Relying on a sweeping review of the literature on interest group influence in health care policy making, we propose a basic definition and a typology of interest groups in provincial health care policy making. Then, using Milbrath’s communication framework, we analyze organized interests’ strategies for influencing policy making. This article is a modest attempt to cross-fertilize the group theory and resource dependency literature. This theoretical framework allows us to explore many of the recurring questions about groups’ origins and strategies from an original standpoint.
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