A multinational fuel consortium: Obstacles,options,and ways forward

Abstract

The World Nuclear Association estimates that by 2030, 600 nuclear reactors will be in operation around the world; 60 countries are considering nuclear power, out of which 10 to 25 are expected to bring nuclear power plants on line by 2030. This could lead to the construction of additional uranium enrichment plants, which, with adjustments, can produce material for nuclear weapons. Any of these states can work to be within reach of weapons capability while, until the last minute, remaining within their international nonproliferation obligations. In recent years, efforts have again intensified to limit the spread of nuclear enrichment by proposing various multinational approaches to reduce proliferation concerns. While there has been progress in the establishment of low-enriched uranium banks, several obstacles remain to be removed. A special consideration is given to the fuel-leasing option, which reduces distribution of additional enrichment capabilities, provides economic incentives, and addresses safety and security concerns of increasing spent fuel storages. However, in order to make such an approach attractive to industry, obstacles related to spent fuel take-back and waste disposal need to be resolved. Unless decisive actions are taken now, several states could be a political decision away from acquiring nuclear weapons capability.

The harnessing of the atom to develop a nuclear bomb 70 years ago unleashed a magnitude of terrifying destruction the world had never witnessed before. The same atomic power also resulted in an “atoms for peace” program, which gave the world nuclear power as a clean source of energy and benefited humanity in the development of nuclear medicine, agriculture, and sciences.

Since its establishment in 1968, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has recognized the need to promote the peaceful purposes of nuclear power while concurrently ensuring that its destructive nature is not proliferated. The brute fact remains that the same fuel-cycle technologies, uranium enrichment and reprocessing that are essential to power a nuclear reactor can, with adjustments, produce material to fuel the core of a nuclear explosive. The challenge remains in controlling the spread of such dual-use nuclear technologies that can be developed and used both for civilian and military purposes. The risks of not managing this process properly are consequential and dire.

The obstacles

Today, 14 states worldwide either operate or are building enrichment plants, while 10 have reprocessing facilities on their soil (International Panel on Fissile Materials, 2010). Combined, they have produced enough weapons-usable material for over 200,000 nuclear bombs. According to recent estimates by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), there are currently 440 operating nuclear power plants in the world. Sixty countries are considering nuclear power (many of which are located in unstable regions), out of which 10 to 25 countries are expected to bring nuclear power plants online by 2030 (Amano, 2010). The World Nuclear Association’s conservative estimate on the total number of power reactors expected to come online by 2030 is nearly 600 (World Nuclear Association, 2011). If states that buy reactors also build uranium-enrichment facilities (such as Iran) or reprocess spent fuel (such as North Korea), they will be equally capable of having the opportunity to develop the technology needed to build nuclear weapons. Theoretically speaking, any of these states can climb the nuclear stairway to within reach of a mushroom cloud while remaining within their international obligations.

The nuclear fuel cycle process needs to be further tightened. Two years ago, former head of the IAEA Mohamed ElBaradei said, “pretty soon” the world will probably have “another 10 or 20 virtual weapons states” (Borger, 2007), that is countries with the technical know-how and material to build a nuclear weapon rapidly. In a world with additional enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, the risks of theft of fissile material and threat of nuclear terrorism—particularly in unstable regions or areas of lax security—are greatly magnified.

There have been successive calls over the years to address the systemic flaws inherent within the current nuclear nonproliferation regime, which has failed to adequately address the dangers of the spread of reprocessing and enrichment capabilities. The concept of providing international nuclear fuel supply guarantees as an alternative for states that may choose to develop their own domestic enrichment and reprocessing facilities has been advocated for years by the arms control community. But this initiative has largely gone nowhere for three main reasons. First, the “haves” refuse to transfer their own sensitive know-how and fuel-making technologies, implicitly asserting that these activities are only allowed for certain countries. ¹ Second, the “have-nots,” in particular during recent years the Non-Aligned Movement, cite this refusal as further unfair discrimination by the “haves.” Moreover, these states feel that it is within their sovereign right to develop or expand their capabilities for peaceful nuclear activities that include all parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. Third, an international fuel consortium poses substantial operational and political complexities that would be difficult for an international agency to manage effectively.

The options

Motivated by many states’ resurgent interest to acquire nuclear power, nonproliferation advocates have refocused global efforts to control access to these sensitive nuclear technologies.

In recent years, renewed efforts have been made to limit the spread of nuclear enrichment in particular. Nearly a dozen viable proposals have been floated—nationally as well as internationally—each with their own variance of particularities, conditions, and requirements to support a state’s right to access peaceful nuclear energy while addressing proliferation concerns (McCombie et al., 2010). All are premised on the basic concept that states that promise not to pursue enrichment and reprocessing capabilities would in turn receive assured access to the “benefits of nuclear technology,” including fuel for reactors.

In 2005, the United States committed up to 17 tons of high-enriched uranium to be down-blended to low-enriched uranium for states that forego enrichment and reprocessing (IAEA, 2005). In December 2010, Russia established a low-enriched uranium reserve on its territory in Angarsk (IAEA, 2009). ² The United Kingdom’s enrichment bond initiative (IAEA, 2007a), approved in March 2011 by the IAEA Board of Governors, guarantees states that buy into the bond an uninterrupted flow of enrichment services under certain conditions, including remaining compliant with NPT obligations. In addition, the IAEA is establishing its own reserve low-enriched uranium fuel bank, which will likely be located outside current supplier states. The bank will be owned and managed by the IAEA.

Ways forward

The various proposals to limit the transfer of enrichment technology provide a growing palette of choices of fuel assurance arrangements for countries to select. Such choices increase the attractiveness and benefits offered through readily available commercial enrichment markets, backed by the necessary fuel supply guarantees. It makes the case more difficult for countries to justify domestic enrichment. And it paves the way for all nuclear enrichment (and reprocessing) centers to be placed under multinational control in the future. But a targeted focus on getting states to forego domestic nuclear enrichment through promoting fuel assurances, while significant, is only one aspect of addressing the control and spread of enrichment technologies. Many other considerations—ranging from political (tightening the supply-side requirements and improving safeguards options), financial (increasing economic nonviability), to technical (developing proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors)—will also have to be brought to bear to mitigate the spread of sensitive nuclear technology (McGoldrick, 2011).

At the same time, a fair number of objections have been raised against limiting the transfers of sensitive enrichment technologies. These objections are real and do serve as constraints. But such objections alone cannot be a reason to discontinue the task of: one, addressing the even more serious ramifications of leaving the door open for nuclear enrichment (and reprocessing); and two, finding creative ways forward to get around the impasse.

Indeed, there is no reason to continue to wait to establish a new international architecture for the nuclear fuel cycle. In his address at the Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference in Washington, DC in March 2011, US National Security Advisor Tom Donilon reiterated that a major element of President Barack Obama’s nuclear agenda is “to develop new mechanisms to support the growth of safe and secure nuclear power in ways that reduce the spread of dangerous technologies.” In this context, he said that the United States is “committed to developing commercial concepts for nuclear fuel leasing.” ³ Launching a new leasing proposal to provide fuel for states that forego reprocessing and enrichment, with a new condition for spent fuel take-back, would be a concrete step toward that goal. It is an important additional proposal, among others, in a broader effort to confront and overcome twenty-first-century nuclear dangers.

There are also other developments that support such an initiative, based on nuclear safety and security considerations. A recent MIT study indicated that national nuclear fuel reprocessing or recycling is a costly and technically unfeasible option to pursue and therefore unlikely to be developed on a large scale over the next few decades (MIT, 2011). The consequence will be an increasing number of countries struggling to manage the massive accumulation of spent fuel. Stockpiles of used fuel will be costly to store and could pose significant safety and security challenges, as recent events at Fukushima have shown. A reliable and transparent arrangement for long-term storage and the final disposal of spent fuel will serve as not only a powerful incentive to get the system right but also an added benefit and net positive for recipient states to participate in a leasing consortium option.

On the supply side, any multinational approach to the fuel cycle can only be a success if industries find that it is good for business. A new leasing proposal that combines the back end of the fuel cycle with enrichment services will likely increase industry interest and provide the needed boost for consortium partnerships. It will force governments to take a fresh look at private-public partnerships to remove existing obstacles for spent fuel take-back and for nuclear waste disposal. ⁴ The back end of the fuel cycle that involves shipping and storing spent fuel and disposing of nuclear waste needs to be further explored. A new lucrative market could be created if industries are incentivized to be part of the solution.

An international fuel-leasing and take-back market that includes current suppliers, or a new consortium of suppliers, could offer fuel on economically attractive terms and address the problem of spent fuel, which makes the alternative of producing one’s own fuel through enrichment or reprocessing highly unattractive. Some have argued that no country would sacrifice sovereign rights for economic benefits. But this misses the point. Proposals that would include options for regional or wider enrichment ownership would be a reasonable and requisite compromise to work toward a scenario in which all enrichment centers, including present ones, would eventually come under multinational control. Attempts to construct an entire fuel cycle from scratch cannot but point to an ulterior motive: namely, to move up the step ladder or at least to get to that last rung in which a weapon is only a step away. The international community would be right to monitor such a state vigilantly. The current international fuel enrichment market works well. Owners of operating power reactors have been able to acquire fuel for their reactors. Last-resort low-enriched fuel banks and the British enrichment bond scheme provide additional assurances for uninterrupted supply of low-enriched uranium.

Safety, security, and proliferation concerns call for the development of multinational approaches both for uranium enrichment and long-term spent fuel storage, disposal, and recycling. There will remain countries that may choose to develop their own costly enrichment programs; no one-size-fits-all solution exists. But the hope is that the outliers will be but a few special cases, which must be addressed and contained under a strengthened non-proliferation regime. Unless bold and imaginative actions are taken now, several states could be a political decision away from acquiring the world’s most destructive weapon.