Trapped in the Sandwich layer: How Does Administrative Burden Influence the Willingness of Street-Level Bureaucrats to Exercise Discretion?—A Survey Experimental Study

Abstract

As the national governance focus shifts downward, the administrative burden on street-level bureaucrats(SLBs) continues to increase. Consequently, SLBs appear less inclined to exercise their discretion, resulting in the phenomena of “lying flat” and “avoiding responsibility” at the grassroots level. This study uses a survey experiment to simulate street enforcement scenarios and analyze the relationship between administrative burden and the willingness of SLBs to exercise their discretion. The study found that SLBs’ willingness to exercise discretion weakens under administrative burdens. Additionally, public service motivation may exacerbate the perception of administrative burden in high-enforcement-burden scenarios. The research findings offer a framework for optimizing the structure of grassroots administrative burdens and increasing the willingness of SLBs to exercise their discretion.