Moving forward: Trends in science and technology and the future of the Biological Weapons Convention

Abstract

Developments in science and technology are potentially relevant to the scope of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), as well as to its operation and implementation. At the upcoming Seventh Review Conference in December this year, three basic trends are likely to play a part: the rapid pace of relevant advances in science and technology; the global diffusion of science and technology research and its applications; and the breadth of fields now engaged in the “life sciences.” Continued engagement of the scientific community, the authors write, will be important for monitoring ongoing developments in science and technology and for contributing to assessments on the implications of these developments for the BWC. Sustained engagement will enable the Convention to anticipate and respond more effectively to the challenges and opportunities offered by the continuing advances in science and technology.

Keywords

Biological Weapons Convention convergence dual-use S&T science and technology Seventh Review Conference

In his message to mark the opening of the States Parties meeting of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in December 2010, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon emphasized areas needing particular attention during the upcoming review conference. Science and technology was one of three issues he singled out:¹

Next year, the Seventh Review Conference will consider how to build upon this work [the intersessional process]. Indeed, that meeting offers the best chance in a decade or more to reach significant agreements on the future of the Convention. With the pace of advances in biological science and technology growing ever quicker, there is a pressing need for a structured and regular means of monitoring developments and assessing their implications. (Ban, 2010)

The relevance of science and technology to the health of the BWC has also been reflected in the topics and discussions of the intersessional process, which have included both meetings where advances in science and technology are integral to the discussions (e.g., public health and disease surveillance in 2004 and 2009, investigations of alleged use in 2010) and those that touch directly on the interests of the scientific community (e.g., codes of conduct in 2005, education and research oversight in 2008). The innovation of “friends of the chair” has brought noted scientists to give presentations and take part in panel discussions during the plenary sessions. Scientific and technical experts from outside government are increasingly included in national delegations for the experts meetings. The popular side events, from panels at breakfast and lunch to the poster sessions, have enabled more detailed discussions of science and technology advances and issues and further engagement of the science and technology community.²

Over the last decade, both the BWC and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) have drawn on the expertise of international scientific organizations to provide independent input to treaty review conferences.³ The most recent example is an international workshop held in November 2010 at the Institute of Biophysics of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) in Beijing. Convened as a cooperative activity of several international scientific organizations, the CAS and the National Research Council (NRC) of the US National Academy of Sciences, the workshop brought together about 80 participants from 28 countries and several international organizations.⁴ The purpose of the workshop was to:

survey key trends in areas of science & technology (S&T) that might be potentially relevant to the development of new or more deadly biological weapons and/or to developments in detection, diagnostics, therapeutics, or vaccines that could affect potential prevention and response to biological attacks. (NRC, 2011b)⁵

Immediate impact

Much of the attention to the implications of advances in science and technology for the BWC tends to focus on the potential to pose new threats or make old ones worse. However, developments in science and technology have potentially positive as well as negative effects on the BWC.

The first, and largely negative, potential impact is on the treaty’s scope, and hence its relevance to science and technology and security landscapes that have changed dramatically since the treaty was signed in 1972. Each review conference must consider whether there are new or novel types of agents or materials emerging that would not be captured by Article I: “Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.” So far, all of the review conferences have reached the understanding that Article I provides a sufficiently comprehensive umbrella to cover any new developments.⁶

Science and technology also affects the other major articles of the convention by helping or hindering the practical tasks related to the operation and implementation of the treaty. Policies and regulatory systems to support national implementation, for example, are subject to concerns about relevance and obsolescence in the face of rapidly evolving science and technology. Improving the ability to investigate allegations of the use of biological weapons will depend on advances in the scientific underpinnings of microbial forensics as well as improved international cooperation on many levels (Murch, 2010). Advances in disease surveillance and response are tied to the promises of breakthroughs in biomedical science for diagnostics, vaccines, and therapeutics, as well as to the increasing capacity of computer networks and other communications technology. Taken together, these and other advances in science and technology, such as those relevant to innovation and economic development, influence the forms and types of international cooperation that will be most effective in promoting peaceful applications of biology.

Aspects to watch

There are three issues that are likely to play a part in the review conference preparations and deliberations:⁷ the pace of relevant advances in science and technology; the global diffusion of science and technology research and its application; and the breadth of fields now engaged in the “life sciences.”

The pace of advances in science and technology

As Ban’s 2010 message illustrates, one of the important trends that potentially affects the future of the BWC is the rapid pace of advances in science and technology. One of the best illustrations of this trend is the increasing speed and decreasing costs of DNA sequencing, DNA synthesis, and the analysis of protein structures (de Villiers, 2010; Pitt, 2010). The comparison is frequently made between “Moore’s Law”—that the number of transistors on a chip, and hence computing power, roughly doubles every two years—and the “Carlson Curves”—which depict how DNA sequencing and synthesis capabilities have undergone a similar rapid increase (Carlson, 2003).⁸ For example, in 2002, it took a team of scientists two years to carry out the de novo synthesis of the polio virus (Cello et al., 2002), but by late 2003, a team synthesized a virus of only slightly smaller length in two weeks (Smith et al., 2003).

As the speed has increased, the cost has fallen at an equally dramatic rate. The Human Genome project, completed in 2003, sequenced approximately 3 billion bases of DNA in the human genome and sought to map all of the genes it contained. The project was a massive international effort that required a decade and cost hundreds of millions of dollars, whereas today a sequence can be completed in a week for several thousand dollars (de Villiers, 2010).

Similarly, other fields that rely on high-throughput measurement techniques continue to advance and to build on understanding gained through genomics. These include transcriptomics, the analysis of the set of RNA transcripts expressed by a cell, tissue, or organism; proteomics, the study of the set of expressed proteins that result from these transcripts; and metabolomics, the study of the cellular metabolites produced by the cell, tissue, or organism. The field of systems biology seeks to integrate these levels of knowledge into descriptive, and ultimately predictive, mathematical models. However, the vast amounts of data produced by high-throughput measurements need to be analyzed and converted into useful information, and experts note that the complexity of biological systems remains a significant challenge to the ability to construct accurate mathematical models, even at the level of a molecular signaling pathway (Pitt, 2010). As a result, further increases in computational power may be needed before systems biology can achieve its goals of moving toward rational design (Pitt, 2010). As these fields advance the understanding of biological systems, they raise the possibility of enabling the development of novel or more deadly biological weapons that could challenge the provisions of the BWC. Alternatively and importantly, however, they may also open new and promising avenues for the development of therapeutics and countermeasures.

The globalization of science and technology

The Beijing workshop underscored a theme sounded in a 2006 NRC report:

Advances in science and technology with biological dual-use potential are materializing worldwide at a very rapid pace. Over the next five to ten years, the United States, followed by the European Union and Japan, will likely remain the most powerful global players in the life sciences. Yet, many other nations and regions are developing new and strong scientific and technological infrastructures and capabilities, and some states are emerging as regional and global leaders in their respective fields of specialization. Brazil, China, India, and Russia are among those expected to become stronger economic, political, scientific, and technological global players in the future. (NRC, 2006: 79)⁹

One indication of this global spread of science is the publication record, which shows a significant increase in the percentage of non-US authors of articles in science journals. A recent analysis by the National Science Foundation observed that for US and European Union researchers, the “combined world share of published articles decreased steadily from 69% in 1995 to 59% in 2008 as Asia’s output increased. In little more than a decade, Asia’s world article share expanded from 14% to 23%” (National Science Board, 2010). The report further noted the increasing prevalence of collaborative scientific research, finding that “[i]n 1988, only 8% of the world’s S&E articles had international coauthors; by 2007, this share had grown to 22%” (NSB, 2010).

The work of Etienne de Villiers, a bioinformatics expert working at the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) in Kenya, shows a particularly striking example of the potential impact of globalizing technology: Kenya has suffered from periodic outbreaks of Rift Valley fever, a mosquito-transmitted disease that can be deadly for both humans and animals. De Villiers is currently undertaking a data-gathering and management effort to enable researchers to determine “where” the virus goes in the five or six years that elapse between standard outbreaks. The project will take advantage of the possibilities offered by the completed installation of fiber-optic cables along the east coast of Africa to use distributed computing to support analysis of the large amount of sample meta-data generated in parallel with the storage of the samples themselves in a biobank.

According to de Villiers, distributed computing allows a network of smaller computers to create the equivalent of a supercomputer, thus enabling the analysis of far more complex problems. One example that he cites is “Folding@Home,” a project based at Stanford University that is devoted to understanding the process of protein folding and the relationship of misfolding to disease.¹⁰ By downloading project software, participants can donate a portion of their unused computing resources; the project website notes that “since October 1, 2000, over 5,000,000 [central processing units] throughout the world have participated in Folding@Home” (sFolding@Home, 2011), making it the equivalent of the largest computer in the world.¹¹

Another striking example of the global expansion in collaborative scientific research was provided at the Beijing workshop by Herawati Sudoyo of the Eijkman Institute for Molecular Biology in Indonesia. The Pan-Asian SNP Consortium involves researchers in 11 countries (China, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and the United States). The consortium analyzed single nucleotide polymorphisms that serve as genetic markers in order to reconstruct historical population movements in the region. Future work may explore the relationships between genetic variations and disease. Sudoyo noted that the initiative is designed, managed, and funded by researchers in Asia and that countries with less developed scientific infrastructures benefit from the advanced technology and training available in countries such as Japan, Singapore, China, and South Korea. This exchange of resources, ideas, and information has helped foster regional collaboration and capacity building (Sudoyo, 2010).

The breadth of relevant fields

For many years, trends in science and technology have involved “more than microbes,” that is, more than the traditional threat agents that were the focus of national offensive programs prior to the signing of the treaty in 1972. One illustration of the growing diversity of fields relevant to the future of the BWC is “synthetic biology,” which takes an engineering approach to biology and is devoted to “the design and construction of new biological parts, devices, and systems, and the re-design of existing natural biological systems for useful purposes” (Synthetic Biology 5.0, 2011). Many of those engaged in synthetic biology, perhaps a majority, come from fields outside the life sciences, in particular engineering and computer sciences. Similarly, analysts have noted the growing convergence of chemistry and biology for some time (Tucker, 2011).

This breadth is an essential part of a vision for the future of life sciences foreseen in the 2009 NRC report, A New Biology for the 21st Century.

Biology is at a point of inflection. Years of research have generated detailed information about the components of the complex systems that characterize life—genes, cells, organisms, ecosystems—and this knowledge has begun to fuse into greater understanding of how all those components work together as systems. Powerful tools are allowing biologists to probe complex systems in ever-greater detail, from molecular events in individual cells to global biogeochemical cycles. Integration within biology and increasingly fruitful collaboration with physical, earth, and computational scientists, mathematicians, and engineers are making it possible to predict and control the activities of biological systems in ever greater detail… . [T]he life sciences have reached a point where a new level of inquiry is possible, a level that builds on the strengths of the traditional research establishment but provides a framework to draw on those strengths and focus them on large questions whose answers would provide many practical benefits. (NRC, 2009: 12–13)

National governments, as well as regional and international organizations, are developing their own visions and strategies to enable them to take advantage of these advances to meet fundamental needs and ambitions in both developed and developing countries.¹²

Cutting edge research being undertaken by many experts also makes use of the engagement of scientists, engineers, and mathematicians in “life sciences” research.¹³ Within the field of nanotechnology, Jackie Ying, of the Institute of Bioengineering and Nanotechnology in Singapore, has dubbed the careful and effective integration of chemistry, materials science, and the life sciences the “nano toolbox.” As an example, Ying points to research in the design of materials with properties that enable them to be used for targeted drug delivery as well as tissue regeneration (Ying, 2010).¹⁴

Interest in the development of biosensors also continues, particularly the design of smaller-scale sensors that would be able to respond quickly and with high accuracy to detect multiple substances under real-world conditions. A variety of options for sensor technology are being explored, and several have been discussed by Gary Resnick of Los Alamos National Laboratory and Ilya Kurochkin of M. V. Lomonosov of Moscow State University. Resnick and Kurochkin have noted that the responsive biological elements of a sensor may include antibodies, enzymes, nucleic acids, physical adsorption, or other techniques, resulting in changes to electrical, chemical, or optical signals (Kurochkin, 2010; Resnick, 2010). The demands placed on sensor systems include the translation of contact with a biological substance into a signal, amplification of signals from background noise, and signal processing into a form that can be interpreted by end users. What this means in practical terms is that the development of a successful biosensor draws strongly on the fields of engineering, mathematics, and computer science in partnership with biology and chemistry. As researchers from multiple disciplines beyond traditional fields of biology become increasingly involved in life sciences research with potential implications for the scope and operations of the BWC, strategies for engaging these researchers in discussions of the BWC and in educating them about dual-use issues and responsible scientific conduct will become more important (NRC, 2011a).

Conclusion

The three major themes described above—rapid pace, continuing diffusion, and increasing integration among fields—seem set to continue as basic trends in the life sciences for the foreseeable future. At the same time, taking account of the developments in science and technology in ways that are useful to the BWC will require an understanding of the details within these broad trends, including the forces that drive different aspects at different rates and the inevitable barriers that arise to hamper progress.

It also requires reaching out broadly to engage a range of expertise within the scientific community in at least two ways. First, such expertise can help with monitoring the state of science and technology, that is, keeping track of developments so that the States Parties and the experts in Geneva have a reasonable grasp of the “state of science” as it evolves. This can be done in a variety of ways, from formal papers submitted by governments or outside groups to presentations and discussions inside or outside of regular BWC meetings. The intersessional process, particularly over the last five years, has provided numerous examples of how such activities might be carried out. Monitoring developments in science and technology is a continuing process and in order to be effective, it will need to be a regular part of whatever future program of work results from the Seventh Review Conference.

Second, engaging the scientific community will also be essential for assessing the implications of the developments in science and technology for the scope and operation of the treaty. If the first activity can be considered as independent input from the scientific community, carrying out the second objective will require more interaction between States Parties and outside experts. As the Beijing workshop and its predecessors demonstrated, however, monitoring the state of science and technology also benefits from the opportunity for the scientists doing the research to engage with government technical experts. The primary difference may be that, at some point, when implications of science and technology developments move governments toward action, assessing policy options and making decisions may become an activity for States Parties individually or collectively, with little or no outside input.

A major task for the Seventh Review Conference will thus be to work out the arrangements that will permit both effective monitoring and assessment of science and technology. In the case of monitoring the state of science and technology, this seems to be largely a task of choosing among an array of options, perhaps experimenting with a few approaches between now and the Eighth Review Conference in 2016. Options that could be envisioned might include convening ad hoc expert committees on specific topics of interest, forming a standing scientific advisory body, drawing on the expertise of independent national and international scientific organizations, or providing an expanded mandate to the BWC Implementation Support Unit.

Assessments may be more contentious; at present, they are undertaken every five years as part of the regular review conference process. There are many suggestions that more frequent assessments are needed, but whether those should be comprehensive or focus on one or more topics of particular interest will have to be discussed and debated. The good news is that there is already a substantial record of effective engagement between the scientific community and the BWC and experience with both monitoring the state of science and technology and assessing the implications of science and technology developments on which the review conference can draw. The opportunity thus exists for the BWC to become much better able to respond to the challenges and opportunities offered by the continuing advances in science and technology.

Editor’s Note

Although many of the authors’ views were informed by presentations and discussions at a November 2010 workshop in Beijing organized by the US National Research Council and the Chinese Academy Sciences (NRC, 2011b) and other NRC reports, the views expressed in this paper do not necessarily represent the views of the NRC or any of its constituent units.

Footnotes

Notes

Author biographies

Katherine Bowman is a senior program officer with the Board on Life Sciences of the National Research Council (NRC) of the US National Academy of Sciences (NAS). She manages studies and activities across a range of life sciences topics, and participates in NRC activities addressing the potential implications of developments in science and technology.

Kathryn Hughes is a program officer with the Board on Chemical Sciences and Technology (BCST) supporting scientific and technical advisory committees working in the areas of chemistry and chemical engineering. Currently, she is also supporting the US National Committee for Chemistry on behalf of the National Academies’ Board on International Scientific Organizations.

Jo L. Husbands is a scholar and senior project director with the NRC’s Board on Life Sciences, where she manages studies and projects to help mitigate the risks of the misuse of scientific research for biological weapons or bioterrorism and represents the NAS on the Biosecurity Working Group of the Inter Academy Panel on International Issues: The Global Network of Science Academies. Husbands is currently an adjunct professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University.

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