U.K. Reserve Forces, principally the Territorial Army (TA), have been increasingly used since the end of the cold war, but there have been some concerns about their mental health problems and also possible unwillingness to remain in service. This article reports on the retention issues of 191 TA personnel who deployed to Iraq from 2003 to 2006. Qualitative data were thematically analyzed from three complementary studies. The authors found that, in 2003, negative aspects of Army organizational culture were reported as the prime reasons for TA personnel wishing to leave the military. In particular, Reservists reported their being unaccepted and underutilized. In contrast, by 2006, TA personnel were generally reporting being satisfied with their work as a Reservist and felt integrated with Regular colleagues. Those who stated they wanted to leave the military now reported it was primarily because of poor military family welfare support. These results suggest that although the British Army appears to have successfully managed the changing role and integration of the TA on operations, family welfare needs further consideration as an important influence on retention. Since the end of data collection for this study, new measures focusing on welfare have been introduced. Future work will assess the impact of these changes.
Charles C. Moskos, "Toward a Postmodern Military: The United States as a Paradigm," in The Postmodern Military, ed. Charles C. Moskos, Jay Williams, and David R. Segal (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000), 18-19.
2.
See Wallace Earl Walker, "Comparing Army Reserve Forces: A Tale of Multiple Ironies, Conflicting Realities, and More Certain Prospects," Armed Forces & Society 18 (1992): 303-22; James Griffith, "The Army Reserve Soldier in Operation Desert Storm: Perceptions of Being Prepared for Mobilization, Deployment, and Combat," Armed Forces & Society 21 (1995): 195-215; James Griffith, "Will Citizens Be Soldiers? Examining Retention of Reserve Component Soldiers," Armed Forces & Society 31 (2005): 353-83; Edna Lomsky-Feder, Nir Gazit, and Eyal Ben-Ari, "Reserve Soldiers as Transmigrants: Moving between the Civilian and Military Worlds," Armed Forces & Society 34 (2008): 593-614.
3.
For an interesting study on this theme, see Sheila Nataraj Kirby and Scott Naftel, "The Impact of Deployment on the Retention of Military Reservists," Armed Forces & Society26 ( 2000): 259-84.
4.
Speech of Mr. Mark Lancaster, member of Parliament, to the House of Commons, April 1, 2008, column 740, http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200708/ cmhansrd/cm080401/debtext/80401-0022.htm (accessed August 26, 2008). Also see Ian F. W. Beckett, Territorials: A Century of Service (Plymouth, UK: DRA, 2008).
5.
Ministry of Defence (MOD), Britain’s Reserve Forces http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/ AboutDefence/WhatWeDo/ReserveForcesandCadets/ReserveForces/ (accessed September 25, 2009).
6.
House of Commons Defence Committee, Recruiting and Retaining Armed Forces Personnel, 14th Report of 2007-08 HC 424, July 30, 2008, par. 17, citing National Audit Office Recruitment and Retention in the Armed Forces, Session 2005-06, October 2006, HC 1633, 964, Executive Summary.
7.
See http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/WhatWeDo/ReserveForcesandCadets/ReserveForces/ (accessed August 26, 2008). Also see SaBRE News & Updates: Future Use of the UK’s Reserve Forces, http://www.sabre.mod.uk/output/page300.asp (accessed September 6, 2007); Lords Hansard, http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.com/pa/ ld200607/ldhansrd/text/70315-0007.htm (accessed September 7, 2007).
8.
On this formulation, see the discussion in Tim Edmunds and Anthony Forster, Out of Step: The Case for Change in the British Armed Forces (London: DEMOS, 2007), 60. The distinction between intelligent mobilization and compulsory callout is not taken up in the recent analysis of regular perceptions of reserves by Kirke. See Charles Kirke, "Issues in Integrating Territorial Army Soldiers in to Regular British Units for Operations: A Regular View," Defense and Security Analysis 24, 2 (2008): 181-95.
9.
House of Commons Defence Committee, Recruiting and Retaining, par. 17, 10.
10.
For a useful statement, see the official view at http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/WhatWeDo/ReserveForcesandCadets/ReserveForces/ (accessed August 26, 2008).
11.
MOD, Reserve Forces: Types of Reservist and Manpower Strength, 2007, http://www.armedforces.co.uk/army/listings/l0070.html (accessed August 30, 2007); MOD, British Army Strength and Deployment, 2007, http://www.armedforces.co.uk/army/listings/l0086.html (accessed August 30, 2007).
12.
House of Commons Defence Committee, Recruiting and Retaining, par. 28, table 4.
13.
Ibid., par. 181. Also see M. Hotopf, L. Hull, N. Fear, T. Browne, O. Horn, A. Iversen, M. Jones, D. Murphy, D. Bland, M. Earnshaw, N. Greenberg, J. Hacker-Hughes, R. Tate, C. Dandeker, R. Rona, and S. Wessely, "The Health of UK Military Personnel Who Deployed to the 2003 Iraq War: A Cohort Study," Lancet 367 (2006): 1731-41.
14.
Recent concerns about Reservists’ mental health prompted the launch of the Reserves Mental Health Assessment Programme in November 2007. However, the number using this service has been small. See the speech by the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, Derek Twigg, http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/DefencePolicyAndBusiness/ NewMentalHealthcareProgrammeAnnouncedForReservists.htm (accessed September 24, 2009). As at July 2008, of the 261 calls received, 63 cases were assessed and 48 received treatment following assessment. MOD October 2008. However, the take-up figure may mask the number who need help but do not or feel they cannot ask for it.
15.
Ed H. Schein, Organizational Culture & Leadership, 2nd ed. ( San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1992 ), 17.
16.
Benjamin Schneider, ed., Organizational Climate and Culture (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1990). The micro, meso, macro levels were key to discussions of institution and occupation in the military. See Frank R. Wood, "At the Cutting Edge of Institutional and Occupational Trends: The U.S. Air Force Officer Corps," in The Military: More than Just a Job? ed. Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1988), 28-29.
17.
Schein, Organizational Culture. Also see the interesting discussion in Teemu Reiman and Pia Oedewald, "The Assessment of Organisational Culture: A Methodological Study," VTT Tiedotteita-Research Notes2140 (2002): 6-10, http://www.vtt.fi/inf/pdf/tiedotteet/2002/T2140.pdf (accessed September 1, 2008).
18.
Charles Kirke , "Organizational Culture-The Unexpected Force ," Journal of Battlefield Technology7, 2 (2004): 11-17.
19.
There are rather more colorful terms in circulation, such as STAB ("stupid TA bastard"). Reservists are not passive recipients of such epithets. In return, they can offer the riposte of ARAB to Regulars, meaning "arrogant Regular Army bastard."
20.
There is more to cultural differentiation within the Army than the regimental system: Corps and Brigades or Divisions (as in the household division) have an important cultural aspect. For a good discussion, see A. Beevor, Inside the British Army, rev. ed. (London: Corgi Press, 1991).
21.
Kirke, "Organizational Culture."
22.
Charles C. Moskos , "A New Concept of the Citizen Soldier ," Orbis49, 4 (2005): 663-76; Charles C. Moskos , "What Ails the All-volunteer Force: An Institutional Perspective ," Parameters31, 2 (2001): 29-47; Nataraj Kirby and Naftel, "The Impact of Deployment"; Griffith, "Will Citizens Be Soldiers?"
23.
Griffith, "Will Citizens Be Soldiers?"; Nataraj Kirby and Naftel, "The Impact of Deployment."
24.
Moskos, "A New Concept."
25.
Mark Harper, House of Commons Debates: Oral Answers to Questions-Defence: Iraq (Reservists), January 23, 2006, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/ cmhansrd/vo060123/debtext/60123-03.htm, (accessed September 25, 2009). National Audit Office, Reserve Forces (London: HMSO, 2006), 1-68.
26.
Hotopf et al., "Health of UK Military Personnel"
27.
For full details, see ibid.
28.
Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss, More Grounded TheoryMethodology: A Reader (Mill Valley, CA: Sociology Press , 1994), 377-88.
29.
The samples were representative of the British Army as a whole; consequently, they are split into mainly juniors and fewer seniors. The numbers were too small to begin to analyze intergroup differences, and to do so would lengthen this article without providing much additional valuable detail. The key break point of rank is clearly commissioning, and this is accounted for. So far as age is concerned, it is reasonable to assume that that older personnel will be associated with different life perspectives, but this may be less important in the Reserves, where rank may not link to age in the same way as in Regulars. So it is likely that for Reservists it is their circumstances as Reservists rather than their age that is the influential consideration.
30.
The issue of deploying as an individual augmentee (IA) or as a formed unit is an important one but is not confined to Reserve Forces. Many Regulars now also deploy as IAs. In a recent study by Neil Greenberg and colleagues, only 55 percent of the approximately 1,200 participants deployed with their complete unit and about 20 percent deployed as IAs. See Neil Greenberg, Amy Iversen, Lisa Hull, Duncan Bland, and Simon Wessely, "Getting a Peace of the Action: Measures of Post Traumatic Stress in UK Military Peacekeepers," Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine 101 (2008): 78-84. Indeed, for all forces (Reserve and Regulars), improvements have been made in the way IAs are prepared for and recovered from operations, and this may in some way have explained some of the changes we observed over the study period: namely, both groups were dealt with in the same way.
31.
Although we question whether this statement was based on reality or perception, the quote appears to represent frustration at the "system." Reserve medical staff (including combat medical technicians and medical assistants) from all three services deploy in support of land operations, and the frustration apparent in this quote is likely to affect some military medics, whatever their status.
32.
While Reservists may have complaints about the quality of equipment, it is important to note that they were not alone in this experience: Regular soldiers suffered from similar difficulties.
33.
We do not know why this individual seems to have not been granted compassionate leave, as should have happened, how many other such cases have occurred, or if this is a relatively isolated example.
34.
National Audit Office, Reserve Forces.
35.
RAND, Army Families and Soldier Readiness, R-3884-A (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992), http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R3884/ (accessed September 6, 2007); Chris Bourg and Mady W. Segal, "The Impact of Family Supportive Policies and Practices on Organizational Commitment to the Army," Armed Forces & Society 25 (1999): 633-52; Rene Moelker, "Military Families: A Theoretical Framework" (paper, International Sociological Association, Ankara, Turkey, July 6-9, 2004); Christopher Dandeker, Claire French, and Samantha Thomas, The Family and the Military as "Greedy Institutions": Negotiating the Work-life Balance in the British Armed Forces (Swindon, UK: Economic & Social Research Council, 2005), http://www.esrcsocietytoday.ac.uk/ESRCInfoCentre/SearchResultsPage. aspx?data=% (Accessed September 24, 2009).
36.
Army Families Federation, Good News for TA Families, Support for reserve and regular families is detailed at, http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/404A14FF-1064-48C4-808F6915E866A4A5/0/TAandReservistFamilyPredeploymentGuide.pdf (accessed September 25, 2009); LAND, Army Headquarters, Welfare Support to Members of the TA and Their Families, LAND SofS Brief (June 24, 2004).Welfare Support to Members of the TA and Their Families, LAND SofS Brief (MOD, June 24, 2004).
37.
In 2005, the UK MOD announced a re-balancing of the Army, which included the TA. ‘The move to larger, multi-battalion regiments is the only sustainable way in which to structure the British Army for the long-term…The new battalions will continue to recruit in the areas of their original constituent elements. Regional recruiting will remain the bedrock of the British infantry. Nor will there be any diminution in the role of the Territorial Army (TA) and the Reserves. The TA will in future be more closely integrated with the Regular Army for both training and operations. Each of the 14 TA infantry battalions will be part of a regular parent regiment, one per regular regiment with the exception of the Royal Regiment of Scotland which will have two, and the Guards Division which will have one affiliated TA battalion.’ See G Hoon, Defence, Australian Government Department of Defence, February 2005, <http://www.defence.gov.au/defencemagazine/editions/20050201/sections/the_big_ picture.htm (accessed September 25, 2009). A strategic review of reserve forces announced in March 2008, reported in April 2009, see Strategic Review of Reserves, http://www.mod .uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/ReserveForcesandCadetsPublications/SRUKRF/StrategicReviewOfReserves.htm (accessed September 25, 2009).
38.
Moskos, "A New Concept." Also see Lomsky-Feder, Gazit, and Ben-Ari, "Reserve Soldiers as Transmigrants."
39.
BBC, US Army Reserve a "Broken Force," January 6, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/4150749.stm (accessed August 30, 2007).
40.
Schein, Organizational Culture; Donna Winslow, Misplaced Loyalties: The Role of Military Culture in the Breakdown of Discipline in Peace Operations," Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 35, 3 (1998): 345-64; Christopher Dandeker and Mady W. Segal, "Gender Integration in Armed Forces: Recent Policy Developments in the United Kingdom," Armed Forces & Society 23 (1996): 29-47; Charles B. Breslin, Organizational Culture and the Military (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, April 2000).
41.
See Coghlan, D. , drawing on Schein’s work (op cit) in Change Processes in Catholic Religious Orders in Fred Massarik, Advances in organizational Development Vol 3, 1995Greenwood Press, 184.
42.
MOD, Reserve Forces: Territorial Army; MOD, TA Rebalancing.
43.
See Major B. A. Northover, "Does a Culture of Mobilisation Exist in the Post Op TELIC Era?" (thesis, Cranfield University , 2004), esp. chap. 4.
44.
Changes in support systems include the following. As part of the TA Rebalancing Implementation Plan, an officer post was established in all major units to fulfill the recruiting, retention, and welfare functions. Originally named the Regimental Recruiting Retention and Welfare Officer, these posts were renamed Regimental Operations Support Officer (ROSO). See Army Headquarters memorandum, LAND/RF/5501 27 Nov 05. Reservists, like their Regular counterparts, can also access the Army Families Federation-see http://www.army.mod.uk/welfare-support/welfare-support.aspx. Official information on welfare packages is available in Joint Service Publication 770 Tri Service Operational and Non Operational Welfare Policy, issue 1, July 31, 2007, MOD Directorate Service Personnel Policy.
45.
Kirke, "Issues in Integrating." It is based on a small number (fifteen) of majors, only one of whom was from a combat unit, and is therefore less representative of the cross-section of the Army compared to the work presented here. Kirke points out that Regular-Reserve integration is a key theme in the Future Army Structure being designed in the United Kingdom. Our findings give some indication that the proposed structure may already be having an effect before being fully implemented.
46.
Nataraj Kirby and Naftel, "The Impact of Deployment"; Griffith, "Will Citizens Be Soldiers?"
