How to approach nuclear modernization?

Abstract

Between 2014 and 2023, the United States expects to spend $355 billion to modernize its nuclear arsenal. In subsequent decades, even higher expenditures are envisioned. But Washington is far from alone in modernizing its nuclear weapons. According to researchers from the Federation of American Scientists, “all the nuclear-armed states have ambitious nuclear weapon modernization programs … that appear intended to prolong the nuclear era indefinitely.” Disarmament advocates believe such modernizations are fundamentally at odds with the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons—while weapon states argue that, as long as nuclear weapons exist, arsenals must be modernized in order to keep them safe, secure, and effective. Here, Eugene Miasnikov of Russia (2015), Matthew Kroenig of the United States (2015), and Lu Yin of China debate how—in a world where complete disarmament is nearly every nation’s stated goal but disarmament seems by no means imminent—nuclear-armed countries should approach the maintenance and modernization of their arsenals.

In nuclear arms control and disarmament, one sees two competing trends at play: an aspiration in many quarters to eliminate nuclear weapons and a practical desire among nuclear weapon states to modernize their arsenals. What sort of balance between these forces can be achieved?

Nuclear powers feel the need to modernize their arsenals for three main reasons. First, in today’s international security environment they still see nuclear weapons as necessary, mainly for deterrence purposes. Second, nuclear weapons continue to play a very important role in maintaining global strategic stability. Third, as long as nuclear arsenals exist, modernization is necessary in order to keep weapons safe and reliable.

But nuclear weapon states themselves, even as they emphasize the necessity of modernizing their arsenals, acknowledge that nuclear weapons ought to be eliminated eventually. For example, the Obama administration launched in 2009 a vigorous initiative toward achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. But today’s heavy US investment in nuclear modernization seems at odds with the objective of disarmament. Between 2014 and 2023, the United States is expected to spend $355 billion on modernization. Reductions in US warheads envisioned under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) will be offset by upgrades in the quality of the US arsenal.

China also feels the need to modernize its nuclear forces—in order to enhance survivability and maintain a credible minimum nuclear deterrent. But these are China’s only objectives for its nuclear weapons. Among the five recognized nuclear weapon states, China is the only nation that has committed itself to an unconditional no-first-use policy. This policy has consistently placed restraints on China’s nuclear force development (which, in any case, has never been a top priority in China’s military modernization drive). China consistently advocates for a world free of nuclear weapons. It has never participated in a nuclear arms race. It has never deployed nuclear weapons in any other country’s territory.

But again, all nuclear-armed nations (not limited to the United States and China) see modernization as indispensable. Further disarmament progress seems extremely difficult as long as modernization programs continue apace. What’s the way out of this bind? The key—because national nuclear strategies determine the direction of nuclear programs—is to adjust national strategies so that less emphasis is given to the role of nuclear weapons.

Today, most nuclear-armed states still assign nuclear weapons a very important role in their strategies for safeguarding security. Washington, in its most recent Nuclear Posture Review, decided to no longer assign certain marginal or unrealistic tasks to nuclear weapons, but made no fundamental changes to the role of US nuclear weapons or to nuclear war-fighting strategy. As long as nuclear weapons play such a crucial role in US strategy, and as long as the United States maintains its desire for absolute security, Washington will unlikely reduce its nuclear arsenal to relatively low levels or make dramatic changes to its current modernization program. Much the same holds true for Russia.

But if the United States and Russia significantly alter their nuclear strategies, further substantial reductions in arsenals will be possible. If the two nations’ arsenals are reduced, other states will be encouraged to consider how and when they might participate in multilateral disarmament processes. Multilateral disarmament will be no easy task—as shown by the history of US-Russia disarmament negotiations, even bilateral processes are very difficult. Still, further progress by the United States and Russia can serve as an inspiration to other nuclear-armed nations.

There’s a further complication, however—missile defense systems and Prompt Global Strike capacities pose a serious threat to strategic stability and to disarmament. New START imposed no restrictions on the development of ballistic missile defense or advanced conventional weapons, and developments in either technology could trigger a renewed nuclear arms race. Consequently, the development and deployment of such systems require great discretion. (New START, incidentally, also leaves the United States with a strong nuclear “upload” capability. That is, the United States retains ample space on deployed missiles to redeploy warheads that have been taken out of service (Kristensen, 2010). Russia, in contrast, has little upload capacity.)

The practical choice

Eliminating nuclear weapons does not appear feasible at this stage. Modernizations of nuclear arsenals are certain to go forward. But it’s possible, and very important, to achieve a balance between modernization and disarmament. The United States and Russia must take the lead in establishing this balance—first by de-emphasizing nuclear weapons in their national security strategies so that the practical reasons for possessing nuclear weapons can gradually disappear, and second by reducing their arsenals. This can establish trust and set a good example for other nations. Nations with smaller nuclear arsenals must also join in comprehensive arms control and disarmament processes in the long run. In the meantime, they must be careful not to impede US-Russia bilateral reductions.

For the two nuclear superpowers, reducing arsenal size should simply be a practical choice. Nuclear modernization and maintenance are very expensive. Huge nuclear arsenals have become redundant in the post-Cold War security environment. Washington and Moscow will retain their deterrence capability if they reduce their arsenals and will also, at least partially, satisfy the disarmament expectations of the international community.

The complete prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons may be a long-term dream at this point, but the longest journey begins with a single step. A practical path toward disarmament can be set if, most importantly, the United States and Russia de-emphasize nuclear weapons and reduce their nuclear arsenals. In addition, all nuclear-armed nations should take concrete actions such as dealing cooperatively with common security challenges, instituting or enhancing confidence-building measures, making careful plans for crisis management, and seeking to avoid miscalculations.

In addition, nuclear-armed countries should seriously consider establishing a treaty that would, among signatories, ban the first use of nuclear weapons. Such a treaty would also prohibit using nuclear weapons, or threatening to use them, against non-nuclear weapon states at any time and under any conditions. National positions on such a treaty might constitute a litmus test as to whether countries are truly serious about nuclear disarmament.