Assessing the effects of an Intelligence Performance Regime: Quebec's Municipal Management Indicators,1999–2010

Abstract

Quebec's Municipal Management Indicators embodies what Hood (2007) described as an intelligence regime. This research tries to determine if the design of the municipal intelligence performance regime in Quebec, Canada, delivered the expected results. To answer that question, publicly available official documents, minutes of meetings, and survey data are used. The story of Quebec's regime offers a counter-example to Pollitt and colleagues’ (2010) theory that once in place, performance regimes follow a logic of escalation. The municipal intelligence regime in Quebec never moved from formative to summative; from intelligence to targets and rankings. The experience in that Canadian province offers support to Hood's (2007) model about the shortcomings of intelligence regimes.

Points for practitioners

The case study of a performance regime details an effort with few demands on participants. It is argued that the documented shortcomings are the result of the strategic path initially taken by decision makers, not the result of their later decisions and adjustments. Shielded from public scrutiny and without sanctions from the provincial government, most municipal managers chose not to use the indicators, not to include them in budgets and annual reports, not to compare themselves to others, and not to set targets for themselves. In a mandated regime with bottom-up and voluntary approaches, most municipalities effectively opted out.