money back to the public purse. The motions did not pass because the councillor and his allies voted against them. As a result, the municipality incurred the costs of the lawsuit, and the details of the case will likely never be known. When the councillor eventually lost his seat in the fall 2022 election however, the newly elected council issued the ex-IC an apology and quickly re-hired her.

Discussion

Our analysis of councillor-perpetrated sexual violence in three municipal jurisdictions in Ontario, Canada offers new insights on the democratic costs of weak codes of conduct to address this problem. Existing research has examined the scope and impact of violence directed at women politicians, revealing that those with the most power and visibility (i.e., women mayors) are more likely to face violence and harassment compared to their male counterparts (Håkansson 2021; Rheault, Rayment, and Musulan 2019). We broaden this research agenda to examine the rules that purport to address councillor-perpetrated sexual violence, who by virtue of being elected have a fiduciary responsibility to uphold the integrity of public office and maintain public trust. Our paper additionally considers the consequences of sexual violence when it is directed at a wider range of targets than has previously been examined, including at municipal employees, political staffers, and members of the public. When councillors engage in sexual violence with impunity, it sends a signal to the survivors, other municipal employees, and the wider community that local governments are not inclusive or safe places to work.

Using Bacchi’s “What’s the Problem?” feminist approach to municipal codes of conduct for the first time, we seek to “make visible” how Ontario’s handling of councillor-perpetrated sexual violence advantages (mostly men) councillors, while disadvantaging (mostly women) survivors. Given its relatively advanced municipal ethics regime, Ontario is a useful test case to evaluate how its rules regarding sexual violence have developed. Our study demonstrates that despite a requirement to have codes of conduct in place, sexual violence remains a problem across the province’s municipal councils. These findings highlight how those with the least amount of institutional and political power (e.g., employees and citizens) continue to be negatively impacted by the actions of councillors who engage in sexual violence and the lack of proportional consequences they face for their actions. As a result, several women staffers were re-traumatized through their experiences of reporting sexual violence against a sitting councillor. In some cases, survivors were forced to leave their careers in local government altogether. These policy shortcomings exist because sexual violence has not been problematized as a unique and inherently gendered type of ethical misconduct that is distinct from COI’s.

We also expand on research that documents the relationship between COI laws and good governance (Alcantara, Leone, and Spicer. 2012; Stedman 2022) and argue that there is a need for similarly strong rules to deal with sexual violence in local governments. Compared to COI rules, policies that address sexual violence in local governments are varied across the province, with municipalities left on their own to interpret vague provincial requirements. These rules do not offer enough independence, transparency, or accountability, leaving the problem of sexual violence perpetrated by councillors left largely unproblematized in Ontario’s municipalities. Weak ethics rules that insufficiently address sexual violence, we argue, undermine public trust in, and the integrity of, local governments. Although outside the scope of this study, future research that analyzes violence perpetrated by other types of actors, such as members of the public, against municipal employees and politicians, is needed. Studies on how to address incidents of racism, homo- and transphobia in local governments are also required.

As mentioned earlier, the Ontario government has introduced a bill aimed at modernizing municipal sexual violence rules, and at the time of writing it is at first reading. The bill proposes to allow the Integrity Commissioner of Ontario to recommend to a council that a member’s seat be vacated, yet the bar for removal has been set extremely high by requiring approval by all members of council (other than the member in question). It remains to be seen whether the legislation will be passed as is, with amendments or at all. Ontario’s potentially changing legal context and ongoing debates underscore the importance of standalone rules that address sexual violence when it is perpetrated by an elected official and the need to treat it as a unique form of unethical conduct. They also demonstrate that even with such rules in place, accountability can be difficult to achieve.

Policy Recommendations

The case of Ontario, Canada reveals that weak rules that address councillor-perpetrated sexual violence risk giving rise to serious reputational, legal and financial costs to local councils. We also see costly independent investigations, reduced productivity, and higher turnover for employees who are targeted. To mitigate these issues, we offer a few recommendations for other municipal governments to consider.

Based on our findings, independence and transparency are essential to sufficiently address sexual violence in local politics. Councils should not have the authority to conduct secret investigations into allegations of sexual violence involving a fellow politician. Independent officers should be involved in every case where a council member is named as a respondent, irrespective of the status of the complainant. In local governments that have public disclosure provisions for COIs already in place, decision-makers should not apply the same transparency standards to cases involving violent and harassing councillors where survivors’ identities must remain confidential. At the same time, allowing for public disclosure of the investigation process, its outcome, and the sanctions (if any) imposed upon a sitting councillor is in the public’s interest, with the requisite provisions to protect the anonymity of survivors.

Those investigating also need to be independent and shielded from political interference. Rather than being hired on employment contracts, ICs should be employed according to non-renewable terms with a set number of years specified. This requirement would limit the ability of councils to remove them without just cause, thereby strengthening their independence. Clearer rules about who can investigate sexual violence claims are required, and those who serve in an investigative or adjudicative role should be required to have, and to maintain, relevant expertise and training on harassment and discrimination.

Local governments also need a strong sanctioning system with proportionate penalties that can be imposed on councillors who perpetrate sexual (and other forms) violence. In less serious cases, ICs should be permitted to impose a broader range of sanctions, including gender bias/sensitivity training or increasing the suspension of pay beyond 90 days (Arcis 2023, 32–34). In the most egregious cases, the removal of a councillor from office should be a viable option. The threshold for such a serious step should require a majority vote of council (not including the councillor in question). This bar is high enough that only the most egregious cases would result in this severe form of punishment, yet not so high that it would be almost impossible to meet. Rather than focus solely on punitive measures, municipal policies should have a strong preventative orientation, with ICs playing a lead educative role.

Male-dominated, highly masculinized cultures where sexism, sexual harassment, racism and homo- and transphobia are permissible also need to be addressed. To prevent these problems in municipal politics, broader diversity-sensitizing measures should be adopted by councils, including rules that regulate social media use and civility during meetings. These measures might help entice a broader slate of candidates to run for municipal politics, and ensure they remain in public office once elected. Municipalities should further include ICs in their broader efforts to make city halls more representative, which means striving for greater gender and racial diversity in appointments to these roles.

Conclusion

The municipal ethics rules in Ontario, Canada are quite advanced relative to other parts of the world. This is true in terms of its COI rules. Our study reveals the hazards of using COI rules as a template to address sexual violence that is committed by a councillor, and the need for decision-makers to apply a gendered lens in the development of such rules. In addition to failing survivors of sexual violence, there are broader democratic costs to weak sexual violence rules. These costs include, but are not limited to, reducing public trust in local government and imposing a representational cost to municipal staff and public service. Strong rules that address councillor-perpetrated sexual violence can help promote inclusive governance and policymaking processes inside municipal governments.