Abstract
A long-standing debate in psychology concerns whether doing something good or bad leads to more of the same or the opposite. Conway and Peetz proposed that conceptual abstraction moderates if past moral deeds lead to consistent or compensatory behavior. Although cited 384 times across disciplines, we did not find any direct replications. It was also unclear how increases or decreases from one’s baseline prosociality might underlie the effect. A large-scale experiment (N = 5,091) in the registered report format tested Conway and Peetz’s original hypothesis. The hypothesized interaction was not replicated: conceptual abstraction did not moderate the effect of recalling moral vs. immoral behavior on prosocial intentions. Our results show that recalling moral behavior led to higher prosocial intentions than recalling either immoral or neutral behavior, irrespective of recalling from the recent or distant past. Thus, the current research found no evidence for compensatory moral behavior, only for positive moral consistency.
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