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Abstract

Russia is modernizing its strategic and nonstrategic nuclear warheads. It currently has 4,500 nuclear warheads, of which roughly 1,780 strategic warheads are deployed on missiles and at bomber bases. Another 700 strategic warheads are in storage along with roughly 2,000 nonstrategic warheads. Russia deploys an estimated 311 ICBMs that can carry approximately 1,050 warheads. It is in the process of retiring all Soviet-era ICBMs and replacing them with new systems, a project that according to Moscow is about halfway complete. The outgoing ICBMs will be replaced by the SS-27 Mod. 1 (Topol-M), the SS-27 Mod. 2, two follow-on versions of the SS-27 which are still in development, and a new liquid-fuel “heavy” ICBM. Following technical problems, the Russian Navy is also rolling out its new Borey-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine. Russia’s upgrades to its nuclear arsenal help justify modernization programs in other nuclear weapon states, and raise questions about Russia's commitment to its obligations under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons.

Keywords

nuclear modernization Russian nuclear arsenal Russian nuclear weapons Russian tactical nuclear weapons Sergei Karakayev

Russia is in the middle of a broad modernization of its strategic and nonstrategic nuclear forces. While much of this process continues well-known programs that have been under way for many years, some developments are new. Combined, the steps Moscow is taking contribute to growing concern in other countries about Russian intentions, and help justify nuclear modernization programs and political opposition to reductions in other nuclear weapon states.

As of early 2015, we estimate that Russia has a military stockpile of approximately 4,500 nuclear warheads, of which roughly 1,780 strategic warheads are deployed on missiles and at bomber bases.¹ The number of deployed warheads is higher than the 1,600 we estimated in the Nuclear Notebook a year ago, mainly due to the operational deployment of the first Borey-class ballistic missile submarines. Another 700 strategic warheads are in storage along with roughly 2,000 nonstrategic warheads. In addition to the military stockpile for operational forces, a large number—perhaps 3,200—of retired but still largely intact warheads await dismantlement (see Table 1).²

Table 1.

Russian nuclear forces, 2015

There are many uncertainties about the status and future of Russia’s nuclear arsenal. One is poor transparency, due to New START having discontinued public release of detailed aggregate numbers and the fact that Moscow does not publish comprehensive information about its nuclear forces. The increasing diversity of the Russian intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force creates additional uncertainty. Until a few years ago, it appeared that Russia planned to reduce the force to a couple of versions of the SS-27 missile. Since then, the government has announced plans to deploy several new modifications of the SS-27 and to develop a new “heavy” ICBM.

This diverse force will be more complex and costly to produce and maintain, and requires production of more and different types of missiles. In February 2012, then-Prime Minister (now President) Vladimir Putin stated that the military would receive “more than 400 advanced ground and sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles” over the coming decade, or an average of 40 missiles per year (Putin, 2012). In his formal remarks to the Defense Ministry Board in late 2014, however, Putin declared that “the strategic nuclear forces will receive more than 50 intercontinental ballistic missiles” in 2015 (President of Russia, 2014a). In addition to Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) for additional Borey-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), this production probably includes additional RS-24 ICBMs for mobile launchers and the silos, and RS-26 ICBMs.

Overall, the nuclear modernization effort will present Russia and the international arms control community with new challenges. Unless a new arms control reduction agreement is reached in the near future, the shrinking of Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal that has characterized the past two decades will likely come to an end, with the posture leveling out at around 500 launchers with roughly 2,400 assigned warheads. To remain below the limit set by New START of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads even after 2018, Russia will probably have to reduce the warhead loading on some of its missiles.

The broad modernization reflects the Putin government’s conviction that nuclear forces—in particular strategic nuclear forces—are indispensable for Russia’s security and status as a great power. Maintaining parity with the United States is a strong motivation for this modernization, but the development of multiple versions of the same missiles indicates the strong influence of Russia’s military-industrial complex on nuclear planning.

Despite the strong commitment to nuclear modernization, however, the effort competes for funding with the modernization of Russia’s general military forces, which remain dominated by Soviet-era equipment, as well as with civilian programs. The modernization program is based on a defense plan that was drawn up based on fiscal assumptions that are no longer valid. Sanctions imposed after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the decline in oil income have significantly reduced Russian revenues, but the financial decline was already under way even before those events. “When we were adopting the defense program, the forecasts for the economy and budget revenues were completely different,” said Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov in October 2014. “Right now, we just cannot afford it” (Kelly, 2014). As a result, parts of the nuclear modernization program will likely be scaled back or delayed in the next defense plan.

Nuclear doctrine

The mission of Russia’s nuclear forces has been relatively consistent over the past decade. The most recent version of the military doctrine, approved by Putin in December 2014, states that Russia:

shall reserve for itself the right to employ nuclear weapons in response to the use against it and/or its allies of nuclear and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, as well as in the case of aggression against the Russian Federation with use of conventional weapons when the state’s very existence has been threatened. (President of Russia, 2014c)

This formulation is almost identical to the mission described in the 2010 version of the doctrine, which stated that Russia:

reserves the right to utilize nuclear weapons in response to the utilization of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, and also in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation involving the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is under threat. (President of Russia, 2010; this doctrinal language is from the public version of the documents—it is unknown what is contained in the classified version or other supporting documents)

Like its predecessor, the 2014 doctrine identifies NATO as the top item on the list of main external military dangers facing Russia. This includes what the Kremlin sees as a:

buildup of force potential of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its endowment with global functions being realized in violation of rules of international law; an approach of the military infrastructure of NATO member countries to borders of the Russian Federation, including by further bloc expansion. (President of Russia, 2014b)

In his annual address to the Defense Ministry Board, Putin said, “The situation in the world around us is not becoming any simpler,” and specifically pointed to “the USA’s plans to build a missile defense system” and that “NATO has stepped up its activity too, including in Europe, especially in Eastern Europe.” Even so, Putin said, “our military doctrine nevertheless remains unchanged and is exclusively defensive in nature, as you know. But we will defend our country’s security firmly and consistently” (President of Russia, 2014a).

Meeting in February 2015, the NATO defense ministers reportedly discussed an internal study of Russia’s nuclear strategy that expressed concern that Moscow may be lowering the threshold for potential use of nuclear weapons in a conflict. One diplomat told Reuters:

What worries us most in this strategy is the modernization of the Russian nuclear forces, the increase in the level of training of those forces, and the possible combination between conventional actions and the use of nuclear forces, including possibly in the framework of a hybrid war. (Croft, 2015).

NATO did not release information from its study.

ICBMs

Russia deploys an estimated 311 ICBMs that can carry approximately 1,050 warheads. The ICBMs are organized under the Strategic Rocket Forces in three missile armies with a total of 12 divisions.

Retirement of all Soviet-era ICBMs is well under way and scheduled for completion in 2022. Deployment of the first-generation SS-27 Mod. 1 (Topol-M) is complete, deployment of the second-generation SS-27 Mod. 2 is continuing at an accelerated pace, and development of two follow-on versions of the SS-27 (RS-26 and a rail-based version) is in progress. The current force includes.

The SS-18 (RS-20V)

This is a silo-based, 10-warhead heavy ICBM first deployed in 1988. The missile is being gradually retired with approximately 46 SS-18 s with 460 warheads remaining in the 13th Missile Division at Dombarovsky and the 62nd Missile Division at Uzur. The SS-18 is scheduled to remain in service until 2022 when it will be replaced by the Sarmat “heavy” ICBM.

The SS-19 (RS-18 or UR-100NUTTH)

This silo-based, six-warhead SS-19 entered service in 1980 and is gradually being retired and replaced by the silo-based SS-27 Mod. 2. We estimate that no more than 30 missiles remain in service with 210 warheads with the 28th Guards Missile Division at Kozelsk and possibly with the 60th Missile Division at Tatishchevo. The SS-19 is scheduled to be retired in 2019.

The SS-25 (RS-12 M or Topol)

Russia has been retiring SS-25 missiles for several years, each year removing between one and three regiments (nine to 27 missiles) from service. During the past few years, at least nine SS-25 regiments have been retired, leaving perhaps 99 launchers in five or six divisions. It is possible that the number of launchers is lower (around 72) if divisions converting to the RS-24 retired the SS-25 in one step instead of regiment by regiment. The last SS-25s will be withdrawn from service in 2021.

The SS-27 Mods. 1 and 2 (Topol-M and RS-24)

Russia deploys two versions of the SS-27 missile. The first is the SS-27 Mod. 1, a single-warhead missile that comes in either mobile (RS-12M1) or silo-based (RS-12M2) variants, known in Russia as Topol-M. The second is the SS-27 Mod. 2, a MIRVed version of the Topol-M known in Russia as the RS-24 or Yars. Deployment of the SS-27 Mod. 1 was completed in 2012 with a total of 78 missiles: 60 silo-based missiles with the 60th Missile Division in Tatishchevo and 18 road-mobile missiles with the 54th Guards Missile Division at Teykovo, northeast of Moscow.

The halfway point of the ICBM modernization was reached at the end of 2014 when Strategic Rocket Forces Commander Lt. Gen. Sergei Karakayev announced that “modern missile systems” accounted for 50 percent of the ICBM force. He added that all old missiles would be retired by 2020 (Interfax, 2014a). The 50-50 ratio doesn’t quite match the missiles that appear to be deployed, but this is probably due to uncertainty about how many SS-19 and SS-25 regiments are still operational. To meet the 2020 deadline, nearly 30 old ICBMs will have to be retired annually for the next six years. The schedule partly depends on the production of new replacement missiles, which will probably be affected by Russia’s financial crisis.

All new Russian ICBM deployments are MIRVed SS-27 Mod. 2s. Following deployment of the first two regiments with a total of 18 mobile missiles at the 54th Guards Missile Division at Teykovo, deployment is now well under way at the Novosibirsk and Nizhniy Tagil divisions and in the preparation stage at the Yoshkar-Ola division. Deployment of the silo-based SS-27 Mod. 2 version is well under way at the Kozelsk division in western Russia.

Novosibirsk, the home of the 39th Guards Missile Division, received its first SS-27 Mod. 2 regiment with nine launchers on “experimental combat duty” in late 2013. A second regiment entered service in 2014, and a third is scheduled for 2015. The fourth and remaining SS-25 regiment there will probably be retired soon if that hasn’t already happened.

Nizhniy Tagil, the home of the 42nd Missile Division, received a partial SS-27 Mod. 2 regiment (initially only with six launchers) in late 2013. That regiment was completed in 2014, as was a second regiment. A third regiment is scheduled to be completed in 2015. It is yet unclear if Tagil will get three or four regiments.

Deployment of the silo-based version of the SS-27 Mod. 2 began in 2014 with the 28th Missile Guards Division at Kozelsk, where it is replacing the remaining SS-19s. It is unknown how many of the original 60 SS-19 silos will be converted for SS-27 Mod. 2 s, but the figure might be close to the 60 SS-27 Mod. 1 s that were deployed with the Tatischevo division.

Upgrades are also scheduled for three other mobile divisions—Irkutsk, Yoshkar-Ola, and Vypolzovo—but it is uncertain if they will receive the SS-27 Mod. 2 or a new shorter and lighter version that is under development, the RS-26. News reports in 2014 indicated that Irkutsk would be the first to receive the RS-26 (Itar-Tass, 2014), which is a compact and lighter version of the SS-27 Mod. 2. The final mobile division, the 35th Missile Division at Barnaul, has not yet been announced to upgrade to the SS-27 Mod. 2 or the RS-26, but the Strategic Rocket Forces are expected to include at least the same number of divisions in the future as the 12 that exist now.

The RS-26 is only one of several new ICBMs the Strategic Rocket Forces are working on. The RS-26, known as Rubezh or Yars-M, has been flight-tested and appears to be scheduled for deployment sometime in 2016. The missile was tested to intercontinental range in 2012 and intermediate range later in 2012 and in 2013—as were other ICBMs (Kristensen, 2013). The RS-26 apparently weighs 40 tons less than the 120-ton RS-24 and carries a modified warhead payload.

Karakayev, the commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces, told the Interfax news agency that “RS-26 is a working name, like Avangard and Rubezh. It is a prototype intercontinental ballistic missile based on Yars and Topol-M” (Interfax, 2013). He went on: “There are no fundamentally new missiles ‘on the approach’ for [the Strategic Rocket Forces]. We are talking about modernizing the existing Yars class by improving the warhead.” He compared the Yars class modernization to the Russian Navy’s modifications to the Sineva SLBM, which became the Layner SLBM. “There is nothing new in the missile itself. Only the ‘warhead’ is new. Its creators went down the same route as the designers of the Layner,” he said (Interfax, 2012a).

There seem to be two objectives for building yet another version of the SS-27: reducing the weight of mobile missiles and improving the ability of the SS-27 to penetrate missile defense systems. “The use of new fuel is one of the features of the missile,” an unnamed industry source told Interfax after the 2012 flight-test. “It reduces boost phase engine operation time. Consequently, the missile’s capabilities to penetrate missile defenses will go up,’ he said (Interfax, 2012b).

Moreover, whereas the current SS-27 Mod. 2 (Yars) missile weighs more than 120 tons, according to Karakayev the RS-26 only weighs about 80 tons. Karakayev said:

By improving the missile fuel component itself, the solid one, we are creating a new missile system, which we can put on various types of terrain and in various positional areas. Its cross-country capability will be better, its sizes will be smaller, it will have greater survivability and it should have a smaller camouflaging case. We will not put it in silos. It is a ground-mobile missile system. (Interfax, 2013)

Another question is whether the future mobile ICBM deployments will all be RS-26 or a combination of RS-26 and RS-24. Karakayev reportedly said in 2012 that Russia was working “on a new mobile solid fuel rocket to replace the Topol-M and Yars” systems (Voice of Russia, 2012; emphasis added). But other reports say the RS-26 is intended to supplement the SS-24 Mod. 2 (Yars) and SS-27 Mod. 1 (Topol-M). There have also been discussions about whether the RS-26 is a new intermediate-range missile (which would violate the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty), and some Russian officials have referred to it as a “medium” missile. Some of the flight-tests were to intermediate range, but all ICBMs can be test-flown to intermediate range (Russia frequently does so with its SS-25 s), and the RS-26 clearly has been flight-tested to intercontinental range and is designated an ICBM by the US intelligence community (US Air Force, 2013: 21). More test-launches are scheduled for 2015 before possible RS-26 deployment begins in 2016.

Russia is also developing the Sarmat “heavy” ICBM intended to replace the Soviet-era SS-18 (RS-20 V) beginning around 2020. With a rumored throw weight of about five tons, the Sarmat would be able to deliver as many MIRVs as the SS-18 (10), or an advanced payload with countermeasures against missile defenses. The Sarmat is scheduled for deployment in the latter part of this decade following a series of flight-tests. Soviet liquid-fuel ICBMs such as the SS-18 were produced in Ukraine and, given the reliability problems with developing the Bulava SLBM, it remains to be seen whether the Sarmat will be a Russian reengineered SS-18 or a truly new missile.

The ICBM arsenal is expected to drop below 300 missiles by the early 2020s, depending on production and deployment rates for the new missiles. Because this force is significantly smaller than the 400 ICBMs the United States plans to retain, Russian planners are compensating by increasing the share of the ICBM force that is equipped with multiple warheads from 43 percent today to approximately 73 percent by 2024. Although Russia will deploy slightly fewer ICBM warheads by that time, roughly 90 percent of them will be MIRVs. That trend is unhealthy for US-Russian strategic stability because 400 warheads on the US ICBM force can be used to threaten 1,000 warheads on the Russian ICBM force.

Moreover, in the future a significantly greater portion of Russian ICBM warheads will be on mobile launchers than is currently the case (66 percent versus 32 percent today). That means it will be more important for Russia to protect its mobile launchers and more important for potential adversaries to target them. That could increase the need to disperse the launchers earlier in a crisis and fuel more advanced targeting technologies and dynamic targeting strategies.

SSBNs and SLBMs

The Russian Navy’s technical problems with the introduction of the new Borey-class SSBN (Project 955) and its SS-N-32 (Bulava) SLBM finally appear to have been resolved. New START aggregate data for September 2014 appeared to show that the first submarine was fully loaded, the second was being loaded, and the third was undergoing sea trials. New piers are being constructed at the Yagelnaya (Gadzhiyevo) base on the Kola Peninsula, which is also the homeport of Russia’s fleet of Delta IV nuclear missile submarines and includes an SLBM depot and underground warhead storage facility. The first submarine, Yuri Dolgoruki (K-535), will be permanently based at Yagelnaya, while the second and third—Alexander Nevsky (K-550) and Vladimir Monomakh (K-551)—will transfer to the Pacific Fleet at Rybachiy near Petropavlovsk starting in 2015.

A total of eight Borey-class submarines are planned in the 2014 to 2020 defense plan. The first three are each armed with 16 SS-N-32 (Bulava) SLBMs that can carry up to six warheads apiece. The subsequent Borey-class submarines will be of an improved design known as Borey-II (Project 955 A). The first improved Borey, Knyaz Vladimir, will be delivered in 2016 for service in 2017. The keels for the fifth and sixth boats—Knyaz Oleg (or Alexander Suvorov) and Generalissimus Suvorov—were laid down in 2014 for possible completion in 2018 or 2019. The schedule of the last three boats means that the eight-boat program will probably not be completed until the early to mid-2020s.

There is considerable uncertainty about how the improved Borey submarines will be armed. Numerous articles over the past several years have reported that each Borey-II will be equipped with 20 missile tubes, four more than each of the first three boats (Interfax, 2012c). But in February 2013 a senior defense industry source told the RIA Novosti news agency that the number of tubes would not be increased. “The Project 955 A differs significantly from the original Borey (Project 955) but not in the number of missiles carried—there will still be 16 on board,” the source said (RIA Novosti, 2013a).

For the remainder of this decade, the mainstay of Russia’s nuclear submarine force will continue to be the six third-generation Delta IVs built between 1985 and 1992, each equipped with 16 SLBMs. All Delta IVs are part of the Northern Fleet and based at Yagelnaya Bay on the Kola Peninsula. Since 2007, Russia has been upgrading the Delta IVs to carry a modified SS-N-23 SLBM known as the Sineva. Each missile carries up to four warheads. All six boats have now completed an overhaul and conversion to the Sineva. The Yekaterinburg was damaged by a fire in December 2011 and is undergoing sea trials. As a result, only four to five of the six Delta IVs are operational at any given time.

There are also rumors that a modified version of the Sineva, the Layner (or Liner) will be deployed on the Delta IVs over the next decade. One unnamed Navy General Staff official reportedly said that “while the Sineva can carry four warheads, the Layner will carry 10” (Izvestia, 2012). But another source, in the Russian General Staff, said that the Layner is not a new missile but a modified Sineva: “It is in fact a Sineva. Only the warhead is new.” The Layner has an improved penetration capability achieved by, among other things, “a greater number of reentry vehicles (boyevoy blok) in the warhead” (Interfax, 2012a). Instead of more than twice the number of warheads, it seems more likely that the modified payload includes modified warheads and additional penetration aids.

Two Delta III nuclear submarines remain in service on the Kamchatka Peninsula as part of Russia’s Pacific Fleet. Each boat is equipped with 16 SS-N-18 M1 Stingray (RSM-50) SLBMs with three warheads each. One of the Delta IIIs—Podolsk—launched an SS-N-18 on May 8, 2014. Preparation for the arrival of the Borey-class submarines has been delayed, to the clear frustration of the Russian leadership. During a visit to the Rybachiy submarine base in September 2014, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu said, “These [construction deadlines] are too serious to joke about. The jokes are over” (RIA Novosti, 2014a).

The Borey-class modernization will have a significant impact on the capability of the Russian SSBN fleet. While the Delta IV-class SSBNs will continue to operate through the 2020s, they will gradually fade out and be replaced with Borey-class SSBNs. The 2015 to 2020 defense plan includes eight Borey SSBNs, but it is possible that the subsequent plan will increase that number to 10 or even 12. After all, the United States is planning to have 12 SSBNs, and Russian planners seem to think that parity is very important. Even with eight Borey-class SSBNs, the capability of the Russian SSBN fleet will increase significantly. With eight, each with 16 SLBMs, the fleet would increase the warhead loading from 672 to approximately 800 by the early 2020s. If the improved Boreys carry 20 SLBMs as rumored, the warhead loading could be closer to 900 warheads. If the New START Treaty is extended beyond 2021, Russia would probably have to reduce warhead loading on the Bulava SLBM to stay below the treaty limit.

Strategic bombers

Russia operates two types of nuclear-capable heavy bombers: the Tu-160 Blackjack and the Tu-95MS Bear H. Both types can carry the nuclear AS-15 Kent (Kh-55) air-launched cruise missile (ALCM)³ and possibly gravity bombs,⁴ and the Tu-160 can also carry the nuclear AS-16 Kickback (Kh-15) short-range attack missile.⁵ A new long-range nuclear cruise missile, designated the Kh-102, is under development.

There is growing uncertainty about the number of Russian bombers and their operational status. New START does not only count bombers known to have been assigned a nuclear mission but all bombers with some residual equipment. Our current estimate of roughly 60 deployed nuclear bombers is based largely on commercial satellite images, which show an average of 54 to 57 bombers typically present at the two strategic bomber bases, Engels and Ukrainka. Another 23 to 26 bombers are typically present at the Ryazan training base, the Kazan production plant, and the Zhukovsky design plant, for a total inventory of 77 to 83 bombers. This number is probably a little high because some of the visible bombers may have been retired, some of the bombers counted were Tu-142 maritime bombers, and the satellite images were not all taken on the same day. Nevertheless, by averaging the numbers visible on all of the images we arrive at a rough estimate of 72 nuclear-capable bombers in service. In addition to the 54 to 57 deployed bombers normally visible at Engels and Ukrainka, another half a dozen or so aircraft from the bases might be on training flights or temporarily at other bases, for an estimated force of perhaps 60 deployed nuclear bombers. Unfortunately, New START does not publicize the actual number.

How many nuclear weapons are assigned to the heavy bombers is a great unknown. Each Tu-160 can carry up to 12 nuclear AS-15 A air-launched cruise missiles. The Tu-95MS can carry six to 16 cruise missiles, depending on configuration. Combined, the 50 to 60 operational bombers could potentially carry an estimated 640 cruise missiles. The Tu-160 may also have a secondary mission with nuclear gravity bombs, but it seems unlikely that the old and slow Tu-95 would stand much of a chance against modern air defense systems. Most bomber nuclear weapons are probably in central storage with only a couple of hundred deployed at the two heavy bomber bases.

The first seven upgraded Tu-160 s and Tu-95MSs returned to service in 2014 (Interfax, 2014b), and Russian military officials have recently indicated that 10 Tu-160s and as many as 43 Tu-95MSs will be upgraded (Interfax, 2014c; RIA Novosti, 2013b).

In addition to the Tu-160 and Tu-95MS bombers counted under New START, Russia also operates approximately 100 intermediate-range Tu-22M3 (Backfire) bombers that are capable of delivering AS-4 (Kitchen) cruise missiles and bombs. Because it is not counted under New START and does not have intercontinental range, the Tu-22M3 is not considered strategic but tactical. The Tu-22M3 and its weapons are old, and approximately 30 are scheduled for an upgrade to the Tu-22M3M configuration by 2020.

To replace all of these old bombers, Russia is developing a new nuclear-capable, subsonic bomber known as the PAK-DA. The government signed a contract with manufacturer Tupolev in 2013 for construction at the Kazan factory. The first flight is planned for 2019 with delivery to the Russian Air Force around 2023 (RIA Novosti, 2014b).

Nonstrategic (tactical) weapons

In addition to modernizing its strategic nuclear forces, Russia is also updating some of its nonstrategic nuclear forces. This effort is less comprehensive and less clear but essentially also involves phasing out Soviet-era weapons and replacing them on a less than one-for-one basis with newer but fewer weapons. The Russian military continues to attribute importance to nonstrategic nuclear weapons that can be used by naval, tactical air, and air- and missile-defense forces, as well as on short-range ballistic missiles. Part of the rationale is that nonstrategic nuclear weapons are needed to offset NATO’s—and particularly the United States’—superior conventional forces.

Another rationale is that nonstrategic nuclear weapons are needed to counter China’s large and increasingly capable conventional forces in the Far East. Yet another rationale sometimes heard is that a sizable inventory of nonstrategic nuclear weapons helps Russia keep overall nuclear parity with the combined nuclear forces of the United States, Britain, and France. Finally, Russia maintains a diverse and sizable nonstrategic nuclear arsenal because it is there; it is what was left after the demise of the Soviet Union and helps maintain Russia’s prestige among military powers.

We estimate that Russia has approximately 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear warheads assigned for delivery by air, naval, and various defensive forces.⁶ As with the US government, the Russian government does not provide any information of how many nonstrategic nuclear weapons it possesses. We estimate that the Russian inventory is declining and will continue to decline over the next decade with or without an arms control agreement. The Russian government has repeatedly said that all of its nonstrategic nuclear weapons are in central storage.

The Russian Navy’s nonstrategic nuclear modernization effort is focused on the introduction of the next class of nuclear attack submarines, the Severodvinsk (known in Russia as Yasen). This submarine may be equipped with a new type of nuclear-capable, long-range sea-launched cruise missile, known as Kalibr. The NATO designation is still unclear; it might be called the SS-N-30, but it is thought to be a replacement for the SS-N-21 (Granat). The status of the Severodvinsk class is unclear because the Kalibr name is also sometimes used to describe a short-range, non-nuclear anti-ship cruise missile. The Severodvinsk-class submarines will also be able to deliver SS-N-16 (Veter) nuclear anti-submarine rockets, as well as nuclear torpedoes.

The air force is working to replace its long-term nonstrategic nuclear bomber, the Su-24M (Fencer), with the new Su-34 (Fullback) fighter-bomber. This new bomber is equivalent to the US nuclear-capable F-15E and F-16 fighter-bombers deployed in Europe. Deployment of the Su-34 has begun at two bases in the western and southern military districts: Voronezh and Morozovsk. A total of 120 Su-34 s are planned through 2020.

The army is in the middle of a modernization of its short-range ballistic missile force that involves replacing the SS-21 (Tochka) with the SS-26 (Kaliber-M). Whereas the SS-21 launcher carries a single missile with a range of 120 kilometers, the SS-26 launcher carries two missiles with a range of about 300 kilometers.

In 2014, the US government formally accused Russia of being:

in violation of its obligations under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles. (US Department of State, 2014)

Russia’s GLCM presumably is intended for potential deployment with army forces, but the US government has not publicly provided details about the weapon system. During the nomination process to become secretary of defense, though, Ashton Carter confirmed that the GLCM is nuclear: “Russia’s INF Treaty violation is consistent with its strategy of relying on nuclear weapons to offset US and NATO conventional superiority” (US Senate Armed Services Committee, 2015). US government officials privately say the GLCM is not yet deployed.

Russia’s air- and missile-defense forces are also upgrading nuclear-capable systems. The S-300 air-defense system with nuclear-capable SA-10/20 interceptors is deployed across Russia and is slowly being upgraded to the S-400 system with SA-21 interceptors, and an upgrade of the nuclear-tipped A-135 antiballistic missile defense system around Moscow is said to be under way.

Overall, however, as non-nuclear weapon systems become more effective, some Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons will likely be phased out in the foreseeable future. One example is the SS-N-19 (Granit) on the Oskar-class guided-missile submarines, Kuznetsov-class aircraft carriers, and the Kirov-class nuclear-powered cruisers, a naval nuclear cruise missile that was developed specifically to destroy aircraft carrier battle groups. Some of the vessels currently carrying the SS-N-19 (Granit) may be converted to carry the non-nuclear SS-N-26 (Onyx) or SS-N-27 (Sizzler) in the future.

One of the unique characteristics of nonstrategic nuclear forces is that they tend to be dual-capable; that is, they can be armed with either conventional or nuclear weapons. This raises some important questions about intentional and unintentional signals and the risk that nuclear weapons could unintentionally get pulled into a crisis and exacerbate the threat perception. This is to some extent already occurring in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis, with Russian deployment of nonstrategic nuclear-capable forces to Crimea noted by NATO, and US rotational deployments of nuclear-capable, nonstrategic aircraft to Poland noted by Russia (Kristensen, 2014a, 2014b; Sputnik, 2014).

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

Research assistance was provided by Puja Mody, an intern at the Federation of American Scientists.

Funding

This research was carried out with grants from the New-Land Foundation and the Ploughshares Fund.

Notes

Author biographies

Hans M. Kristensen is the director of the Nuclear Information Project with the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) in Washington, DC. His work focuses on researching and writing about the status of nuclear weapons and the policies that direct them. Kristensen is a co-author of the world nuclear forces overview in the SIPRI Yearbook (Oxford University Press) and a frequent adviser to the news media on nuclear weapons policy and operations. He has co-authored Nuclear Notebook since 2001. Inquiries should be directed to FAS, 1725 DeSales St., NW, Sixth Floor, Washington, DC 20036, USA; (202) 546-3300.

Robert S. Norris is a senior fellow with the Federation of American Scientists in Washington, DC. A former senior research associate with the Natural Resources Defense Council, his principal areas of expertise include writing and research on all aspects of the nuclear weapons programs of the United States, the Soviet Union and Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China, as well as India, Pakistan, and Israel. He is the author of Racing for the Bomb: General Leslie R. Groves, the Manhattan Project’s Indispensable Man (Steerforth) and co-author of Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to Yeltsin (Westview). He co-authored or contributed to the chapter on nuclear weapons in the 1985 to 2000 editions of the SIPRI Yearbook (Oxford University Press) and has co-authored Nuclear Notebook since 1987.

References

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Russian nuclear forces,2015