How does the withdrawal of troops after a military intervention supporting the government affect the number of rebel groups in the long term? This study argues that the withdrawal of foreign support for the government affects the number of rebels by directly provoking a nationalist backlash in the short term and threatening government legitimacy in the long term. Whether or not nationalism is provoked and whether legitimacy is enhanced or eroded depend on whether or not it was a humanitarian intervention. If rebels win, the intervention withdrawals also indirectly affect the number of rebel groups in the long term through the militias’ presence. Using interrupted time-series estimates between 1961 and 2005, this study found that humanitarian intervention withdrawals decrease the number of rebel groups in the long term, whereas nonhumanitarian intervention withdrawals promote the growth of militias and increase the number of rebel groups.
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