Although scholarship has highlighted the role of stakeholders in policy making, less is known about the preparations they make that lay the groundwork for their lobbying activities. This article links ideas on collaborative governance with the study of agenda setting within interest groups. We outline an orthodox mode of agenda setting that anticipates groups possess a proactive policy mode, an institutionalized policy platform, and a pyramid-like agenda structure. Subsequently, we use this orthodox mode as a heuristic device for examining agenda structures and processes, combining survey data on the practices of groups in Australia with illustrative qualitative evidence.
AtkinsonM.ColemanW. (1989). Strong states and weak states: Sectoral policy networks in advanced capitalist economies. British Journal of Political Science, 19, 47-67.
2.
Austen-SmithD.WrightJ. (1994). Counteractive lobbying. American Journal of Political Science, 38, 25-44.
3.
BaumgartnerF. R.JonesB. (1993). Agendas and instability in American politics. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
4.
BaumgartnerF. R.Larsen-PriceH.LeechB.RutledgeP. (2011). Congressional and presidential effects on the demand for lobbying. Political Research Quarterly, 64, 3-16.
5.
BaumgartnerF. R.LeechB. (1998). Basic interests: The importance of groups in politics and political science. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
6.
BaumgartnerF. R.LeechB. (2001). Interest niches and policy bandwagons: Patterns of interest group involvement in national politics. Journal of Politics, 63, 1191-1213.
7.
BinderkrantzA.ChristiansenP. M.PedersenH. (2014). Interest group access to the bureaucracy, parliament, and the media. Governance, 28, 95-112.
8.
BossoC. (2005). Environment Inc. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
9.
BouwenP. (2002). Corporate lobbying in the European Union: the logic of access. Journal of European Public Policy, 9(3), 365-390.
10.
BraunC. (2013). The driving forces of stability: Exploring the nature of long-term bureaucracy–interest group interactions. Administration & Society, 45, 809-836.
11.
BrowneW. P. (1990). Organized interest and their issue niches: A search for pluralism in a policy domain. Journal of Politics, 52, 477-509.
12.
CobbR. W.ElderC. D. (1971). The politics of agenda-building: An alternative perspective for modern democratic theory. The Journal of Politics, 33, 892-915.
13.
CraftJ.HowlettM. (2012). Policy formulation, governance shifts and policy influence: Location and content in policy advisory systems. Journal of Public Policy, 32, 79-98.
14.
CraftJ.WilderM. (2015). Catching a second wave: Context and compatibility in advisory system dynamics. Policy Studies Journal, 45, 215-239. doi:10.1111/psj.12133
15.
DaugbjergC.FawcettP. (2017). Metagovernance, network structure, and legitimacy: Developing a heuristic for comparative governance analysis. Administration & Society, 49(9), 1223-1245.
16.
FraussenB.HalpinD. (2016). Assessing the Composition and Diversity of the Australian Interest Group System. Australian Journal of Public Administration, 75(4), 476-491.
17.
GaujaA. (2015). The construction of party membership. European Journal of Political Research, 54, 232-248.
18.
HalpinD. (2015). Interest group “policy agendas”: What are they? And how might we study them? In CiglerA. J.LoomisB. A.NownesA. N. (Eds.), Interest group politics (pp. 58-75). Washington, DC: CQ Press.
19.
HalpinD.ThomasH. F. (2012). Evaluating the breadth of policy engagement by organized interests. Public Administration, 90, 582-599.
20.
HeaneyM. T. (2004). Outside the issue niche: The multidimensionality of interest group identity. American Politics Research, 32, 611-651.
21.
HeinzJ.P.LaumannE.O.NelsonR.L.SalisburyR.H. (1993) The Hollow Core. Cambridge Mass, Harvard University Press.
22.
JonesB.BaumgartnerF. R. (2005). The politics of attention: How government prioritizes problems. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
23.
JordanG.MaloneyW. A. (1997a). Accounting for subgovernments—Explaining the persistence of policy communities. Administration & Society, 29, 557-583.
24.
JordanG.MaloneyW. A. (1997b). The protest business? Mobilizing campaign groups. New York, NY: Manchester University Press.
25.
KarpfD. (2012). The MoveOn effect: The unexpected transformation of American political advocacy. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
26.
KimY.DarnallN. (2016). Business as a collaborative partner: Understanding firms’ sociopolitical support for policy formation. Public Administration Review, 76, 326-337.
27.
KingdonJ. W. (1984). Agendas, alternatives, and public policies. Boston, MA: Little, Brown.
28.
KnutsonK. (2016). From identity to issue: Policy agenda and framing shifts within long-term coalitions. Politics, Groups and Identities. Advance online publication. doi:10.1080/21565503.2016.1208106
29.
KollmanK. (1998). Outside lobbying: Public opinion and interest group strategies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
30.
LangA. (2016). Collaborative governance in health and technology policy: The use and effects of procedural policy instruments. Administration & Society. Advance online publication. doi:10.1177/0095399716664163
31.
LeechB.BaumgartnerF. R.La PiraT. M.SemankoN. A. (2005). Drawing lobbyists to Washington: Government activity and the demand for advocacy. Political Research Quarterly, 58, 19-30.
32.
LinH.DarnallN. (2015). Strategic Alliance Formation and Structural Configuration. Journal of Business Ethics, 127(3), 549-564.
33.
MilesR. E.SnowC. C. (1978). Organizational strategy, structure, and process. New York: McGraw-Hill.
34.
NownesA. J. (2006). Total lobbying. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
35.
O’LearyR.GerardC.BinghamL. B. (2006). Introduction to the symposium on collaborative public management. Public Administration Review, 66, 6-9.
36.
OlsonM. (1965). The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
37.
PetersG. B. (2005). Policy instruments and policy capacity. In Martin PainterM.PierreJ. (Eds.), Challenges to state policy capacity: Global trends and comparative perspectives (pp. 73-91). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave.
38.
PetersG. B. (2015). State failure, governance failure and policy failure: Exploring the linkages. Public Policy and Administration, 30, 261-276.
39.
SabatierP. A. (1987). Knowledge, policy-oriented learning, and policy change an advocacy coalition framework. Science Communication, 8, 649-692.
40.
SalisburyR. H. (1992). Interests and institutions. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
41.
SchlozmanK. L.VerbaS.BradyH. E. (2012). The unheavenly chorus: Unequal political voice and the broken promise of American democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
42.
ScottJ. C. (2013). Social processes in lobbyist agenda development: A longitudinal network analysis of interest groups and legislation. Policy Studies Journal, 41, 608-635.
43.
SkocpolT. (2003). Diminished democracy: From membership to management in American civic life. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
44.
StrolovitchD. Z. (2006). Do interest groups represent the disadvantaged? Advocacy at the intersections of race, class, and gender. Journal of Politics, 68, 894-910.
45.
StrolovitchD. Z. (2007). Affirmative advocacy: race, class, and gender in interest group politics. Chicago: University of Chicago.
46.
TarrowS. (1988). National politics and collective action: Recent theory and research in Western Europe and the United States. Annual Review of Sociology, 14, 421-440.
47.
TrumanD. B. (1951). The governmental process: Political interests and public opinion. New York, NY: Knopf.
48.
WalkerJ. L. (1991). Mobilizing interest groups in America: Patrons, professions, and social movements. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
49.
WeibleC. M.HeikkilaT.deLeonP.SabatierP. A. (2012). Understanding and influencing the policy process. Policy Sciences, 45(1), 1-21.
