How Europeans view tactical nuclear weapons on their continent

Abstract

With the debate among NATO member states over the stationing of US nuclear weapons in Europe likely to continue, it is useful to examine why some European NATO members wish to see an end to the US nuclear presence and why others stick to the status quo. In assessing the different positions of key European NATO countries on nuclear disarmament, the author notes that the positions depend on whether the states possess nuclear weapons, how their history and geography affect threat perceptions, and how the nations variously perceive their role in international and regional affairs. Geography-driven history produces one dividing line, which largely runs along the former border between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Less obvious are the reasons for a north–south division on this issue within “old Europe.” The northern nations are more vocally pro-disarmament than are the Mediterranean nations. Domestic politics, of course, also play a determining factor in all counties. Interest in removing the weapons is strongest in countries where senior statesmen spanning the political spectrum have sought to lead public opinion in the direction of disarmament.

Questions remain about the need for US nuclear weapons in Europe and how their retention fits the vision of a nuclear-weapons-free world. At the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, NATO adopted its new Strategic Concept, which associated further reductions to Europe’s nuclear arsenal with the idea that Russia would reciprocate. This tie to future Russian actions constrained what, until now, has been a series of unilateral US decisions to withdraw more than 97 percent of the weapons stored in Europe in the 1970s (Norris and Kristensen, 2011). Although the issue is not a high priority for any NATO member, the momentum that developed in the past two years pushing for removal, particularly in northern Europe, is unlikely to disappear. To anticipate how the debate may evolve, it may be instructive to examine where and why the removal momentum developed.

Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium: The push for removal

Strong anti-nuclear sentiments in Germany are manifested in popular opposition to both nuclear power and nuclear weapons. Determined to overcome the errors of the past, post-war leaders pursued policies of détente and ostpolitik, which aided Germany’s economic recovery and eventually its peaceful unification. An anti-nuclear energy movement dating back to the early 1970s was strengthened when large parts of Germany were contaminated by radiation from the 1986 Chernobyl disaster. Not surprisingly, a stable majority of the population has favored the complete removal of US nuclear weapons from German territory (Thränert, 2009).

These attitudes are balanced by pragmatism about the nation’s energy needs and its security dependence on an alliance structure that holds nuclear deterrence at its core. In the energy sphere, the contrasting impulses resulted in Germany first deciding in 2000 to phase out nuclear energy, and then reversing the decision in 2010. In the security sphere, the debate has come down on the side of putting alliance needs first. Yet when former US Secretary of State George Shultz, former Defense Secretary William Perry, former Chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee Sam Nunn, and former National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger pushed disarmament goals in a 2007 op-ed published in the Wall Street Journal, it opened room for Germans to take a more active stance. The suggestion that nuclear tactical weapons be removed from Germany was rekindled by four German elder statesmen in January 2009 in an op-ed that emulated the editorial of their American counterparts, which has proven to be a trendsetting piece for diplomats and politicians around the world (Schmidt et al., 2009).

In April 2009, then Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, head of the Social Democratic Party, broke with his coalition partner, Chancellor Angela Merkel, in publicly calling for removal of the weapons, which he argued had become militarily obsolete. Steinmeier’s successor, Guido Westerwelle, leader of the centrist Free Democratic Party, had made tactical nuclear weapons removal a signature issue in his election campaign that year. As a condition for replacing the Social Democratic Party in the coalition government, he persuaded Merkel that Germany should seek the withdrawal of nuclear weapons as part of a wider NATO effort to pursue arms control.

Westerwelle’s foreign ministry lobbied other NATO member states to join the cause. Four nations—Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Norway—joined Germany’s stance. In February 2010 the foreign ministers from these five nations sent a letter to NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen calling for debate among NATO members on the future of the tactical weapons and discussion on how the alliance could move closer to President Barack Obama’s objective of peace and security in a world without nuclear weapons. While recognizing that the alliance’s future policy requires the full support of all allies, including its members living near Russia, they wanted its new Strategic Concept to reinforce arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation—along with credible deterrence—as integral elements of a comprehensive policy. ¹

The Netherland’s decision to join Westerwelle’s initiative was strongly pushed by Foreign Minister Maxime Verhagen. The security establishment of the Netherlands has supported hosting US nuclear weapons as a way for the Dutch to contribute to the alliance and, although not usually stated publicly, to maintain the stature of the Netherlands in NATO. Although he is a conservative politician from the Christian Democratic Party, Verhagen took up the nuclear disarmament cause in a March 2008 parliamentary speech in which he said the Netherlands should be willing to return the nuclear weapons on its soil not as a unilateral gesture but if doing so contributed to US–Russia arms control negotiations. More recently he said that having the debate over US nuclear weapons in the context of the NATO Strategic Concept is the best way for the alliance to contribute to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. He advocated transparency regarding steps to reduce nuclear weapons and said the tactical nuclear weapons were not necessary in light of ongoing US security guarantees.

As in the case of Germany, the decision by the conservative-led government in The Hague to join with Berlin in advocating withdrawal of US nuclear weapons was foreshadowed by the publication in April 2009 of an op-ed by four senior Dutch statesmen advocating that the weapons are no longer needed (Lubbers et al., 2009). One of the senior statesmen was former Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers, a Christian Democrat with hawkish credentials. In making the disarmament case, the editorial noted, inter alia, the 1996 advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice calling for implementation of Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Given the location of the court in The Hague, the Dutch government is bound to take its rulings seriously. The op-ed also argued that in order to play an active role in the revision of the Strategic Concept, the Netherlands should no longer be silent on the issue of US nuclear weapons in Europe. Dutch government officials privately hint that by including themselves in the letter to Rasmussen, they ensured that Germany would not take unilateral steps to shed its nuclear hosting role. ²

In Belgium, the call for a debate on the deployment of the tactical nuclear weapons meshed well with the pacifist streak of the population and the nation’s increasing identity with the EU, overshadowing what used to be a stronger orientation with NATO. A week before the letter to Rasmussen, five elder Belgian statesmen penned an op-ed calling for removal of the weapons from Europe, in support of the broader global agenda for a nuclear-weapon-free world. Concerns over the security of nuclear weapons in Belgium were raised in January 2010, when protestors breached the fences at Klein Brogel Air Force Base and came close to where the warheads are thought to be stored. The inclusion of Belgium and Luxembourg in the letter to Rasmussen also reflects a decision at a November 2008 meeting of ministers from Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg to reinvigorate Benelux cooperation.

At the May 2010 NPT Review Conference, a larger number of European nations joined the call to remove the tactical nuclear weapons. A paper introduced by Germany, on behalf of itself and nine other countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, and Sweden), argued for the inclusion of non-strategic nuclear weapons into the US–Russia arms control process in order to advance toward a nuclear-weapon-free world. The paper also encouraged the US and Russia to negotiate “increasingly lower ceilings for the numbers and the eventual elimination of both strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons in their arsenals,” building on their unilateral 1991 and 1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives.

Italy and Turkey: Silent hosts

The countries hosting the largest number of US tactical nuclear weapons, Italy and Turkey, joined neither the letter to Rasmussen nor the paper by 10 EU nations at the NPT Review Conference. These two Mediterranean NATO members were conspicuously silent.

In the case of Italy, the main reasons may be found in domestic politics and what internal critics call a national inferiority complex, although government officials characterize the reticence as foreign policy realism. In security policy, the fast-changing governments in Rome have been constant in keeping solidarity with NATO. This was the best way of containing not only the Soviet Union, but also the large Italian Communist Party. Notwithstanding the demise of both communist threats, hosting nuclear weapons is still an important political asset for Italy. This participation in nuclear burden-sharing, Italians believe, gives them greater weight in NATO; further, this also gives the Italian security establishment a sense of relevance and worth. It is a way to make up for Italy’s exclusion from too many other groupings, including, for example, the EU-3 (France, Germany, United Kingdom) negotiating team with Iran. Italians resent not playing a role in international affairs commensurate with the country’s size. There is a fear that removing US nuclear weapons could further marginalize Italy, leaving it more dependent for its security on France and the UK, each of which only slightly outweighs Italy in population and GDP.

Italy’s bit part on the world stage is partially due to its typical reluctance to take the initiative on foreign policy matters when doing so could cause trouble for governments that too often are embroiled in domestic struggles. The pro-American Silvio Berlusconi government is even less interested in promoting transparency about the nuclear weapons stationed on its soil unless at Washington’s suggestion, but an unspoken policy of nuclear opacity predates his administration. This reluctance to rock the boat on NATO nuclear policy is somewhat at odds with a widespread, but not particularly deep-rooted, anti-nuclear popular mood that found expression in the national decision to forgo nuclear power in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident (a decision recently reversed).

In Turkey’s case, the US nuclear weapons stationed at Incirlik Air Force base are seen as playing an important security role, providing reassurance of American assistance in the event of an emergency and a “hook” tethering Turkey to the European mainland. The nuclear weapons also appear to perform a nonproliferation function: As long as Turkey has access to US nuclear weapons it can turn to in extremis, there is no need for Ankara to consider developing its own nuclear weapons option. Given that the whole of Turkey falls within range of Iranian nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, the nuclear weapons may be more relevant now than they were in the past two decades. Turkish officials say they do not feel directly threatened by Iran, but they do feel a strong need to maintain power parity with the other non-Arab Muslim regional power. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, Turkey’s relative power in the region will weaken and its sense of security will diminish if the US arsenal is withdrawn precipitously. If US nuclear weapons were to be withdrawn from other NATO countries, Turkey would have reason to feel exposed and to question the fundamental principles of alliance solidarity and burden-sharing that have been the basis of Turkey’s nuclear hosting arrangements (Kibaroglu, 2010).

For Ankara, the deterrent role of the US nuclear weapons in Turkey has shifted focus from the Soviet Union to Turkey’s regional neighbors Iraq, Syria, and Iran—all of which have at some point acquired unconventional weapons systems and ballistic missiles (Kibaroglu, 2010). Given Turkey’s recent and ongoing rapprochement with these countries, however, the deterrence rationale for the nuclear stationing has eroded. Efforts to bring about a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East may also undermine the viability of the deployments. In addition, many Turks have a lingering skepticism about NATO security guarantees, which they did not feel were forthcoming in the first and second Gulf Wars.

To date, there has been very little public debate about the nuclear weapons. When asked to assess Turkey’s attitudes toward disarmament, one foreign scholar wrote: “There is not enough public information to evaluate Turkey’s likely stance if there were a serious effort by the United States and other nuclear weapon states to eliminate all nuclear weapons on a global basis. However, what can be surmised … is that Turkey would welcome such an initiative precisely because, in the absence of nuclear-armed countries, its industrial and conventional military prowess would help increase its influence in its immediate region and beyond” (Barkey, 2009: 78).

Eastern Europe: Concerns about Russia temper disarmament enthusiasm

Eastern European states place a greater emphasis on the alliance’s deterrence posture and are thus keener on keeping a US nuclear presence in Europe as a visible sign of NATO’s Article V guarantees regarding collective security. These new NATO members cannot themselves offer to host US nuclear weapons; doing so would violate the terms of the NATO–Russia Founding Act of 1997, under which the member states of NATO reiterated that they had “no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear policy—and do not foresee any future need to do so.” Highly interested in attracting other forms of US military presence, the Eastern European states seem to share the same view expressed by Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski, who, in November 2008, declared that “countries that have US soldiers on their territory do not get invaded” (Pincus, 2008). They see Russia as increasingly authoritarian and Russian foreign policy as increasingly aggressive. After the 2008 Georgia crisis, Eastern Europeans want more than ever to engage militarily with the United States and fear any weakening of the US commitment.

Among the new NATO members, the Baltic states are the most concerned about the alliance not letting down its guard. Annexed by the Soviet Union and recently bullied by Russia, these states believe that this experience gives them keener insights into the Russian mindset and good reason to remain vigilant (Chalmers and Lunn, 2010). The Baltic states are not all alike in this respect, however. Lithuania, which currently has a cozier relationship with Russia and a generally less military approach to international relations, calls for reciprocal reductions and eventual elimination of tactical nuclear weapons. Estonia, which experienced a Russian cyber attack and vilification campaign in 2007, is the most focused on nuclear deterrence. A recent Estonian statement emphasized the indispensable role of the United States as “the provider of nuclear deterrence along with elements of the nuclear sharing arrangements” and concluded that “any change in that role would constitute a fundamental change in the North Atlantic security system” (Chalmers and Lunn, 2010: 16).

Other Eastern European states are more enthusiastic about disarmament, particularly the Czech Republic, which, having hosted Obama’s April 2009 speech and the April 2010 signing of the New START agreement, has a vested interest in seeing a successful follow-though.

Although Poland has also borne the brunt of Soviet invasion and recent Russian threats regarding deployment of Iskander missiles in Kalingrad, the nation has been active in global disarmament diplomacy. Four Polish senior statesmen issued an op-ed in April 2009 calling for nuclear weapons abolition (Kwasniewski et al., 2009). Warsaw has also taken a more nuanced approach to the issue of the US nuclear weapons in Europe. Seeing Germany’s push to remove the weapons from its soil, Poland proactively sought to bring Russian tactical nuclear weapons into the equation. It promoted this idea first in a joint op-ed by the Polish and Swedish foreign ministers (Bildt and Sikorski, 2010), then in a Polish–Norwegian proposal at the NPT Review Conference, calling for a “step-by-step approach, including transparency and confidence-building measures as well as balanced and mutual arms reductions.” ³ Poland’s growing identity with the EU makes it all the more useful to be able to partner with Scandinavian countries and to be in sync with Germany. Poland’s rapprochement with Russia predated the “reset” in US–Russia relations but was reinforced by it. These factors all account for Poland’s willingness to see the withdrawal of US nuclear forces.

United Kingdom: “Disarmament laboratory”

Among all the nuclear-armed states, the United Kingdom is the most committed to the vision of nuclear disarmament. It is also the only one with a politically significant public constituency for disarmament (Perkovich, 2010). It has reduced its nuclear forces to be reliant on a single delivery system (the Trident missile), a single warhead design, and a single launch platform (submarines) (Freedman, 2009). In October 2010, Prime Minister David Cameron announced a further reduction to no more than 180 warheads by the middle of the next decade.

The “special relationship” with the United States provides the UK with an additional layer of security that enables more of its citizens to consider jettisoning the country’s own nuclear weapons. An attraction to disarmament is also shaped by the character trait of individualism that makes the British more inclined than citizens of many other countries to disagree with government policies when the nation is not perceived to be at peril. Given the international status of the English language and the UK’s role at the head of the 53-member Commonwealth of Nations, the British have less psychological need for nuclear status to demonstrate global leadership.

To date, the UK’s disarmament constituency has been largely limited to the left side of the political spectrum, where it has had a checked history. Grassroots organizations mobilized protestors in large numbers, especially in opposition to the introduction of US nuclear cruise missiles under NATO’s 1979 double-track decision. But the Labour Party’s rejection of nuclear deterrence in the 1980s on moral grounds was widely credited as having cost the party the 1987 election, giving Margaret Thatcher an unprecedented third term (Freedman, 2009). Learning from that mistake, former Prime Minister Tony Blair a decade later recast “New Labour” as pragmatic on defense: supportive of disarmament but not unilaterally. This policy line has prevailed since then, including in the current coalition government. The UK has no interest in being the only P-5 member to disarm. It has sought, rather, to foster a multilateral disarmament process, particularly in order to bring in China.

The UK has not taken a visible part in the ongoing debate within NATO over the disposition of US nuclear weapons in Europe. These weapons were quietly pulled out of the UK in about 2008, apparently for physical security reasons, not because of host country demands. One notable elder statesman, Lord George Robertson, former NATO secretary-general and former UK defense secretary, forcefully argued against withdrawal of the nuclear weapons from elsewhere in NATO in a February 2010 article co-authored with two American conservatives (Miller et al., 2010). Yet Robertson earlier joined with other former British ministers in calling for Britain and France to join multilateral efforts to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and thus move toward their complete abolition (Hurd et al., 2008).

France: Emphasis on nuclear deterrence

Among all Western states, France is the most skeptical about calls for complete nuclear disarmament and has a truculent go-it-alone attitude. It acceded to the NPT only in 1992 and continued nuclear weapons testing until 1995. For France, nuclear weapons are a central element of its security policy.

This policy is largely driven by security concerns shaped by the nation’s historical experience, although political ambitions and prestige factors also play a role (Tertrais, 2009). When France initiated its nuclear program in the 1950s, it was still emerging from the national trauma and humiliation of its invasion and defeat by Nazi Germany, and the devastation of World War I was within living memory. Determined to prevent repetition and seeing a new threat emerge from Soviet-led Warsaw Pact forces, Charles de Gaulle decided that France needed a nuclear deterrent independent of the US nuclear guarantee.

The fall of communism has removed any sense of an existential threat, yet the French security establishment sees the need to maintain prudent protection against unknown future threats. Status considerations also played a key role in de Gaulle’s determination to possess an autonomous nuclear deterrent. French pride and desire to maintain an international leadership status on par with that of its long-time rival across the English Channel required that French security not be dependent on a nuclear umbrella held by Anglo-Saxons.

There is very little disarmament constituency in France, where only a small number of grassroots organizations are devoted to this cause. French nuclear expert Bruno Tertrais explains that this is because “for the French, nuclear weapons remain the positive symbol of an independent foreign and defense policy, in particular from the United States. French political culture has long identified nuclear technology with independence” (Tertrais, 2009: 14).

Rejecting the contention that disarmament and nonproliferation are co-dependent, French strategists found themselves in sympathy with the conservative nuclear policies of the United States under President George W. Bush, who similarly rejected the theory that nonproliferation and disarmament are necessarily linked. France is somewhat discomforted by the emphasis President Barack Obama has given to disarmament, which they fear has raised unrealistic expectations. They worry that the vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world distracts from the more imminent threat of nuclear proliferation.

Looking ahead

The areas of common ground among NATO members are far greater than the areas of disagreement. European members of the alliance all understand the importance of unity on nuclear policy. They also recognize the role of nuclear deterrence in maintaining international security until the future day when conditions allow nuclear weapons to be abolished. There is a shared perception that the peace and prosperity that has blessed the continent for over two generations owes much to the role of nuclear deterrence in preventing re-occurrence of a major war. Extended deterrence is seen as the bedrock of the alliance and the most enduring symbol of the transatlantic bond. But there are real doubts about whether US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe are necessary for that purpose.

With New START now ratified, Europeans who share the vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world will be looking for ways to keep up the momentum toward this goal. Many will continue to ask why the next steps should not include movement in their own backyard.