Abstract
In 2009, President Barack Obama announced from Prague’s Hradcany square that “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security” was nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists, and world leaders listened. A year later, 47 of these leaders responded to Obama’s call “to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years” when they gathered in Washington, DC, for the first Nuclear Security Summit. Since then, nearly 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) have been removed from 10 countries. And both Russia and the United States have worked hard on HEU destruction efforts—48 metric tons and 7 metric tons, respectively. In March, 50 nations are taking part in the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. But how can these countries ensure that the momentum toward a global nuclear security culture isn’t lost, and the Seoul summit does not devolve into just another gathering? Three authors explore this question: from the United States, Sharon Squassoni; from Turkey, Mustafa Kibaroglu (2012); and from India, Rajiv Nayan (2012). The authors are nuclear security experts and members of the Fissile Materials Working Group, which publishes a monthly column at www.thebulletin.org.
Keywords
Summits are like promises—they are only valuable in so far as they are kept. More than just pageantry, they should be judged by their tangible results. This can be difficult when summits address issues where progress is recommended but not required, and where states may not always agree on the urgency of the task at hand.
Nuclear security is one such area. Nuclear security wasn’t invented after the 9/11 attacks—it has been a staple of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for decades. Without required measures for nuclear security, however, rigorous implementation has been lacking. This is where summits come in handy.
Of all the nuclear issues on President Barack Obama’s agenda, nuclear security is something in which all countries can participate, either to protect their own fissile materials or to ensure none are illegally imported, sold, or traded. In short, improvements would have immediate benefits for reducing nuclear risks.
The 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC, was a landmark event attended by 47 world leaders who sought consensus on the priority of reducing the risks of nuclear terrorism. And there was an even more determined objective. That is, to achieve what President Obama set forth in Prague in—to secure the world’s most vulnerable nuclear material in just four years. There have been tangible results already: Ukraine, Chile, and Kazakhstan have secured or removed vulnerable highly enriched uranium; and additional countries have signed up to the amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism—two legal instruments that strengthen the nuclear security regime. As of January 2012, about 80 percent of the national commitments made at the 2010 summit had been implemented. But most experts agree that much more needs to be done (e.g., Cann, 2012).
Perhaps one of the more important outcomes of the 2010 summit was that participants agreed to hold a second summit in 2012 in Seoul. Without a deadline to sharpen focus, what pressure could have reliably ensured progress in this area? The Sherpa process, leading up to the 2012 summit—that is, the continued meetings of officials and experts below the heads of state to shape the substance and process of the next summit—enabled a discussion of how to move forward. The next summit will expand on the menu of efforts from 2010. Beyond nuclear material security, leaders will also focus on the security of facilities, radiological sources, sensitive information, and cross-border controls. In light of the Fukushima Daiichi disaster, the 2012 summit will also attempt to address the interface between nuclear safety and nuclear security.
This expansion of the agenda is crucial for further progress—mostly to continue sustained interest in nuclear security. Without new topics to consider, it is unlikely that an endless horizon of summits with static goals would truly encourage improvements. Moreover, unlike promises, summits are expensive and time-consuming to produce. In a global economy reeling from recession, some may question the time and effort put into nuclear security summits.
Right now, the summit process itself may end with a final meeting in 2014 hosted by the Netherlands. Beyond the fact that we are likely in no danger of achieving the four-year goal by that time, is there a downside to this?
Summits cannot achieve everything; in fact, they can only set deadlines and create momentum for action. Most experts agree that the nuclear security regime is even less robust than the nuclear safety regime, which in the aftermath of Fukushima we know needs further review. A few good summits that improved the nuclear security regime with targeted goals would be helpful. These could include specific requirements in international conventions, the adoption of international security standards, more regularized review of the conventions—such as exists in the Convention on Nuclear Safety—more regularized peer reviews, more and consistent money channeled through the International Atomic Energy Agency, and sustained political attention from global leaders to all facets of nuclear security.
Korean officials handling the 2012 summit had hoped to put in place a mechanism for tracking implementation as a way of institutionalizing progress. In the Sherpa process, however, it has been difficult for parties to agree upon coordinated reporting of nuclear security. At the 2012 summit and on the road to 2014, states should work to identify ways in which the existing infrastructure can be used to help track implementation of summit commitments and, more generally, improvements in nuclear security. For example, since the 2010 summit, a dozen or so training and research centers, known as “centers of excellence,” have been established or adapted to work on nuclear security. Collaboration among these centers could serve as a bridge to coordination at the policy level. Beyond that, they need to consider the broader horizon on nuclear security governance: namely, how to ensure that any nuclear future is safe and sustainable.