Civilian abuse and targeting are as old as war itself and are often presumed to be an inevitable consequence of conflict and militant barbarity. Existing studies have most often attributed civilian victimization rates to conflict and non-state actor-specific characteristics. However, these studies often overlook the broader strategic situation that non-state actors find themselves in, inevitably framing abuse as an end itself and not as a means to an end. Using an opportunity cost framework, this study centers civilian victimization within a rational actor framework and analyzes when non-state actors become more or less likely to choose strategies of abuse in line with their own unique opportunity costs. This study finds significant evidence to suggest that opportunity costs imposed by international human rights institutions can reduce the severity of civilian targeting by non-state actors.
AllenS. H.BellS. R.MachainC. M. (2021). Air power, NGOs, and collateral killings. Foreign Policy Analysis, 17(2), oraa025.
2.
AllenS. H.BellS. R.MachainC. M. (2023). Air power, international organizations, and civilian casualties in Afghanistan. Armed Forces & Society, 49(4), 1048–1060.
3.
AzamJ. (2006). On thugs and heroes: Why warlords victimize their own civilians. Economics of Governance, 7(1), 53–73.
4.
BainesE.PaddonE. (2012). “This is how we survived”: Civilian agency and humanitarian protection. Security Dialogue, 43(3), 231–247.
5.
BlantonS. L.BlantonR. G. (2007). What attracts foreign investors? An examination of human rights and foreign direct investment. The Journal of Politics, 69(1), 143–155.
6.
DaiX. (2014). The conditional effects of international human rights institutions. Human Rights Quarterly, 36(3), 569–589.
7.
DeMerittJ. H. R. (2009). Delegating death: A strategic logic of government killing (Paper 770). Florida State University.
8.
DonnellyJ. (1999). Human rights, democracy, and development. Human Rights Quarterly, 21(3), 608–632.
9.
DownesA. B. (2006). Desperate times, desperate measures: The causes of civilian victimization in war. International Security, 30(4), 152–195.
10.
DownesA. B. (2007). Restraint or propellant? Democracy and civilian fatalities in interstate wars. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 51(6), 872–904.
11.
EckK.HultmanL. (2007). One-sided violence against civilians in war: Insights from new fatality data. Journal of Peace Research, 44(2), 233–246.
12.
EckK.SollenbergM.WallensteenP. (2004). One-sided violence and non-state conflict. In MargaretaS. (Ed.), States in armed conflict (pp. 133–142). Uppsala University.
13.
FjeldeH.HultmanL.NilssonD. (2019). Protection through presence: UN peacekeeping and the costs of targeting civilians. International Organization, 73(1), 103–131.
14.
FrankR.BernankeB. (2011). Principles of economics (2nd ed.). McGraw-Hill/Irwin.
15.
GatesS. (2002). Recruitment and allegiance: The microfoundations of rebellion. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46(1), 111–130.
16.
Geneva Call. (2016). Dr Congo: Launch of the “fighter not killer” awareness campaign to sensitize armed movements on the rules of war [Technical Report].
17.
HathawayO. A. (2002). Do human rights treaties make a difference?Yale Law Journal, 111(8), 1935–2042.
18.
HawkinsD. G.LakeD. A.NielsonD L.TierneyM. J. (Eds.). (2006). Delegation and Agency in International Organizations. Cambridge University Press.
19.
HultmanL. (2009). The power to hurt in civil war: The strategic aim of RENAMO violence. Journal of Southern African Studies, 35(4), 821–834.
20.
International Committee of the Red Cross. (2010). Building respect for humanitarian action and IHL among “other” weapon bearers [Technical Report].
21.
JoH. (2015). Compliant rebels: rebel groups and international law in world politics. Cambridge University Press.
22.
KalyvasS. (2006). The logic of violence in civil war. Cambridge University Press.
23.
KrainM. (1997). State-sponsored mass murder: The onset and severity of genocides and politicides. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41(3), 331–360.
24.
LacinaB.GleditschN. P. (2005). Monitoring trends in global combat: A new dataset of battle deaths. European Journal of Population/Revue Européenne de Démographie, 21, 145–166.
25.
MarshallM. G.JaggersK.GurrT. R. (2020). Political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800-2018. Polity V Project. University of Maryland.
SalehyanI.SirokyD.WoodR. M. (2014). External rebel sponsorship and civilian abuse: A principal-agent analysis of wartime atrocities. International Organization, 68, 633–661.
28.
StoneD. F. (2015). Clarifying (opportunity) costs. The American Economist, 60(1), 20–225.
29.
ThomasJ. (2014). Rewarding bad behavior: How governments respond to terrorism in civil war. American Journal of Political Science, 58(4), 804–818.
30.
ValentinoB.HuthP.Balch-LindsayD. (2004). “Draining the sea”: Mass killing and guerrilla warfare. International Organization, 58(2), 375–407.
31.
WeinsteinJ. M. (2007). Inside rebellion: The politics of insurgent violence. Cambridge University Press.
32.
WoodE. J. (2009). Armed groups and sexual violence: When is wartime rape rare?Politics and Society, 37(1), 131–162.
33.
WoodR. M. (2010). Rebel capability and strategic violence against civilians. Journal of Peace Research, 47(5), 601–614.
34.
WoodR. M. (2014). From loss to looting? Battlefield costs and rebel incentives for violence. International Organization, 68, 979–999.
35.
WoodR. M.KathmanJ. D.GentS. E. (2012). Armed intervention and civilian victimization in intrastate conflicts. Journal of Peace Research, 49(5), 647–660.
