This article examines the relationship between state budgetary delays and party polarization. Although others have evaluated the influence of divided government on a state’s likelihood of passing a budget on time, the influence of party polarization has not been explored. Given the growing rate of party polarization in the American states, it is important to understand the implications that this trend has for the budgetary process. The first analysis in this article predicts if a budgetary delay will occur, and the second evaluates the factors that explain how long the stalemate continues when a delay occurs.
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