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Abstract

Northern Nigeria has been plagued by the nefarious activities of terrorist groups, including Boko Haram, its affiliates, and armed bandits. Beyond its kinetic operations, the military has since deployed several strategies toward trust building across the region. This article contributes to the literature, by adopting process-based leadership as a social psychology conceptual and analytical lens. As a departure from traditional conceptualizations of civil–military relations, process-based leadership identifies where influence exists and how it is being exchanged toward the attainment of mutually linked security goals and objectives, between the military and society, in conflict settings. A central argument of the article is that improving civil–military relations in conflict settings is largely dependent on trust building, and achieving this is a function of the exchange of influence and the establishment of mutuality between the military and society.

Keywords

process-based leadership exchange of influence trust building civil–military relations military effectiveness Northern Nigeria

Introduction

Northern Nigeria continues to grapple with an insecurity impasse. This has resulted in the loss of lives and properties caused by the activities of violent non-state actors such as Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad, popularly known as Boko Haram and its breakaway factions, Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimia Fi Biladis Sudan (also known as Ansaru), and the Islamic State in West African Province (ISWAP) in the Northeast region. Between 2009 and 2021, the number of deaths from the activities of Boko Haram was over 350,000 (UNDP, 2021). This is also in addition to the displacement of over 2.1 million people at the end of 2021 (IOM, 2022).

The states mostly affected by the violence and insecurity in the Northeast region include Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states, popularly referred to as “BAY” states (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [UNOCHA], 2021). Others include Bauchi, Gombe, and Taraba states. In the country’s Northwest region, the nefarious activities of armed bandits, recently proscribed as terrorists, remain unabated (Ejekwonyilo, 2022). There were over 2,600 deaths from the activities of armed bandits alone in 2021, according to the Armed Conflict Location and Events Dataset (ACLED), as noted by Ayandele and Goos (2021). Furthermore, an estimated, 1 million people have been displaced by the activities of these terrorist groups as of 2021 (Hassan & Barnette, 2022). The most affected states include Kaduna, Katsina, Sokoto, and Zamfara. In addition, the crisis extends to Benue, Nassarawa, Niger, and Plateau states in the Northcentral region.

This study therefore contributes to the literature on civil–military relations (CMRs) by examining how process-based leadership has contributed toward addressing trust building between the military and society, particularly as it relates to the military’s effectiveness in nontraditional armed combat roles in countering terrorism. This is especially given the threat of terrorism from violent non-state actors (VNSAs) and their influence on vulnerable communities in Nigeria’s troubled Northern region. The study seeks to provide an empirical answer to the question of how the exchange of influence and establishment of mutuality between the military and society contributes toward trust building, particularly with regards to the military’s nontraditional combat operations, in conflict-affected settings in Northern Nigeria.

Being one of the pioneering studies that offers a departure from the traditional approaches to understanding CMRs in conflict settings, this article’s contribution to the literature is situated in its central argument which is that improving CMRs in conflict settings is largely dependent on trust building. The article further argues that achieving this is a function of the exchange of influence and the establishment of mutuality between the military and society, particularly within conflict settings. In addition to these, considering that research on CMRs is mostly focused on intra-state relations, this article offers an important contribution to CMRs during insurgencies, which is often understood via counter-insurgency lenses. Within such contexts, the dependent variable of interests resides within the purview of successes in combating these insurgencies, including establishing state control over territories or populations at the expense of empirical understandings of how these insurgencies affect CMRs, particularly within the ambient of state–military relations. As the effects of counterinsurgency efforts on state-society relations become increasingly more apparent, especially in countries where the military has historically played a significant political role such as in Nigeria, this article is therefore timely and relevant to the emerging discourse.

Following the introduction, the article’s structure proceeds with the methodology adopted. It then provides a conceptual/theoretical framework for CMRs, process-based leadership, and trust building in conflict settings. An overview of insecurity in Northern Nigeria and an analysis of the drivers of insecurity in the region are also provided. The article then unpacks the military’s effectiveness in its nontraditional roles by assessing some of its initiatives aimed at building trust in the affected local communities across the region, after which the challenges to the military’s trust-building strategies are discussed. Finally, the article ends with a conclusion.

Methodology

This study’s research design is descriptive as the causal insight reflects causal mechanisms rather than causal effects. The study, therefore, adopts an exploratory nature which is both flexible and idiosyncratic (Casula et al., 2021) to its investigation, which includes examining process-based leadership as a social psychological analytical construct in CMRs and how it contributes toward trust building between the military and society in conflict settings. This is in addition to having an in-depth case study design (Northern Nigeria), which is useful in establishing empirical findings, and is beneficial for advancing theory development. Given that the study is exploratory research, as part of its strengths, it discusses theory building that could lead to analytical generalizations (Stebbins, 2001, p. 6). The study adopts a qualitative approach that draws on secondary sources of data (from books, academic peer-reviewed journals, as well as other reliable news articles from local and international media outlets) and primary sources of data (from official reports and press briefings by the Nigerian military). More specifically, the main evidence collected for the study was based on official accounts of the military’s nontraditional armed combat roles as obtained from the Nigerian military through its periodic press briefings which are available online as open sources on its official website.

The evidence was used to support the central argument of the article through the adoption of qualitative research techniques such as content analysis, textual criticism, and structural phenomenology. Content analysis proved to be useful through sorting and ranking thereby helping to derive relevant information from the various secondary sources of data utilized. Textual criticism enabled reading between the lines, which was useful in helping to draw out notable and hidden details in the available reports. Moreover, the use of structural phenomenology was useful in providing contextual meaning to the specific cases and how they possibly shaped the general narrative and understanding. In addition to these, the data obtained from these sources were analyzed using thematic data analysis which is advantageous in identifying and reporting patterns within the data itself which helps to reinforce or refute the central arguments of the study. The article therefore adopts deductive reasoning.¹ Its scope covers the military’s nontraditional and nonarmed combat roles in Nigeria’s Northern region from 2015 to the second quarter of 2023. The choice of Northern Nigeria is informed by the high concentration of terrorist groups, high number of victims, and the military’s active presence across the region.

CMRs, Process-Based Leadership, and Public Trust Building—A Conceptual/Theoretical Framework

CMRs: An Enduring Debate

Despite the progress made in research on CMRs, challenges persist. One of which is the difficulty associated with theory building and empirical research. Early scholarship on CMRs has been mostly situated around the broad themes of structure versus agency (Pion-Berlin, 2011). This implies the contours upon which the military as part of the state’s coercive apparatus is differentiated from the extent of control it has in the way and manner it pursues its mandate. Others are the unexplored fields of military effectiveness, particularly related to its nontraditional roles (such as internal security operations toward countering terrorism, and crimes, including peace and stability operations, among others), and the quality and extent of established knowledge owing to variations in regime types (Croissant, 2022). Regime types here which are reflective of the nature of the political system at a given point in time connote an autocratic (military junta) or unautocratic regime (democratically elected regime). This article draws attention to the former. This study also considers civilians as comprising the general society, rather than civilians representing the authorities (Cohn, 2003).

Owens (2010, p. 1) defines CMRs as the interaction between the armed forces of a state, and other sectors of the society in which the armed forces are embedded. As an interdisciplinary field of study, CMRs focus on interactions between the armed forces as the coercive apparatus of the state from which it draws its legitimacy on the one hand, and society on the other hand, which could be domestic or foreign.

CMR as a field of study can be viewed from different dimensions, which include relationships in the spheres of power and politics, economics and media, science and technology, as well as culture and history (Rukavishnikov & Pugh, 2018).

However, the field of study itself has been inundated with several challenges along the way. For instance, Forster (2002) argued that the field of CMR was mostly confronted with three major challenges which include the epistemological challenge, leading to new ways of explaining and understanding CMR. The second is an ontological challenge resulting in scholars focusing their attention on state-centric approaches to more inclusive approaches. The third is a public policy challenge that focuses attention on the issues of effectiveness and efficiency in policy delivery and transfer. Therefore, he argued that the combination of these challenges created an intellectual revolution in the field of CMRs and its parameters, thereby moving scholars from an old set of concerns to a new research agenda (Forster, 2002, p. 71).

Kümmel (2002), however, offers important differentiations in CMR, which are dependent on time to include peacetime, crises situations, traditional military operations (defense, deterrence, attack), and nontraditional military operations (peacekeeping, humanitarian interventions, among others), also popularly referred to as Operations Other Than War (OOTW). It is pertinent to note that this paper, however, focuses on OOTW in conflict settings in Nigeria and its influence on CMR.

In more recent times, the discourse on CMRs has shifted toward the subject of the military’s effectiveness. This is of significance given that the literature on CMRs has tended to focus mostly on the military’s armed combat roles, whereas most militaries are increasingly being tasked with other nonarmed combat roles (Matei et al., 2022; Nuciari, 2018). This emerging area of research on CMR can be described as the “fourth wave” of the research agenda on CMR, which has largely been influenced by the post-9/11 world. Nuciari, (2018, p. 45) contends that this new paradigm of the military’s professional role has given rise to a new type of soldier, which, under military sociological theory, is understood as “the military peacekeeper.”

However, a major shortcoming of the current and existing literature on the conceptualization and theorization of CMR, particularly regarding control and effectiveness, is that it does not offer a way of interrogating the exchange of influence, toward the establishment of mutually linked goals and objectives between the military and society. This is especially so in given situational contexts such as conflict settings. Furthermore, prior scholarship contributions to theory building and development have often ignored the importance of trust building as a critical component in strengthening CMR, especially regarding the military’s effectiveness in its increasingly nontraditional roles. This lacuna further reveals the need for establishing the theoretical rigor required to improve our understanding of the subject. On this, there is a need to address the attendant issue of measurability of the military’s effectiveness. Egnell (2013) makes a case for coordination between civilian leadership and the military, as a central tool for determining effectiveness. While useful, this approach does not consider the primacy of the exchange of influence and the establishment of mutuality between the military and society in the former’s often complex nontraditional roles.

In addition, the perspectives offered on CMR have been mostly West-centric, necessitating appropriate applicability, such as in African contexts (Williams, 1998). Integrating this into the broader discourse is particularly relevant given that colonial legacies have strongly influenced CMRs in Africa (Ngoma, 2006). Furthermore, where CMRs in Africa have been discussed in the literature, it has mostly been through the limited prism of coup d’états (Khisa & Day, 2020).

Jan Angstrom’s work adds to the discourse by advancing the notion that the distinction between the contents of CMRs is shaped by norms rather than fixed categories, which is useful in opening new research agendas on the subject beyond Western-dominated perspectives (Angstrom, 2013). These perspectives, however, do not account for other political governance systems, such as the Presidential system, in which many African states operate. On this, Banerjee and Webeck (2022) probe the contours of how political institutions of presidential systems influence CMR, thereby provoking the need for a better understanding of the conditions relevant to CMR such that presidential institutions could manifest. Rosén (2009) also draws attention to the complexities embedded in norms and principles as they relate to what kinds of tasks the military should and should not do within the context of their nontraditional roles. This is done through what he terms “third-generation CMRs” (Rosén, 2009).

Another important area of research that requires more attention is the new challenges for CMRs in irregular warfare contexts, in which this study is situated. As Cronin (2008) rightly notes, apart from being profoundly political, intensely local, and of longer duration, irregular warfare is not winnable in the traditional sense. This calls into question the military’s effectiveness in nontraditional and nonarmed combat roles, particularly regarding its relationship with vulnerable and affected local communities. Therefore, the complexities of these realities necessitate a framework that explains CMRs in such situational contexts as asymmetric warfare. Asymmetric warfare here refers to a form of war where a weak party uses a non-conventional instrument of struggle against a stronger party to bridge the gap between the two (Caforio, 2018).

The subject of trust in social institutions has been traditionally anchored on two theoretical frameworks, which include cultural and institutional theories. However, this study is aligned with the latter, also known as performative theories. These theories stress that public trust is accorded to institutions for performing satisfactorily, establishing a connection between performance and trust. (Malešič & Garb, 2018, p. 147). It is also significant to note that public trust could be influenced to a large extent by the media’s coverage of social institutions such as the military. This explains the central hypothesis of the media coverage thesis (Hanitzch & Berganza, 2012). Their hypothesis is reflected in how media coverage shapes and informs society’s perceptions, understanding, and acceptance of the military. Other aspects of “New Media” such as social media channels and their role in shaping public trust, have also been considered in the literature (Jones & Baines, 2013).

Process-Based Leadership: A New Conceptual Framework for CMRs

As the discourse on CMRs continues to evolve, the importance of ensuring the effectiveness of the military in its nontraditional roles and missions cannot be overemphasized. As Rosén (2009, p. 611) rightly notes, the military is not only about strike capabilities, which reflect its fundamental jurisprudence. Moreover, its engagement within society has also expanded to include other nonarmed combat missions and roles such as policing, state-building, disaster management, and even diplomacy.

Key to the military achieving effectiveness in these roles requires strengthening the military’s relationship and building trust with society through the exchange of influence and the establishment of mutuality, particularly with vulnerable and affected societies. Therefore, this article makes a case for adopting process-based leadership as a conceptual and analytical lens for interrogating the exchange of influence intended to establish mutuality between the military and society. The subject of leadership can be broadly categorized into two groups. These include leadership as a field of intellectual inquiry and academic study and as an endeavor toward personal development (Kellerman, 2016, p. 93). Both classical and contemporary understandings of the subject of leadership have been mostly limited to individualistic metatheory, as rightly argued by Haslam and Reicher (2016, p. 21). However, this study deviates from the established discourse around power and political authority, which has dominated political and sociological perspectives, and focuses instead on the centrality of social influence.

While the literature is saturated with several perspectives on social influence, the works of French et al. (1959) remain among the most notable. In their theory of social influence and power, they argue that the influence of a social agent, which could be in the form of a person, a role, a norm, a group, or a part of a group, on a system in the life space of another person, is defined as the resultant force on that system, which has its source in the act of the social agent (French et al., 1959, p. 251).

Northouse (2021, p. 6) contends that “leadership is a process whereby an individual influences a group of individuals to achieve a common goal.” The process-based leadership framework identifies where influence is being exchanged and how this fosters the establishment of mutuality between leaders and followers. This framework resonates with the new psychology of leadership theory which seeks to “outline a social identity approach that explains leadership as a process grounded in an internalized sense of shared group membership that leaders create, represent, advance and embed” as defined by Haslam and Reicher (2016). This theory draws on certain similarities with Michael Hogg’s social identities theory, which specifies how cognitive, motivational, and social interactive processes interact with one another, along with the knowledge that we have about the nature of relations among social groups (Hogg, 2008). However, the emphasis here is placed on “social identities,” which Hogg defines as a representation and evaluation of shared attributes to which a person belongs (Hogg, 2008, p. 65). He, therefore, contends that social identity leadership processes occur in groups where members strongly identify with and overwhelmingly look to their leaders to define the group’s attributes within society.

Process-based leadership, therefore, depicts leadership as a social influence process rather than a fixed state of being (Hollander & Julian, 1969, p. 388). The military, as leaders, here represents an institution of the state, through which the state exercises its legitimacy over the use of force toward ensuring the safety and security of society, which is at the heart of the social contract. Society here connotes followers, who ascribe authority to the military to provide leadership.

Within this conceptual and analytical construct, the “exchange of influence” is interpreted as a relationship that is built over time between leaders (the military, though part of society, yet as a distinct social organization that is representative of the state) and followers (constituting society, including vulnerable and affected local communities in conflict settings). This relationship reflects the exchange of “transactions” between the two, such that in giving, the leader also receives something else in return from followers (Hollander & Julian, 1969). Leadership here is not about an individual’s traits but rather a transactional event that concurs between two parties, as noted by Northouse (2021, p. 7), which he refers to as leaders (military) and followers (society). It is significant to note that within this framework, the leader seeks to fulfill the group’s expectations. What the leader gives is attributed to a “resource,” which is further interpreted as an adequate role behavior that is intended to ensure the group’s goals. In return, the leader is accorded more significant influence in status, recognition, and esteem—all of which are necessary for contributing to the leader’s legitimacy—required for making influence assertions acceptable by followers (Hollander & Julian, 1969, p. 388). The sustenance of this relationship over time is determined by the extent to which both sides yield to influence.

It is imperative to note that this transactional event does not occur in isolation but within a given situational context, which could be in conflict settings. As Brown (2016) rightly notes, for leadership to be better understood, it must be situated within a context. As part of the relationship between leaders and followers, the former is recognized not only as an integral element in the situational context but as one who also shapes it, as an active agent of influence, through goal setting. This is mostly done by communicating “demands” on the group through words and actions that members are inclined to react to (Hollander & Julian, p. 389). This implies that despite the close linkages between leaders (military) and followers (society), the burden of ensuring the relationship between the two is maintained mostly resides with the former. One of the reasons for this can be attributed to the advantageous position enjoyed by the leader through greater access to resources. In the case of the military and society, how well the former can maintain its relationship with the latter toward the attainment of shared goals and objectives, such as peace and security, reflect its effectiveness, particularly in OOTWs. With regards to CMR contexts, where the military fails to provide the required goal orientations within the broader group, this is often met with distrust—which is manifested through various forms of disenchantment, antagonism, tension, and absenteeism—thereby affecting its effectiveness.

The Military and Public Trust Building

Malešič and Garb (2018) rightly note that the military, which constitutes a social institution, requires public acceptance and support—in other words public trust. Acquiring public trust requires demonstrating specific social skills and attitudes (Coletta, 2011). Several scholars have since recognized the importance of mutual dependence between the military and society (Boëne, 2003; Cohn, 2003; Pinch, 2003). This study is, therefore, concerned with public trust in the military, which here can be referred to as the legitimacy of the military in its parent society (Malešič & Garb, 2018, p. 146). It is also pertinent to note that the literature on public trust in the military as a social institution has mostly centered around public opinion toward it. This has been used in assessing the legitimacy of the military by the public (Meulen, 1998).

Trust building between the military and society remains paramount, especially ensuring the former’s effectiveness in OOTWs such as conflict settings. Malešič and Garb (2018, p. 155) rightly note that it is difficult to identify a prevailing causal factor of trust or distrust in any given country. They, however, contend that there may be concrete reasons for the levels of trust found in the military including in OOTWs, which have significantly contributed to increase public trust in the military. The absence of this could result in what has been described as a “civil-military gap” (Feaver & Kohn, 2001). Within the confines of CMR, this gap results from the lack of communication, as well as in knowledge and experience, interests and goals and values (Malešič & Garb, 2018, p. 156).

Overview of Insecurity in Northern Nigeria

Nigeria’s Northern region has been under the siege of violent non-state actors (VNSAs) for the past two decades. The activities of Boko Haram date as far back as 2003. Boko Haram and its breakaway factions, Ansaru and ISWAP have been responsible for several kidnappings, suicide bombings, exploitation, and sexual violence perpetrated against women and girls. Boko Haram is known to have kidnapped over 2,000 women and girls across the region (Stig, 2019). The group is driven by a political ideology founded on the goal of entrenching an Islamic caliphate in Nigeria under Sharia Law (United States Institute for Peace [USIP], 2012). While Boko Haram and ISWAP, have mostly operated within Nigeria’s Northeast region and the fringes of the Lake Chad Basin, Ansaru, on the other hand which has always maintained its allegiance to Al-Qaeda, has mostly operated in the Northwest and Northcentral regions (Samuel, 2022). As a result, the Nigerian military has been deployed across the region to contain the threat of these groups.

Similarly, another emerging threat to peace and security in Northern Nigeria is the nefarious activities of armed bandits. These groups, numbering over 30,000 across the region (Yaba, 2021), were recently proscribed by the Nigerian state as terrorists, in November 2021 (Ameh, 2022). Apart from the loss of lives, and property, these VNSAs have resulted in a humanitarian crisis in the affected region, including the forceful displacement of over 11,500 people in the neighboring Niger Republic (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], 2021).

It is pertinent to note that while Boko Haram and its splinter groups are mostly driven by a political ideology such as the need to establish an Islamic Caliphate, armed bandits on the other hand are mostly driven by economic opportunism. In attempting to achieve their goals and objectives, Boko Haram and its splinter groups rely on setting up alternative local authorities and in some instances delivering public goods. These differences in tactics and operations are fundamental to understanding and distinguishing between these insurgent groups.

While conflict emanating from violent extremism is not peculiar to Nigeria alone, it is important to note that to address the situation in the country’s troubled Northern region, a people-centered, locally focused approach to understanding the peculiarities of this challenge to the region is central to achieving any meaningful results (Meagher, 2014). This point is echoed by Bjørgo and Silke (2018), who noted that future preventive measures could be taken by understanding the underlying causes of terrorism (Bjørgo & Silke, 2018). Nevertheless, the need to understand the drivers of insecurity across the region is of equal importance. Two primary drivers of insecurity in the troubled region are socio-economic drivers and religio-political drivers.

Challenges to the Military’s Trust Building Strategies in Northern Nigeria

Several challenges continue to affect the military’s trust building strategies with society in Northern Nigeria. These include allegations of corruption and human rights violations against the institution, civilian informants collaborating with terrorists, issues related to collateral damage, and the influence of operations deployed by terrorist groups.

Human Rights Violations

In February 2018, the quickly responded to allegations of human rights violations and extrajudicial killings leveled against it by Amnesty International (AI). This was done through a public press briefing rather than responding directly to Amnesty International (Defence Headquarters Nigeria [DHQ], 2018f ). AI had alleged that 4,900 Boko Haram detainees were being held in an overcrowded facility, resulting in the deaths of 340 detainees from diseases and dehydration. The military has also been accused on several occasions of torture as part of efforts to eradicate Boko Haram (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights [OHCHR], 2021).

Corruption and Mismanagement of Resources

On corruption, a report by Transparency International in 2017 revealed how corruption in the military benefits Boko Haram (Solomon, 2017). Similarly, the military has been accused of selling weapons to terrorists in the Northern region (“Insurgency, Secessionism, and Banditry Threaten Nigeria,” 2021). Furthermore, in 2021, Nigeria’s National Security Adviser revealed that $1billion meant to prosecute the country’s war on terror had been stolen (Adebayo, 2021).

Citizen’s Collaboration With the Enemy

Another challenge confronting the military in its efforts at trust building through HAM has been the issue of some members of the affected local communities collaborating with terrorists as informants. Apart from working as informants to terrorists by leaking vital information, some members of the local communities have been reported to harbor terrorists in their homes and settlements and assist with planting landmines targeted at Nigerian troops in the Northern region (Omonobi, 2021). These activities are further complicated owing to the disguise as military personnel by terrorists who sometimes illegally wear the military’s uniforms (Campbell, 2019). The activities of these local sympathizers, particularly in the “BAY states” tend to derail military efforts in trust building with society.

Collateral Damage

Issues related to collateral damage have also continued to impede the military’s trust-building efforts across the theater of operations in Northern Nigeria. An example of this was the erroneous bombing of the Rann IDP Camp which resulted in the death of about 170 people, as discussed above. In 2017, the military was also accused of massacring more than 80 men in Babagana, Borno state (Searcey, 2017). In an airstrike by the NAF in September 2021, targeted at Boko Haram terrorists, nine villagers, including three children, were erroneously killed in the Northeast state of Yobe (Chason & Alfa, 2021). The military had initially denied the incident before eventually taking responsibility for it. Between 2017 and 2022, the Nigerian military has been responsible for mistakenly killing civilians at least seven times in the Northern part of the country. (Egbas, 2021).

Non-State Actors’ Influence Operations

Another major challenge affecting the military’s trust building efforts in Northern Nigeria has been the influence operations embarked upon by terrorist groups, which are intended to gain the support of the local populations. For instance, ISWAP has used preachers in its recruitment drive. In other instances, they have also dispatched emissaries to various IDP camps, especially in Borno state, requesting that they return to their farms, fishing activities and trading (Salkida, 2020). Terrorists are also known to collect Hadaya (taxes and levies) from members of local communities every 6 months, in exchange for Hisbah (arbitration services) in settling local disputes. This also includes granting access to basic medical services and security. These taxes and levies are also paid to the terrorists in the form of drugs, phones, recharge cards, cooking stoves, and petrol, among others (Salkida, 2020). ISWAP also ensures that farmers are not taxed but buying from them. The group is also known to exploit service delivery gaps caused by the state (Samuel, 2019). ISWAP has also extended its influence operations to include providing money to children and giving charitable goods to civilians. During Ramadan, ISWAP is known to preach to both youth and the elderly, including collecting Zakat, toward charitable causes (“Sources: ISWAP currently collecting taxes in Borno,” 2021). In the Birnin Gwari LGA of Kaduna, Ansaru a terrorist group is also known to protect local communities against other terrorist groups, such as armed bandits who raid these local communities (Dahiru, 2022).

While several other challenges confront the military as it seeks to exchange influence with and establish mutuality over shared security goals and objectives with society in Northern Nigeria, the above are among the most salient. These challenges also erode the military’s effectiveness as it engages in OOTW across the troubled region. This has been reflected in how these challenges perpetually discredit the military, as a social organization within the broader society.

The Military’s Effectiveness and Trust-Building Strategies in Northern Nigeria

As Chuter and Gaub (2016) rightly note, while African populations appreciate the armed forces, depicting a level of trust, however, the same cannot be said of their approval of military rule. Findings from a report on institutional trust conducted by Afrobarometer revealed that the army is the most trusted state institution in Africa, with 64% of survey respondents on average saying that they trust the army “a lot” or “somewhat.” Of the 36 countries surveyed in 2014/2015, Nigerians’ trust in the armed forces was among the lowest recorded levels at 40% (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake, 2016). This represented a decline of 10% from the results of the Afrobarometer Round 5 Survey in Nigeria, which was conducted between 2011 and 2013, where 50% of Nigerians indicated trust in the military “a lot” or “somewhat” (Afrobarometer, 2013). In the 2014/2015 survey, only about four in 10 Nigerians surveyed backed the military’s counter-insurgency efforts, which is in contrast to the high approval ratings with regional neighbors such as Niger and Cameroun at 96% and 81%, respectively (Anyadike, 2016).

Given that most of the drivers of insecurity in Northern Nigeria are structural, the military has sought to integrate nonkinetic measures aimed at complementing its military campaigns, including air strikes, clearance operations, search, and rescue missions among others, across the region. These interventions are significant in building public trust, given that the military often contests influence along with VNSAs. This section shall lay out some of the OOTWs the military has instigated in the region, aimed at trust building with society in the period under study.

Provision of Medical Services

In November 2015, the Nigerian Air Force (NAF), as part of its humanitarian efforts, attended to the health care needs of internally displaced persons (IDPs) at Dalori, Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state, through the NAF hospital that it built. According to the defense headquarters, this intervention aimed to alleviate the plight of the IDPs affected by the Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeast (DHQ, 2015).

Following the case of the military’s erroneous bombing of IDPs near a camp in Rann, Kala-Balge Local Government Area (LGA) in Borno state, on January 17, 2017, which resulted in the death of up to 170 people (Reuters, 2017). The military reassured the public through a press briefing where it accepted responsibility and explained what caused the unfortunate incident. It also conveyed the measures it had put in place to prevent a future recurrence. In addition, the military made the panel report on the incidence public (DHQ, 2017). As of February 2018, 300,000 IDPs were reported to have benefited from the NAF’s medical outreach programs.

Similarly, in the same month of February, following the recapturing of Camp Zairo, the NAF, in addition to airlifting rescued hostages from Sambisa Forest, which used to be Boko Haram’s stronghold, also provided medical treatment, including feeding the victims. They also reintegrated back into society (DHQ, 2018b). A 3-day medical outreach was also flagged off by the NAF and targeted about 4,450 IDPs in Agan IDP Campy, located in the Northcentral state of Benue in March 2018. These involved the provision of eye surgeries, and medicated eyeglasses, mass deworming, and insecticide-treated mosquito nets. (DHQ, 2018c). In March 2018, the National Youth Council of Nigeria, a coalition of youths, in a show of support for the military, embarked on a peaceful rally at the defense headquarters calling for enhanced salaries and welfare packages. In addition to the provision of advanced equipment required to address insecurity (DHQ, 2018d, 2018e).

In June 2018, over 1,843 people benefited from the medical outreaches for IDPs in Bama LGA, Borno state, carried out by the Nigerian Army (NA) as part of its activities to mark the NA Day Celebration (NADCEL), 2018. During this intervention, one of the women leaders was specifically reported to have noted that it would “further strengthen the already existing cordial relationship between the troops and host community” (DHA, 2018a). In September 2020, the military also organized a 2-day free medical outreach at Kamuru-Ikulu, in Zango Kataf LGA of Kaduna state, Northwest Nigeria (DHQ, 2020). These interventions were at no cost to the beneficiaries.

At the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Nigerian Airforce’s crisis management response went a long way in helping to build trust between it and the Nigerian society in the Northern region. In 2020, it distributed palliatives and food items to poor and vulnerable households such as in Makurdi, Benue state, Northcentral Nigeria, to 240 families from Abinsi, Fiidi, Ogondu, and Ter communities. In Kaduna state, Northwest Nigeria, these included 350 families in Barkallahu, Kuaya, and Kirama communities in the Rigachikun District of Igabi local government area. In August 2020, it announced the provision of a health education awareness talk on COVID-19 and the distribution of nonsurgical face masks to internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Kaduna state, affected by armed banditry (NAF, 2020b). Part of these responses also involved airlifting medical equipment and supplies among others. For instance, on September 17, 2020, it had distributed over 140 cylinders of liquid oxygen to two isolation centers in Abuja (NAF, 2020a).

Fostering Unity Among Diverse Groups

The military’s OOTW efforts have contributed toward trust building with the military by society. For instance, in February 2018, indigenes of Dikwa LGA commended the military for restoring peace to their communities, given that it used to be one of the LGAs under Boko Haram’s authority after it was captured in late 2015 (DHQ, 2018a).

In January 2022, the Governor of Northcentral Nigeria’s Plateau state, as well as the paramount ruler of Irigwe Kingdom and the Ardo of Gashish, both of whom are traditional rulers, commended the troops of Operation Safe Haven (OPSH) for uniting diverse youth groups from across 24 LGAs of Plateau, Bauchi, and Kaduna states. This was done during the Grand Finale of the Chief of Defence Staff Peace and Unity Marathon and Football Competition, which was successfully organized by OPSH in Jos, the capital of Plateau state. During the event, cash prices were awarded to the winners and consolation prizes were presented to other physically challenged competitors (DHQ, 2022).

In March 2022, the Department of Civil Military Affairs of the NA organized the 20th edition of its seminar which it started in 2018, for social media influencers, bloggers, and online journalists in Sokoto state, Northwest Nigeria (“Army Organises Seminar for Social Media Influencers, Bloggers, Online Journalists,” 2022). Similarly, as part of efforts to foster unity between itself and other diverse groups, the NA organized a seminar for social media influencers in Dutse, the capital of Jigawa state, Northwest Nigeria. These seminars were intended to create rapport and mutual understanding with the public toward the promotion of peace (“Nigerian Army Organises Seminar for Social Media Influencers in Jigawa,” 2022).

Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Ex-Fighters

In November 2019, the military ensured that 86 former Boko Haram child fighters between the ages of 10 and 19, who had voluntarily surrendered as part of its rehabilitation and reintegration program, Operation Safe Corridor (OPSC), were handed over to the Borno State Rehabilitation Center, in Bulumkutu (DHQ, 2019). This was after they had been thoroughly profiled and screened for 6 months by the military. OPSC is the Nigerian military’s nonkinetic multinational and multiagency humanitarian operation targeted at repentant Boko Haram terrorists. As of September 2022, over 79,000 insurgent combatants and noncombatants had surrendered, which the Nigerian military attributes to its nonkinetic approaches (Vanguard, 2022).

Other areas of interventions by the military, especially the NA, aimed at trust building have included the donation of a block of classrooms on November 4, 2022, by the Chief of Army staff (COAS) to Okene community, in Kogi state, Northcentral Nigeria (NA, 2022a). Similarly, on June 25, 2022, through the COAS special intervention project for Civil Military Cooperation 2022, several projects were commissioned at Dawaki Tofa Science Secondary School, in Kano, in the Northwest region. Some of these projects include; renovated and furnished Dunawa and Tofa hostels, a staff room, a renovated latrine, the school clinic, kitchen shade, a solar borehole and the construction of walkways, in addition to the repair of the school bus (NA, 2022b). In November 2022, the NA also commissioned a newly constructed 1.4km road in Kaoje Baguda Local Government Area of kebbi state intended at complementing basic services, amenities, and infrastructures (Odita Sunday, 2022).

In May 2023, the NA commissioned six newly constructed blocks of classrooms at Leme Bora Primary School and renovated the Nurul-Ulum Primary School in Gembu community in Sardauna Local Government Area of Taraba State in the Northeast region (NA, 2023a). On June 15, 2023, the COAS commissioned a NA commissioned a water project which was donated by the NA in the town of Gadam in Kwami Local Government Area of Gombe state in the Northeast region (NA, 2023b).

It is also pertinent to note that as part of its trust-building measures, the Nigerian military has acknowledged that despite the progress made in CMRs, there are still occasional complaints leveled against it by members of the society. At a press briefing in March 2017, the DHQ reassured the public that such reported cases were always handled appropriately. This reflects the exertion of influence through society’s demands for accountability in the military. These efforts, however, demonstrate the military’s effectiveness in OOTW across the region, which has contributed to trust-building within society. This has been reflected in society’s attitude toward the military. For instance, in July 2021, when a NAF Alpha jet aircraft returning from an interdiction mission between Zamfara and Kaduna states came under enemy fire, the pilot who successfully ejected the aircraft was able to seek refuge in nearby settlements before he was eventually rescued (DHQ, 2021a). In August 2021, the Chief of Defence Staff was reported to have also expressed appreciation to citizens and residents of the Northeast for their support while attempting to allay their fears and concerns regarding the mass surrender of Boko Haram/ISWAP fighters (DHQ, 2021b).

These examples demonstrate the extent of the military’s effectiveness in OOTW, as the participation of locals in military initiatives such as the types highlighted including participating in sporting events, providing useful information, and helping stranded soldiers. They further reveal that the successes or failures of the military in nonkinetic counterinsurgency operations are not necessarily a measure of the number of insurgents killed or the areas being cleared of insurgent activities, but rather the establishment of mutuality between the military and society toward shared goals and objectives—such as the restoration of peace and security. These efforts therefore contribute positively to changing CMRs, particularly in conflict-affected settings such as in Northern Nigeria.

Process-Based Leadership Revisited: An Applied Conceptual/Theoretical Discourse

By exerting influence on vulnerable groups and affected local communities through its OOTW interventions as “rewards” toward the establishment of mutually linked security goals, the Nigerian military demonstrates some effectiveness in its nontraditional roles. This effectiveness is echoed through the esteem and legitimacy accorded to it in return by society. On other matters that also necessitate its actions and inactions being questioned by society, influence is exerted on it through “demands” requiring accountability and transparency. This influence exchange demonstrates the nature of the process-based leadership between the military and society, reflecting existing CMRs in situational contexts such as asymmetric warfare, and how it contributes toward trust building or otherwise.

Drawing on the examples above, the exchange of influence between the military and society in Northern Nigeria is reflected in the provision of “resources,” which include medical services to victims such as IDPs for instance who have been displaced and affected by the activities of violent extremist groups. This provision helps in addressing their vulnerabilities which is critical to ensuring their well-being and human security within conflict-affected settings in the region. As a result, these affected members of the society ascribe recognition to the military which is fundamental to its legitimacy as a component of the state, carrying out its protective obligations toward society. The military is also able to make “demands” in return from the society such as its cooperation and collaboration toward defeating the perpetrators of violent extremism. By so doing both the military and society can establish mutuality toward the attainment of shared goals and objectives which includes peace and security.

Similarly, drawing on the example of the military’s OOTW in fostering unity among diverse groups in Northern Nigeria, which remains crucial to peace and harmony, the military’s provision of “resources” in the form of the provision of such an enabling environment for extracurricular activities such as organizing and facilitating sports events contributes toward its ascribed legitimacy, and recognition from these local communities. Through such activities, the military is better able to attract the support and goodwill of the society it seeks to protect. This transactional relationship strengthens the establishment of mutuality between both parties thereby increasing the prospects for the attainment of shared goals and objectives. Theoretically, these outreaches therefore affect the nature and character of society–military relations, especially within conflict-affected settings such as in Northern Nigeria.

Conclusion

As the Nigerian military takes the lead in prosecuting Nigeria’s war against terrorists across the Northern region, building trust with society remains crucial to winning the hearts and minds of local communities. Doing so requires the continued exchange of influence between leaders (the military) and followers (society) toward establishing mutually linked security goals and objectives in situational contexts such as the conflict settings that characterize the troubled Northern region of the country.

Pursuing this has necessitated the military’s increasingly active involvement in nontraditional roles beyond its kinetic operations in what is otherwise known as operations other than war. In the case of the Nigerian military’s engagement in the Northern theater of operations, this has included the provision of humanitarian services such as medical services to IDPs, organizing sporting activities, and the rehabilitation and reintegration of former terrorist fighters into society, among others. However, these nontraditional operations have also been met with several challenges, including allegations of corruption, human rights violations, members of local communities collaborating with terrorists as informants, issues related to collateral damage, and the unrelenting influence of operations of terrorist groups toward local communities.

These issues not only affect the military’s effectiveness in OOTW but they could also potentially jeopardize its trust building efforts with society. Therefore, addressing them is central to winning Nigeria’s war on terror and attaining victory over the battle for hearts and minds.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

I wish to acknowledge Oluwabukola Makinde who assisted with editing the initial draft of the manuscript and the two peer reviewers for their constructive feedback.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Folahanmi Aina

Notes

Author Biography

Folahanmi Aina is a Political Scientist and international security expert. He completed a second masters’ degree in African Studies, at the University of Oxford, having earlier obtained a master’s degree in international development policy from Seoul National University, South Korea. He completed a doctorate in Leadership Studies, with reference to security and development at King’s College London, United Kingdom. His research interests include leadership in national security policy decision-making, military strategy and operations, terrorism, insurgency and extremism, and international security, with a country focus on Nigeria and regional focus on the Lake Chad Basin and Sahel regions. Dr Aina is currently an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), London, United Kingdom, and a fellow at the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), Florida, USA. His works have appeared in several reputable international academic peer-review journals.

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Between “Victims” and Their “Saviors”: Process-Based Leadership and Trust Building in Civil–Military Relations in Northern Nigeria

Abstract

Keywords

Introduction

Methodology

CMRs, Process-Based Leadership, and Public Trust Building—A Conceptual/Theoretical Framework

CMRs: An Enduring Debate

Process-Based Leadership: A New Conceptual Framework for CMRs

The Military and Public Trust Building

Overview of Insecurity in Northern Nigeria

Challenges to the Military’s Trust Building Strategies in Northern Nigeria

Human Rights Violations

Corruption and Mismanagement of Resources

Citizen’s Collaboration With the Enemy

Collateral Damage

Non-State Actors’ Influence Operations

The Military’s Effectiveness and Trust-Building Strategies in Northern Nigeria

Provision of Medical Services

Fostering Unity Among Diverse Groups

Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Ex-Fighters

Process-Based Leadership Revisited: An Applied Conceptual/Theoretical Discourse

Conclusion

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

Funding

ORCID iD

Notes

Author Biography

References