This study evaluates the effect of returnee directors on corporate tax avoidance by using data on publicly listed Chinese companies from 2000 to 2012. Returnee directors grow up in China and then study or work abroad before returning home to be listed firms’ board directors. We use the introduction of provincial policies toward attracting skilled individuals with foreign experience as an instrumental variable for Returnee directors, which is the fraction of returnee directors divided by the total number of directors within a firm. Using quantile regression, we find a positive relation between Returnee directors and corporate tax avoidance for low levels of tax avoidance but a negative relation for high levels of tax avoidance. The result is robust to a battery of tests. The relation between returnee directors and tax avoidance is stronger for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) than non-SOEs and stronger for returnees who hold MBA degrees, possess a background in accounting or auditing, or are independent directors than other returnees.
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