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Abstract

The United Nations has consistently supported the elimination of nuclear weapons, frequently referring to the effects of the 1945 bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan. Despite awareness of the severe effects of the use of nuclear weapons on targeted or adjacent populations, at a practical level the UN system has not specifically planned how it would respond to assist the victims of nuclear weapons. Moreover, the current humanitarian system is largely unprepared for the special challenges of such an event. This is significant for three reasons: First, the probability of the explosion of a nuclear weapon in populated areas may be low, but such an event is not impossible; there are many ways nuclear weapons might be detonated, either deliberately or inadvertently, with severe humanitarian consequences. Second, in assisting the victims, the UN-coordinated humanitarian system could put its own personnel at risk. Third, although any humanitarian response would at least in part be only palliative, and prevention remains the only adequate response, organizations within the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement have already begun considering these issues and the UN needs to be ready to work with them. There are many ways in which the humanitarian system could better prepare for the challenges that even a single nuclear explosion would pose, and such preparation is consistent with the UN’s mission and the secretary-general’s recent call for all feasible steps to be taken to avoid systemic humanitarian failures.

Keywords

disaster relief humanitarian response nuclear weapons Red Crescent Red Cross United Nations

Representatives from more than 128 states, international organizations, civil society groups, and academia met in Oslo, Norway, in March 2013 to discuss the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons. Convened by the Norwegian government, the conference was inspired by a document agreed to at the end of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’s 2010 review that expressed “deep concern at the continued risk for humanity represented by the possibility that these weapons could be used and the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would result from the use of nuclear weapons” (2010 Review Conference, 2010: 19).

The Oslo conference was significant in part because it prompted several international humanitarian and development agencies to look at how well they were prepared to respond to the detonation of a nuclear weapon, and how smoothly their efforts could coordinate. In some cases, this was the first time they had attempted to take stock. (Building on the Oslo conference, a follow-up conference was held in Nayarit, Mexico, this past February. A third conference will take place in Vienna, Austria, this December.)

The results of the stock-taking were not reassuring. In summarizing the contributions, the Oslo conference’s chair found:

It is unlikely that any state or international body could address the immediate humanitarian emergency caused by a nuclear weapon detonation in an adequate manner and provide sufficient assistance to those affected. Moreover, it might not be possible to establish such capacities, even if it were attempted. (Eide, 2013)

The Oslo conference’s finding underlined the importance of preventing the use of nuclear weapons—ideally by curbing and eliminating the more than 17,000 nuclear weapons still in the arsenals of nine countries (SIPRI, 2013). Reinforcing this finding, an increasingly detailed picture is emerging that depicts the risks of the detonation of a nuclear weapon from a litany of accidents, mishaps, and misperceptions that have been “too close for comfort,” as one study put it (Lewis et al., 2014). Because risk in basic terms is the probability of an event multiplied by its consequences, even an event that is very unlikely to occur at any given moment could still be of significant risk in view of its severe consequences, and it will happen sooner or later.

One question the Oslo conference raises for international bodies is what kind of humanitarian situation would actually be created by a nuclear weapon’s detonation. During the Cold War, the world feared a large-scale—and maybe civilization-ending—thermonuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. This led World Health Organization (WHO) experts to state in 1987 that in public-health terms the “primary prevention” of nuclear war was the only course of action, as the humanitarian consequences would be utterly overwhelming (WHO, 1987).

After the Cold War, concerns about nuclear war largely faded, although since the attacks of September 11, US policy attention has focused on the consequences of the explosion of a nuclear bomb in a city by terrorists. There are many scenarios that involve a nuclear detonation, however, at least as plausible as a single low-yield nuclear explosion in a Western city, or a war entailing the use of hundreds or thousands of thermonuclear warheads. In at least some of these scenarios, international humanitarian organizations such as the UN and components of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent are likely to be called upon to assist victims (Loye and Coupland, 2007).

Because of this, a further question is whether the UN could feasibly do anything to make the international response to assist the victims better than what the Oslo and Nayarit conferences suggest it would currently be. Humanitarianism marks the UN system’s broader mission, and since the organization’s inception it has taken a strong stand in favor of nuclear disarmament (Rydell, 2013). Recently, the UN secretary-general said the organization must avoid further systemic failure in its humanitarian response and “improve how we react to impending catastrophes” (Secretary-General of the United Nations, 2013). Making specific plans for how to respond to the explosion of a nuclear weapon is logical and consistent with these aims. Moreover, other organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, have concluded that they have a responsibility to plan their response to nuclear weapon detonations—even if such assistance is largely palliative (Coupland and Loye, 2009).

Prompted by the Oslo conference’s finding, researchers at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) began investigating these questions in August 2013 in cooperation with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the UN Development Programme. Among other things, their study, to be published by UNIDIR in summer 2014, recommends that the UN form a humanitarian task team, conduct simulations of nuclear detonations and their effects on humanitarian responses, review the plans for responding to a nuclear detonation (or lack of them), clarify the roles of relevant humanitarian organizations and specialized agencies, and develop measures to protect field personnel responding to assist the victims of a nuclear explosion (Borrie and Caughley, 2014).

Why nuclear weapon detonations create particular humanitarian challenges

As a first step, it is important to briefly review what nuclear weapons do, because in policy literature nuclear weapon detonations are often lumped together with chemical, biological, and radiological weapons use. Yet the detonation of nuclear weapons is very different from the release of germs, toxic chemicals, or dirty bombs—as are their effects (WHO, 2003a, 2003b). It is also tempting to conflate the kind of response required to assist the victims of nuclear weapons with the response needed at civil nuclear accidents like the reactor meltdowns and radiation releases at the Fukushima Daiichi and Chernobyl plants. However, nuclear weapon explosions are different from accidents at nuclear power plants, and in most respects more serious than a reactor meltdown or radiation release.

One reason for this distinction is that a nuclear weapon’s detonation creates enormous blast and heat effects over a wide area. If the explosion occurs in a populated area—which could be a city, a suburb, a refugee or displaced persons camp, or a relief delivery point—these effects will actually cause the largest proportion of immediate death, injury, and destruction. (For simplicity’s sake, we talk here about the detonation of a single nuclear weapon, but a single “nuclear weapon detonation event” could plausibly involve detonation of multiple weapons in a single place or contiguous area around the same time, whether caused deliberately or inadvertently.)

Also, a large amount of what is called “prompt” radiation created by the nuclear detonation would be lethal a significant radius from its hypocenter, or ground zero. However, depending upon the explosive yield of the nuclear weapon, many of those harmed by that radiation would probably already be killed or wounded by the blast or thermal radiation effects. Other effects include flash (which can cause eye injury, including blindness for anyone within range looking in the direction of the detonation) and electromagnetic pulse, which could disable or destroy electronic equipment over a wide area, especially for devices on electrical power (Glasstone and Dolan, 1977).

Beyond this, it is difficult to generalize too much about the effects of nuclear weapons, because many factors come into play. These include the yield of the explosion, the altitude at which it detonates, environmental factors such as the weather, and the location and topography of the area in which it is detonated, as well as population density and the time of day at which a detonation occurs. (Many cities swell in population during the day as commuters arrive for work.) By way of illustration, even though the atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki on August 9, 1945 was larger in explosive yield than the one dropped a few days earlier on Hiroshima, Nagasaki’s more hilly terrain resulted in fewer immediate casualties (Rhodes, 1986).¹

Certainly, the explosion of a nuclear weapon in a population center would create a wide zone of devastation. Many fires would be started by the intense thermal radiation, and they could be expected to spread without emergency intervention. Even if emergency responders in the area survived and tried to fight the blazes, debris would lie everywhere in the most severely affected zones, blocking roads and disabling other transport infrastructure. In Nagasaki, for example, surviving fire crews were not able to get within two kilometers of the hypocenter after the detonation, and the many broken pipes caused loss of water pressure and water supply, permitting fires to spread (Committee for the Compilation of Materials, 1981).

Meanwhile, many injured or dead people would lie trapped in the rubble. Large numbers of injured people with severe burns and other serious trauma would require urgent medical assistance and radioactive decontamination, or else they would die. Many would die simply because no country has enough of the specialized medical resources to adequately treat patients with serious burns, even if these people made it alive to functioning hospitals (IAEA, 2005). In addition, some victims would also be suffering the effects of radiation-induced illness—which can be fatal on its own—compounding the challenges of effective medical treatment (Gale and Baranov, 2011).

Furthermore, radioactive fallout would be created by nuclear weapons detonated at ground level, as well as by large airburst nuclear detonations. This creates a range of challenges for the safety of responders, for access to help victims, and for populations downwind of the bomb blast in the days and weeks following a nuclear weapon’s detonation. Such radioactive fallout can be lofted for hundreds and even thousands of kilometers, and shifts its trajectory according to wind strength and direction. One US study, taking into account the wind patterns in four major American cities suffering a hypothetical attack with nuclear weapons, found that not only would the direct suffering and destruction be terrible, but that many of the hospitals and other medical facilities in the area would be unusable because of fallout (Bell and Dallas, 2007). (In fact, some of these facilities might also be rendered ineffective due to electromagnetic pulse effects.) In sparsely populated regions, fallout from even a single low-yield nuclear weapon detonated at ground level could still have a significant effect on human health, including fatalities (Nelson, 2002).

Even in the scenario of just a single nuclear detonation, the fear of radiation and of further nuclear bomb detonations could have profound effects on mass behavior (Dodgen et al., 2011). In addition to people fleeing the detonation zone, experts foresee that many others further away would flee as well—a process that in many cases would make them more vulnerable and compound problems for first responders if those fleeing were to cluster at already overstretched hospitals and other essential facilities, or cause traffic jams (Meit et al., 2011). In a city like New York or Mumbai, mass evacuation would be challenging due to transportation bottlenecks caused by topography. Contradictory guidance to the public by the authorities, or official hesitancy or obfuscation, could create panic or the breakdown of order.

Studies of survivors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear attacks (Committee for the Compilation of Materials, 1981), and more recently studies of the long-term consequences for the population around Chernobyl after the 1986 nuclear reactor disaster (UNDP et al., 2002), indicate that there would be a multitude of longer-term effects of nuclear weapon detonations. Perhaps the biggest immediate issue could be mass displacement of people from the affected areas. Depending upon the disaster’s scale, sizable populations might require help of various kinds—such as food, water, sanitation, shelter, medical care, and education—for some time. Such displacement would create pressure on resources in surrounding regions and probably require outside assistance (Redlener et al., 2013). Some hypothesize that a regional nuclear war, in South Asia for instance, could see mass death and millions of survivors on the move, including across borders. These effects could possibly include global famine (Helfand, 2013), due to the impact of such a war on the climate and thus on food production (Robock and Toon, 2012). (Detonation of nuclear weapons in multiple urban areas could produce so much smoke that temperatures would fall below those of the Little Ice Age of the 14th to 19th centuries, thereby shortening the growing season around the world and threatening the global food supply.)

The trauma of a nuclear detonation event, including loss of life savings, physical assets, personal and business capital, plant facilities, and other forms of wealth and economic opportunity, along with the death or disappearance of friends and family members, would be profoundly stressful for survivors and likely lead to depression and post-traumatic stress disorder among some survivors (Redlener et al., 2013). In view of the magnitude of destruction and the lingering radioactive contamination in the zone affected by the nuclear weapon, survivors may literally have nothing to return to, leading to the need for resettlement or migration.

The humanitarian system

The international community’s primary mechanism for responding to major sudden disasters is the humanitarian system coordinated by the UN’s emergency relief coordinator, who also handles the organization’s humanitarian affairs. The “humanitarian system” refers primarily to entities involved in the provision or coordination of relief activities, including relevant parts of the UN, specialized international agencies, and humanitarian nongovernmental organizations. Other participants include the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (ICRC, 2013), and in certain cases governments themselves—which, irrespective of the level of their direct involvement, are asked to pay the bulk of the humanitarian system’s costs.

This highly heterogeneous system is structured around 11 thematic clusters, each with its own lead agency to coordinate and act as a provider of last resort, ranging from logistics, shelter, health, emergency telecommunications, water, sanitation, and hygiene to education and early recovery, as well as issues of various kinds that cut across neat boundaries (IASC, 2006).

The cluster system is highly flexible, and not all clusters are necessarily activated in any given emergency. To be effective, the system depends on a high degree of largely voluntary cooperation. It also has a long history of efforts to develop common standards, procedures, and coordination processes.

The humanitarian system has plenty of experience to draw upon, in the form of many types of disasters. In addition to the wide variety of contexts in which the humanitarian system operates, at the beginning of 2014, three situations were designated as major sudden humanitarian crises triggered by natural disaster or conflict, or Level 3 emergencies: in Syria, in the Central African Republic, and in the Philippines following Typhoon Haiyan (OCHA, 2014). These were situations in which system-wide mobilization was required (IASC, 2012); to give a sense of scale, the humanitarian system is presently coordinating assistance to more than 9 million people in the Syria conflict alone, and it has helped nearly 14 million people affected by Typhoon Haiyan (OCHA, 2014).

Fortunately, a nuclear weapon detonation event in a populated area is one kind of disaster to which the humanitarian system has not had to respond—yet. (The UN did not yet exist in 1945 when the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings occurred.) If the humanitarian system were asked to do so, it would “present manifold and severe challenges” (OCHA, 2013b). Some of its existing procedures and capacities would be relevant on paper, such as those within the cluster system. However, in other important senses, responding to the consequences of a nuclear weapon detonation is not completely analogous to other sudden disasters.

Nuclear detonations—including the radioactive fallout they spread—create special complications of their own, including the need for decontamination and special medical treatment of victims and those downwind. It could be challenging for the UN simply to protect its own humanitarian personnel, given the lack of protective equipment, doctrines, and training—especially if the imminent threat of further use of nuclear weapons exists. Like many emergencies, the aftermath of a nuclear weapon detonation event would be complex—but complex in new and unfamiliar ways for the humanitarian system.

Moreover, the many scenarios in which nuclear detonations could conceivably occur would each have varying effects, which in turn would affect the response that is required or is even possible. The level of harm and destruction caused in a highly populated area would defy any reasonable state of local preparedness; help would have to come from outside. The scale of that need for assistance would likely be too great for most states to deal with one nuclear weapon’s detonation, let alone several detonations.

So where does the United Nations system stand in relation to a nuclear weapon detonation event?

No specific response framework

Certain niche capabilities exist for radiation detection or protection within some specialized agencies, such as the WHO and the International Atomic Energy Agency; there are also networks of expertise that can be tapped to track radiation-related phenomena, and a joint plan to respond to civil nuclear emergencies (IAEA, 2013). Nevertheless, a specific UN framework for coordinating a humanitarian response to the detonation of nuclear weapons does not exist. Basic levels of preparedness for practical ways to protect humanitarian staff in the field—let alone offer the victims assistance—are lacking. This is significant because some of the UN officials with whom we spoke during our research assumed that plans exist for “lower-end” nuclear weapon detonation events, with the IAEA in particular playing a leadership role in providing expertise, equipment, and operational capacity. Even when one considers the Inter-Agency Committee on Radiological and Nuclear Emergencies (IACRNE) or the UN inter-agency work on coordinating international response to nuclear terrorism (CTITF, 2010), this does not appear to be the case.

Moreover, there have been no international humanitarian exercises on providing relief to the victims of nuclear weapon detonations.

By the time the UN is called in to coordinate humanitarian assistance in the aftermath of a nuclear weapon explosion, it would already be too late to avoid a humanitarian disaster. Asking for the humanitarian system to mobilize to help indicates that the event is already beyond the capacity of affected states to respond.

This may seem like an obvious point, but for a UN-coordinated humanitarian response to become necessary, the situation must already be a disaster. This implies that the nuclear weapon detonation event has already occurred in a populated area, or will soon affect it via delayed effects such as fallout or fleeing survivors. Consequently, there would already be many casualties and a great deal of critical infrastructure destroyed or damaged. Fear, displacement, and disruption would already be occurring.

In an important sense, any response would be inadequate, because the immediate harm has already been done. Anything that the UN system could do at this point is in response to an already serious level of harm. Moreover, before the UN could even respond, an affected state would have to request humanitarian assistance, which it might not do straightaway. One reason might be that the nuclear blast has incapacitated the government, but other reasons are also conceivable—including fears about admitting the international community, or that international humanitarian operations could interfere with its own response.

Delayed deployment

The immediate needs of the victims in the event of a nuclear weapon detonation event would fall upon local and national authorities, to the extent that they can still function. Expert opinion assumes that any help beyond local resources would take days or longer to arrive (National Security Staff, 2010)—and this is particularly true of international assistance, which is sometimes not even seriously considered in local and national-level planning for nuclear weapon detonation events, to the extent that planning exists.

This is unfortunate, as the time immediately after any disaster occurs is a key period. US authorities have noted that “by far, the greatest factor impacting the reduction of the effects of the detonation on the general population will remain the speed and appropriateness of the decisions that are made and the effectiveness of the dissemination of this information” (DHS, 2006: 1.6). This is also a relevant point for the UN in coordinating a meaningful humanitarian response at an international level.

It also bears on the likely roles the UN could usefully play, such as acting as a reputable and consistent source of expert advice to the public, assisting the international community with scientific data and analysis to provide informed decisions about allotting resources for humanitarian assistance, helping with crisis communications, and handling second-wave crisis problems such as assisting displaced populations. The needs of affected people and communities would continue to evolve in the weeks, months, and even years that follow the explosion of a nuclear bomb.

The humanitarian cluster system is unprepared to respond to a nuclear weapon detonation

Some of the issues that the UNIDIR study identified include the fact that there is no clearly defined focal point within the humanitarian system for planning a response to nuclear weapon-specific phenomena. In addition, specialized standing responsibilities, such as radiation monitoring and decontamination at the field level in support of humanitarian operations, have not been allocated either to international agencies or to other humanitarian partners.

Furthermore, it is currently unclear to those inside and outside the humanitarian system whether and how the mandates of each individual agency would apply. For instance, some specialized agencies view their responsibilities as coming into play only in cases of civil radiological emergencies but not in cases of nuclear weapon use. Or they may see themselves responding to some scenarios, such as nuclear weapons terrorism, but not to others—such as accidents with nuclear weapons, or the deliberate use of nuclear weapons by a country.

Standing arrangements for coordination between the UN humanitarian system and the relevant national authorities in the specific case of a nuclear weapon detonation event do not appear to exist.

There is little doubt that the humanitarian system would swing into action as swiftly as it could. In being interviewed for the UNIDIR study, some UN personnel said in effect that “where there’s a will, there’s a way,” especially by using back channels such as social media and personal relationships. But developing these kinds of complex or specialized arrangements during the heat of a crisis is not ideal. And they would take time—with ample chance for confusion or misinterpretation that could impede assisting the victims in meaningful ways.

Fear of further nuclear weapon explosions could complicate response

In the hours, days, or even weeks following a first event, its origin—or the identity of those responsible—may not be known. Such uncertainty could create further crises. In view of this, and because of deficiencies in planning and appropriate response capacity, humanitarian agencies may decide that it is too hazardous to deliver humanitarian relief to the affected.

For their part, the state or states affected might be unwilling to accept relief until the environment is sufficiently “secure.” Countries in a position to offer assistance may be unwilling to do so if they fear further nuclear weapon detonation events are plausible. This could exacerbate suffering for those directly affected or displaced.

Planning for the aftermath can make a difference

Organizing the capacity for a response before a nuclear weapon explodes in an inhabited area—however inadequate that response may prove to be—is not simply a matter of anticipation and readiness to meet public expectations. It can help to save lives by reducing the time necessary for devising decision-making channels, coordinating the mobilization of resources, and resolving health and safety issues related to the positioning of relief personnel.

What the UN-coordinated humanitarian system needs are systematic decision-making processes, determined in advance, that clearly set out the premises on which mobilization will be triggered based on assessments of the contamination levels and other risks involved in deploying personnel to an area that has suffered a nuclear blast.

There is a base to work from here: The UN system has honed its cooperative efforts in the humanitarian sphere—which include the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), a group that includes key UN and non-UN humanitarian partners and the cluster system—and in dealing with civil radiological issues through entities such as the Inter-Agency Committee on Radiological and Nuclear Emergencies (OCHA, 2013a; Secretary-General of the United Nations, 2011). Components of planning could include studying and simulating various scenarios for nuclear weapons detonation to determine the best humanitarian response. In view of existing coordination practices, the development of necessary understandings about decision making and a protocol for planning need not consume a lot of resources.

Establishing appropriate arrangements in the humanitarian system is one thing. But no one should believe that in a humanitarian emergency caused by any of a number of nuclear weapon detonation scenarios, the humanitarian system could respond in “an adequate manner and provide sufficient assistance to those affected,” in the words of the Oslo conference chair’s summary (Eide, 2013). Defining a general approach and enhancing the planning to deal with lower-end events like single detonations may be all that is feasible for the UN to do, given its many pressing priorities and constrained resources. The sheer immensity of the challenges involved in responding to the explosion of a nuclear weapon in a populated area means that prevention remains the only fully effective humanitarian or public health approach. This was also the conclusion of the chairs of the Oslo and Nayarit conferences in their summaries.

Yet, there is another side to this kind of “reality check” (Coupland and Loye, 2009). It may be that those states possessing nuclear weapons or otherwise dependent upon them for perceived security are not eager to face renewed attention on the humanitarian aspects of nuclear explosions in populated areas; such attention raises uncomfortable questions about the continued acceptability or legitimacy of these arms. In view of this, it might be tempting for international agencies to ignore the task of making specific plans for responding to nuclear weapon explosions of the most plausible kinds.

If this were to occur, what would be left is the continued illusion of safety, in which humanitarian staff are put at unnecessary risk if an event should occur, and more victims are likely to endure greater suffering. This is something states should bear in mind in their deliberations about disarmament, nuclear emergencies, and planning for response. Some advance thought and planning within the humanitarian system now could significantly reduce the overall, long-term level of harm arising later from a nuclear weapon detonation event, even if there is not much it could do in the immediate aftermath.

Considering all these issues, UNIDIR’s study suggests a number of practical steps, including the development of a humanitarian task team; the simulation of various nuclear weapon detonations and their effects on humanitarian responses; the review of current plans for responding to a nuclear detonation; the clarification of the roles and mandates of relevant humanitarian organizations, as well as specialized agencies such as the IAEA and the WHO; and the development of measures to protect field personnel (UNIDIR, 2014).

The UN’s humanitarian and development chiefs have welcomed the UNIDIR study (Borrie and Caughley, 2014), and the humanitarian system is reflecting on its findings. National governments and the general public could help this process along by asking international agencies questions about their mandates and their plans for responding to nuclear weapon detonations. Governments should also consider how to better pursue the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, because as long as nuclear weapons exist there is the risk that they will explode, either deliberately or accidentally.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The author thanks Tim Caughley of UNIDIR for his comments.

Funding

The governments of Norway and Ireland funded this study. Otherwise, this research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

Note

Author biography

John Borrie is a senior researcher and policy adviser at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR; ) in Geneva, Switzerland, where he has led several projects related to disarmament and arms control. Since January 2013, he has been researching the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons. He is also an associate fellow at Chatham House in London. Prior to joining UNIDIR, he worked on weapons issues at the International Committee of the Red Cross, and was deputy head of mission for disarmament at the New Zealand Permanent Mission in Geneva.

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Improving UN planning for a humanitarian response to a nuclear detonation