Democratic Civilian Control in Limited-Access Orders: Rethinking Civil–Military Relations in Nigeria

Abstract

This article examines civil–military relations in Nigeria through an integrated application of civil–military relations theory and the Limited-Access Order (LAO) framework. Despite the formal institutionalization of democratic control since 1999, military effectiveness and accountability remain constrained by neopatrimonial politics, elite bargaining, and weak oversight. Drawing on 23 elite interviews and document analysis, the study shows that constitutional mechanisms for civilian control are undermined by politicized appointments, institutional fragmentation, and regional disparities in governance. By synthesizing normative theories of civilian oversight with a political-economy perspective, the article explains how authority is produced and negotiated within hybrid political orders. It argues that reforming Nigeria’s civil–military relations requires addressing both institutional weaknesses and structural incentives sustaining elite cohesion, which undermine institutions under the LAO. The findings advance comparative debates on democratic consolidation and security governance in postcolonial and limited-access contexts.

In fragile democracies, achieving a balance between maintaining an effective military and preserving democratic oversight poses a fundamental governance challenge. Nowhere is this more evident than in Nigeria, where the paradox of sustained civilian rule since 1999 coexists with persistent internal insecurity, weak democratic oversight, and the pervasive deployment of military forces in domestic roles (Nnabuihe et al., 2023; Ojo, 2008; Oshita et al., 2019; Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre, 2017). Despite a return to constitutional government after decades of military rule, questions continue to surface about the effectiveness, accountability, and politicization of Nigeria’s armed forces (International Crisis Group, 2016).

This article investigates a central question: How has the nature of civil–military relations in Nigeria since 1999 affected the military’s effectiveness in internal security operations?

As would be revealed, while military subordination to civilian authority is constitutionally enshrined, in practice, civilian control is often symbolic—shaped less by legal frameworks and institutional oversight than by elite bargains and neopatrimonial politics. As the military is drawn deeper into domestic security roles—counterterrorism, anti-banditry, and election security—it increasingly operates under conditions of strategic ambiguity and political interference, raising concerns about mission coherence, professionalism, and civil–military relations (Agbese, 2013; Bappah, 2016; ICG Report, 2016).

To analyze this state of affairs, the study employs a dual theoretical lens. First, it draws from civil–military relations theory, particularly the tension between the military’s strength and its subordination to elected authority (Feaver, 1999; Huntington, 1957; Ojo, 2009). Second, it adopts the Limited-Access Order (LAO) framework developed by North et al. (2009, 2013), which situates political stability in fragile states within elite bargains, rent-seeking arrangements, and negotiated control of violence. In LAO societies, such as Nigeria, the military’s role is embedded in the political economy of elite distribution, where institutional authority is often subordinated to informal arrangements.

This combined framework offers a more nuanced explanation of why formal democratic oversight may exist without substantive control, and why operational military effectiveness may be constrained by systemic weaknesses rather than doctrinal or technical deficiencies. Existing civil–military theory (Matei et al., 2022)—largely shaped by the experiences of consolidated democracies and failed states—provides limited analytical traction in LAOs such as Nigeria, where the military’s role is simultaneously embedded in elite governance and essential to regime survival. As Khisa and Day (2022, p. 4) acknowledge, “ . . . the conceptual and theoretical language to assess civil–military relations remains underdeveloped.”

Khisa and Day (2022) make a significant contribution by reconceptualizing civil–military relations through the lenses of regime proximity and social embeddedness, offering valuable insights into the dynamics of elite collusion and the sociocultural integration of the military. Yet, as Barany (2012) reminds us, developing a general theory of military politics that transcends specific national contexts remains inherently challenging, given the diversity of historical and cultural conditions shaping these relationships. Consequently, the empirical experiences and interpretations of key actors become indispensable for understanding how civil–military relations evolve within particular settings.

The perceptions of senior military officers and key policymakers, when integrated with foundational theories of civil–military relations and the LAO framework, enable a reconceptualization of the civil–military interface as a site of negotiated authority, constrained autonomy, and adaptive stability. This perspective highlights the contingent and interactive nature of civil–military relations in LAO contexts, where authority is neither fully monopolized by civilian institutions nor entirely autonomous within the military sphere. Instead, it is continuously negotiated through elite bargains and institutional adaptations aimed at preserving regime stability. By situating these interactions within the broader systemic and historical conditions of limited access, this approach deepens understanding of how military and political elites co-produce a dynamic equilibrium between control and cooperation.

This article contributes to the expanding scholarship on civil–military relations in postcolonial and fragile state contexts. By grounding theoretical reflection in Nigeria’s empirical realities—drawing on elite interviews and institutional analysis—it advances a political-economy critique of security governance within hybrid political orders. In doing so, it bridges the gap between abstract theorization and lived experience, illustrating how formal institutional arrangements are mediated by informal power relations and elite bargaining. More broadly, the analysis engages with ongoing debates on democratic consolidation, security governance, and reform trajectories in states navigating the uncertain terrain between authoritarian legacies and democratic aspirations.

The article is organized as follows. Section “Conceptual Clarifications” provides key conceptual clarifications, while “Analytical Framework: Civil-Military Relations in an LAO” develops the analytical framework by integrating civil–military relations theory with the LAO model, outlining how this combined approach is used to assess the political and institutional contexts that shape military effectiveness in subsequent sections of the article. “Methodology” outlines the methodology and research design. “Political Interference, Civilian Control and Military Effectiveness” presents the empirical findings, analyzing how elite bargains, institutional fragmentation, and subnational variation influence the military’s role and performance. “Civil-Military Relations and the Dynamics of LAOs in Fragile States” critically examines the challenges of civil–military relations within LAOs in postcolonial and fragile states, using Nigeria as the primary case. It explores how these dynamics condition prospects for democratic governance and constrain pathways of institutional reform. The conclusion synthesizes the core findings, reflecting on how the character of civil–military relations in Nigeria since 1999 has shaped military effectiveness in internal security operations, and highlights the study’s theoretical and policy implications while identifying avenues for further research.

Conceptual Clarifications

Civil–Military Relations

Civil–military relations (CMR) describe the interaction between the state and its armed forces, encompassing the political, social, and institutional dynamics that shape how militaries are embedded within governance. Huntington (1957, pp. 7–18, 83) defined CMR as the relationship between the officer corps and the state, arguing that professionalism and political neutrality are the foundation of “objective control.” Yet, as later scholars observe, professionalism does not necessarily ensure neutrality; it can instead legitimize intervention when the military assumes a self-defined “national interest” (Finer, 2002, pp. 35–39).

Janowitz (1971) offers a contrasting perspective through his constabulary model, which redefines military professionalism within the context of limited wars, peace operations, and political engagement. In this view, the armed forces act as a constabulary force “constantly ready to intervene in any part of the world, dispensing the necessary minimum of organized violence to achieve an acceptable set of international relations rather than victory in the field” (in Caforio & Hong, 2018, p. 19). Whereas Huntington stresses divergence between the military and society to preserve autonomy, Janowitz advocates convergence, aligning the military more closely with societal and political values (Caforio & Hong, 2018, p. 19).

These theoretical debates demonstrate that CMR rest on questions of legitimacy, professionalism, political culture, and the interaction between structural constraints and elite agency (Croissant et al., 2011). In Nigeria, these dynamics are shaped by a history of coups, politicization, and fragile civilian institutions (Nwagwu, 2002; Onuoha, 2023, pp. 85–104; Siollun, 2009, 2019; Isike & Olasupo, 2022). Stepan’s (1988) notion of “new professionalism,” centered on internal security and development, remains pertinent, as Nigeria’s military identity has been defined as much by counterinsurgency and state-building as by external defense responsibilities.

Civil–military relations in Nigeria can thus be conceptualized as a structured yet contested interaction between political and military elites—an arena where professionalism, political culture, and historical legacies both sustain and constrain democratic governance.

Civilian Democratic Control of the Military

Civilian democratic control refers to the subordination of the armed forces to constitutional authority exercised through democratic institutions. It operates through mechanisms that promote depoliticization, ensure parliamentary and executive oversight, and guarantee transparency in defense management (Edmunds, 2003; Giraldo, 2006; Matei et al., 2022). Yet, as Kuehn and Croissant (2023, pp. 23–24) note, civilian control is relational rather than absolute, existing along a continuum between full civilian authority and military dominance. Nevertheless, it remains a prerequisite for democratic consolidation (Dahl, 1971, in Croissant et al., 2011, p. 76), requiring that civilian elites possess full authority to determine and implement national policy, including defense and security (Kuehn, 2018, p. 168).

In many new democracies, however, such authority is constrained by the legacies of military rule and weak institutional capacity (Kuehn, 2018, pp. 169–170). As Pion-Berlin (2001, in Kuehn, 2018, p. 170) observes, disentangling the multiple, intersecting causes that shape effective civilian control is particularly complex in transitional settings. Nigeria’s experience illustrates this challenge: the residual influence of military governance continues to shape civil–military relations and limit the institutionalization of civilian oversight (Fayemi, 2003; Nwagwu, 2002; Onuoha, 2023, pp. 85–104; Siollun, 2009).

As Nwankpa (2023, p. 57) argues, Nigeria’s Fourth Republic remains “a militarized democracy,” sustained by a pervasive military ethos that accords superiority to the armed forces. The category of “civilian elites” is itself fluid, encompassing retired officers who have entered politics and continue to influence defense and security policy. Adekanye (1999, pp. 159–175) describes this group as “an elite of power,” whose integration into political structures blurs the boundary between civilian and military authority. This pattern reflects a much older dynamic identified by Mosca (in Caforio & Hong, 2018, p. 13), who argued that the incorporation of the officer corps into the ruling elite serves to reconcile civilian supremacy with military loyalty.

Civilian democratic control, therefore, extends beyond the formal subordination of the military to elected authority. It involves the organization and legitimization of political authority within democratic institutions that empower civilian elites—broadly defined to include politicians and retired officers—to direct and oversee defense and security policy, with ultimate authority vested in democratically elected leaders.

Military Effectiveness

Military effectiveness refers to the capacity of armed forces to accomplish the missions entrusted to them by political authorities. It encompasses both efficiency—the optimal use of resources—and effectiveness—the achievement of strategic and operational objectives (Matei & Halladay, 2021). In fragile and postcolonial settings, effectiveness is less often judged in terms of external defense than in the ability to manage internal security challenges, including counterinsurgency and policing operations (Matei et al., 2022, p. 4). Scholars have proposed a range of indicators for assessing this capacity, including the coherence of strategy, institutional resilience, transparent budgeting, accountability mechanisms, the size and composition of forces, and the extent of mission accomplishment (Matei & Halladay, 2021; Pion-Berlin & Martínez, 2017, pp. 299–309). Civilian oversight is central to this equation, since expansive internal deployments without clear boundaries frequently undermine both accountability and operational effectiveness (Serra, 2010, pp. 85–86).

In Nigeria, the military has assumed a default role in counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and even policing, a pattern that has generated widespread human rights violations and further strained civil–military relations (Momodu, 2019, pp. 399–440; Musa & Heinecken, 2022; Yake, 2019, pp. 441–459). Comparative experiences, such as Colombia, nonetheless illustrate that stronger democratic oversight can improve outcomes in internal missions (Bruneau & Goetze, 2022, pp. 310–321).

Thus, military effectiveness cannot be understood solely in terms of resources or doctrine; it also depends on the wider governance context and the accountability structures that shape military conduct. In this article, military effectiveness is understood in the Nigerian context as the degree to which the armed forces fulfill constitutionally and politically assigned missions—primarily internal security—through strategies, resources, and practices that achieve operational objectives while remaining accountable to civilian authority.

Security Governance

Security governance emerged in the post–Cold War era as the concept of security broadened beyond state defense to include threats such as terrorism, organized crime, and health crises (Cawthra, 2009; Krahmann, 2003). Its core objective is to create legitimate, accountable, and effective systems that protect citizens while reinforcing democratic governance. Over time, authority over security provision has become increasingly diffused among states, international organizations, private actors, and non-governmental agencies (Bagayoko et al., 2016).

This diffusion has generated hybrid systems of security provision. As Baciu (2021, p. 14) observes, the recognition of plural actors and localized practices has fostered “multi-agency, hybrid, post-Westphalian peace and security governance” approaches that reflect both the evolving nature of security and the limitations of liberal peace models. The resulting shift from hierarchical government to multi-level governance, while enhancing flexibility, has, however, intensified concerns over legitimacy, coordination, and accountability (Luckham & Kirk, 2013; Schnabel & Born, 2011).

In African contexts, state-centric frameworks often obscure the reality that security provision depends on fluid interactions among state institutions, communities, non-state armed groups, and international partners (Cawthra, 2009). Security governance is thus inherently hybrid—defined by negotiation, coexistence, and competition among diverse actors.

Building on this insight, this article conceptualizes security governance as the structures and processes through which state, societal, and international actors negotiate and legitimize security in contexts of fragmented authority. In Nigeria, this hybridity is manifest in the interplay between the military, police, and vigilante formations such as the Civilian Joint Task Force, alongside traditional authorities and international partners. These overlapping arrangements highlight the negotiated character of security governance in contexts where authority is dispersed, revealing how order is maintained through continual adjustment rather than institutional stability.

Hybrid Political Orders

Postcolonial African states often grapple with crises of legitimacy, weak institutions, and neopatrimonial governance. Nigeria exemplifies these dynamics through patronage politics, ethno-religious conflict, and the politicization of the military (Adebanwi, 2023; Fukuyama, 2015, pp. 217–226; Siollun, 2018). The fragile state paradigm interprets such deficits as failures to conform to Weberian ideals of statehood—namely, a centralized authority monopolizing force, an effective bureaucracy, and the universal provision of public goods evolving through the accumulation and centralization of coercion and capital (Day & Reno, 2014; Tilly, 2012, pp. 251–265).

In contrast, the concept of hybrid political orders underscores that governance is rarely the preserve of the state alone. Instead, authority is negotiated among a plurality of actors—formal institutions, neopatrimonial networks, traditional rulers, vigilantes, militias, and international organizations—that overlap, coexist, and often compete to shape legitimacy (Bagayoko et al., 2016; Luckham & Kirk, 2013). As enunciated by Boege et al (2009, p. 19) “Recognizing the hybridity of political orders should be the starting point for any endeavors that aim at peacebuilding, development.”

In Nigeria, hybridity is evident in the coexistence of constitutional democracy with patronage politics, the reliance on community-based security actors amid weak policing, and the contestation of state authority by insurgent groups. For this article, a hybrid political order is defined as a form of governance in which formal state institutions coexist and interact with informal and non-state structures, producing negotiated and contested authority rather than a consolidated monopoly of power.

Internal Security Missions

Internal missions have become a defining feature of contemporary militaries, extending beyond external defense to include counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, disaster relief, riot control, and the protection of critical infrastructure (Matei et al., 2022, p. xxiv; Pion-Berlin & Martínez, 2017, p. 307). Yet, as Serra (2010, pp. 85–86) and Ojo (2008) caution, such deployments risk eroding both civilian authority and military professionalism unless clearly bounded by legislation, governed by precise rules of engagement, and conducted in support of police forces rather than as substitutes for them.

Across Africa, internal missions are dominated by counterinsurgency campaigns that often escalate into protracted conflicts, displacing millions across the Sahel (R4Sahel UNHCR Coordination Platform for Forced Displacement in the Sahel, 2020; UNHCR, 2024). Shemella’s (2006, pp. 126–127) typology captures this dynamic: many African militaries act as “police officer” or “fire fighter” forces—replacing weak police institutions or intervening in crises. Nigeria epitomizes this dilemma. Though constitutionally tasked to support civil authorities, its armed forces have become deeply embedded in counterinsurgency against Boko Haram, counterterrorism, and internal order operations (Joshua et al., 2021). This “police officer” orientation entrenches the militarization of law enforcement and blurs the line between defense and internal security.

To mitigate these challenges, scholars have called for a transition toward the “fire fighter” model, where the military supports rather than supplants civilian institutions, reinforcing legitimacy and operational effectiveness (Ehwarieme, 2011; Ouedraogo, 2014). Within this framework, internal operations in Nigeria are best understood as constitutionally mandated missions that must remain circumscribed by law, subject to democratic oversight, and implemented in complementarity with civilian authorities.

Analytical Framework: Civil–Military Relations in an LAO

This study draws on two complementary bodies of theory—classical civil–military relations theory and the LAO framework—to analyze the nature of civilian democratic control and its impact on military effectiveness in Nigeria. While each theoretical framework offers valuable insights on its own, their combination provides a more robust analytical lens for understanding civil–military dynamics in fragile, postcolonial states where informal power structures often override formal institutions.

Civil–Military Relations: Classical Perspectives and African Realities

The classical literature on civil–military relations is structured around what Feaver (1996) terms the civil–military problematique: how to ensure that a military strong enough to defend the state remains subordinate to civilian authority. Scholarly debates have evolved through competing frameworks that often reflect divergent perspectives rather than consensus. Huntington (1957, pp. 83–85) laid the classical foundation by distinguishing between objective control, which prioritizes professional autonomy in exchange for political neutrality, and subjective control, which seeks loyalty through integration into the political sphere. Janowitz (1971) challenged this dichotomy by introducing the “constabulary” concept, arguing that modern militaries cannot remain politically detached but must adapt to societal changes. Feaver (1999) later reframed the discussion as a principal–agent problem, shifting the focus from professionalism or social integration to the mechanisms through which civilians monitor and enforce compliance.

Yet these models—developed within consolidated democracies—have limited explanatory power in postcolonial and fragile states where authority is fluid and constantly negotiated. As Finer (2002) and Stepan (in Bruneau, 2018) observe, the coexistence of professionalism and political ambition often enables militaries to supplant civilian authority, undermining assumptions of a clear division between military and civilian spheres.

Building on this critique, African scholars have redirected attention to the historical and political specificities shaping civil–military relations on the continent. Rupiya et al. (2015) trace how colonial and liberation legacies institutionalized the military as a political actor, revealing that African state formation was militarized from inception—complicating subsequent efforts at professionalization and democratic oversight. Salihu (2021) extends this analysis, showing that the postcolonial provenance of African militaries continues to shape their institutional orientation and conception of professionalism, with consequences for how legitimacy and authority are negotiated. Rupiya et al. (2015) also provide a continent-wide study exposing persistent praetorian logics, as African militaries frequently sustain civilian authoritarianism under the guise of stability—challenging assumptions that formal subordination guarantees democratic consolidation. Khisa and Day (2022) have advanced the conceptualization of civil–military relations in Africa by demonstrating how social embeddedness and regime proximity condition military behavior, explaining why political stability often results from negotiated accommodation rather than institutional separation.

More recent scholarship interrogates the resurgence of coups in Africa (Chigozie & Oyinmiebi, 2022; Levine, 2025; Taruvinga, 2023), with Akinola and Makombe (2025) attributing this to the erosion of democratic legitimacy and the perceived credibility of the military amid poor governance and external complicity. Collectively, these contributions reframe the debate from normative questions of control to how military authority is produced, legitimized, and exercised within hybrid and negotiated political orders.

Nigerian scholarship further grounds these debates in the country’s specific historical and political context. Ojo (2006) characterizes the military as a “monster,” whose contradictory pressures of depoliticization and continued intervention undermine democratic consolidation. His later work (Ojo, 2009) reveals how the blurred roles of the military and police in internal deployments—such as Odi and Zaki-Biam—illustrate the limits of professional autonomy under democracy. Agbese (2013) similarly argues that recurrent internal deployments since 1999 have eroded both legitimacy and professional capacity, reshaping the nature of civil–military relations. Agbese’s view is in line with the advice of Serra (2010, p. 86) who cautions that “missions linked to internal security should be short-lived, not permanent, supported by the police, carried out under civil control, and subject to civil legislation,” a view echoed by Barany (2012, p. 31), who warns that excessive domestic use of the military undermines effective civilian oversight.

Despite these warnings, the Nigerian military has been persistently deployed in internal missions. Ehwarieme (2011) however, notes that the military has been a stabilizing factor in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic as its involvement in internal security has helped stabilize the polity. More recent analyses move beyond questions of control to expose deeper structural dynamics. Oriola (2022) rejects both Huntingtonian and bureaucratic–organizational models, advancing a civilian–military leadership interest convergence thesis that highlights corruption, poor welfare, and elite bargains as drivers of dysfunction. Similarly, Bappah (2016) offers a more direct critique, questioning the competence and professionalism of the Nigerian armed forces in confronting Boko Haram.

Collectively, these studies recast Nigerian civil–military relations not as a matter of weak oversight or contested autonomy, but as one of systemic collusion, elite alignment, and the militarization of internal security governance (Nwankpa, 2023; Siollun, 2018). As Siollun (2018: 273) observes,

The frequency of deployments since 1999 has intensified civil–military animosity. It has also positioned the military as a prism through which underlying economic, ethnic, political, and religious conflicts are viewed and contested.

The International Crisis Group (2016) reinforces these critiques by highlighting corruption, opaque procurement, overstretch, and weak oversight as structural barriers to reform. Its recommendations—strengthening parliamentary and ministerial capacity, rebuilding the police to reduce military overreach, and institutionalizing accountability—underscore the gap between normative reform blueprints and Nigeria’s entrenched realities of elite collusion and militarized governance. Rather than resolving the dilemmas identified by Nigerian scholars, such prescriptions reveal the persistence of fragile institutions that classical civil–military models fail to explain.

The Nigerian case thus calls for a reconceptualization of civil–military relations that accounts for the logic of practice within contexts of weak institutions, negotiated authority, and pervasive security challenges. Classical frameworks, while conceptually valuable, cannot explain blurred military–police roles, elite–military alliances, or the institutionalization of internal deployments that entrench military dominance. Nor can fragile-institution arguments fully capture how military influence is embedded in cultural norms, historical trajectories, and neopatrimonial networks. What emerges instead is a hybrid system where formal oversight coexists with informal bargains distributing authority and rents among civilian and military actors.

To capture this complexity, this article turns to the LAO framework (North et al., 2009), which conceptualizes order in fragile settings as maintained through elite coalitions managing access to power and resources. Though rarely applied to civil–military relations, the LAO framework offers a compelling lens for understanding how elite bargains and shared interests shape security governance and sustain stability in contemporary Nigeria.

Political Economy of LAOs

Debates on African politics have long been shaped by the concept of neopatrimonialism, which highlights the coexistence of formal bureaucratic institutions with informal patron–client networks. For example, while examining counterinsurgency strategy in African states Day and Reno (2014) argue that African regimes’ counterinsurgency strategies are shaped by patronage-based political relationships, with governments choosing between accommodation or elimination of rebel leaders depending on their historical ties to the state and the level of political threat they represent. Bachmann (2014) similarly situates neopatrimonialism and clientelist networks at the center of African politics with implications for the nature of civil–military relations. This interpretation challenges Weberian expectations of impersonal, rule-based statehood by demonstrating how authority is sustained through personalized, reciprocal ties rather than institutionalized processes (Aiyede & Igbafe, 2017; Beresford, 2014; Nasong’o, 2018).

The LAO framework, developed by North et al. (2009, 2013), provides a systematic interpretation of these neopatrimonial dynamics. While neopatrimonialism describes the prevalence of clientelism and informal networks, the LAO framework identifies the structural logic underpinning them. In LAO systems, governance is achieved through the management of violence by elite bargains in which access to rents, privileges, and coercive resources is controlled by ruling coalitions. Stability rests not on the impartial enforcement of rules, as in Open Access Orders, but on negotiated agreements among elites who command the potential for violence (North et al., 2009, 2013). From this perspective, practices such as prebendalism, patronage distribution, and rent-sharing are not simply governance failures but mechanisms for maintaining elite cohesion under fragile conditions.

More recent scholarship analyzing the politics of the Fourth Republic exposes these patrimonial dynamics, illuminating the nature of the Nigerian state—its fragile institutions, prebendal politics, pervasive corruption, and chronic insecurity (Adebanwi, 2023).

The LAO framework thus provides a lens for interpreting neopatrimonial practices not as aberrations but as integral to the logic of order maintenance in fragile and hybrid regimes. In the field of civil–military relations, as this article demonstrates, it offers a valuable explanatory framework for conceptualizing the Nigerian case, clarifying how the dynamics of elite bargaining and limited institutional autonomy shape civil–military relations and influence military effectiveness in internal operations.

Applied to Nigeria, this combined perspective draws attention to the military’s dual position. On one hand, the armed forces operate as a permanent institutional presence and a central pillar of state security. On the other hand, they are deeply embedded within elite bargains that politicize command structures, fragment operational authority, and blur the boundaries between external defense and internal security functions (Ehwarieme, 2011; Ojo, 2006; Oriola, 2022). The frequency of military deployments for counterinsurgency, communal conflicts, and election security thus reflects not a coherent strategic doctrine, but the political logic of patronage and regime survival (Agbese, 2013; International Crisis Group, 2016).

Integrating civil–military relations theory with the LAO framework provides a coherent analytical lens for understanding Nigeria’s democratic trajectory since 1999. Classical civil–military theory advances the normative ideals of civilian supremacy, professionalism, and operational autonomy, while neopatrimonial scholarship reveals how African elites govern through patronage and informal bargains. The LAO framework situates these practices within a broader logic of rent distribution and violence management, explaining their structural persistence. Synthesized together, these perspectives suggest that in Nigeria, civilian control is formal but constrained by elite bargains; professionalism is proclaimed yet undermined by politicization and mission creep; and operational effectiveness is shaped less by doctrine than by negotiated authority and interest convergence.

Methodology

Case Selection and Analytical Generalization

Nigeria was selected for its strategic, demographic, and analytical significance as a postcolonial basic LAO (North et al., 2009, 2013). The case exemplifies the tension between formal democratic governance and informal elite-driven security arrangements. While context-specific, its findings offer analytical generalization to other fragile and hybrid political orders—particularly across Africa—where military roles are shaped by negotiated authority rather than legal formalism.

Philosophical Orientation and Rationale

The study adopts a qualitative methodology grounded in an interpretivist epistemology and social constructivist ontology. This orientation allows exploration of how actors embedded in LAOs perceive and negotiate the boundaries of civilian control and military effectiveness (Creswell & Poth, 2018). Rather than pursuing universal laws, the research seeks to illuminate meanings, interactions, and institutional practices within Nigeria’s hybrid political system. A single-case design (Yin, 2018) provides the depth needed to analyze institutional dynamics and elite bargaining within a postcolonial context where the military remains central to state formation and internal security.

Elite Interviews: Strategy, Value, and Reflexivity

Elite interviews constituted the empirical foundation of the study, offering nuanced perspectives on the practice of civilian democratic control and its implications for military professionalism and effectiveness (Bryman, 2016, pp. 468–469). Twenty-three semi-structured interviews were conducted between May and August 2023, mostly in Abuja, with one via Zoom. Interviews were held in English—the language of elite political and military discourse. Participants included retired senior officers, former civil servants in the Ministry of Defense, academics, and security consultants. The purposive sampling strategy ensured analytical depth and variation in institutional experience, competence, and regional representation (Curtis et al., 2000; Farrugia, 2019; Stake, 1995; Yin, 2018).

Respondents were selected for their proximity to decision-making and ability to illuminate operational, strategic, and political dimensions of civil–military relations. They included senior officers with command experience in conflict zones such as the Niger Delta and Maiduguri, one former Chief of Defense Staff, three Ministry of Defense officials (including two permanent secretaries), and four scholars or policy experts (Brinkmann, 2016; Bryman, 2016; Creswell & Creswell, 2020).

Regional diversity was intentionally incorporated to reflect how Nigeria’s political cultures shape perceptions of civil–military relations (Bryman, 2016, pp. 416–417; Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007). Participants were drawn from the North, Middle Belt, South-West, South-East, and South-South. Northern voices tended toward conservative, continuity-oriented positions; those from the South-East and South-South reflected reformist perspectives linked to histories of exclusion; the Middle Belt expressed loyalty tempered by frustration with elite dominance, while South-West respondents adopted pragmatic reformist stances informed by administrative traditions. This diversity provided a balanced empirical basis for analyzing both consensus and contestation in Nigeria’s civil–military landscape.

The researcher’s insider status as a retired senior officer facilitated access to elite networks while demanding sustained reflexivity (Braun & Clarke, 2022; Creswell & Poth, 2018). Subjectivity was treated as an interpretive resource rather than a bias to suppress, consistent with qualitative methodology. Reflexivity, anonymization, and open-ended questioning mitigated risks of over-identification and prioritized participants’ framings of oversight, authority, and reform.

While access to elite respondents was occasionally constrained by scheduling pressures, security sensitivities, and institutional gatekeeping, these limitations were mitigated through professional networks, assurances of confidentiality, and flexible arrangements in scheduling interviews. Conducting the interviews primarily in Abuja—the institutional hub of Nigeria’s defense and policy establishment—facilitated access to serving and retired officials, while the use of English ensured linguistic consistency and conceptual clarity across respondents.

Interviews were transcribed, anonymized, and thematically coded using NVivo, revealing convergences and divergences in elite views on oversight, accountability, and effectiveness (Braun & Clarke, 2022; Bryman, 2016; Higate & Cameron, 2006; Oriola, 2022; Tight, 2017).

Document analysis complemented the interviews and strengthened triangulation. Reviewed materials included the 1999 Constitution, the Armed Forces Act, National Assembly resolutions, defense white papers, military doctrines, and newspaper archives. These sources illuminated both formal oversight frameworks and informal governance patterns characteristic of LAO societies, deepening contextual and analytical understanding.

Analytical Strategy

Data were analyzed through reflexive thematic analysis, following Braun and Clarke’s (2022) six-phase model. Coding combined deductive categories—drawn from civil–military theory and the LAO framework—with inductive insights emerging from interviews and policy documents. The process was abductive, entailing iterative movement between empirical data and theoretical models (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2018, pp. 321–332), thereby refining assumptions through engagement with evidence.

Empirical Findings and Analysis

The findings are organized into four thematic clusters that demonstrate how elite bargains, strategic ambiguity, regional disparities, and institutional fragmentation constrain democratic oversight and military effectiveness.

Political Interference, Civilian Control, and Military Effectiveness

The 1999 Constitution (The Nigerian Constitution, 1999, Section 217, as amended) and the Armed Forces Act of Nigeria (2003) formally enshrine civilian supremacy over the military, laying down statutory frameworks to regulate appointments, promotions, and deployments. Yet in practice, these provisions remain more aspirational than real. Presidential discretion and elite patronage frequently override formal frameworks, with political expediency taking precedence over institutional rules. The result is a pattern of personalized control that distorts military professionalism and weakens operational effectiveness.

Interviewees were emphatic that political interference is routine. PB, a retired major general and former Director of Military Intelligence, estimated that “about 25 per cent of promotions and postings are influenced by politicians,” not based on merit. (Interview with PB, 21 May 2023). PD, a retired rear admiral and former JTF commander in the Niger Delta, lamented the erosion of professional standards: “Appointments once grounded in professional excellence are now determined by religious and political bargaining. The military is not strong enough to resist what the politicians are doing” (Interview with PD, 27 May 2023). PZ, a former Special Forces commander, was blunter: “civilian leaders are winner-take-all; they disregard military hierarchy and protocol once they want something” (Interview with PZ, 24 May 2023).

The corrosive effects of such practices are visible across the system. Officers spoke of truncated careers, premature retirements, and the sidelining of merit in favor of patronage. QZ, a former Chief of Defense Staff, argued that “politically motivated appointments lead to huge losses to the nation,” stressing that leadership selection must be guided by institutional stability, not short-term political advantage (Interview with QZ, 10 June 2023). PR, a retired Major General and theater commander of Nigerian armed forces in the Northeast, described how his forced retirement—despite a presidential service extension—enabled the appointment of a favored but inexperienced officer: “within months there were significant territorial and equipment losses to Boko Haram” (Interview with PR, 18 May 2023). PD, in his interview, concluded that patronage-driven advancement has “undermined professionalism and weakened operational effectiveness.”

These insights raise the question as to what extent civilian control is institutional and in the interests of the nation, vis-à-vis control in pursuit of selfish group or personal interests. RP, a retired rear admiral, argued that while civilian control is constitutionally entrenched, it is exercised less through institutions than through “the personal interests of politicians, which frequently erode the system” (Interview with RP, 12 June 2023). He stressed that Nigerian politics is “more of the individual than the institution,” making civilian control highly personalized. PD echoed this concern, warning that without stronger institutional checks, “standards will continue to decline.” He pointed to the paradox that Nigerian forces “perform effectively abroad but falter domestically because of political manipulation of command structures.”

The politicization of military appointments and postings in Nigeria illustrates how informal networks of influence subvert institutional norms and compromise professionalism. Interviewees repeatedly described how political and social elites—including legislators, traditional rulers, and retired officers in civilian roles—routinely intervene in recruitment, postings, and promotions to favor their protégés or allies. PP, a retired Brigadier General who served as Chief of Staff to the Chief of Army Staff, recounted a case where a senator threatened to remove the service chief unless unqualified cadets were commissioned —“ . . . imagine the extent of interference even while cadets are in training.”

Such interference entrenches patronage and weakens institutional meritocracy. As PJ, a retired general, observed, “the officer corps is no longer thinking about removing politicians; they are now thinking about ingratiating themselves with those who wield power.” QF, a retired Major General, linked this trend directly to political loyalty, explaining that “in trying to seek patronage and sustain a status quo, you retain those that are aligned and discard those that are not.” QE, a retired Brigadier General and former Commander of the Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad Basin, went further, asserting that “the military is politicized,” with service now perceived as “ethnic or political representation.”

For RP, a retired Rear Admiral, the core problem lies in the erosion of institutional rules: “There are situations where rules are breached for the benefit of those close to the leader.” Collectively, these testimonies reveal a deeply embedded system of politicized appointments that blurs the line between military service and political allegiance, undermining both professionalism and democratic oversight.

Civil–military relations in Nigeria are further complicated by the federal structure, which blurs the distinction between constitutional oversight and political interference. PE, a retired Colonel and intelligence commander, explained that state governments often fund operations, creating informal obligations for commanders: “ . . . but sometimes they fund operations and expect us to act according to their political interests” (Interview with PE, 27 May 2023). QB, a retired Major General and former division commander, observed that while state security councils are constitutionally recognized, “many governors shy away from responsibility or calculate the political capital they might lose by taking tough decisions,” explaining that their decisions are sometimes not in the overall national interests. (Interview with QB, 22 May 2023).

Rather than strengthening institutional oversight, this dynamic embeds civil–military relations within networks of patronage and reciprocal obligation. PR, a retired brigade commander, noted that “governors influence postings to ensure commanders align with their preferences,” making loyalty to political patrons more rewarding than adherence to institutional norms (Interview with PR, 2023). QF, a retired Major General, similarly remarked that “promotion and posting have become political tools. . . you retain those that are aligned and discard those that are not” (Interview with QF, 2023). RC, a former Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Defense, explained that:

the problem is not the absence of civilian oversight, but the quality of it—governors and ministers often see defense decisions as avenues for influence rather than institutional responsibility.

RF, a retired Group Captain, summed it up succinctly: “What you have is not institutional civilian control but personalized influence. Civilian supremacy exists, but it operates through patronage rather than law” (Interview with RF, 2023).

These accounts reinforce Alagappa’s (2001) observation that civilian supremacy in transitional democracies is often mediated through patronage networks rather than institutionalized rules. In Nigeria’s federal context, the dependence of field commanders on governors’ goodwill and resources collapses the boundary between oversight and interference. Civilian control, though formally established, thus becomes negotiated through political loyalty, patronage, and resource flows—producing a fragmented system of authority that undermines professionalism, impartiality, and operational coherence.

Furthermore, legislative oversight, which should provide a counterbalance, remains weak and often compromised by corruption. QB, a retired Major General and former division commander, observed that “defense is one of the juiciest committees—I know politicians who struggle to be there,” noting that “if there is no transparency in the budgeting and expenditure process, corruption will definitely be there” (Interview with QB, 21 May 2023). QE, a retired brigadier general who had embarked on a political career was more scathing:

Everybody there is interested in the kind of oversight they’re fighting for. . . lucrative committees where they can get money. That is why I’m saying corruption will kill this country. (Interview with QE, 27 May 2023)

QJ, a former Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Defense, confirmed this pattern from a civilian perspective, explaining that “the legislators were more with the services because they have more money. . . they assign more of these oversight projects” This alluded to the collusion between the service chiefs and members of the National Assembly over constituency projects used to pad the defense budget (Interview with QJ, 2 June 2023). RD, an academic who had been an adviser to the defense committee of the Senate, argued that “the capacity of the Parliament to conduct oversight is almost lacking,” and that their failure to interrogate questionable allocations has allowed corruption to persist:

allocations of resources within the military were questionable. . . on the battle front, you still see our military revolting in terms of the weaponry they’re using, alluding to the lack of proper equipment for troops in operations. (Interview with RD, 25 May 2023)

Similarly, PB, a retired Major General, lamented that legislators often lacked institutional memory or expertise:

our legislature has not grown to that extent. . . somebody coming today is like going to start all over, . . . oversight has to do with capacity—the capability to understand what type of military we need to defend the country. (Interview with PB, 20 May 2023)

This erosion of professionalism and the perception that oversight is a channel for personal enrichment, rather than accountability, undermines democratic control.

The Nigerian case reveals a paradox of post-1999 civil–military relations: formal civilian supremacy has prevented military intervention yet entrenched personalized control, elite patronage, and institutional fragility. Civilian oversight functions less as democratic accountability than as an extension of neopatrimonial politics, mediated through informal networks and selective rule enforcement. This hybrid arrangement subordinates the military without enhancing professionalism or effectiveness, producing what Bruneau and Croissant (2019) describe as ineffective control—one that maintains regime stability while eroding institutional integrity and strategic coherence.

Strategic Ambiguity in Coordination of Defense and Internal Security

The Ministry of Defense (MOD) is widely perceived as a marginal actor within Nigeria’s security architecture, exerting limited influence over military affairs. QJ, a former Permanent Secretary at the MOD, observed that:

the Ministry’s authority is undermined by the military’s direct control over substantial financial resources, which incentivizes legislators to align more closely with the armed services than with the Ministry itself. (Interview with QJ, 11 June 2023)

This view was reinforced by RC, another senior former Permanent Secretary, who argued that:

without a fundamental reorganization of the armed forces, the MOD will continue to play a largely symbolic role—particularly since procurement decisions remain firmly under military control. (Interview with RC, 13 June 2023)

Such perceptions align with wider analyses highlighting the MOD’s institutional weakness and the dominance of the services over civilian administrators in transitional democracies (Bruneau & Goetze, 2006, pp. 71–97).

This imbalance is rooted in Nigeria’s military-led political history. RF, a retired Air Force officer and former AU adviser on SSR, explained that “successive military regimes deliberately kept the position of Minister of Defense weak to maintain direct presidential oversight of the armed forces” (Interview with RF, 13 June 2023). The pattern persisted in the democratic era, as former military rulers-turned-presidents such as Obasanjo and Buhari maintained close ties with the service chiefs while sidelining the MOD. PP, a retired Brigadier General and former ADC to the President, confirmed that “service chiefs often enjoyed direct access to the President, bypassing established civilian oversight structures and weakening the chain of accountability” (Interview with PP, 2 June 2023).

In practice, this structural imbalance has left the MOD sidelined. RP, a retired Rear Admiral, noted that while the Minister of Defense “superintends” the services, “he does not have operational control—this rests with the President as Commander-in-Chief” (Interview with RP, 12 June 2023). Consequently, logistics and procurement remain under the direct control of the service chiefs, while ministers are reduced to ceremonial figures. RC added that service chiefs often bypass even the Chief of Defense Staff (CDS), asserting influence through personal proximity to the President. As RF remarked, “Ministers often have to align themselves with the interests of the services to retain political relevance and secure access to resources, thereby reinforcing their institutional weakness” (Interview with RF, 13 June 2023).

Beyond these operational ambiguities, interviewees highlighted deep structural weaknesses in higher defense management that blur accountability and undermine institutional coherence. RP, a retired Rear Admiral, lamented:

the lack of institutionalized rules and regulations in promotions and appointments, where decisions are shaped by the preferences of service chiefs or the President rather than institutional norms. (Interview with RP, 12 June 2023)

RC, a retired permanent secretary, concurred, describing “opaque processes governing postings, retirements, and promotions within the armed forces, often politicized and lacking transparency” (Interview with RC, 13 June 2023). PB, a retired Major General, similarly noted that “once appointments are politicized, officers no longer focus on merit or performance . . . everyone looks up to the next administration for survival” (Interview with PB, 20 May 2023).

From the civilian side, QA, a professor of politics, observed that “the ministry has lost control over human resource management in the forces . . . promotions depend on who has access to power, not the rule book” (Interview with QA, 16 May 2023). RC further noted that “without clear institutional rules, every new service chief resets the system, bringing his own people and retiring others” (Interview with RC, 18 May 2023).

Alongside these structural issues, the Nigerian Armed Forces have been extensively deployed for internal security roles far beyond their constitutional mandate (Momodu, 2019; Ojo, 2008). From counterinsurgency in the Northeast to communal conflicts in the Middle Belt and oil infrastructure protection in the Niger Delta, the military has operated as a de facto internal policing institution (Ojo, 2008; Siollun, 2018). Interviewees repeatedly noted the corrosive effects of this overextension. QB, a retired major general and former divisional commander in the Northeast, lamented:

one of the reasons the military is always called in is because of the weakness and incapacity of the police . . . the government must reform the police to be able to take care of internal security. (Interview with QB, 22 May 2023)

RC, a former permanent secretary in the MOD, similarly insisted that “there’s a need to have a police force that is worth its salt, so that a soldier would do his assignment . . . let the military be the place of last resort” (Interview with RC, 13 June 2023). QZ, a former Chief of Defense Staff, reinforced this by stressing that “strengthening the police is essential to reducing military involvement in internal security” (Interview with QZ, 10 June 2023). As QB explained, military involvement in internal operations often becomes self-perpetuating:

wars develop a life of their own, and some people begin to benefit from them. . . Operation MESA, for example, was meant to be temporary support for civil authority, but it became a funding stream for the services. (Interview with QB, 22 May 2023)

QB further recalled instances where “checkpoints remained for 15 years, funded by local governments and even supported by traditional rulers and retired officers . . . soldiers loved it because it brought extra income” (Interview with QB, 22 May 2023).

This dynamic not only incentivizes continued military dominance in internal security but also blurs the boundary between policing and professional defense functions.

The result is a pervasive strategic ambiguity. Military units are deployed without clear exit strategies, doctrinal clarity, or consistent rules of engagement in contravention of prevailing wisdom that “Missions linked to internal security should be short lived, not permanent . . .” (Serra, 2010, p. 86), Barany (2012, pp. 31–32) also makes it clear that the military should play a limited role in internal missions.

The evidence reveals a “strategic ambiguity” at the heart of Nigeria’s security governance: while formal rules assert civilian supremacy, authority is mediated through personalized access, fiscal side-channels, and ad hoc presidential–service chief ties. This arrangement blurs defense and policing roles, fuels mission creep, and transforms internal deployments into patronage streams, effectively inverting the principal–agent relationship. Civilian control exists on paper, but real authority rests with those who command resources and proximity. The MOD’s weakness reflects not only limited capacity but a deliberate institutional design shaped by incentives, as legislators, ministers, and commanders prioritize access and rents over accountability. In LAO terms, internal security serves elite coalition management rather than public security, sustaining an equilibrium that preserves regime stability at the expense of professionalism, accountability, and institutional coherence.

Fragmented Security Governance Across Nigeria

Security governance across Nigeria reflects a complex mix of politicization, informality, and regional asymmetry. In each zone, the interaction between political authority and the use of the military exposes deep ambiguities in how security is organized, funded, and controlled.

In the Niger Delta, elite settlements transformed militancy into a system of patronage. PD, a retired Rear Admiral and former JTF commander, recalled that:

elections in the Niger Delta were fraudulent; votes were allocated rather than cast. Election officials colluded with militants to manipulate results, and we [the military] were often pressured to look away. (Interview with PD, 27 May 2023)

The amnesty program in the Niger Delta, intended to restore peace, was similarly captured by political interests (Oluduro & Oluduro, 2012). As PD explained:

PE, a retired Colonel and intelligence officer, added that “in the Niger Delta, security became business. Everyone—military, politicians, militants—was getting something out of it. You cannot end what feeds too many powerful people” (Interview with PE, 27 May 2023). Such dynamics blurred distinctions between security, politics, and profiteering. The co-optation of violence into electoral and economic systems entrenched a militarized political economy in which former militants became brokers of access and protection (Adibe et al., 2024; Ebiede, 2018; Ebiede & Langer, 2023; Joab-Peterside et al., 2012).

In the Middle Belt, recurrent farmer–herder conflicts illustrate how political calculation distorts security responses (International Crisis Group, 2018; Nwozor et al., 2021; Odigbo, 2019). QB, a retired Major General, explained that:

many governors shy away from responsibility; they weigh every decision against its political cost. There is a complicity—if firm action threatens their support base, they retreat, and that is why crises keep recurring (Interview with QB, 22 May 2023). PE, a retired Colonel and former intelligence officer, when describing the governor, noted that:

in Benue, nobody is sure whether it was political or he was tackling the security. . . if he had been purely somebody who knows that security is quite different from politics, things would work out better. (Interview with PE, 2023)

The implication meant that political elites manage insecurity not to resolve it but to preserve coalitions, reinforcing cycles of impunity. The military, caught between local and federal pressures, often becomes an arbiter in politically charged conflicts, undermining its professional neutrality and weakening institutional trust (Ibrahim 2018; Ikpe 2009; Omilusi, 2017; Onuoha et al., 2020). PR, a retired Major General and former operational commander, explained how governors routinely influence command decisions:

the governor can talk to the Chief of Army Staff and say, I don’t want this man here—he’s disrupting my program. If the Chief of Army Staff doesn’t budge, the governor takes it to the Presidency or the NSA’s office, and the Chief will be called and told, ‘We don’t want this man here.’ So, the man is pulled out, even when he’s doing a professional job. It happens in so many places. (Interview with PR, 2023)

This pattern of interference not only politicizes operational command but also blurs the boundaries between civilian oversight and partisan control.

PR further observed that:

because some places, the military or the civilians are not properly funded, you go begging the state governor or the political master to assist you. You compromise your professionalism at that level. He who provides for you, you need to somehow bend certain structures. (Interview with PR, 2023)

Such dependence entrenches informal patron-client relations between commanders and governors, reinforcing political loyalty at the expense of institutional integrity.

The Northwest equally demonstrated the limits of state control. Negotiations with bandits and ransom payments, often brokered by state governments, have normalized coercive bargaining as a governance tool (Maigari et al., 2021). QB observed that this practice has “emboldened criminals, because once the state starts bargaining with them, it signals weakness. . . tomorrow they will come back” (Interview with QB, 22 May 2023). PZ, a former Special Forces Commander, recounted that “after bandit attacks, governors would summon us not to discuss security strategy, but to protect their political image” (Interview with PZ, 24 May 2023). These transactional arrangements substitute political theater for strategic coordination, exposing the fragility of state authority and the manipulation of military operations for reputational control (Okoli & Abubakar, 2021, Olafusi, 2020).

In the Northeast, where Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) insurgents operate, governance oscillates between coercion and conciliation (Omeni, 2018). PF, a retired Major General and former coordinator of Operation Safe Corridor, the Government’s deradicalization program for repentant Islamists, explained that “the program was designed to deradicalize and rehabilitate ex-combatants, but the military was drawn too far into roles beyond its core mandate” (Interview with PF, 21 May 2023). PZ added:

when the same military unit is fighting in the bush and then rehabilitating insurgents in town, it creates confusion . . . we are neither fully at war nor fully at peace. (Interview with PZ, 24 May 2023)

These blurred operational boundaries dilute the military’s effectiveness and legitimacy, underscoring the lack of a coherent civilian framework for managing post-conflict reintegration (Owonikoko, 2022).

In the Southeast, the state’s strategy toward the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) illustrates coercive co-optation. QB, a retired Major General, noted that, “governors shy away from tough measures against their own groups for fear of political backlash, so they outsource repression to the military” (Interview with QB, 22 May 2023). Such delegation undermines civilian authority and fuels allegations of human rights violations (Obi-Ani et al., 2020). The reliance on force without political dialogue reinforces mutual distrust and accentuates the military’s role as both enforcer and scapegoat.

By contrast, the Southwest reflects a more institutionalized—though still negotiated—form of order. The co-optation of the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC) through pipeline protection contracts illustrates how non-state violence is absorbed into state-aligned structures (Abiodun et al., 2021). RF, a retired Air Force officer, reflected that Obasanjo’s 1999 election “was the price to settle Yoruba grievances after June 12 . . . stability in the Southwest was bought through inclusion” (Interview with RF, 13 June 2023). While such inclusion fostered relative stability, it also entrenched clientelist arrangements that prioritized political accommodation over institutional reform.

The gradual institutionalization of the Amotekun security outfit further reflects this dynamic (Nwoko, 2021). Emerging from regional demands for self-defense, Amotekun was later incorporated into state-level security governance, symbolizing both innovation and compromise. Its formalization underscores the region’s preference for negotiated autonomy within the federation, where local legitimacy compensates for the weaknesses of national security institutions. Yet, as with earlier arrangements, its operation remains politically mediated, reinforcing hybridity rather than transforming underlying governance norms.

Across Nigeria’s regions, security governance remains fragmented and politicized, reflecting the predominance of negotiated rather than rule-based authority. Security functions less as an institutionalized public good than as an instrument of control and a currency of elite bargaining, sustaining order through informal accommodations that entrench rather than resolve fragility. Within this configuration, the military operates simultaneously as enforcer and negotiator, its loyalty shifting from professional hierarchy to civilian patrons who mediate access, promotion, and protection. Such politicization renders civilian control largely symbolic—anchored not in policy coherence, parliamentary oversight, or transparent budgeting, but in patronage and expedient alliances. The outcome is a hybrid equilibrium that maintains regime stability while corroding professionalism, institutional trust, and the foundations of democratic accountability.

Civil–Military Relations and the Dynamics of LAOs in Fragile States

Civil–military relations in postcolonial and fragile states such as Nigeria are deeply embedded within the structural logic of LAOs, where political stability depends on the controlled distribution of privileges among powerful elites (North et al., 2013). In such contexts, the military functions not merely as an instrument of state authority but as an integral actor within the dominant coalition that sustains political order. The persistence of patronage, elite bargaining, and informal rule networks constrains the emergence of impersonal, rule-based governance—the very foundation upon which effective civilian democratic control rests.

In LAOs, political and economic power is concentrated in elite coalitions that restrict access to organizational and economic opportunities as a means of containing violence. These coalitions typically incorporate the armed forces as both guarantors and beneficiaries of the political settlement. Consequently, civilian control becomes negotiated rather than institutionalized—dependent on elite consensus rather than constitutional mechanisms. Nigeria’s postcolonial experience vividly illustrates this dynamic.

The military’s central role in state formation, coupled with recurrent political interventions, has entrenched its dual position as both stabilizer and stakeholder in elite pacts. The Fourth Republic itself emerged from an elite bargain that balanced the interests of retired officers, political leaders, and business magnates (Adekanye, 1999; Campbell, 2020; Onuoha, 2023). While this settlement ensured regime continuity, it blurred the boundary between military subordination and political participation. Successive administrations have relied on selective co-optation, patronage-based appointments, and the strategic distribution of rents to secure loyalty within the armed forces (Adekanye, 1999; Siollun, 2018).

This structural dependence generates three interrelated challenges for civil–military relations in Nigeria.

First, politicization of command and appointments undermines professionalism, as postings and promotions are shaped by political expediency rather than merit, fostering internal rivalry and eroding cohesion. Interview data reveal recurring instances where service chiefs were reshuffled to satisfy political interests—reflecting how elite bargains shape military hierarchies.

Second, fragmented oversight erodes accountability. Weak bureaucratic and legislative institutions lack the authority or technical capacity to scrutinize defense policies, concentrating control in the presidency and rendering it susceptible to capture by personal networks. This mirrors what North et al. (2013) describe as personalized LAOs, in which authority is exercised through informal reciprocity rather than impersonal rules.

Third, the hybridization of security governance—through joint operations, regional militias, and ad hoc task forces—further blurs civilian–military boundaries. The military’s expanded role in internal security, peacekeeping, and development has diluted its professional focus and normalized its presence in civilian spheres (Joshua et al., 2021).

These dynamics have created a paradox of control: while civilian leaders maintain formal supremacy, their authority depends on continual negotiation with the military and other elite actors. Civilian oversight thus operates transactionally—anchored in personal trust, financial inducement, and regional balancing—rather than being institutionalized through law and policy. This negotiated equilibrium sustains short-term stability but impedes democratic consolidation and professional autonomy within the armed forces.

The implications of this elite bargaining extend beyond the formal civil–military interface to the broader security landscape. The negotiated compromises between the government and various armed groups across Nigeria—bandits in the Northwest, Islamist insurgents in the North, Fulani militias in the Middle Belt, and Niger Delta militants in the South—illustrate how the state manages insecurity through political accommodation and rent distribution rather than impartial enforcement of law. Such arrangements, including the use of militants for electoral intimidation or oil pipeline protection, exemplify a strategy of managing violence rather than resolving it, thereby stabilizing ongoing conflict instead of ending it.

For the military, this produces a structural dilemma. Its operational posture becomes contingent on the interests of the ruling coalition, forcing it to act simultaneously as a counterinsurgent force and as an instrument of appeasement. As PD, a retired Rear Admiral and former Joint Task Force commander in the Niger Delta, put it, this often feels like “fighting with one hand tied behind your back.” While efforts to win hearts and minds remain central to internal security operations, the politically conditioned restraint that accompanies such strategies reinforces a broader pattern of strategic ambiguity. In this environment, armed criminals and insurgents may be placated on ethno-religious or political grounds, even as peaceful protesters—such as those in the Southeast—encounter the full weight of military repression.

This pattern illustrates how Nigeria’s LAO structure sustains a system of security governance rooted in negotiation, selectivity, and the uneven application of force. Civil–military relations both mirror and reinforce this broader political settlement—one that privileges regime stability over institutional integrity, elite consensus over democratic accountability, and managed disorder over durable peace.

Conclusion

This study has examined how the logic of LAOs shapes the character of civil–military relations in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. It has shown that civilian control, while constitutionally enshrined, is sustained through patronage, rent distribution, and elite bargaining rather than institutionalized oversight. The central question— how has the nature of civil–military relations in Nigeria since 1999 affected the military’s effectiveness in internal security operations — has been addressed by demonstrating how negotiated authority substitutes for rules-based governance, producing a system that privileges regime stability over institutional integrity and professional autonomy.

Empirically, the study finds that political interference in appointments, promotions, and deployments, alongside the weakness of oversight bodies such as the Ministry of Defense and the legislature, has hollowed out accountability and blurred the boundary between defense and domestic governance. The military operates as both guarantor and beneficiary of elite bargains, securing stability through managed disorder rather than strategic coherence. This dynamic exposes the paradox of post-authoritarian control: subordination without institutionalization.

Theoretically, the article advances the study of civil–military relations by integrating classical theory with the LAO framework to explain how authority and control function in hybrid political orders. It contributes to comparative scholarship by reframing what is often described as “dysfunction” as a rational adaptation to the political economy of limited access—where control, rents, and coercion are negotiated rather than institutionalized. This perspective extends the civil–military relations literature beyond institutionalist paradigms rooted in advanced democracies, offering a more contextually grounded approach to analyzing governance in postcolonial and fragile states.

Future research should explore how variations in LAO dynamics across African and other hybrid regimes affect patterns of military professionalism, oversight, and regime stability. Comparative and longitudinal analyses could illuminate how shifts in elite cohesion, resource distribution, and international engagement reshape the trajectory of democratic control. Ultimately, understanding civil–military relations in limited-access contexts requires attention not only to institutions but to the political settlements that sustain them.