Negligence is often conceptualized as a failure of thought, yet social evaluations of negligence depend on how those failures occur. We present a unified framework predicting variation along three axes: whether the agent lacked diligence, whether the agent made a perceptual or mnemonic error, and whether the agent was factually or normatively ignorant with respect to their wrongdoing. Across four pre-registered experiments (N = 2,727), negligence type affected moral judgment. Process and diligence information differentially influenced blame, wrongness, and accidentality judgments. Using a judgment-updating paradigm, negligence information globally reduced perceived intentionality while selectively increasing blame for certain forms of negligence. Finally, we identified relevant priming effects: emphasizing ease of avoidance increased sanctions, whereas self-projection cues attenuated sanctions. Our results integrate across different lines of research on negligence and specify what factors are associated with different evaluations. We also identify policy-relevant considerations for jury instructions and sentencing for negligence. Participants were recruited through Academic Prolific and were restricted to being located in the United States. Thus, our results are limited in terms of drawing exclusively from people in the United States with Internet access. This presents an important constraint on generalizability. We measured attitudes and judgments through self-report across all studies.
AlexanderL. (2017). Ignorance as a legal excuse. In PeelsR. (Ed.), Perspectives on ignorance from moral and social philosophy (pp. 205–216). Routledge.
2.
AlexanderL.FerzanK. K. (2009). Crime and culpability: A theory of criminal law. Cambridge University Press.
3.
AlickeM. D. (2000). Culpable control and the psychology of blame. Psychological Bulletin, 126(4), 556–574.
4.
AlickeM. D.BuckinghamJ.ZellE.DavisT. (2008). Culpable control and counterfactual reasoning in the psychology of blame. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94(6), 864–881.
5.
AmayaS. (2023). Negligence: Its moral significance. In VargasM.DorisJ. M. (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of moral psychology (pp. 660–682). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198871712.013.33
6.
BaronM. (2017). Justification, excuse, and the exculpatory power of ignorance. In PeelsR. (Ed.), Perspectives on ignorance from moral and social philosophy (pp. 53–76). Routledge.
7.
Ben-ShaharO.PoratA. (2016). Personalizing negligence law. New York University Law Review, 91, 627–707.
8.
BrownT. R. (2023). Minding accidents. University of Colorado Law Review, 94(1), 89–148.
9.
CooterR.PoratA. (2014). Lapses of attention in medical malpractice and road accidents. Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 15(2), 327–358.
10.
CusimanoC.GoodwinG. P. (2019). Lay beliefs about the controllability of everyday mental states. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 148(10), 1701.
11.
De BrigardF.HenneP.StanleyM. L. (2021). Perceived similarity of imagined possible worlds affects judgments of counterfactual plausibility. Cognition, 209, Article 104574.
12.
FlickC.NuñezN.LaurentS. M. (2024). If negligence is intentionality’s cousin, recklessness is it’s sibling: Differentiating negligence and recklessness from accidents and intentional harm. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 110, Article 104529.
13.
Florida Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Cases. (2018, February1). Florida standard jury instructions in civil cases: § 401.4 Negligence (rev. ed.). Florida Supreme Court.
14.
GillesS. G. (2001). On determining negligence: Hand formula balancing, the reasonable person standard, and the jury. Vanderbilt Law Review, 54, Article 813.
15.
GradyM. F. (1993). Res Ipsa Loquitor and Compliance Error. U. Pa. l. Rev., 142, 887.
16.
GrahamJ.HaidtJ.KolevaS.MotylM.IyerR.WojcikS. P.DittoP. H. (2013). Moral foundations theory: The pragmatic validity of moral pluralism. In Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 47, pp. 55–130). Academic Press.
17.
GreenL. (1967). The litigation process in tort law. Washington and Lee Law Review, 173, 158–175.
18.
GreenbergS. (2024). Awareness and the recklessness/negligence distinction. Criminal Law and Philosophy, 18(2), 351–367.
19.
HarmanE. (2017). When is failure to realize something exculpatory? In RobichaudP.WielandJ. (Eds.), Responsibility: The epistemic condition (pp. 117–126). Oxford University Press.
20.
HartfordL. (2019). Moral and factual ignorance: A quality of will parity. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 22, 1087–1102.
21.
Hawaiʻi State Judiciary. (2016, March7). Hawaiʻi civil jury instructions: No. 6.1 Negligence defined; No. 6.2 Foreseeability. State of Hawaiʻi Judiciary.
22.
HusakD. (2021). Ignorance of wrongdoing and mens rea. Arizona State Law Journal, 53, Article 523.
23.
HutchinsonA. C. (2023). The next revolution? Negligence law for the 21st century. Dalhousie Law Journal, 46, Article 575.
24.
ImaiK.KeeleL.TingleyD. (2010). A general approach to causal mediation analysis. Psychological Methods, 15(4), 309–334. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0020761
25.
JaegerC. B. (2021). The empirical reasonable person. Alabama Law Review, 72, Article 887.
26.
JaegerC. B. (2025). The hand formula’s unequal inputs. Yale Law Journal, 135, 461–537.
27.
Judicial Council of California. (2025). CACI No. 401: Basic standard of care. In Judicial Council of California civil jury instructions (2025 ed.). Judicial Council of California.
28.
KaminK. A.RachlinskiJ. J. (1995). Ex post ≠ ex ante: Determining liability in hindsight. Law and Human Behavior, 19(1), 89–104.
29.
KarlovacM.DarleyJ. M. (1988). Attribution of responsibility for accidents: A negligence law analogy. Social Cognition, 6(4): 287–318.
30.
KneerM.MacheryE. (2019). No luck for moral luck. Cognition, 182, 331–348.
31.
KneerM.SkoczeńI. (2023). Outcome effects, moral luck and the hindsight bias. Cognition, 232, Article 105258.
32.
KneerM. (2022). Reasonableness on the Clapham Omnibus: Outcome-sensitive folk concept of reasonable. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 35(4), e2285.
33.
KovacevicK. M.BonalumiF.HeintzC. (2024). The importance of epistemic intentions in ascription of responsibility. Scientific Reports, 14(1), Article 1183.
34.
LagnadoD. A.GerstenbergT.ZultanR. I. (2013). Causal responsibility and counterfactuals. Cognitive Science, 37(6), 1036–1073.
35.
LaurentS. M.NuñezN. L.SchweitzerK. A. (2016). Unintended, but still blameworthy: The roles of awareness, desire, and anger in negligence, restitution, and punishment. Cognition and Emotion, 30(7), 1271–1288.
36.
MalleB. F.GuglielmoS.MonroeA. E. (2014). A theory of blame. Psychological Inquiry, 25(2), 147–186.
37.
MargoniF.BrownT. R. (2023). Jurors use mental state information to assess breach in negligence cases. Cognition, 236, Article 105442.
38.
MargoniF.SurianL. (2022). Judging accidental harm: Due care and foreseeability of side effects. Current Psychology, 41(12), 8774–8783.
39.
MasonE. (2015). Moral ignorance and blameworthiness. Philosophical Studies, 172(11), 3037–3057.
40.
MillerA. D.PerryR. (2012). The reasonable person. New York University Law Review, 87, 323–392.
41.
MurrayS. (2017). Responsibility and vigilance. Philosophical Studies, 174(2), 507–527.
42.
MurrayS. (2024). The nature and norms of vigilance. American Philosophical Quarterly, 61(3), 265–278.
43.
MurrayS.KrasichK.IrvingZ.NadelhofferT.De BrigardF. (2023). Mental control and attributions of blame for negligent wrongdoing. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 152(1), 120–138.
44.
MurrayS.VargasM. (2020). Vigilance and control. Philosophical Studies, 177(3), 825–843.
45.
NadlerJ. (2012). Blaming as a social process: The influence of character and moral emotion on blame. Law & Contemporary Problems, 75(2), 1–31.
46.
New York Pattern Jury Instructions—Civil. (n.d.). PJI 2:91 Liability for condition or use of property (open and obvious).
47.
NobesG.MartinJ. W. (2022). They should have known better: The roles of negligence and outcome in moral judgements of accidental actions. British Journal of Psychology, 113(2), 370–395.
48.
NobesG.PanagiotakiG.MartinJ. W. (2023). Moral luck and the roles of outcome and negligence in moral judgments. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 106, Article 104456.
49.
NobesG.PanagiotakiG.PawsonC. (2009). The influence of negligence, intention, and outcome on children’s moral judgments. Journal of experimental child psychology, 104(4), 382–397.
50.
NuñezN.LaurentS.GrayJ. M. (2014). Is negligence a first cousin to intentionality? Lay conceptions of negligence and its relationship to intentionality. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 28(1), 55–65.
51.
ParkinsonM.ByrneR. M. J. (2017). Judgments of moral responsibility and wrongness for intentional and accidental harm and purity violations. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 71(3), 779–789.
52.
RobbennoltJ. K. (2010). Apologies and reasonableness: Some implications of psychology for torts. DePaul Law Review, 59, Article 489.
53.
RosenG. (2003). Culpability and ignorance. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 103(1), 61–84.
54.
RosenG. (2021). The problem of pure negligence. In Rodriguez-Blanco,V.PavlakosG. (Eds.), Agency, negligence and responsibility (pp. 15–36). Cambridge University Press.
55.
SarinA.CushmanF. (2024). One thought too few: An adaptive rationale for punishing negligence. Psychological Review, 131(3), 812–824.
56.
ShultzT. R.WrightK. (1985). Concepts of negligence and intention in the assignment of moral responsibility. Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science / Revue canadienne des sciences du comportement, 17(2), 97–108.
57.
SimonsK. W. (1999). Negligence. Social Philosophy and Policy, 16(2), 52–93.
SteinA. (2017). The domain of torts. Columbia Law Review, 535–611.
60.
TobiaK.HannikainenI. R.KamperD.AlmeidaG.BystranowskiP.StrohmaierN.DranseikaV.KneerM.AguiarF.DolininaK.JanikB.LauraitytėE.LiefgreenA.PróchnickiM.RosasA.ShuklaV. K.StruchinerN. (2025). The nature of reasonableness. Stanford Journal of International Law, 61, 111–155.
61.
UhlmannE. L.PizarroD. A.DiermeierD. (2015). A person-centered approach to moral judgment. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 10(1), 72–81.
