Abstract
Executive scholars suggest that unilateral action is used for two reasons: to circumvent a hostile legislature and in response to delegation from the legislature as a means of expediting action. Extant research on unilateral action focuses on one governmental setting, limiting our understanding of how chief executives with different degrees of formal power use unilateral action and about how legislatures of varying capacity respond. We examine the use of executive orders in a cross-sectional context (the U.S. states), thus providing a more comprehensive perspective of where unilateral action fits in relation to other executive powers and why it is used.
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