The fight against nuclear terrorism needs global cooperation—and the IAEA

Abstract

The inherent characteristics of the nuclear terrorist threat require adequate global security standards for all fissile nuclear material. Combating the threat of nuclear terrorism therefore demands a coordinated global response within the existing nuclear security architecture. In lieu of a formalized treaty, which could take years or decades to become effective, there must be a timely directed effort to secure nuclear material. While no institution is perfectly seated to preside over this effort, the International Atomic Energy Agency, with its expansive reach and decades of experience, is well suited to lead the charge. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism—a multinational collaborative effort founded by the United States and Russia—can act as a diplomatic vehicle to promote greater cooperation between the world’s largest nuclear powers. As a stabilizing force in an increasingly destabilized world, global cooperation to ensure nuclear security and prevent nuclear terrorism is urgently needed.

ISIS’s bloody reign of terror in Iraq and Syria continues to capture the headlines but one story has faded from the forefront: In July 2014, ISIS—an Islamic terrorist group so radical that Al Qaeda has disavowed it—seized nuclear materials from Mosul University in Iraq (Nichols, 2014). Years earlier, the thought of a para-state insurgency obtaining access to weapons of mass destruction was highly troublesome but not altogether unthinkable. Today it’s a startling reality.

The Iraqi city of Mosul fell to ISIS insurgents on June 10, 2014, and is now an ISIS stronghold. Mosul University, allegedly home to a 40-kilogram stockpile of uranium, also fell under ISIS control. Iraq’s ambassador to the United Nations, Mohamed Ali Alhakim, frantically appealed to the United Nations for assistance: “Terrorist groups have seized control of nuclear material at the sites that came out of the control of the state,” he wrote, adding that such materials “can be used in manufacturing weapons of mass destruction” (Nichols, 2014). Alhakim cautioned that, with enough expertise, terrorist groups could smuggle these nuclear materials and use them separately or in combination with other materials to commit terrorist acts.

Intelligence sources later learned that the seized nuclear materials were not enriched and that there was little chance they could be used for weapons fabrication; the unenriched uranium posed more risk as a toxin than as an improvised nuclear device (Smith, 2014). But what if the uranium had been weapons-grade? The repercussions of highly enriched uranium falling into the hands of an extremist organization would unimaginably disrupt the balance of regional and global peace and security. This sort of scenario is not completely unprecedented; just a month before, ISIS fighters seized a degraded Saddam-era chemical weapons wasteland in Iraq’s Al Muthanna Province. Though most of the damaged munitions and buildings were no longer usable, the seizure demonstrated the potential for repurposing military facilities and equipment for terrorism. Clearly ISIS is in search of weapons of mass destruction, whether they be chemical or radiological.

The ISIS crisis reawakened policy makers to the possibility of nuclear terrorism (Moore, 2014). Moreover, ISIS’s seizure of nuclear materials and the intensity and rapidity with which Iraq has fallen to the ISIS insurgency underscore the fundamental paradigm shift confronting states: Non-state actors, especially terrorist and insurgent organizations, may now pose greater security threats than traditional states. At the same time, the US-Russia relationship has reached its lowest point since the Cold War, making cooperation on matters of global nuclear issues increasingly difficult. The future of nuclear security and the fight against nuclear terrorism stand at a critical juncture between inaction and progress. Dealing effectively with the complicated, dynamic threat of terrorist groups, which know no boundaries and defy the conventions of warfare, calls for a coordinated, multilateral effort. Nuclear terrorism cannot be prevented by a few states and organizations going it alone.

Strained relations

As violent non-state actors attain increasingly lethal capabilities, the global responsibility to combat nuclear terrorism has fallen to the world’s two largest nuclear superpowers—the United States and Russia. However, the current state of global affairs makes collaboration difficult, even on issues as critical as nuclear material security; relations between the United States and Russia are highly strained because of the Russian annexation of Crimea, Russian support of separatist rebels in eastern Ukraine, Western sanctions against Russia, and Russian sanctions against the United States and its allies.

The repercussions of US-Russian tensions in the past have resulted in the failure of major arms control agreements such as START II, and have hindered global cooperation on crucial issues such as nuclear terrorism. The inability of the two largest nuclear superpowers to effectively cooperate will likely have lasting effects on international nuclear relations, and prolonged diplomatic tensions could result in the failure of such efforts as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), which is co-chaired by the two countries.

In 2009, almost three years after the joint US-Russia launch of the GICNT, President Obama announced his own plan for a renewed diplomatic partnership with Russia—a “reset.” But after some initial progress on reducing nuclear stockpiles with the New START agreement in 2010, US-Russia relations have reached their lowest point since the Cold War (Sen, 2014). On July 17, 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin warned that the latest round of sanctions against Russia would bring US-Russia relations to a “dead end” (Anishchuk and Orlofsky, 2014). Fallout over the Edward Snowden affair and his subsequent asylum in Russia (Calamur, 2013); Putin’s crackdown on human rights, particularly with respect to the gay and transgender communities, and Obama’s subsequent Sochi Olympic snub (Liptak, 2013); Russia’s continued support of the Assad regime in Syria; the Russian invasion and annexation of Crimea; and continued Russian support of pro-Russian separatist rebels in Ukraine have all deeply strained relations (Labott, 2014). Relations between Russia and the G7 bloc are also at unprecedented lows; in March 2014 the G7 (formerly the G8) indefinitely suspended Russia from membership over its annexation of Crimea (Acosta, 2014). ¹ Russia, in an unprecedented move, snubbed a planning meeting for the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit (Associated Press in Vienna, 2014).

Unsecured fissile material and weapons components left over from the Cold War are scattered across former Soviet Union states such as Ukraine and Kazakhstan, and continue to be sources of concern (O’Neill, 1999). To make matters worse, the manifestation of global terrorism as an undeterred network of motivated individuals seeking to use nuclear weapons has quickly given rise to a new and adaptable delivery mode: In a world of suicide bombers, conventional nuclear weapons delivery systems aren’t required to ensure a credible threat. Moreover, as a result of the decentralized and international nature of terrorist groups, deterrence of acts of terrorism is complicated by the inability to identify where to direct a retaliatory response. The global growth of nuclear power programs, along with non-standardized and inadequate state physical protection barriers, also continues to pose problems for security. Combating the nuclear terrorist threat demands a coordinated global effort led by a renewed partnership between the United States and Russia.

The existing policy landscape

Adequate nuclear material control is critically important to ensuring international security, a commitment reflected in several international agreements enacted over the past few decades. The existing policy framework is an informal network of collectives, United Nations resolutions, conventions, international bodies, “gift baskets,” ² and Centers of Excellence. ³ The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the GICNT, the International Atomic Energy Agency (specifically the IAEA’s Office of Nuclear Safety within the Department of Nuclear Safety and Security), United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540, ⁴ the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), and the Nuclear Security Summits are the main pillars of the global nuclear security architecture (Semmel, 2005).

International agreements indicate a global commitment to nuclear material security and an acknowledgement that it is a top priority. However, these agreements lack an internationally formalized implementation mechanism. As a result, there are still many states with unsecured or inadequately secured nuclear material.

Recognizing the lack of teeth in the current regime, the United States took a leading role in the fight against nuclear terrorism under the leadership of President Obama. He organized the first Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in 2010, followed by the 2012 NSS hosted by South Korea, and most recently the 2014 NSS hosted by the Netherlands. The summits emphasized nuclear material security and the development of nuclear forensics capabilities as top priorities, but commitments to secure nuclear material were made on a state-by-state basis (Nikitin, 2012). For example, a number of participating countries disposed of highly enriched uranium, with the United States’ assistance, but did so independently of one another (Nikitin, 2012).

Despite these commendable efforts, international nuclear material security remains unstandardized and insufficient. The IAEA recognized in its 2014 fact sheet on its Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) that “[i]ncidents reported to the ITDB show that problems persist with regard to illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material and with thefts, losses and other unauthorized activities and events” (IAEA, 2014: 2).

Uncoordinated efforts

Deeper cross-organizational collaboration and greater coordination within the nuclear security community would serve the dual purpose of reducing redundancies and making existing cooperative efforts more effective. Yet despite expert consensus that the pace of progress is slow and inadequate, no international coordinating body exists to lead or preside over global nuclear security challenges (Ferguson, 2014). Whatever cross-organizational cooperation exists has arisen organically and not as the result of a concerted international effort.

For example, the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction works in a collaborative capacity with the international community by helping countries meet their UNSCR 1540 obligations to prevent proliferation. The Global Partnership has succeeded in “effective coordination of global threat reduction work” (Heyes, 2013). The GICNT also facilitates cross-organizational cooperation by helping states fulfill their UNSCR 1540 obligations through participation in GICNT initiatives (US Department of State, n.d.).

INTERPOL is another institution that works cooperatively within the international nuclear security architecture. One of INTERPOL’s greatest strengths as an organization is its close relationship and cooperation with the Nuclear Security Summit, IAEA, and various states. Through its Operation Fail Safe, INTERPOL aims to improve the process of collecting and sharing actionable information about traffickers of nuclear material by supporting “the global law enforcement community in the real-time monitoring and tracking of individuals involved in the illicit trafficking of nuclear or other radioactive materials, primarily using INTERPOL’s system of notices” (INTERPOL, 2014). The problem, however, is that few of these instances of collaboration are effectively managed or coordinated by an overarching institution, and nuclear material continues to fall into the hands of non-state actors.

Measuring success

A “coordinated international effort” may seem like an amorphous concept, so defining what is expected is key. In its most literal sense, international coordination means directing and managing the component pieces of the current nuclear security architecture to work in a more formalized manner toward common goals. Additionally, it means facilitating the GICNT, IAEA, INTERPOL, UNSCR 1540, and G8 Global Partnership to work collaboratively to maximize resources and capabilities and to enhance competencies. An important distinction must be made, however, with respect to the nature of these collaborative efforts: They are not intended to be the same voluntary, non-binding, confidence-building measures of the past but rather programs and activities implemented by a formalized group working together toward a common goal. ⁵

The creation of a global nuclear forensics database to identify and catalog nuclear fissile material is just one example of what is meant by a coordinated international effort. Within the nuclear security policy community, coordination is multilevel and can be classified along a spectrum from the most formal (treaties) to the least formal (gift baskets). A coordinated international effort would be somewhere in the middle of the spectrum.

There are myriad possibilities for coordination and cooperation within the component organizations of the existing security architecture. For example, INTERPOL is composed of a large network of international police officers and can leverage that capability to investigate nuclear material that has crossed borders before being interdicted. The IAEA, which also tracks stolen nuclear material in its Interdicted Nuclear Materials Database, can collaborate with INTERPOL to create a global catalog of fissile material. As the world’s politically neutral, trusted authority on technical nuclear science, the IAEA can also offer its international expertise to various countries and institutions. Through a series of cooperative projects, the G8 Global Partnership has also contributed by augmenting the physical protection of nuclear materials, dismantling nuclear submarines, safely storing spent fuel, improving detection of nuclear material and preventing its illicit trafficking, and encouraging nuclear experts to use their skills for peaceful purposes (US Department of State, n.d.).

International coordination will likely manifest itself in many forms and employ a variety of implementation mechanisms to make the most of each organization’s unique strengths and capabilities. As an open-ended and evolving policy goal, coordination of the global nuclear security architecture is best delineated in broad strokes and not defined in a way that delimits possibilities for cooperation.

Calling all leaders

While the need for greater international coordination and leadership is pressing, the most politically feasible and practical policy recommendation remains the development of a collaborative multilateral framework that leverages the existing architecture to effect immediate global action. In the nuclear security community the IAEA is an oft-cited candidate to coordinate the global charge to secure nuclear material, while the GICNT is a less obvious choice. To bolster the international nuclear security infrastructure the IAEA should coordinate all bodies, using the GICNT as a vehicle for bilateral collaboration. The GICNT and IAEA must act as partners in leading a coordinated effort, given the current political climate.

Despite the fact that nuclear security is largely beyond the scope of the IAEA, it may still be the institution best suited to facilitate coordination. Charles D. Ferguson, president of the Federation of American Scientists, writes that national leaders “have largely recognized that nuclear security is not some end state but a continuing process and must be sustained to achieve high standards,” and that they expect that “the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Division will provide the continuing coordinating role” (Ferguson, 2014: 15). The sharing of responsibilities, roles, and burdens among the IAEA, the other key players (GICNT, G8 Global Partnership, UNSCR 1540, and INTERPOL), and additional organizations would allow the IAEA to facilitate cooperation without overburdening itself.

While it has faced criticism for its reactions to recent nuclear disasters (most notably, Fukushima) and its allegedly lax oversight of the nuclear energy industry (Borger, 2011), the IAEA has become an indispensable part of the global nuclear architecture. Its greatest strength is its extensive reach, with 164 member states as of March 2015. The IAEA is also a long-standing, highly respected institution perceived as credible and neutral on the world stage (Boureston and Semmel, 2010).

Unsurprisingly, many nuclear scholars contend that the IAEA should take a greater coordinating role in the fight to ensure the efficacy of international nuclear agreements (Boureston and Semmel, 2010). With the Obama-initiated National Security Summits slated to end in 2016 unless reinstated by the succeeding administration, the IAEA would be the most qualified candidate to fill this potential leadership vacuum (Findlay, 2014). However, the IAEA itself has expressed reluctance to take on greater coordinating responsibilities, with Director General Yukiya Amano making it clear in 2013 that any expansion of responsibilities beyond its current mandate would have to come at the behest of the agency’s member states (Findlay, 2014). Despite its expansive reach and unrivaled prestige, the IAEA is hindered by a lack of authority to establish a baseline global nuclear security standard and to verify the physical protection of nuclear materials in states outside its safeguards mandate (Boureston and Semmel, 2010).

A united front

While the GICNT is not well suited to preside over the global nuclear security architecture, the initiative has unique diplomatic and political capabilities that would make it an indispensable partner for collaboration with the IAEA. The GICNT’s position as a joint initiative of the United States and Russia is a critical fact that policy makers should not overlook when assessing the viability of the GICNT in a coordinating role.

With US-Russia relations at a nadir, nuclear security remains one of the few major policy areas upon which these two powers can still agree. Despite deep ideological and foreign policy differences, the two countries share a firm commitment to securing nuclear material against the threat of nuclear terrorism. Russia especially has had “serious concerns” about possible radiological and nuclear terrorism by Chechen rebels (Ferguson, 2014). With an already established basis of cooperation through the GICNT, mutual nuclear security interests could salvage US-Russia relations. The GICNT is naturally suited to serve as the vehicle for greater collaboration between the world’s two largest nuclear powers, where a renewed collaboration could potentially repair diplomatic ties and reduce current political tensions.

Although such rapprochement may seem unlikely at the moment, it would send an unequivocal message to the international community—that the cause of nuclear security is of utmost urgency and an issue so critical to global security and stability that it transcends political and ideological differences. Cooperation on nuclear issues might also yield positive spillover effects, leading to US-Russian cooperation on other policy fronts.

The GICNT is not just a political and diplomatic vehicle, though; it also has technical expertise to offer. In the past, the GICNT has effectively engaged the international community through hands-on exercises in consequence management and generation of “best practice” guidelines. But the GICNT clearly has untapped potential beyond simply organizing multilateral exercises. It has also shown that it can work collaboratively with other collectives and international organizations to reinforce the nonproliferation norm, support treaties, and ultimately develop a framework for nuclear materials management. Whereas other international organizations and collectives have broader mission scopes, securing nuclear material is a foundational component of the GICNT mission.

Serious limitations constrain the GICNT, however. It still lacks name recognition and prestige and remains underutilized by the US government and the international community. The initiative also faces limited funding and understaffing at the State Department. It remains unclear whether any of its 85 members, besides the United States, have thus far contributed financially to the GICNT’s efforts. The GICNT boasts ambitious goals but the lack of globally recognized accomplishments or a solid internal structure make it an unconventional candidate to preside over global nuclear security challenges.

Ultimately, the development of the GICNT should proceed in tandem with the development of a bilateral IAEA-GICNT partnership, as the IAEA works to coordinate cross-organizational collaboration. Since formalized efforts by the five primary international bodies (the Global Initiative, Global Partnership, United Nations, IAEA, and INTERPOL) typically proceed slowly, the solution is not achieved through a “proliferation of initiatives” but via a coordinated effort to lay the groundwork for a comprehensive, legally binding international agreement. At this stage the most realistic policy recommendation seems to point toward the IAEA in a coordinating role, with adequate funding and increased support from the international community for a bilateral partnership between the IAEA and GICNT.

The outlook

The risk of nuclear terrorism exists as long as nuclear materials remain poorly secured. Non-state actors and extremist organizations such as ISIS are acquiring increasingly deadly capabilities and fomenting unrest and political instability in global hot spots. At the same time, the US-Russia relationship is severely strained. The international community may also lose a valuable component of the global nuclear security architecture if the Nuclear Security Summits end in 2016.

As seemingly intractable conflicts and crises in the Middle East, Africa, Eastern Europe, and Latin America consume the international community and media attention, the challenge of nuclear security may fade from the forefront. But ISIS’s recent seizure of nuclear materials in Mosul makes it patently clear that this issue cannot be ignored. Policy makers and the international community must not wait for the first successful nuclear terrorist attack before taking action. A coordinated push to secure nuclear material against the threat of terrorism must be the primary focus of the upcoming 2016 Nuclear Security Summit. Today’s challenges demand a focused, multilateral effort within the existing nuclear security architecture, with the IAEA and the GICNT ideally presiding over this challenge in a facilitating role. It’s time to cooperate.