A teachable moment for biological weapons: The Seventh BWC Review Conference and the need for international cooperation in education

Abstract

The central goal of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) is, in effect, to prevent the life sciences from becoming the death sciences. The international community is now debating what steps are necessary to achieve this goal. The author recounts recent efforts to engage and educate those associated with the life sciences about their potential destructive applications, and makes the case for the importance of addressing dual-use education as part of the 2011 BWC Review Conference. The BWC is a valuable forum for promoting national and international efforts, and attention to education could, in turn, help strengthen the treaty. Reaching consensus on future international cooperation and milestones for expanding educational efforts is both possible and necessary.

Since the adoption of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1975, questions have been asked about how life scientists and other practitioners can help achieve the goal of prohibiting biological weapons. In the years after the 9/11 and anthrax attacks in the United States—as part of the resurgent attention to terrorism in general and biothreats in particular—much effort turned toward developing professional codes of conduct akin to the Hippocratic Oath as a way of ensuring that those associated with the life sciences act appropriately. Such codes were seen by many as a vehicle for community self-governance. They were also seen as a tool for educating life scientists about the potential destructive applications of their work. In 2005 and 2008, codes of conduct were discussed during the BWC intersessional process.

And yet, for all the attention paid to this option, efforts to devise such codes largely came to naught. This was in no small part due to the lack of prior awareness by researchers and some scientific bodies of the potential destructive applications of the life sciences (Rappert, 2009). Stated simply: Before codes can help raise awareness, awareness raising—that is, education—is needed to convince life scientists that codes are even necessary.

Why education?

In the first half of the decade of the 2000s, professional associations such as the World Medical Association, international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, science academies including the British Royal Society and US National Academy of Sciences, and funders such as the Wellcome Trust called for the education of those associated with the life sciences—students, researchers, government officials, administrators, and regulators—regarding their potential destructive applications.

That perceived need reflected—and continues to reflect—the shifting nature of biothreats. Today’s concerns are not just with traditional warfare agents (such as anthrax, Ebola or Marburg) and related equipment. Such traditional threats can largely be addressed through existing measures, such as export controls and the physical and biological control of pathogens. The concern is that the “dual use” nature of the life sciences today includes the potential for biological knowledge and biotechnological techniques to serve both beneficial and hostile purposes. Specific concerns include new capabilities to increase the virulence of pathogens, synthesize viruses from scratch, modify bacteria to increase virulence, and use pathogens to interfere with specific cellular targets in order to alter cognition, behavior, and perception. The US National Research Council report, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism (NRC, 2004), provided what has become a defining statement of this particular meaning of dual use. It also provided one of the early recommendations that professional societies educate their members about dual-use issues, given what was asserted to be a wide variation in awareness.

What’s more, studies of life scientists’ familiarity with this meaning of dual use have indicated low levels of awareness. Since 2004, Malcolm Dando—a biologist and international security researcher at the University of Bradford—and I have conducted seminars for university faculties and public research centers. These seminars have had a twofold purpose: first, to inform participants about current life science security debates; and second, to generate discussion about how research findings should be communicated, whether experiments should be subject to institutional oversight, and how the funding of research is being affected by concerns about biothreats.

More than 130 seminars have been conducted in 15 countries—including the UK, Uganda, Japan, Argentina, and Australia—attracting over 3,000 participants. With some variation by country, a recurring message from participants has been the limited attention given to how science might be used in ways that might be prohibited by the BWC. To be sure, some practitioners have given the matter sustained and considered thought. Yet few participants have said that they had previously considered how developments in the life sciences contributed to biothreats, were aware of the current debates about dual-use issues, or were familiar with the BWC (Rappert, 2010; Rappert et al., 2006).

Subsequent surveys in Europe (Revill and Mancini, 2010), Japan (Minehata and Shinomiya, 2010), Israel (Friedman, 2010), and the Asia-Pacific region (Minehata, 2010) have indicated low levels of formalized training as part of university curricula in relation to dual-use issues and wider biosecurity issues. On a positive note, certain additional surveys have shown that at least some groups of scientists have given prior attention to the potential for hostile use of research (McLeish and Nightingale, 2005; NRC and AAAS, 2009).

A practitioner community knowledgeable about the potential hostile applications of its work is a prerequisite for sound practices and policies because:

Determining the likelihood and nature of any threats requires technical input.

There is little possibility of effective and meaningful governance without well-informed practitioners.

Education is a prerequisite for assuring the effectiveness of some forms of intervention (as with codes of conduct).

Education can reinforce international ethical standards against bioweapons.

Education is possible within the limitations of existing international arms control regimes and national capabilities.

In short, education is an enabler. In the absence of widespread professional recognition of and consensus about the extent of concerns posed by the destructive use of biology, the prospect remains for scientists and others in the future to contend that “I didn’t know there was an international prohibition,” “I didn’t know what to do about the implications of my research,” or “My work is not relevant to the BWC.”

Educational efforts

The calls for, and activities related to, education between 2001 and 2005 have been expanded in recent years at the national and international level. The 2008 intersessional meetings of the BWC were notable in this regard. The final report of these meetings included this statement:

 … [States] recognized the importance of ensuring that those working in the biological sciences are aware of their obligations under the Convention and relevant national legislation and guidelines, have a clear understanding of the content, purpose and foreseeable … security consequences of their activities, and are encouraged to take an active role in addressing the threats posed by potential misuse of biological agents and toxins as weapons, including bioterrorism. (United Nations, 2008: 6–7)

The report also noted that:

 … formal requirements for seminars, modules or courses, including possible mandatory components, in relevant scientific and engineering training programs and continuing professional education could assist in raising awareness and in implementing the Convention. (United Nations, 2008: 7)

Such international accords have been reflected in identified national priorities. To take the example of the United States, in 2008, the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity issued the report Strategic Plan for Outreach and Education on Dual Use Research Issues. After offering an evaluation of insufficient awareness among the life science community regarding matters of dual use, the board made a number of recommendations. These included, for instance, that “All federal agencies involved in the conduct and support of life sciences research … should require that their employees, contractors, and institutional grantees train all research staff in the identification and management of dual-use research of concern” (NSABB, 2008: 10). The National Security Council’s National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats recommended greater education of and engagement by professional researchers about the potential for the hostile use of their research (NSC, 2009). This was seen as part of promoting a culture of responsibility.

Such developments in policy have taken place alongside practical activities. To take the case of the United States again, the State Department’s Biosecurity Engagement Program as well as Sandia National Laboratories’ International Biological Threat Reduction programs support educational and training efforts in relation to dual-use matters, laboratory security, and wider issues associated with biosecurity. These include holding awareness-raising events, assessing lab procedures, fostering standards, and developing training material. Canada’s Global Partnership Program provides another example. And some parts of the life science industry, such as AstraZeneca, have moved to train their workforce about dual-use matters.

In November 2009, the Polish Academy of Sciences hosted a workshop about the state of dual-use education in collaboration with the InterAcademy Panel, the International Union of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology, the International Union of Microbiological Societies, and the NRC. The workshop report detailed various activities taking place. Yet, it also offered the caveat that “These examples come from all over the world and seem to result primarily from the work of an interested, committed individual or a specific project, often by a nongovernmental organization” (NRC, 2010: 7). Thus, moving forward will require providing a more stable and sustainable grounding for future efforts.

While the need for education has been highlighted and initiatives undertaken, prominent questions that could be asked about any program of education include: What subject matter should be covered? Who needs to be educated? What is the purpose of education? How can audiences of practicing scientists or other practitioners be reached? How can their attention and active engagement be secured? (Rappert, 2007).

These questions suggest the importance of attending to the wider process issues associated with encouraging professional engagement. For instance, it became apparent through my international seminars that translating interest into concrete activities would require far more than just producing educational material. Active and continuing efforts are needed to make dual-use issues an ongoing topic of professional discussion. Building sustained engagement requires working with the institutional opportunities, existing levels of interest, and resources available in different contexts.

In recent years, a range of implementation models in different national settings have received strong support (Rappert, 2010). These have included:

Facilitating the implementation of more top-down, legislative-driven requirements in Israel.

Building networks of concerned scientists, academics, and government officials in Sweden and Switzerland.

Using surveys about biosecurity education within Europe and Japan to identify would-be champions to bring dual-use issues into curricula and textbooks.

Facilitating national instances of good practice in Australia, China, and Japan.

Education and the BWC

Given the practical implementation questions associated with realizing educational programs and goals, it is clear that much work is still required to bring emerging efforts to fruition and to foster new ones. If activities underway today are to be sustained, they cannot primarily rest on the initiative of specific individuals and organizations. Instead, it is necessary to find an institutional basis for supporting such efforts.

As a cornerstone of the prohibition and stigmatization of biological weapons, the BWC could play such an institutional support role. In recent years, the treaty has fashioned itself as a forum for sharing experiences, debating options, and coordinating initiatives.

What is needed is an agreement between state parties for concerted action to educate life scientists. The Seventh BWC Review Conference provides an excellent opportunity to establish such a plan. It could include measures such as setting targets, deadlines, and milestones; designating international and/or regional coordinators; setting a schedule of national and international workshops; and establishing bilateral and multilateral assistance arrangements.

In my estimation, though, perhaps what is needed most is a collective vision among governments, civil society, industry, and national and intergovernmental organizations. Such a vision would give credibility and priority to emerging educational efforts. In 2008, as part of the BWC Meeting of Experts, I proposed that elements for such a shared vision could include that:

All those graduating from higher education in fields associated with the life sciences should be familiar with the international prohibition against biological weapons.

All those undertaking professional research careers should have received effective training or instruction related to preventing the misuse of their research.

Each government should commit itself to initiating a dialogue with their respective national science academies (or other relevant bodies) about how the present low level of awareness can be swiftly corrected.

Whether or not these are the most appropriate elements, current and future activities around the world would benefit from aligning themselves with such positive shared aspirations.

Education is also a valuable topic for the future of the treaty. The need for dual-use education is a matter upon which states today generally agree. If meaningful agreements could be made on this topic—including the establishment of deadlines and milestones for action—this could provide momentum for moving forward on other aspects of the BWC as part of the review conference. If handled correctly, the topic of education could help overcome longstanding divisions. It could provide a way to resolve concerns about national implementation (under Article IV) and international cooperation (under Article X) through the recognition that a properly trained workforce is essential for ensuring the application of biological agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. The topic of education is also well-suited to provide a basis for widespread engagement and participation in prohibition. This will be important in renewing the relevance and strength of the treaty beyond 2011.