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Abstract

Currently, all nations with nuclear weapons are modernizing their arsenals, delivery systems, and related infrastructure. These programs have serious implications for nuclear disarmament. By investing in the extension, upgrading, and reinforcement of their arsenals and capacities, the author writes, these governments are investing in the future of nuclear weapons, not in the future of disarmament. Other non-nuclear states have expressed concern with these programs and are using international venues, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty review conferences, to call on the nuclear-armed states to cease these programs, which undermine the objectives of the treaty in terms of both non-proliferation and disarmament. Ending upgrades and investment in nuclear weapons would help establish the necessary conditions for disarmament. The author writes that non-nuclear weapon states should further advance the conditions for disarmament by negotiating a treaty banning nuclear weapons, highlighting that the world’s governments, themselves, do not need to possess nuclear weapons in order to prohibit them.

Keywords

abolition China disarmament France India Israel modernization non proliferation nuclear Pakistan Russia United Kingdom United States weapons

Just a little over three years ago, the future of nuclear disarmament seemed bright to many. In April 2009, US President Barack Obama outlined his “commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons” (White House, 2009). Leaders from other nuclear weapon states agreed in principle with this goal. The Indian government indicated its intention to revive the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan for Nuclear Disarmament. Former political and military figures throughout the world wrote op-eds calling for nuclear disarmament. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon issued a five-point proposal for nuclear disarmament. The 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference reaffirmed the nuclear weapon states’ unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their arsenals. There appeared to be growing, high-level international convergence on the need to eliminate nuclear weapons.

Instinctively, such commitments would be followed by reductions in nuclear arsenals, diminished emphasis on their role in military plans, and lowered expenditures on improving weapons and delivery vehicles. But that wasn’t the case. In fact, while 190 nations convened in New York City for the 2010 NPT Review Conference, in Washington, DC, the Obama administration was in the process of submitting—along with its request for the Senate’s consent to ratify the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START)—a report that included a $180 billion commitment to modernize the country’s nuclear weapons complex: its warheads, its delivery systems, and its production infrastructure.

Though it vastly leads the rest of the world in scale, the United States is not alone in its pursuit of a modernized nuclear arsenal. In fact, China, France, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, and the United Kingdom—all states with nuclear weapons—are planning to, or already are, modernizing their nuclear warheads, delivery systems, or related infrastructure.¹ Their modernization programs have serious implications for disarmament. By investing in the extension, upgrading, and reinforcement of their arsenals and capacities, these governments are actively investing in the future of nuclear weapons, not in the future of disarmament.

The programs

Holding approximately 19,500 nuclear weapons, eight countries have collectively spent around $100 billion on their nuclear programs. At this rate, they will push to at least $1 trillion over the next decade (Blair, 2011). For the past 30 years, these countries have laid down plans to modernize their arsenals and infrastructure, including delivery systems—the primary area of interest for most of these states. France, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom have reduced the numbers of deployed warheads in their arsenals but continue to invest in refurbishing their stockpiles and replacing their delivery vehicles.

China

Since 1980, China’s modernization program has focused on increasing the survivability of its land-based strategic missiles. It is expected that, after this is accomplished, China will speed up the modernization of its sea-based strategic force. US missile defense plans will be a major driving force for China’s nuclear weapon modernization, as some Chinese officials are concerned that even a limited missile defense system could neutralize China’s nuclear force (Zhang, 2012).

France

For at least a decade, France has worked to vastly modernize its nuclear forces, including submarines, aircraft, missiles, warheads, and production facilities that will continue for another decade. Since 2008, France’s Strategic Air Force has undergone significant restructuring, which reflects the modernization of its aircraft and weapons. For example, the force is in the midst of a transition from Mirage to Rafale nuclear-capable fighter-bombers. France has also replaced its cruise missiles and will, by 2015, replace its warheads on its submarine-launched ballistic missiles (Kristensen, 2012).

India

Even prior to its 1998 nuclear tests, India’s modernization program has focused on increasing the diversity, range, and sophistication of nuclear delivery vehicles. Based on official reports and tests, it appears that India is aiming to have all legs of its nuclear triad operational by 2013. There are also plans to expand the nuclear weapons and missile production complex as well as the capacity to enrich uranium (Ramana, 2012).

Israel

Due to the government’s policy of opacity, it is challenging to obtain information about Israel’s nuclear weapons program. In light of current and planned nuclear capabilities, it seems that Israel is continuing to enhance its triad of delivery systems. In 2005, Israel reportedly signed a contract with Germany for the construction of two more submarines. Israel’s nuclear weapons modernization is related to innovations in the security sector generally, specifically in information technology, advanced military technology, and outer-space technology (Datan, 2012).

Pakistan

Pakistan has rapidly developed and expanded its nuclear arsenal since 1998, increasing its capacity to produce plutonium, and thus moving from an arsenal based wholly on highly enriched uranium to one that is more reliant on lighter and more compact plutonium-based weapons. Not only is it testing and deploying a diverse array of nuclear-capable ballistic and cruise missiles—and moving from aircraft-delivered nuclear bombs to nuclear-armed ballistic and cruise missiles—Pakistan also has a growing nuclear weapons research, development, and production infrastructure (Mian, 2012).

Russia

Russia’s modernization plans indicate that the country is determined to maintain parity with the United States in terms of warheads and delivery systems. Most of the operational intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) are currently being retired, but new multiple-warhead missiles are being deployed to replace them. In 2011, the government decided to begin developing a new multiple-warhead, liquid-fuel ICBM, which is slated for deployment in 2016, at the earliest. In the next few years, Russia will continue an overhaul of its current strategic bomber fleet and start work on a new-generation strategic bomber (Podvig, 2012).

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom has plans to upgrade and extend the lives of its warheads in coordination with the US modernization program. Sometime between 2015 and 2020, the government will make a decision on whether or not to replace its Trident system. If it does, major changes are expected that would include participating in the US modernization program of the D5 missile, replacing the UK’s Vanguard-class submarines, modernizing or building new warheads, and upgrading and expanding facilities at the Atomic Weapons Establishment, where the country’s nuclear warheads are both designed and manufactured. The latter would include constructing a new enriched uranium facility and a new warhead assembly and disassembly facility, and refurbishing the plutonium fabrication facility, among other things. The United Kingdom is already developing an arming, fuzing, and firing mechanism for a successor warhead (Ainslie, 2012).

United States

The US government is officially committed to modernizing its nuclear bombs and warheads; the submarines, missiles, and aircraft that carry them; and the laboratories and plants that design, maintain, and manufacture nuclear weapons. US policy and budget documents all demonstrate an intent to keep thousands of nuclear weapons in active service for the foreseeable future, together with the capability to bring stored weapons back into service and to design and manufacture new weapons should they be desired. Furthermore, the United States is refurbishing and upgrading many of the facilities where nuclear weapons are designed, tested, and manufactured (Lichterman, 2012a).

The implications of modernization for nuclear disarmament

All these modernization activities further dim the already bleak prospects for near-term nuclear disarmament. The only two countries that can claim engagement in disarmament negotiations are Russia and the United States, most recently signing and ratifying New START. However, Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists and co-author of Nuclear Notebook in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, has explained that, while New START “reduces the legal limit for deployed strategic warheads, it doesn’t actually reduce the number of warheads. Indeed, the treaty does not require destruction of a single nuclear warhead and actually permits the United States and Russia to deploy almost the same number of strategic warheads that were permitted by the 2002 Moscow Treaty”² (Kristensen, 2010). While both Russia and the United States are considering cuts to their arsenals that go deeper than those required by New START, their simultaneous plans for and investment in modernization undermines the idea that either country is actively pursuing disarmament.

Meanwhile, none of the other nuclear weapon possessors have expressed willingness to engage in negotiations for disarmament until the US and Russian arsenals have come down to “strategic parity” with their own. The Conference on Disarmament, the UN-affiliated body in Geneva in which multilateral disarmament agreements are supposed to be negotiated, has been unable to adopt a program of work in more than 15 years, let alone engage in negotiations on any topic. The governments of France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States have made it clear that they object to the negotiation of a nuclear weapons convention that would ban the possession and use of nuclear weapons. They have all, in one way or another, reiterated President Obama’s remarks that, until nuclear weapons are eliminated, they will retain them (White House, 2009)—a catch-22 of epic proportions.

The international reaction and international law

This state of affairs is not accepted by the vast majority of the world’s governments, yet it continues in large part because the bodies for multilateral disarmament and arms control have not adapted to a post-Cold War period. They allow the interests of the few to outweigh the majority, set up as they are to preserve a balance between power blocs. The dynamics and interests of an interrelated world are not properly accommodated in these bodies, and the nuclear weapon possessors are unwilling to permit structural changes. Nevertheless, at various international fora, non-nuclear weapons states have been pushing hard for measurable, time-bound commitments to nuclear disarmament. Though the strongest provisions of the 2010 NPT Review Conference draft action plan were watered down by the time the final document was adopted, state parties did commit to “pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons” (Final Document: Volume I, 2010). The fact that nuclear weapon modernization programs fly in the face of this commitment has not gone unnoticed by the rest of the world—and it seems it will not go unaddressed during the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

Earlier this year in Vienna, at the 2012 NPT Preparatory Committee, the first meeting leading into the next review conference, non-nuclear weapon states offered critical opinions of modernization. Representatives from the Non-Aligned Movement³ and the New Agenda Coalition⁴—as well as Argentina, Austria, Algeria, Brazil, Egypt, the Holy See, Iran, Malaysia, Norway, South Africa, and Switzerland—all expressed concern about modernization programs and called on nuclear weapon possessors to constrain them. Some states pointed out that investments in modernization will result in the development of new generations of nuclear weapons and perpetuation of non-adherence to the NPT (e.g., Egypt; see Fathalla, 2012a). The Holy See representative argued that it “cannot be considered morally sufficient to draw down the stocks of superfluous nuclear weapons while modernizing nuclear arsenals and investing vast sums to ensure their future production and maintenance. This current course will ensure the perpetuation of these weapons indefinitely” (Banach, 2012).

The Non-Aligned Movement expressed concern that nuclear weapon modernization undermines the minimal reductions agreed upon in New START (Fathalla, 2012b; Puja, 2012). Indeed, it is difficult to judge the New START reductions as a genuine step to nuclear disarmament when they are considered in tandem with programs aimed to upgrade or replace existing systems. Furthermore, since investments in modernization indicate a perpetuation of the possession of nuclear weapons, this is widely seen as an indication of non-compliance with Article VI of the NPT, which stipulates that the nuclear weapon states must achieve nuclear disarmament. Even legal scholars lean on international law to refute the acceptability of modernization.

In fact, international law bearing on modernization is reasonably well-developed. The NPT is currently the only legally binding commitment to nuclear disarmament. Under Article VI, NPT member states have an obligation “to pursue negotiations in good faith on cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date.” Therefore, pending achievement of the end of a nuclear arms race, they must avoid actions that undermine that objective—and they must forego robust improvements to their arsenals (Burroughs, 2012). Furthermore, in addition to reaffirming commitments to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in policy and operation, the 2010 NPT Final Document demonstrated the interest of non-nuclear weapon states in constraining the development of nuclear weapons.

India, Israel, and Pakistan—three states not party to the NPT—also have obligations to disarm, despite their refusal to join the treaty. At an absolute minimum they are arguably subject to the political norm of nuclear disarmament (Burroughs, 2012). The NPT has nearly universal adherence, which is a strong indication of customary international law. In addition, nuclear disarmament has been a goal of the United Nations since its inception.

The incompatibility of nuclear weapons with international humanitarian law, which forbids indiscriminate attacks and prohibits crimes against humanity and genocide, arguably grounds the obligation of their elimination (Burroughs, 2012).

The way forward

With legal, political, and social norms stacking up against modernization, it is clear that concerted opposition is necessary to prevent the further investment in nuclear weapons. Yet as senior research analyst Andrew Lichterman of the Western States Legal Foundation, a nonprofit organization based in Oakland, California, notes:

It appears likely that smaller but still potentially world-destroying nuclear arsenals have been normalized, and are an integral part of the political and economic architecture of the global system as it now exists. Despite social and political changes of a magnitude that, from the perspective of the Cold War times, might have been expected to make nuclear disarmament possible, the nuclear dinosaurs appear to have adapted successfully to their new environment. (Lichterman, 2012b)

Thus, the task now, Lichterman argues, “is to imagine conditions in which humanity can outlive them, and the means to bring those conditions about” (Lichterman, 2012b: 131). Not only must civil society, itself, establish a common movement focused on peace and disarmament—but it must also do the same with governments in order to commit, with one voice, to disarmament and human security.

The international community cannot leave it up to the nuclear weapon states to decide when they are ready to disarm. States party to the NPT violate their obligations to the treaty when they allow states to retain their nuclear weapon capabilities, accept their reliance on nuclear weapons as a form of security and defense, and remain silent when they develop new weapons and facilities. The nuclear weapon states routinely demand that other countries create the conditions for nuclear disarmament; if state parties were to develop concrete responses to ongoing investments in nuclear weapons, this would be a good framework to establish these very conditions.

The clock is ticking. It is now up to non-nuclear weapon states to negotiate a treaty banning nuclear weapons—the world’s governments do not need to possess nuclear weapons themselves in order to prohibit them.

Footnotes

Editor’s note

This article is based on Assuring Destruction Forever: Nuclear Weapon Modernization around the World, a new study published by the Reaching Critical Will project of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom. The study can be accessed free at: .

Funding

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

Notes

Author biography

Ray Acheson is the director of Reaching Critical Will, a project of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom. She monitors and reports on international disarmament and arms control conferences, providing information and analysis to diplomatic and civil society communities. She is also the NGO–UN liaison and NGO coordinator for nuclear disarmament processes at the United Nations. Most recently, Acheson edited a collaborative NGO study called Assuring Destruction Forever: Nuclear Weapon Modernization Around the World and provided daily coverage of the 2012 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee through Reaching Critical Will’s journal, NPT News in Review.

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Modernization of nuclear weapons: Aspiring to “indefinite retention”?