Despite the oft-touted “transitions to democracy” paradigm, in much of the world, hybrid regimes that are better-termed “semi-authoritarian” proliferate, displaying the trappings of democracy, such as elections, but not the substance of democracy. This article, utilizing the Paraguayan case, generalizes to the broader theoretical examination of these newer forms of nondemocracy, providing a counterpoint to some of the transitions literature.
Abraham F. Lowenthal, “Latin America at the Century's Turn,” Journal of Democracy11, 2 (2000): 41-55.
2.
Paul W. Zagorski , “Democratic Breakdown in Paraguay and Venezuela: The Shape of Things to Come for Latin America?” Armed Forces and Society30, 1 (2003): 87-116.
3.
Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century ( Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).
4.
Marina Ottaway, Democracy Challenged : The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism ( Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003).
5.
See Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1988). Special thanks to the Editor for this recommended source.
6.
Ottaway, Democracy Challenged.
7.
See, among dozens, Uncommon Democracies: The One Party Dominant Regimes, ed. T. Pempel ( Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990); Brian Loveman, “Protected Democracies and Military Guardianship: Political Transitions in Latin America, 1978-1993,”Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs36, 2 (1994): 105-89; D.A. Bell, et. al., Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1995); William Case, “Can the Halfway Houses Stand? Semi-democracy and Elite Theory in Three Southeast Asian Countries,” Comparative Politics28, 4 (1996); Enrique A. Baloyra, “ EI Salvador: From Despotism to Partidocracia,” in Post-Conflict Elections, Democratization and International Assistance, ed. Krishna Kumar (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998); Robert Lloyd, “Zimbabwe: The Making of an Autocratic Democracy,” Current History101, 655 ( 2002): 219-24.
8.
Ottaway, Democracy Challenged, 7.
9.
Ibid, 31-50.
10.
Mexico (until 2000), was the most successful, the most durable, and certainly the most sophisticated semi-authoritarian system in the world.
11.
On reform to maintain control, see, among many, Paul C. Sondrol, “The Emerging New Politics in Liberalizing Paraguay: Sustained Civil-Military Control Without Democracy,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs34, (1992): 127-63; Stephen Morris, Political Reformism in Mexico: An Overview of Contemporary Politics ( Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995 ); Terry Lynn Karl, “Imposing Consent: Electoral vs. Democratization in El Salvador,” in Elections and Democratization in Latin America, 1980-1985, eds. Paul W. Drake and Eduardo Silva ( San Diego, CA: Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies, University of California—San Diego, 1996 ).
12.
Fareed Zarkaria , “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” Foreign Affairs76, 6 (1997): 22-43.
13.
This is a common misconception. Stroessner built his dictatorship on the foundations of the traditional Colorado Party and the armed forces, with Stroessner as Caudillo over both institutions. Stroessner never relinquished final command as head of the military and intervened directly in all troop movements and promotions of all officers. Stroessner also introduced political criteria (Colorado Party membership) for promotions and assignments, through oaths of loyalty to Stroessner personally, and indoctrination in Stroessner's political thought and pronouncements. Thus, Stroessner's regime was never a military junta or a faceless bureaucratic-authoritarian dictatorship a la Argentina and Brazil. Neither the collective Paraguayan military nor the Colorado Party ruled Paraguay; Stroessner ruled, totally dominating the political system. Excellent analysis is found in Carlos R. Miranda, The Stroessner Era: Authoritarian Rule in Paraguay (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990).
14.
R. Fitzgibbon and K. Johnson ranked Paraguay alternatively eighteenth or nineteenth out of twenty Latin American nations in nine successive surveys (five-year intervals, 1945-1985) of democratic development. Hill and Hurley's longitudinal study of press freedom found Paraguay invariably in the category levels “poor” or “none” between 1945 and 1975. D. S. Palmer, combining five indicators of authoritarianism (nonelective rule, coups, primacy of the military, military rule, and executive predominance) ranked Paraguay first in the region in its degree of authoritarianism. See Kenneth Johnson, “ Measuring Scholarly Images of Latin American Democracy,” in Statistical Abstracts of Latin America, 26th ed. (Los Angeles: University of California—Los Angeles Latin American Center, 1988), 198; Kim Q. Hill and Patricia Hurley, “Freedom of the Press in Latin America: A Thirty Year Survey,” Latin American Research Review15, 2 (1980): 212-8; David S. Palmer, “The Politics of Authoritarianism in Spanish America,” in ed. James Malloy, Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), 378-84.
15.
Samuel Huntington , Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968) 192-263.
16.
For an extended discussion, see Paul C. Sondrol, “Authoritarianism in Paraguay: An Analysis of Three Contending Paradigms,” Review of Latin American Studies3, 1 (1990): 83-105.
17.
Following the Triple Alliance War, Paraguay descended into chaos and foreign domination. After 1870, the next eighty years witnessed dozens of cuartelazos (barracks revolts), coup threats, and seven successful golpes. In contrast to Francia and the López dynasty, between 1870 and the 1930s, Paraguay had thirty-two presidents, two of whom were assassinated and three overthrown. In the decade from 1901 to 1911, Paraguay had ten presidents, including four in 1911. Those claiming to be the heirs of Francisco Solano López, who were killed defending the nation, formed the Colorado Party that has ruled Paraguay uninterrupted since 1947. The Liberals, fashioned from the survivors and descendants of exiles who fled Paraguay during the father/son López dictatorship, constitute the main opposition. A legacy of their collaboration with the occupying Brazilians after the war is an anti-patriotic stigma applied by the Colorados. See Harris Gaylord Warren, Paraguay and the Triple Alliance War: The Post-War Decade, 1869-1878 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978).
18.
See Paul Lewis, Political Parties and Generations in Paraguay's Liberal Era, 1869-1940 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993).
19.
LatinAmerican Studies Association (LASA), Negotiating Democratic Corridors in Paraguay ( Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994).
20.
Paul Sondrol, “ Paraguay: Precarious Democracy,” in Latin American Politics and Development, eds. Howard Wiarda and Harvey Kline (Boulder, CO : Westview, 2000).
21.
Stroessner's growing detachment, adverse economic conditions, redemocratization in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, and, most important, a succession crisis that created divisions within the Colorado Party threatening its symbiotic axis with the military.
22.
Lambert, “A Decade of Electoral Democracy,” 384.
23.
To the preexisting Colorado “mentality” (traditional hatred of the Liberals, a contempt for formal procedures, populist in sentimentalizing poor farmers), stronismo was the personality cult of Stroessner and his revivification of and identification with the authoritarian tradition of Francia and the López dynasty. On the power structure of the Stronato, see Paul H. Lewis, Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America: Dictators, Despots, and Tyrants ( Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield, 2006), 173-81.
24.
Caudillismo is the `'union of personalism and violence for the conquest of power,” cogently states Robert Gilmore, Caudillismo and Militarism in Venezuela (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1964), 47. The classic mid-nineteenth century caudillo was a sort of political buccaneer whose power and authority was based on personalism and his ability to wield power and authority over others who recognize him as el que mandan (the one who commands). Loyalty and deference to the “man on horseback” thus transcends constitution, party, and policy. When a regional caudillo commanded the loyalty of all the other major warlords in the county, then a jefe maximo or caudillo supremo emerges. The caudillo is thus usually, although not always, a “military” man (who donned a few medals and struck whatever title or rank suited him). See also Frederick Hicks, “ Interpersonal Relationships and Caudillismo in Paraguay,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs13, 1 (1971): 89-111; Eric Wolf and James Hansen, “Caudillo Politics: A Structural Analysis,” Comparative Studies in Society and History9, 2 (1957): 168-79.
25.
This assertion is incorrect. Cuartelazo (also termed sargentada or golpe de cuartel) is the treason of a single barracks followed, classically in Oviedo's case, by the pronunciamiento, or manifesto, or grito. Unmistakably, cuartelazo, the success of which depends on a spreading revolt among other military bases, ultimately aims to overthrow the incumbent government. See the classic typology by William S. Stokes, “Violence as a Power Factor in Latin American Politics,” Western Political Quarterly5 (1952): 445-69.
26.
For extended analysis of ejecutivismo (strong presidentialism), see Paul Sondrol, “ Intellectuals, Political Culture, and the Roots of the Authoritarian Presidency in Latin America,” Governance3, 4 (1990): 416-37.
27.
The term comes from former Mexican President Plutarco Elias Calles' 1929-1934 role as the “power behind the throne.” As Calles was the líder máximo, historians refer to this system as the Maximato. See Jorge Canstañada, Perpetuating Power: How Mexican Presidents Were Chosen ( New York: Free Press, 2000).
28.
Zagorski, “Democratic Breakdown,”104-6.
29.
Ottaway, Democracy Challenged , 156; Paul Brooker, Non-Democratic Regimes: Theory, Government, and Politics (New York: St. Martin's, 2000).
30.
Among the best analysis of corruption, see Steven D. Morris, Corruption and Politics in Contemporary Mexico (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1991).
31.
See R.A.Nickson, “Corruption and Transition,” in eds. Peter Lambert and R. A. Nickson, The Transition to Democracy in Paraguay (London: Macmillan, 1997 ).
32.
Peter Lambert , “A Decade of Electoral Democracy: Continuity, Change and Crisis in Paraguay,” Bulletin of Latin American Research19 (2000): 394.
33.
Kurt Weyland , `'Neoliberal Populism in Latin America and Eastern Europe,” Comparative Politics31, 4 (1999): 381. On European, totalitarian populism, see Gino Germani, Authoritarianism, Fascism, and National Populism (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1978); on populism in Africa, see Robert H. Jackson and Carl Rosenberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press , 1982); Asian variants are examined in A. Munro-Kua, Authoritarianism and Populism in Malaysia (Basingstoke , UK: Macmillan, 1996); for Latin America, see Latin American Populism in Comparative Perspective , ed. Michael Conniff ( Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1982).
34.
Elements as basic to democratic regimes: fair elections free from intimidation or coercion and incorporating substantially the entire adult citizenry, freedom to form independent political parties, institutional autonomy and accepted rules and checks and balances, civilian control of the military, and public-sector transparency. These conditions in varying degree do not obtain in states like Paraguay and many others. On Duarte's planned continuismo beyond the end of his five-year term, ending in 2008, see Latin American Weekly Report (WR-05-44).
35.
Marciel Requelme, “ Bases para la Discusión de las Relaciones Fuerzas Armadas/Sociedad Civil en el Paraguay,” in Hacia una Cultura apra la Democracia en el Paraguay, eds. L. Bareiro, et al. (Asuncion, Paraguay: CDE, 1994), 134.
36.
Few systematic studies of Paraguayan political attitudes exist. Those that do continually suggest low levels of interest or participation in, or understanding of, politics and a sharp decline in support of democracy since 1996. See Byron Nichols , “La Cultura Polftica del Paraguay,” Revista Paraguaya de Sociologio8 ( 1971): 133-60; Ilde Silvero, “ Opinion, Interes y Participacion en la Vida Politica Paraguaya,” Estudios Paraguayos 11 (1883): 215-44; Latinobarometro (Latin Barometer) annual survey of political attitudes (disadvantage: most published results refer only to countries, not social groups or categories) in 17 Latin American nations. See Marta Lagos, “Between Crisis and Stability in Latin America,” Journal of Democracy12, 1 ( 2001): 137-45; Research on three countries, excluding Paraguay, is found in Citizen Views of Democracy in Latin America, ed. Rod Camp (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001). A good synthesis of the political culture literature is found in Peter H. Smith, Democracy in Latin America: Political Change in Comparative Perspective ( New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 285-310.
37.
Brian Turner , “The Ideological Transformation of Authoritarian Political Parties in Mexico, Nicaragua, and Paraguay,” unpublished paper, 1994, 11-12.
38.
Latin American Weekly Report (LA WR), “ Other Than Oviedo, Public Can't Imagine a Saviour,” (September 11, 2001), 429.
39.
Thomas Carothers , “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy13, 1 (2002): 5-21.
