Why do retired U.S. General and Flag Officers (GOFOs) donate to political causes? I argue that retired GOFOs likely sort between nondonors, partisan donors, and corporate political action committee donors. Using a novel data set of all former members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Combatant Commanders from 1979 to 2022 and drawing on data from the Federal Election Commission, I examine the conditions associated with increased likelihood of GOFO political giving. The results suggest that the majority of retired GOFOs are nongivers. However, retired GOFOs are more likely to donate to Republicans than to Democrats, and GOFOs are more likely to donate to Republicans during U.S. presidential elections. I find strong partisan trends in GOFOs’ political giving, and the results provide new insights into the conditions under which retired American GOFOs take domestic political action.
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