Expanding the IAEA’s nuclear security mandate

Abstract

Expansion of civilian nuclear power means that greater international cooperation is required to ensure that terrorist groups do not acquire nuclear and radiological materials. The global nuclear security regime urgently needs to be strengthened; the authors write that boosting the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the best place to start. The IAEA established a nuclear security program in 2002. Recently, this program’s successes, including helping states repatriate highly enriched uranium to Russia and the United States, have prompted more national interest in the IAEA’s nuclear security assistance missions and led to more requests for advisory and evaluation services. If given the authority, the IAEA could verify the continuous level of nuclear security of member states and assess and coordinate the implementation of any actions that need to be taken. The authors write that the problem of the IAEA’s limited authority is tied to fundamental debates in the international community over how to deal with threats in a globalized world. Resources need to be pooled; expertise needs to be shared and centralized; and common standards need to be set, monitored, and enforced in the interests of a safer world. But not all states are convinced of this, and some are suspicious that states advocating global governance are using their power to dominate the global security agenda. The authors explore the expansion of the IAEA’s mandate and ask the pivotal question confronting the international community: How can states build consensus on the need to prioritize nuclear security?

As civilian nuclear power expands anew, the task of ensuring that terrorist groups do not acquire nuclear and radiological materials has become even more urgent and complex, requiring greater international cooperation. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—the body that assists states in the development and use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes—established a nuclear security program in 2002. Successes in this program, including helping states repatriate highly enriched uranium to Russia and the United States, have recently prompted more national interest in the IAEA’s nuclear security assistance missions and led to more requests for advisory and evaluation services (IAEA, 2008).

The IAEA’s program is, for the most part, well respected by member states. The work is supported by in-house scientists and laboratories and is assisted by member state support programs that provide funding and contribute experts and training. However, there are also a number of weaknesses, most of which stem from the agency’s lack of authority to assess or verify the nuclear security efforts of member states, the reluctance of states to grant it that authority, and the unwillingness of the IAEA Secretariat to promote or lobby for an expanded mandate. These handicaps restrict the agency to an assistance role. It may assess (and in some cases implement) nuclear security measures in a particular member state, but only when the state in question invites it to do so.

As a result, the global nuclear security regime is far from comprehensive and urgently needs to be strengthened (Boureston and Ogilvie-White, 2010). Expanding the role and mandate of the IAEA would offer significant and immediate benefits, with the smallest practical hurdles to implementation. Compared with any other body—such as the U.N. 1540 Committee, U.N. Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), or World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS)—it would be relatively easy (in practical terms) for IAEA inspectors to perform nuclear assessments and report their findings to the United Nations. ¹ However, there are significant political obstacles to this proposal: a lack of agreement between developed and developing states on the need to prioritize nuclear security; concerns that new nuclear security obligations will hamper access to nuclear technology; and allegations, often made by Iran, that the IAEA is being hijacked by Western states to fulfill their own security agendas. These political obstacles are anchoring the IAEA to its traditional assistance role.

The IAEA nuclear security program

The IAEA is often referred to in the international media as the “U.N. nuclear watchdog”—a title that helps people visualize its global nuclear security role but gives an overly narrow impression of the agency’s work. The organization was established in 1957 as the world’s “Atoms for Peace” organization—an independent international body set up to work with member states in all areas of peaceful nuclear cooperation, from the promotion of nuclear technology for use in health and agriculture to the development of nuclear energy programs. Increasingly, as the safety and security challenges associated with nuclear technology have expanded and their implications have been grasped, the agency has been mandated by the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council to guide and assist member states in implementing the international treaties and conventions that have been set up to regulate global nuclear activities. It has also been tasked with monitoring member state compliance with their legal obligations and with dealing with states that violate them. In March 2002, in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the IAEA embarked upon a mission to combat the risk of nuclear terrorism by assisting states in strengthening the security of their nuclear materials and facilities. The IAEA’s first nuclear security plan described a program of work encompassing eight activity areas. ² Specific services under this program include missions to reduce inventories of high-risk materials (including highly enriched uranium) and to improve state capabilities in preventing, detecting, and responding to nuclear and radiological terrorism, illicit trafficking, and nuclear and radiological emergencies.

Weaknesses in IAEA-related nuclear security treaties

The IAEA is hampered by inadequacies in the international conventions, amendments, and recommendations that underpin the nuclear security regime. Most of these use guidelines that are non-binding, unclear, and not subject to any form of external oversight, and thus are open to minimalist interpretations or inaction by states that do not consider nuclear security to be a priority. In some cases, even states that are convinced of the nuclear security imperative have been slow to translate political commitment into concrete action, often due to delays caused by legislators who are wary of implementing nuclear security instruments that impinge on their country’s national sovereignty or that require new information-sharing practices that some fear could compromise rather than enhance security at their nuclear facilities.

The CPPNM and its amendment

The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) is the only international legally binding agreement on the physical protection of nuclear materials used for peaceful purposes (IAEA, 2009a). It provides requirements for protecting nuclear materials during international transport and establishes a framework for cooperation in the protection, recovery, and return of stolen materials. The convention lists offenses that states should make punishable, and for which extradition should be accommodated, but signatories are only required to implement measures deemed necessary in accordance with their national security requirements (Steinhäusler, 2009). As of February 2010, the convention had 142 parties. Among states that have not signed are Thailand and Vietnam, both of which have recently launched nuclear energy programs, and North Korea and Iran, which have known or suspected nuclear weapons programs. An amendment to the CPPNM was passed in 2005 but will only enter into force after two-thirds of the current 142 CPPNM parties ratify it. If this happens, the amendment will facilitate cooperation to recover nuclear materials, prevent (or mitigate) the consequences of radiological sabotage, establish new norms for the physical protection of nuclear materials, and encourage parties to criminalize offenses in their domestic law. It will also significantly extend the IAEA nuclear security mandate by conferring additional functions on the agency.

Experts cite inherent problems in the CPPNM and its amendment (Steinhäusler, 2009). First, mandated physical protection measures are unclear, and some argue that ambiguous language could be used as an easy out for states that do not wish to prioritize nuclear security. ³ Second, the CPPNM and its amendment allow states to evaluate their own nuclear security, so other states or organizations (such as the IAEA) cannot reasonably demand that a member state strengthen its physical security. Third, the CPPNM and amendment do not require periodic reporting to any organization and do not specify reviews of member states’ physical protection measures (Berdennikov, 2002). Therefore, there is no verification of work done by states and no consequences if work is not undertaken.

Protecting nuclear materials and facilities

The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225) is a set of IAEA recommendations to establish effective physical protection measures. It is the closest thing the international community has to a set of guiding principles for securing loose nuclear materials and preventing nuclear terrorism. INFCIRC/225 provides best practices from which countries can begin to develop their nuclear security systems. It covers the physical protection of both peaceful and military nuclear materials in use, storage, and transport, whether domestic or international (National Nuclear Security Administration, 2007).

But INFCIRC/225 is deficient on a number of levels. First, its recommendations are non-binding, meaning states have no obligation to implement them; states can therefore use the guidelines as a whole, in part, or not at all. Second, a number of measures that would have strengthened physical protection were weakened or dropped in order to get the revisions passed. As a diplomat noted recently, these guidelines are the lowest common denominator in accepted rules for physical protection (and most are not strong enough to ward off any potential thief or attacker). ⁴

The Code of Conduct on securing radioactive sources

The Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources is a nonbinding, international instrument created by the IAEA to provide guidelines for the control of civilian radioactive sources that may pose a safety or security risk. Since the code was published in January 2004, most states have pledged their political commitment to it; notable exceptions include Egypt, Iran, Malaysia, Myanmar, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Singapore. But few have completed the self-assessment questionnaire, which is intended to help the IAEA evaluate implementation of the guidelines. ⁵ The status of national implementation is therefore difficult to gauge, although most of the indicators suggest that political commitment has been slow to translate into concrete action. Important states that have not been engaging fully in the process of information exchange over their use and control of radioactive sources include Argentina, Israel, Japan, Pakistan, Ukraine, and many countries in the European Union. In addition, China—alone among the nuclear weapon states—has not submitted a completed questionnaire to the IAEA.

The IAEA as the ultimate nuclear security authority

The ideal step to strengthen and manage international security would be to give the IAEA the authority to define, review, and monitor national nuclear security standards and to evaluate compliance. ⁶ That would require states to negotiate—under the guidance of the IAEA—binding agreements that set those standards, giving the IAEA a precise mandate to evaluate whether the standards are being met. As part of this process, the IAEA could clarify the “appropriate effective” steps set out in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 and solidify commitments outlined in the CPPNM, its amendment, INFCIRC/225, and the Code of Conduct. ⁷ Most importantly, it could establish the minimum threat against which all nuclear and radiological materials need to be defended. Once these standards are set, the IAEA could monitor compliance, becoming the verification body for all major nuclear security instruments, including Resolution 1540. The IAEA could conduct regular reviews of nuclear security measures and report any cases of noncompliance to the IAEA Board of Governors. If a state, having been warned of its noncompliance under any of the binding agreements and given a deadline to rectify the situation, failed to do so, the matter could be reported to the U.N. Security Council for further action.

Certain practical hurdles currently constrain the IAEA’s ability to develop its authority over nuclear security standards. One of the biggest is funding: The investment required to expand the IAEA nuclear security role to the extent that is envisaged would be huge, and yet there are already serious funding problems with its existing agenda. Most of the difficulties stem from the fact that the bulk of the IAEA nuclear security budget comes from voluntary funding, and although the IAEA General Conference, the agency’s policy-making body, approved a small budget in 2009, it has to rely on voluntary supplements to pay for its work (U.N. News Centre, 2008). This is problematic because the amount pledged by member states often differs from the amount that is actually received, and donors sometimes place limitations on how voluntary funds are used, creating major planning difficulties.

Other practical obstacles also exist, from limited human resources to technological deficiencies. But perhaps the most important question is this: Would the international community provide the political support for the type of expansion of the nuclear security regime that would be required to make it effective? Much depends on whether states are willing to invest the necessary authority in the IAEA (or another appropriate international body), and whether they are prepared to cede some of their sovereignty to the global level in the interest of the greater good. If they are not willing to take this step, which is essential for coordination, verification, and enforcement, all the practical hurdles become irrelevant.

Political resistance to expanding IAEA authority

The biggest obstacle to expanding IAEA authority is that IAEA member states are deeply divided over the agency’s priorities. Many resist efforts to expand the IAEA nuclear security mandate. Whereas most Western states are keen to expand the IAEA role and authority in the “3Ss” (safety, security, and safeguards), many developing states believe that the IAEA is already doing enough in those areas and that efforts to expand its role further undermine what they see as its core role: assisting states in the utilization of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes—harkening back to the IAEA’s original role as a promoter of nuclear power. Furthermore, some developing states also hint at deeper concerns that Western states are using the IAEA to fulfill their own security/intelligence agendas (United Nations, 2009).

These tensions are being exploited by states that believe it is in their interest to keep the agency divided. Statements by Iran at the 2009 IAEA General Conference show this strategy at work. Iranian Vice President Ali Akbar Salehi stressed that the independence of the IAEA is being undermined “through undue interference and political pressure” (IAEA, 2009c). He went on to condemn a growing trend of “authoritarianism and arrogance,” which his country “courageously and almost single-handedly challenges.” While most states dismiss such statements and criticize Iran’s defiant nuclear diplomacy, there is sympathy for Iran’s position among developing states that regard standardization of nuclear obligations and binding agreements as a constraint on development and a challenge to national sovereignty (for example, see IAEA, 2009d).

A number of developing states also sympathize with other aspects of Iran’s position. They see the U.S. position on nonproliferation and nuclear security as hypocritical. The fact that the United States—which possesses the biggest nuclear arsenal in the world—dominates the nuclear nonproliferation regime is considered illegitimate at best. States that take this view want to expand the membership of the IAEA Board of Governors so that Western states have less influence in IAEA decision making (United Nations, 2009).

The same states also want to limit IAEA nuclear security (and safeguards) mandates—an agenda that acts as a brake on the nuclear security regime. ⁸ Many Western states are trying to release this brake by emphasizing the universal threat of nuclear terrorism, but they are failing to persuade others. As U.S. Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte argued at an IAEA Board of Governors meeting in June 2009, some states “dismiss nuclear security as a special interest of a few countries,” and until that perception changes, the brake will remain in place (Schulte, 2009).

Opportunities for building consensus on the need to prioritize nuclear security are being taken by the Obama administration, which is conscious of the legitimacy deficit, and has pledged to fulfill U.S. disarmament obligations while pursuing an active nonproliferation agenda. Recently, there have been signs that more states accept the need to take nuclear security seriously. Positive indicators include the outcome of the Nuclear Security Summit in April 2010 in Washington, D.C., which brought together 47 world leaders and senior officials to discuss fissile material security. Announcements of concrete actions included Chile’s shipment of highly enriched uranium to the United States; Ukraine’s pledge to convert its nuclear reactors to low-enriched uranium; Malaysia’s enactment of legislation establishing an export controls regime; India’s launch of a Global Nuclear Energy Centre as a tool for promoting nuclear security best practices; Russia’s promise to close its ADE-2 reactor, which has been producing weapon-grade plutonium for 52 years; and steps by Argentina, Italy, and the United Arab Emirates to install radiation detection equipment at their ports ( Jane’s Intelligence Weekly, 2010).

These announcements demonstrate a growing sense of shared ownership of nuclear security obligations among some of the states that attended the summit, but it is important to acknowledge that key states were not invited, that all commitments made at the summit were non-binding, and that discussions among the 47 leaders and senior officials exposed divisions that were later on display at the 2010 NPT Review Conference in New York. Whereas many developed states pushed for clearer and stronger nuclear security obligations and U.N.-imposed penalties for states that fail to comply, many developing states argued against this. ⁹ Evidence of these divisions can be found in the language of the Summit Communiqué and the Final Declaration of the Review Conference: Both respect the non-binding nature of agreements, limits on IAEA authority, and dependence on the willingness and ability of states to assess, implement, and enforce their own nuclear security measures (America.gov, 2010; United Nations, 2010).

Recommendations

Lead by example

There are a number of important steps that vigilant states—that is, states that are taking a leadership role in promoting global nuclear security, such as Australia, Canada, the EU states, New Zealand, and the United States—can take to strengthen the nuclear security regime. These include efforts by these states to demonstrate a balanced approach to the 3Ss and to disarmament. A regime that lacks verification and enforcement tools, as the current regime does, relies on voluntary buy-in and goodwill, which is more likely to be forthcoming if states that are leading the call for stronger nuclear security measures, such as those listed above, clearly demonstrate that they are meeting their own obligations.

Demonstration of commitment by the vigilant states should include ratifying and implementing the major nuclear security instruments (especially the CPPNM amendment, Nuclear Terrorism Convention, INFCIRC/225, and the Code of Conduct) without delay and reporting on concrete steps taken under these agreements in the IAEA General Conference and Board of Governors and at the next Nuclear Security Summit in 2012. At the sub-state level, annual reports by boards of directors in the nuclear industry on their nuclear security record (which member states could report to the IAEA) would demonstrate that responsibility for establishing strong nuclear security systems is also being taken by the private sector.

Cooperate to strengthen nuclear security instruments and bodies

States need to support the IAEA’s expanding nuclear security role through information sharing, education initiatives, and, where possible, generous contributions to IAEA programs. Giving the IAEA greater authority would be the best step toward a more secure nuclear environment, but given the political sensitivities surrounding such a move, the next-best thing would be for international actors to boost the IAEA by assisting with the implementation of the current nuclear security program and plan.

As a part of its 2010–2013 plan, the IAEA is continuing to develop its 3Ss initiative, which aims to develop a “one house” approach to the agency’s work. That would include finding synergies among the approaches to safety, security, and safeguards to reduce costs, prevent duplication, increase efficiency, and, where possible, reduce the burden of mounting nonproliferation obligations (IAEA, 2009b). Other important elements of the plan that will expand the agency’s nuclear security role include enhancing IAEA information sharing; promoting awareness of the Design Basis Threat (DBT) methodology (a tool adopted by the IAEA to help states assess threats by creating a profile of the type, composition, and capabilities of adversaries) and its use by member states in creating DBT reports; coordinating assistance requests and donations; improving IAEA monitoring of physical security measures (as required under the Nuclear Terrorism Convention); and facilitating entry into force of the CPPNM amendment.

Address North-South political divisions

States need to address the difficult issue of how to build consensus over the logic of expanding IAEA authority—especially in the realm of monitoring and legally binding standard-setting. This issue goes to the heart of the evolving international system, to debates over national versus global governance, which have become mired in disagreements between the states of the industrialized North and those of the developing South over security and development priorities and human rights (these disagreements are often referred to in the international relations literature as “North-South debates”). Those backing more robust norms in the evolving nuclear security regime need to do more to understand the nature of North-South debates so they can successfully engage in consensus-building. At times, they may have to adopt diplomatic strategies in international forums to facilitate a bridge-building process (for example, by providing greater support for technical cooperation programs in “fence-sitter states”—states, such as Thailand and Vietnam, that are developing nuclear energy, need significant external assistance to do so, and could be persuaded to support the expansion of IAEA authority if given enough incentives and assurances).

Conclusion

The IAEA is the right organization to manage all the components of a strong nuclear security infrastructure. The agency has an established program that defines nuclear security standards and assists states. It is unique in that it has both the technical and (for the most part) political bona fides to manage a global nuclear security regime. If given the authority, the IAEA could assess and coordinate the implementation of any actions that need to be taken, and verify the continuous level of nuclear security of member states. However, the agency does not have the authority to independently evaluate states’ nuclear security. Developing states, in particular, are unwilling to cede protection of their nuclear facilities to the agency, and this has left the IAEA relegated to the role of an adviser.

The problem of the IAEA’s limited authority is tied to fundamental debates in the international community over how to deal with threats in a globalized world. Many states have accepted that the complex, transnational nature of 21st century threats means that decision-making authority must shift from the national to the international level. Resources need to be pooled; expertise needs to be shared and centralized; and common standards need to be set, monitored, and enforced in the interest of a safer world. But not all states are convinced of this, and some are suspicious that states advocating global governance are using their power to dominate the global security agenda. Correcting these perceptions is a difficult and important task, as they have become deeply embedded in the nuclear nonproliferation regime and throughout the U.N. system.

Proactive states could adopt a series of measures that would strengthen the regime despite these political hurdles, but the important long-term goal of multilateral institution building remains. Beyond the short-term fixes, the pivotal question confronting the international community is: How can states build consensus on the need to prioritize nuclear security? A consensus on nuclear safety began to develop after the Chernobyl accident vividly demonstrated the risks associated with nuclear energy. That raises a chilling question: Will it take a similarly dramatic event to generate a universal sense of urgency on nuclear security?