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Abstract

What explains the post–Cold War surge in peacekeeping contributions from the developing world? I argue that, amid a wave of democratization and expanded peacekeeping activity, such countries use peacekeeping deployments to reduce the threat of the military to nascent democratic institutions. Peacekeeping participation serves to placate the military in the short term with resources and continued activity, while socializing and professionalizing it to pro-democracy behaviors in the long term. Assessing troop contributions from 1990 to 2011, I find evidence that new democracies make larger contributions than other states, where the effect diminishes as democracy becomes consolidated. Moreover, the effect is amplified in countries with a greater military legacy. I supplement this with a study of Argentina to further support the proposed mechanism. These findings help explain the shift in state peacekeeping contributions in recent years, the role of democracy in peacekeeping efforts, and the impact of international actors in supporting democratization.

Keywords

civil–military relations conflict resolution coups and conflicts democracy peacekeeping

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Democratization and Troop Contributions to United Nations Peacekeeping

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