While the dynamics of civil–military relations have traditionally been studied in a dyadic structure, internal deployment changes the relationship between armed agents and their civilian principals. While soldiers fight external wars alone, at home they fight alongside other centrally controlled armed agencies such as police and gendarmeries. This article studies the relationships between militaries, civilians, and centrally controlled police and gendarmeries, which I describe as “alternative security forces (ASFs)” in two democracies with high levels of internal armed conflict, Colombia and Mexico. Based on interview and archival data, I find that while militaries and ASFs will inevitably find themselves in rivalry, the “tone and tenor” of this rivalry matters for civilian governments. While an interservice rivalry allowed for ASF-military cooperation even in the face of competition in Colombia, a zero-sum rivalry in Mexico has hindered the development of law enforcement and perpetuated an unsuccessful over-reliance on the military.
AldaS. (2016a). Las posibilidades de transformación de las fuerzas de seguridad en Colombia tras el postconflicto. Revista del instituto español de estudios estratégico. [The possibilities to transform the security forces of Colombia through the postconflict. Journal of the Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies], 7, 129–154.
2.
AldaS. (2016b). Los desafíos de América Latina para proyectarse como actor regional en el ámbito de la seguridad internacional. Revista de relaciones internacionales, estratégica y seguridad [The challneges for Latin America to project as a regional actor in the environment of international security. Journal of International Relations, Strategy, an Security], 13(1), 35–66.
3.
AparicioJ. (2018). La Ideología de la Policía Nacional de Colomba en los años 60 y 70. Policía Nacional, Escuela de Postgrados de Policía.
4.
Borrero MansillaA. (2019). De Marquetalia a las Delicias [From Marquetalia to las Delicias]. Planeta.
5.
BrittoL. (2020). Marijuana boom: The rise and fall of Colombia’s first drug paradise. University of California Press.
6.
BruneauT. C. (2004). Restructuring Colombia’s defense establishment to improve civilian control and military effectiveness. Naval Postgraduate School, Center for Civil-Military Studies.
7.
BruneauT. C.GoetzeR. B. (2021). From tragedy to success in Colombia: The centrality of effectiveness in civil-military relations. In MateiF. C.HalladayC.BruneauT. C. (Eds.), The Routledge handbook of civil-military relations (pp. 310–321). Routledge.
8.
Congreso de Colombia. (1959). Memoria del ministro de Defensa Al Congreso Colombiana [Memorandum of the Ministry of Defense to the Colombian Congress]. Congreso de Colombia.
9.
Congreso de Colombia. (1960). Memoria del ministro de Defensa Al Congreso Colombiana [Memorandum of the Ministry of Defense to the Colombian Congress]. Congreso de Colombia.
10.
Congreso de Colombia. (1961). Memoria del ministro de Defensa Al Congreso Colombiana [Memorandum of the Ministry of Defense to the Colombian Congress]. Congreso de Colombia.
11.
CotteyA.EdmundsT.ForsterA. (2002). The second generation problematic: Rethinking democracy and civil-military relations. Armed Forces & Society, 29(1), 31–56.
12.
CroissantA.KuehnD.ChambersP.WolfS. O. (2010). Beyond the fallacy of coup-ism: Conceptualizing civilian control of the military in emerging democracies. Democratization, 17(5), 950–975.
13.
DavisD. E. (2006). Undermining the rule of law: Democratization and the dark side of police reform in Mexico. Latin American Politics and Society, 48(1), 55–86.
14.
De BruinE. (2021). Mapping coercive institutions: The state security forces dataset, 1960–2010. Journal of Peace Research, 58(2), 315–325.
15.
DíezJ. (2008). Legislative oversight of the armed forces in Mexico. Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos, 24(1), 113–145.
16.
DíezJ.NichollsI. (2006). The Mexican Armed Forces in Transition. DIANE Publishing.
17.
EscolarD. (2017). Gendarmería: Los límites de la obediencia [Gendarmeria: The limits of obedience]. SB Editorial.
18.
EsparzaD. (2022). Policing and politics in Latin America: When law enforcement breaks the law. Lynne Rienner Publishers.
19.
FeaverP. (2009). Armed servants: Agency, oversight, and civil-military relations. Harvard University Press.
20.
FinerS. E. (2002) The man on horseback: The role of the military in politics. Routledge.
21.
GoertzG. (2006). Social science concepts: A user’s guide. Princeton University Press.
22.
GuptaS.RomanoR. E. (1998). Monitoring the principal with multiple agents. The RAND Journal of Economics, 29, 427–442.
23.
HuntingtonS. P. (1961). Interservice competition and the political roles of the armed services. American Political Science Review, 55(1), 40–52.
24.
HuntingtonS. P. (1981). The soldier and the state: The theory and politics of civil–military relations. Harvard University Press.
25.
IveyA. (2023). Of soldiers and their rivals: A comparative analysis of alternative security forces in Mexico. Democracy and Security, 19, 1–27.
26.
JanowitzM. (2017). The professional soldier: A social and political portrait. Simon & Schuster.
27.
KapiszewskiD.MacLeanL. M.ReadB. L. (2015). Field research in political science: Practices and principles. Cambridge University Press.
28.
LessingB. (2017). Making peace in drug wars: Crackdowns and cartels in Latin America. Cambridge University Press.
29.
López-AlvesF. (2000). State formation and democracy in Latin America, 1810-1900. Duke University Press.
30.
López-GonzálezJ. (2012). Civil-military relations and the militarization of public security in Mexico, 1989-2010: Challenges to democracy In PhilipG.BerruecosS. (Eds.), Mexico’s struggle for public security. Palgrave Macmillan.
31.
LovemanB. (1999). For la Patria: Politics and the armed forces in Latin America. Rowman & Littlefield.
32.
LutterbeckD. (2004). Between police and military: The new security agenda and the rise of gendarmeries. Cooperation and Conflict, 39(1), 45–68.
33.
NordlingerE. (1976). Soldiers in politics: Military coups and governments. Pearson College Div.
34.
PardoR. (1996). De primera mano: Colombia 1986-1994, entre conflictos y esperanzas. [From first hand: Colombia 1986-1994, between conflicts and hopes]. Cerec.
35.
Pion-BerlinD. (2009). Defense organization and civil-military relations in Latin America. Armed Forces & Society, 35(3), 562–586.
36.
Pion-BerlinD.TrinkunasH. (2011). Latin America’s growing security gap. Journal of Democracy, 22(1), 39–53.
37.
Policia Nacional. (2003). Directores de la Policía Nacional de Colombia: 1891-2004. Revista Nacional de Policia de Colombia.
38.
Policia Nacional. (2013). DIJIN: 60 años [DIJIN: 60 years]. The Colombian National Police.
39.
Rahbek-ClemmensenJ.ArcherE. M.BarrJ.BelkinA.GuerreroM.HallC.SwainK. E. (2012). Conceptualizing the civil–military gap: A research note. Armed Forces & Society, 38(4), 669–678.
40.
Ríos-FigueroaJ. (2016). Constitutional Courts as Mediators: Armed Conflict, Civil-Military Relations and the Rule of Law in Latin America. Cambridge University Press.
41.
SabetD. (2012). Police reform in Mexico. Stanford University Press.
42.
SánchezJ. (2017). Oscar Naranjo: El General de las Mil Batallas [The General of Thousands of Battles]. Planeta.
43.
TrejoG.LeyS. (2020). Votes, drugs, and violence: The political logic of criminal wars in Mexico. Cambridge University Press.
44.
TrinkunasH. A. (2002). The crisis in Venezuelan civil-military relations: From Punto Fijo to the Fifth Republic. Latin American Research Review, 37(1), 41–76.
45.
VizcaínoA. (2018). Gendarmería y otras soluciones para la Seguridad Pública y la Seguridad Interio [Gendarmería and other solutioons for Public Security and Internal Security]. Editorial Ubijus.
46.
WhiteheadN. L.FairJ. E.PayneL. A. (2010). Violent democracies in Latin America. Duke University Press.
47.
WrightL. (2006). The looming tower: Al-Qaeda and the road to 9/11. Alfred A. Knopf.
