Restricted accessResearch articleFirst published online 2021-12
The Blame Intensity Inventory : Assessing the Propensity to Blame Harshly and Its Unique Capacity to Predict Malicious Satisfaction From Offender Victimization
Blame permeates our social lives. When done properly, blame can facilitate the upholding of moral norms. When done with excessive intensity or harshness, however, blame can have significant negative impacts. Here, we develop and validate a scale—the Blame Intensity Inventory—to measure individual differences in the propensity for intense blame responses. First, we present evidence for its convergent and divergent validity by examining relations with existing scales. In addition, in two studies, we show that the Blame Intensity Inventory—rooted in an affective conception of blame—predicts hostile responses to offenders better than do measures focused on blame-related cognitive appraisals (e.g., free will, intentionality). Finally, in three studies, we show that Blame Intensity uniquely predicts malicious satisfaction, or gratification upon learning that an offender has suffered gratuitous harm. Results are discussed in terms of important research questions that could be addressed using the Blame Intensity Inventory.
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