when street protests meet feminist activism in the A4 Revolution

Introduction

In China, small-scale, single-issue protests are occasionally observed, but widespread acts of civil disobedience have not been documented for many years. This record was broken in late November 2022 due to a building fire in Urumqi, Xinjiang. Allegedly, ten victims lost their lives as a consequence of the authorities’ extreme ‘dynamic-zero’ (动态清零, dòngtài qīnglíng) COVID-19 control measures, which hindered rescue efforts (Ong, 2023). The first signs of resistance emerged at the Communication University of China, Nanjing, where students used sheets of A4-sized white paper as symbols to protest against the government’s excessive COVID-19 restrictions. Subsequently, these protests gained momentum. Students from across the nation and residents in major Chinese cities voluntarily joined the rallies from their local areas. The slogans being chanted no longer solely revolved around COVID-19 restrictions. Instead, courageous young individuals began raising their voices, calling for democratic reforms across the entire political system. This level of street activism has not been witnessed in China since 1989, the year when the Tiananmen Square protests erupted and the year when I was born. The surge in domestic civil disobedience has also inspired members of the Chinese overseas diaspora. As one from the community based in the UK, I too participated in a rally on the night of 27 November 2022, at the central hub of London, right in front of the Chinese Embassy. My intention was to display solidarity with the brave protesters back home. This experience not only allowed me to partake in street activism but also enabled me to provide a firsthand account of the A4 revolution.

In this piece, I offer a scholarly assessment of the A4 revolution, viewing the protests through the lens of gender, based on my personal observations of the London rally and anecdotes shared by friends who participated in street activism within China. The analysis advocates the recognition of the A4 revolution’s noteworthy feminist potential, signifying the emergence of a non-cooperative strand of grassroots feminism in contemporary China. This strand of feminism is shaped by the intricate interplay between gender injustices and structural issues unique to China’s post-socialist transition (Wu and Dong, 2019). Nestled within the framework of ongoing global feminist momentum, this non-cooperative approach arises as a distinct response to the discernible resurgence of patriarchy in post-socialist China, calling into question the role played by the paternalistic party-state behind the scenes (Luqiu and Liao, 2021). In this sense, the A4 revolution is not at all an isolated example but an indication of the fusion of feminist activism with otherwise-related civil disobedience in the Chinese context. This fusion lays the groundwork for potential democratic transformations, offering a tantalising preview of future changes from within the authoritarian regime.

Feminism and state politics in post-socialist China

State politics and gender struggles have been intricately intertwined throughout China’s modern history. The origins of this interconnection can be traced back to the early twentieth century, when pioneering women, such as He-Yin Zhen and Qiu Jin, played pivotal roles in China’s nationalist revolution (Liu, Karl and Ko, 2013). ¹ Carrying forward their predecessors’ unfinished struggles, female Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cadres proactively participated in state feminism during the era of socialist construction, although their efforts were overshadowed by male leadership, who prioritised class struggles over gender equality (Wang, 2017). This patriarchal paradigm led to the contemporary critique that the state feminism of the socialist construction era marginalised women’s agency, despite its elevation of the social status of female citizens (Evans, 2021).

The CCP abandoned state-led feminist campaigns in the late 1970s, coinciding with the nation’s post-socialist, marketisation-bolstered transition (Rofel, 2007). This shift has given rise to neoliberal discourses in China’s public debates, reframing women’s socially constructed desires as inherent gendered traits (Zhang, 2022). An indigenous strand of cooperative feminism has thus emerged, advocating for women’s empowerment within an individualistic framework without challenging the patriarchal sociopolitical infrastructure (Wu and Dong, 2019). Yet, gender injustices in China are embedded within the sociopolitical infrastructure, owing to inadequate legal protection within the restructured economy and the prevailing male dominance in influential positions across the board (Yang, 2011). The situation exacerbates societal gender asymmetry, effectively impeding cooperative efforts towards women’s emancipation (Yin and Sun, 2021).

Running in parallel with the cooperative strand, a non-cooperative form of grassroots feminism has recently gained currency. This strand predominantly encompasses feminist NGOs, ordinary women and ‘liberal-leaning’ intellectuals, ² who share a critical stance against China’s patriarchal sociopolitical infrastructure (Wu and Dong, 2019). It is important to note that these non-cooperative feminists did not necessarily have a history of explicitly challenging the CCP’s authority. Nevertheless, their organisation of street-level actions, despite their focus on sexual harassment and violence, has increasingly been targeted by the party-state, which perceives them as a threat to its regime stability (Yin and Sun, 2021). In the midst of the oppressive political climate, many non-cooperative feminists have shifted their efforts towards social media campaigns, as a way to navigate around the crackdown on street activism (Luqiu and Liao, 2021). However, the already limited space for social-mediated feminist activism has been further shrinking due to hardened official censorship and propaganda campaigns (Yin and Sun, 2021). This state intervention has antagonised a growing number of grassroots feminists, paving the way for a convergence between non-cooperative feminist activism and other forms of civil disobedience (Peng, 2022).

The A4 revolution as an up-to-date case

The late 2022 A4 revolution stands as a recent case highlighting the convergence between non-cooperative feminist activism and mass civil disobedience. Yet, gender politics per se were not necessarily of paramount importance at the initial protests, as the rallies primarily emerged as an immediate response to the Urumqi building fire, which brought China’s excessive COVID-19 lockdown policies into question (Wong and Tsoi, 2023). Indeed, a combination of stringent lockdowns and mass testing proved to be the most effective measures in countering outbreaks during the early stages of the pandemic (The Lancet, 2022). However, China’s ‘dynamic-zero’ strategy, which involved imposing complete citywide lockdowns in response to even a few, if not a single, infectious case, demonstrated a disregard for human sacrifices from the outset (Ong, 2023). With resources being directed towards mass testing and mobility restrictions being enforced to an extreme degree, Chinese people living in affected areas, including those in highly developed regions, frequently faced shortages of food and life necessities (Associated Press, 2022). As the COVID-19 virus evolved into post-Omicron variants, the mounting collateral damage resulting from such extreme lockdown measures began to render the ‘dynamic-zero’ goal increasingly unattainable towards the end of 2022.

In particular, the Chinese authorities implemented lockdown policies not only to manage outbreaks but also to exert greater control over the citizenry. The latter becomes evident when observing how Henan local authorities manipulated the mobile contact-tracking system to prohibit demonstrations in response to the provincial banking system’s bankruptcy (Tham, 2022). In the midst of this abuse of power, instances of frontline counter-outbreak staff entering homes under the pretext of disinfection were frequently reported (Associated Press, 2022). This atmosphere of coercion led to the building up of strong public sentiment against ongoing lockdowns amongst the broad, ‘liberal’ segments of the population. The Urumqi fire incident, where firefighters’ rescue efforts were purportedly hindered due to the building’s access gate being locked for COVID-19 control, marked a tipping point, allowing mass discontent to escalate into a widespread expression of dissent at the street level.

Resonating with domestic protesters, members of the overseas Chinese community organised rallies worldwide. My attendance at the London event allowed me, a then 33-year-old feminist scholar, to document my proactive participation in and provide a firsthand account of the A4 revolution. Engaging in conversations with fellow protesters during the rally, I noted that the majority of them were international students from China pursuing either undergraduate or postgraduate degrees at British universities. It became evident that a significant portion of these activists at the gathering were women in their late teens or early twenties, surpassing the number of their male counterparts. As the crowd grew in size, we initiated chants echoing those resonating within China, ranging from issue-centred phrases such as ‘end dynamic-zero’ to political slogans like ‘step down, Xi Jinping’. Amid the mounting public frustration, expletives started to be voiced within the crowds. A set of new slogans, predominantly echoed amongst male protesters, directed anger towards Xi Jinping and Zhao Lijian ³ while utilising offensive language related to their female relatives in a sexual manner. Concerns regarding these slogans were swiftly raised by female activists, who argued that the use of such derogatory language was not only disrespectful to women but also constituted a form of gender-based violence. Taking hold of the opportunity to address the crowd through a microphone, one of the female activists took to the floor to provide an explanation behind her objection to these slogans:

From women being chained in Xuzhou to girls being beaten at a Tangshan barbecue restaurant, the CCP’s oppression extends not only to the broader public but also specifically targets women. Throughout history, women have consistently assumed significant roles in revolutions. Regrettably, they often find themselves abandoned after these revolutionary moments, confined to ‘cells’. By ‘cells’, I am referring to the domestic space! (Female protester, name unknown, 27 November 2022) ⁴

‘Chained Xuzhou women’ and ‘Tangshan girls beaten at a barbecue’ are two notorious instances of gender-based violence in China in 2022. The former refers to a woman allegedly being chained as a sex slave by two men in Xuzhou, while the latter describes how four women were sexually harassed and brutally beaten by a gang of male perpetrators in Tangshan. Both of these incidents triggered a public outcry, leading to extended debates about women’s rights in China during the spring and summer of 2022 (Howard, 2022). The former incident served as a poignant case study that underscored the patriarchal nature of the paternalistic party-state. This was evident in the government’s strict censorship of public discussions over the event (Li, 2023), in addition to its tolerance of local officials neglecting apparent crimes against the victim over the course of decades and its suppression of female activists attempting to rescue her.

‘Long live feminism! Long live feminism!’

The sentiment of the female activist’s speech reverberated amongst the protesters, encompassing both women and men. As I stood amidst the crowd, I was deeply touched. It was not just the fearlessness displayed by these young individuals in their confrontation against the regime that moved me but also their wholehearted endorsement of women’s emancipation right there in the moment. The latter aspect highlights the feminist potential inherent in the A4 revolution, emphasising the interconnectedness of gender struggles and otherwise-related civil disobedience in China today.

It is important to recognise that A4 protesters inside and outside of China held slightly divergent agendas. In contrast to overseas Chinese activists, often represented by ‘liberal-leaning’ international students, the protesters within China had a greater presence of professionals, whose involvement in street activism stemmed directly from their frustration with the state’s endless ‘dynamic-zero’ campaigns that significantly impacted their daily lives. Their focus was less on pursuing feminist agendas to hold the regime accountable for gender injustices. These variations, to some extent, influenced the dynamics at protest locations. Friends of mine who participated in rallies in Beijing and Shanghai noted such differences: protests within China appeared to centre on the collateral damage caused by extensive lockdown measures; they did not recall hearing slogans related to women’s emancipation being chanted at those events.

Indeed, the absence of feminist slogans at domestic rallies might stem from protestors’ self-restraint or even self-censorship, reflecting the stigmatisation of feminism in the Chinese context, as a result of the state and misogynist men’s smear campaigns on social media (Zhang, 2023). While I do not have concrete evidence to substantiate this claim, my interactions with female friends who participated in domestic rallies suggest that at least some of them might be self-conscious when chanting feminist slogans. This is, in part, an attempt to unite all possible allies, including those who might otherwise be considered their opponents on gender issues, so as to maximise the momentum of street activism. However, even as it takes a backstage role, the feminist potential of the A4 revolution is evident in domestic protests. Investigative journalistic reports indicate that many female activists have taken prominent leadership positions at protest rallies, with media footage capturing them leading chants nationwide (Yuan, 2022). Notably, key figures who reportedly remained in custody until early 2023 are also women, and they have since become symbols of defiance amongst fellow protesters and their sympathisers (Wong and Tsoi, 2023). This phenomenon aligns with my friends’ firsthand observations of the Beijing and Shanghai rallies, where they noted that female participants appeared to outnumber men. While these instances may be anecdotal, they contribute to solidifying the increasingly prominent role of female activists in China’s political activism today.

Political activism has historically been preserved as a male prerogative, leading to women’s contributions to state politics being consistently sidelined in historical narratives (McClintock, 1993). This holds true in China, where the feminine attributes of indigenous women were problematised by early revolutionaries to rationalise their masculinist endeavours for modern nation-building (Liu, Karl and Ko, 2013). Gender asymmetry persists in contemporary state politics, taking the form of misogynistic discourse adopted not only by nationalists to amplify the propaganda of the paternalistic party-state (Zhang, 2023) but also by dissidents aiming to challenge official censorship and discredit grassroots pro-regime sentiments (Wallis, 2015). Nevertheless, akin to their predecessors, determined young Chinese women have begun asserting their voices as an undeniable force within the A4 revolution. A distinctive aspect of their present-day actions is that they no longer shy away from the frontstage of political campaigns, unlike many of their historical counterparts who remained in the background.

The momentum of the A4 revolution probably dissipated after China terminated the ‘dynamic-zero’ policy in early December 2022. The government’s swift and chaotic reopening of the country complicated the interplay between dissidents on one side and the regime and the pro-regime nationalist factions on the other. The A4 revolution per se, as a self-organised movement rooted in discontent with the government’s extensive COVID-19 control measures, attracted a diverse range of participants, not all of whom shared identical viewpoints on specific matters. While some misogynistic slogans were challenged by female activists and found resonance amongst a majority of their male counterparts, the occurrence of such slogans at the London rally and street protests within China underscores the intricate nature of the A4 revolution. It cannot be overly idealised or simplified as a toxic-free feminist movement. However, the significant role played by women at protest rallies has indeed paved the way for discussions on the potential to align feminist struggles with other progressive politics in the realm of activism, aiming to collectively challenge the party-state.

As evidenced by the notorious Xuzhou and Tangshan incidents repeatedly cited by protesters at the London rally, the active participation of many well-informed women in the A4 revolution is framed within the specific context of China’s gender injustices, which stems from a backdrop where the state is often directly or indirectly involved in structural oppressions against women (Evans, 2021). This has turned gender politics into a crucial entry point, enabling an analysis of the consequences of the CCP’s rule that disproportionately impact women’s lives and restrict personal choices (Wu and Dong, 2019). In this manner, a nexus between feminist activism and broader civil disobedience has been established, forming the basis for cross-spectrum coalitions that lay the groundwork for progressive momentum to emerge from within China. This nexus underscores the need for scholarly attention and activist praxes to further support a feminist trajectory of intervention, which is pivotal in collectively addressing women’s emancipation and broader sociopolitical challenges faced by people in the authoritarian regime.

Concluding remarks

In this piece, I have discussed how the A4 revolution offers insights into the interconnected nature of feminist activism and civil disobedience in the Chinese context. Reflecting on my experience at the London rally, I observed how women’s emancipation is celebrated by overseas Chinese students, who are exposed to feminist theories and praxes that inform their analyses of Chinese society. Although the enthusiastic celebration of feminist slogans is not as prevalent on the streets in China, the prominence of female protesters assuming leadership roles at the forefront of protests also illuminates women’s often overlooked contributions to political processes. The feminist dimension of the A4 revolution highlights the emergence of a non-cooperative strain of feminism in China, which represents a crucial progressive force with the capacity to further disrupt the status quo.

Almost three decades after the Fourth World Conference on Women hosted in 1995 by the CCP, today’s Chinese women do not necessarily find themselves in a much-improved situation (Evans, 2021). While some members of the female cohort exhibit a tendency to uncritically embrace the neoliberal logic of China’s post-socialist transition, their counterparts with more progressive inclinations recognise the complicit role played by the paternal state in the recent resurgence of patriarchy (Wu and Dong, 2019). In the face of the party-state’s increasingly hostile stance towards feminism, a growing sense of resentment towards the regime has been brewing amongst this group of women. This positions them as civil-society actors who are capable of contributing to the collective development of progressive momentum in Chinese society. As this process unfolds, their efforts are converging with other pathways of civil disobedience, not only challenging the continuation of the patriarchal socioeconomic infrastructure but also threatening the very party-state foundations of the regime on which it relies. This underscores the imperative to understand China’s political activism through the prism of gender. This perspective resonates with an emerging body of scholarship, calling for an acknowledgement of women’s consistently overlooked political contributions to maximise the impact of their feminist praxes (Chatterjee and Lee, 2023). By doing so, a progressive broad church can be established, accounting for women’s experiences and agendas to pave the way for future societal changes in Chinese society and beyond.