Nuclear weapons 2011: Momentum slows,reality returns

Abstract

If 2010 was the year of successes and landmarks for arms control, 2011 was the year that the momentum of the new era slowed, and hard realities were made apparent. By the end of the year, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty had not been ratified or even seriously discussed, and negotiations on the Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty remained stuck in the Conference on Disarmament, with no sign of success in the offing. The author takes a look at five events that unfolded in 2011 and that seem certain to cast a powerful shadow in months and years to come. He writes that both the spread of nuclear technology in the Middle East and Southeast Asia and the revision of the export control regime pose a threat to the long-term structure of the global nuclear order. The crisis with Iran continues to present a serious challenge to the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime while raising the risk of a military response. A conference on a Middle East WMD-free zone requires addressing an ambitious objective in the world’s most intractable diplomatic environment. And the impediments to progress in US–Russian relations stifle hopes that further agreements and deeper cuts can be achieved; a deterioration of this relationship could mean serious consequences in the arms control environment. In 2011, no new breakthroughs occurred, the author writes, adding that 2012 could be a much more difficult year.

The arrival of the Obama administration in 2009 promised to usher in a new era in nuclear affairs. Indeed, President Obama’s positions across an array of nuclear issues seemed to herald not so much a change of direction as a reversal of course in US nuclear policy. He pledged to revive and to pursue vigorously bilateral Russian–US nuclear arms control negotiations, to support and seek US Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), to work for the completion of the Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), to privilege engagement, and to participate constructively in multilateral arms control diplomacy. This broad approach was dramatically affirmed in Obama’s memorable and influential April 2009 Prague speech, in which he committed the United States to take seriously its obligation under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to pursue nuclear disarmament. In tone and content, Obama staked out ground that was starkly different from the realities of the previous decade.

The impact of this new approach could be seen in the first two years of the Obama administration. In 2010, year two of the new era, a number of landmarks were achieved. A new US Nuclear Posture Review was issued; though evolutionary in character, it was widely perceived to have de-emphasized the role of nuclear weapons in US policy and to have been fashioned so as to be compatible with Obama’s Prague speech. An unprecedented Nuclear Security Summit was held in Washington, DC, hosted by President Obama, drawing attention to the critical importance of ensuring the safekeeping of weapons-usable nuclear materials in an era of mass-casualty terrorism. A new strategic arms control agreement—New START—was reached with Moscow after painstaking but eventually fruitful negotiations; it mandated moderate reductions in US and Russian nuclear arsenals but also opened the door to an ongoing arms control process. In December 2010, New START was ratified by the US Senate despite strenuous opposition from Obama’s Republican opponents. And in May 2010, the NPT Review Conference concluded successfully with the adoption of a final document that included an extensive action plan aimed at strengthening the regime; the acrimony, bitterness, and failure that marked the previous 2005 Review Conference was avoided.

If 2010 was the year of successes and landmarks, 2011 was the year that the momentum of the new era slowed and hard realities resurfaced. No new breakthroughs occurred. The multilateral nuclear arms control agenda is stymied. The CTBT is no closer to ratification than when President Obama came into office—and if the Republicans regain control of the Senate in the 2012 election, the treaty’s prospects will grow even more remote. The FMCT negotiations remain stuck, and there is no indication that success is in the offing. Year three of the Obama era has been more difficult and less hopeful than the recent past.

While there were no signature moments in 2011, there were a number of consequential developments, some of which will influence the nuclear agenda for 2012 and some of which will have implications for years to come. They raise challenges that are likely to be difficult and in some cases may have a negative impact on the prospects for safe and prudent management of nuclear issues. Obviously, the new direction in US policy under the Obama administration changes the environment in which nuclear issues play out, but the global nuclear order has many players and their behavior is not universally determined by or necessarily in tune with Washington. The United States still plays a disproportionately influential role, but increasingly it is the voices and choices of others that help set the agenda and determine outcomes. And so it was in 2011.

Five particular developments in the nuclear domain shaped the year. And though these do not encompass the entire nuclear agenda and omit topics that could well have been included—such as the North Korea issue or the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in South Korea—they do represent a set of changes that seem certain to cast a powerful shadow over the near- or longer-term future.

The nuclear order widens

On March 14, 2011, Abu Dhabi broke ground for its first nuclear reactor—one of four it is under contract to purchase from the Korean Electric Power Company and all of which it aims to have connected to the electricity grid by 2020. On May 8, 2011, the Iranian nuclear reactor at Bushehr began operating and has since been connected to the electricity grid, becoming the first nuclear power plant to function in the Middle East. On December 2, 2011, Russia began construction of a nuclear power plant at Ninh Thuan, Vietnam, intended to include two nuclear reactors in excess of 1,000 megawatts each and expected to be completed by 2020. All of these developments took place after the terrible accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station in Japan—which might have caused a pause, a rethinking, or even a cancellation of these projects, but did not. Instead, civilian nuclear technology is spreading into two regions—the Middle East and Southeast Asia—where it was previously absent. This is the beginning of a long-term process involving the slow spread of nuclear assets to additional countries; dozens of potential nuclear newcomers have approached the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to express interest in pursuing nuclear power. This is a portentous development. Across time, it will widen the global distribution of nuclear technology, expand the serious nuclear players, reshape the international nuclear marketplace, add to worries about the safety and security of nuclear facilities, and change the politics of the NPT regime.

The implications in terms of nuclear proliferation are indirect. Nuclear reactors themselves do not provide a path to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The pivotal question is whether nuclear newcomers choose to develop the fissile material production capabilities—uranium enrichment, plutonium reprocessing, or both—that will give them the ability to produce weapons-usable nuclear materials. Some places, such as Abu Dhabi, have promised to forsake such capabilities. Other states (including Vietnam, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia) have left the question open. One newcomer state, Iran, has pursued enrichment; the resulting consternation and protracted crisis is symptomatic of how disturbing and disruptive this path can be. Enrichment and reprocessing have inescapable weapons implications, so the extent to which these capabilities spread or fail to spread will have enormous impact on the character of the future nuclear order.

The export control regime tightens

As the spearhead states among the nuclear newcomers have begun to visibly implement their nuclear programs, nuclear suppliers (perhaps not coincidentally) have moved to make the harmonized international export regime more restrictive. The suppliers have organized themselves into a cartel—the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)—that now consists of 46 member states that are committed to follow agreed, though informal, rules for regulating international nuclear commerce. At its annual meeting in Noordwijk, the Netherlands, in June, the NSG agreed, after years of deliberation, to strengthen the guidelines governing enrichment and reprocessing transfers.

According to published reports of the NSG’s private deliberations, under the new rules recipients will not be eligible to import enrichment or reprocessing technologies unless they have signed and ratified the Additional Protocol—a supplemental safeguards arrangement, designed to be voluntary, that requires states to provide more access and more information to the IAEA. Recipients will also be required to accept permanent safeguards on any sensitive technologies they import—thus eliminating the scenario in which a state acquires enrichment or reprocessing as a member of the NPT, and then withdraws from the treaty, thereby escaping international scrutiny of its subsequent nuclear activity. The new guidelines mandate a “black box” approach to the transfer of enrichment technologies to inhibit the spread of knowledge and prevent the replication of the technology. Perhaps most broadly, suppliers are now encouraged and entitled to take into account “other relevant factors” when considering the transfer of sensitive nuclear technologies; these could include assessment of the character of the potential recipient and whether that state has a coherent and believable rationale for civil nuclear power. As one account notes, in general the results of the Noordwijk meeting “give suppliers broad authority to ensure that their exports do not contribute to proliferation” (Horner, 2011).

The future nuclear order will thus be shaped not only by the nuclear appetites of a growing number of countries, but also by the restraint or largesse exhibited by nuclear suppliers. Restrictive rules for sensitive nuclear exports suggest that the global spread of nuclear power need not lead to the spread of dual-use, weapons-relevant technology, in which case the benefits of nuclear power can be obtained without additional risk of weapons proliferation. If the NSG decisions of 2011 contribute significantly to that desirable outcome, they will have been enormously consequential. Two caveats are in order, however. First, many recipient states (often represented collectively by the Non-Aligned Movement) resent and resist efforts by the suppliers to restrict access to nuclear technology and to impose additional conditions on nuclear commerce. If the past is any guide, the new NSG rules will produce friction within the NPT system and are likely to aggrieve at least some have-not states. Second, states that are determined to obtain sensitive technologies but are denied access in the international nuclear marketplace may well be driven into the illicit market for nuclear goods and services; recent experience with the notorious A. Q. Khan network vividly demonstrates that this is more than a hypothetical danger.

Engagement with Iran runs out of steam

President Obama came to office promising to attempt an engagement policy with Iran in pursuit of a solution to the protracted confrontation over Iran’s nuclear program—not as an alternative to the existing strategy focused on sanctions, but as part of a two-track, carrot-and-stick approach. This led to a fleeting diplomatic encounter in October 2009 centered on Iran’s need to acquire reactor fuel for its research reactor located in Tehran. An agreement in principle was reached on a deal to swap 1,200 kilograms of Iranian low-enriched uranium (LEU) for the needed reactor fuel, but the deal foundered when Iran insisted on implementation arrangements that Washington found unacceptable; the Obama administration and its European partners wanted the entire amount of LEU removed from Iran quickly, and this in turn was unacceptable to Tehran. A subsequent mediation by Brazil and Turkey in the spring of 2010 attempted to salvage the deal, and Iran did, in fact, accept terms that were closer to those desired by Washington and friends. By that time, however, the Obama administration had lost interest in this path and rebuffed the agreement—to the considerable anger of Brazil and Turkey. Having, in its eyes, unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate an agreement with Iran, Washington began to grab onto the theme that engagement had been tried and failed.

Subsequent diplomatic interactions with Iran were fruitless and the negotiating track between Iran and the P5 + 1 remained frozen for much of 2011. In August, Russia attempted to resurrect negotiations, putting forward a proposal for a step-by-step approach in which the P5 + 1 would ease sanctions in return for Iranian concessions on transparency. Iran’s public responses to this proposition were positive, but it remained formally noncommittal. There appears to be little enthusiasm among the others in the P5 + 1 group, however. Washington, for its part, did not leap to embrace this option and no longer appears to see much promise in engagement with Iran. As one of the closest observers of the Iran issue, Mark Hibbs has concluded, “[S]ince 2009, the US has lost interest in the diplomatic track” and is really pursuing a one-track policy based on pressure, sanctions, and containment (Hibbs, 2011). With frustrations toward Iran high, a US presidential election looming, Israeli patience waning, and Iran’s nuclear program continuing, Washington is in no mood to be accommodating.

Toward the end of 2011, the confrontation flared. In October, the United States released news of an alleged Iranian plot to kill the Saudi ambassador to the United States—a plot with details so bizarre that some doubted the credibility of the story. The Obama administration was certain that this threat had been real, however, and Iran’s critics had no doubt about what this meant: “This was one big ‘f*** you’ to the West,” said Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute (Stone, 2011). Iran responded with denials and outrage—and the atmosphere was significantly poisoned.

This was followed on November 8 by the IAEA secretary general’s latest report on Iran to the IAEA board of governors. These reports are routine updates normally submitted every six months, and they generally cover the IAEA’s findings about Iran’s nuclear activities in the most recent period of inspections. The November 2011 report, though, contains an unprecedented 12-page annex that outlines in a coherent and comprehensive fashion the activities and allegations that lead the IAEA (and much of the world) to suspect that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons under cover of its civilian nuclear program. Though it offers more detail than earlier reports, this annex does not really put forward any major new claims against Iran; the broad categories of concern are long familiar. But this is a lawyer’s brief that assembles the case against Iran under the imprimatur of the IAEA. It was seized upon in the West as proof that suspicions of Iran’s nuclear intentions are legitimate and warranted, and as evidence that sterner action against Iran is in order. Iran denounced the report, angrily claiming that the IAEA had acted improperly and that the agency had damaged itself by repeating what President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad described as absurd US claims. The United States and its West European partners judged the report to be grounds for additional sanctions, and soon thereafter both the United States and the European Union imposed new sanctions, some aimed at Iran’s ability to export oil. The confrontation escalated still further when an angry Iranian mob attacked the British Embassy in Tehran, provoking the expulsion of Iran’s diplomats from Britain and raising the reciprocal ill will to still greater heights. By this point, Obama’s engagement strategy had been left far behind.

The logic of confrontation was spelled out in an important and strikingly blunt speech by Obama National Security Advisor Tom Donilon. Speaking at the Brookings Institution on November 22, 2011, Donilon claimed that international pressure on Iran is succeeding and that Iran has been “profoundly” weakened and isolated. As Donilan’s comments reveal, the latest assault of pressure and sanctions is seen by the Obama administration as another, perhaps decisive, step in a winning strategy against Iran. If the strategy works, it might, in Washington’s view, result in the resumption of the negotiating track: Iran will be compelled to negotiate seriously if its position is sufficiently weakened. Whether the administration’s optimism about its coercive policy toward Iran is warranted remains hotly debated, however.

The Iran crisis has been on the international agenda for nearly a decade, and it is certain to spill over into 2012. The stakes are understood to be high; failure, as former British Foreign Secretary David Miliband and Nader Mousavizadeh have written recently, would require the difficult challenge of living with a nuclear-armed Iran and could “mean the end of the nonproliferation treaty” (Miliband and Mousavizadeh, 2011). But the current tidings are grim, and the hint of military action hangs in the air.

The Middle East conference moves forward

In order to secure the support of the Arab League for the indefinite extension of the NPT—an urgently desired outcome at the time—the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference famously adopted a resolution on the Middle East calling for the establishment of a zone free of WMD in the region and for member states to work toward that end. Once the 1995 Review Conference ended and its indefinite extension was secured, this resolution was promptly forgotten by all but the Arab League states and virtually nothing was done to implement it. At the May 2010 NPT Review Conference, the Arab League, after impatiently waiting for 15 years, made it clear that it would not support a final document or permit the success of the conference unless its members received a firm commitment to hold an international conference on the Middle East WMD-free zone proposal. The United States and some other states were openly skeptical of this idea (while Israel, which is outside the NPT, was not a part of the discussions and its willingness to participate was uncertain, to say the least). But there was real reluctance to see a second consecutive failed NPT Review Conference (after the particularly acrimonious and fruitless 2005 conference), and so, ultimately, the 2010 Review Conference adopted a resolution calling for a conference to be held in 2012 to discuss the concept of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East. This was a victory for the Arab League, and for Egypt, which had played a leading role in the fight.

But then the NPT Review Conference ended and nothing happened. For months, there was no visible sign of activity. A host needed to be selected, a facilitator appointed, the budget secured—but there did not appear to be any progress. Israel denounced the resolution as “flawed and hypocritical” (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010). The United States, meant to be one of the sponsoring parties of the initiative, was manifestly unenthusiastic and seemed to hope that the idea was so obviously bad that with the passage of time it would simply fade away and die. To the members of the Arab League, the evolving situation seemed to portend another broken promise, another betrayal of commitment. They complained about the absence of progress, about the lack of consultation. And they made it known that if the plan to hold a conference in 2012 were abandoned, there would be serious consequences; if their interests were going to be ignored, then Arab League states would be reluctant to support reforms aimed at strengthening the NPT regime and even their commitment to the regime could be called into question.

After a period of behind-the-scenes diplomacy, the impasse was finally broken. On October 14, 2011, it was announced that Finland would serve as the host country and Finnish diplomat Jaakko Laajava was named as facilitator. Some 17 months after the end of the 2010 NPT Review Conference and only several months before the arrival of 2012, the first basic steps had been taken. In the context of more than a decade and a half of paralysis, this was significant movement. Now, however, all of the fundamental questions must be confronted. Even the most basic of issues, such as which states should participate, are not entirely settled. (Are Pakistan and Turkey in or out? Should all the states of North Africa be included?) It is not entirely certain that the two essential states, Israel and Iran, will participate; there is little sense in confronting the issue without them. There is virtually no expectation from any quarter that this first conference will actually result in a WMD-free zone in the Middle East, which leaves open the issue of what the purpose of this gathering should be and how it can be used constructively. It will not be easy to reconcile the Arab view that the 2012 meeting should be regarded as the first step in an ongoing process with Washington and Jerusalem’s reluctance to participate in a series of meetings on this subject; the instincts of the two sides on this core question are exactly contrary. And all of this must be sorted out in a regional context in which the peace process is nearly nonexistent and the wider enmities seem as deep and bitter as ever.

Consultations will ensue, with the Finnish facilitator in the lead. A conference is planned for 2012, and it will be a major feature on the nuclear agenda. But there is no reason to be sanguine about the prospects for success. And failure will disappoint and antagonize a substantial and important subset of the NPT membership.

US–Russian relations sputter

Obama entered office intending to repair US–Russian relations, which had reached a low ebb, especially due to the harsh clash over Russia’s war with Georgia; the Bush administration had firmly backed Georgia and was critical of Russian policy. Obama aimed to “reset” US–Russian relations and to revive US–Russian arms control. As noted, this policy was met with some success and the New START agreement was successfully concluded in 2010. By the end of 2011, however, the tone had changed dramatically. The broader relationship was in the doldrums, with Russia feeling neglected and downgraded. As Russian analyst Dmitri Trenin has commented, the US–Russian reset is “in recess” and there is a “broad gap” in their views of one another and of arms control (Trenin, 2011).

Further, the hope that New START would mark the beginning of a reinvigorated US–Russian arms control process has been diminished. The sticking point has been continuing Russian concerns over US plans to deploy missile defenses. At an otherwise congenial meeting between Presidents Obama and Medvedev in Hawaii in mid-November 2011, for example, it was clear that the two sides were in substantial disagreement over missile defense. Washington has made protracted efforts, under both Presidents Bush and Obama, to persuade Moscow that it has nothing to fear, that the contemplated defensive deployments are oriented against Iran and lack the capability to threaten Russia’s deterrent force, that some form of cooperation or collaboration on missile defense is possible, and that Russia’s objections are therefore unwarranted. But no matter how much the United States insists that Russia has no reason to care about US missile defenses, Russia remains extremely concerned. Not long after meeting with Obama in Hawaii, Medvedev issued a sharp threat about Russia’s possible reactions to US missile defense policy. He not only stated that Russia will deploy new missiles and advanced technologies to negate US defenses, but also suggested that it might feel the need to withdraw from New START (Herszenhorn, 2011). With the United States wholly committed to its missile defense program and Russia still deeply opposed to that program despite Washington’s many reassurances, further progress on nuclear arms control appears unlikely in the near future; indeed, if Russia’s position remains unaltered and Medvedev’s threats are someday carried out, the result would be a serious deterioration in the arms control environment.

The year ahead

Some of the major nuclear challenges for 2012 and beyond are evident in these five developments. The spread of nuclear technology and the revision of the export control regime have to do with the long-term structure of the global nuclear order. The crisis with Iran continues to pose a serious challenge to the NPT regime, while raising the risk that force might be used. The Middle East conference requires addressing an ambitious objective in the world’s most intractable diplomatic environment. The impediments to progress in US–Russian relations stifle hopes that further agreements and deeper cuts can be achieved. All things considered, it looks to be a more difficult road ahead.