The civil-military-relations literature has long concentrated on domestic factors in explaining the relationship between civilians and the military. This article concentrates on the effect of an external actor, the European Union (EU), on civil-military relations in Greece and Turkey. The main findings reveal that the two countries shared similar characteristics until the mid-1970s. However, their path of civil-military relations diverged considerably as soon as Greece’s EU membership prospect became tangible. While in the Greek case, “civilianization” took place, Turkey had witnessed a mere “demilitarization” of its regime. However, the article also shows how EU membership paves the way for the improvement of civil-military relations in the Turkish case.
and Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960).
2.
and Charles Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David Segal, eds., The Post Modern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000).
3.
For the positive effect of NATO membership on civil-military relations in Central and Eastern Europe, see Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds, and Andrew Cottey, eds., The Challenge of Military Reform in Postcommunist Europe: Building Professional Armed Forces (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave, 2002).
4.
The European Union was, until 1993, also known as the European Community (EC). To avoid confusion, we will use the term European Union throughout the article.
5.
Burk, “Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations,”20.
6.
For the basic theoretical distinction between “civilianization” and “demilitarization,” see Ahmet Evin, “Demilitarization and Civilianization of the Regime,” in Politics in the Third Turkish Republic, ed. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994), 23-40.
7.
Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Designs and Methods (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2003), 1.
8.
Ibid., 37.
9.
Ibid., 53.
10.
R. I. Sutton and B. M. Staw, “What a Theory Is Not,”Administrative Science Quarterly40 (1995): 378.
11.
Yin, Case Study Research, 29.
12.
Huntington, The Soldier and the State.
13.
An outline of the Copenhagen Criteria as well as the so-called Madrid Criteria for EU membership is obtainable at the Web site of the European Commission, Directorate General for Enlargement, http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/intro/criteria.htm.
14.
For the “reactive-reinforcement” argument, see Frank Schimmelfenning, Stefan Engert, and Heiko Knobel, “Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey,”Journal of Common Market Studies41, no. 3 (2003): 495-518.
15.
This has been especially apparent in the Greek case where a consensus over EU membership, let alone the policy guidelines that the country should follow post-1974, had been absent for a long time.
16.
Grabbe, “EU Conditionality,”260.
17.
and Heather Grabbe, “How Does Europeanization Affect CEE Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity,”Journal of European Public Policy8, no. 6 (December 2001): 1013-1031.
18.
The European Union introduced “Accession Partnerships” in 1998. This document lists the policy priorities that have to be implemented either in the short term (defined as one year) or medium term (defined as five years). “Accession Partnerships” can be found at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/pas/aps.htm%23npaa and “Regular Reports” at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_11_98/index.htm%23report.
19.
Burk, “Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations,”20.
20.
and Ümit Cizre, “Problems of Democratic Governance of Civil-Military Relations in Turkey and the European Union Enlargement Zone,”European Journal of Political Research43, no. 1 (January 2004): 107-125.
21.
This relationship of patronage and mutual distrust continued in the twentieth century. See George Zaharopoulos, “Politics and the Army in Post-war Greece,” in Greece under Military Rule, ed. Richard Clogg and George Yannopoulos (London: Secker and Warburg, 1972).
22.
Papakosma, The Military in Greek Politics, 65.
23.
Nikiforos P. Diamantouros, “Prospects for Democracy in Greece: 1974-1983,” in Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, ed. Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 140.
24.
Ibid., 142.
25.
Constantine P. Danopoulos, “Democratizing the Military: Lessons from Mediterranean Europe,”West European Politics14, no. 4 (October 1991): 25-41.
26.
Nikos Mouzelis cited in Susannah Verney and Theodore Couloumbis, “State-International Systems Interaction and the Greek Transition to Democracy in the Mid-1970s,” in Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe, ed. Geoffrey Pridham (Leicester, UK: Leicester University Press, 1991), 105.
27.
Postwar Greece, in need of economic development that would keep radical political forces away from politics, opted for a full integration to the international market. Diamantouros, “Regime Change and the Prospects for Democracy in Greece: 1974-1983,” in Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 144.
28.
Nikos Poulantzas, The Crisis of the Dictatorships (Thetford, UK: Lowe and Brydone Printers, 1976), 17.
29.
Danopoulos, “Democratizing the Military,”32.
30.
Zaharopoulos, “Politics and the Army in Post-war Greece,”28.
31.
Professionalization is also regarded to be in tandem with a realization by the officer corps that they are distinguished from the rest of society on grounds of their values, attitudes, and mode of thinking. See Richard A. Ball and Guy B. Peters, Modern Politics and Governments (Basingstoke, UK: Mcmillan, 2000), 267.
32.
Zaharopoulos, “Politics and the Army in Post-war Greece,”22.
33.
Danopoulos, “Democratizing the Military,”30.
34.
Pridham, “International Context,”190.
35.
Zaharopoulos, “Politics and the Army in Post-war Greece,”22.
36.
The following part has been largely based on Constantine P. Danopoulos, “Military Professionalism and Regime Legitimacy in Greece,1967-1974,”Political Science Quarterly98, no.3 (Fall 1983):485-506.
37.
The colonels organized a (rigged) plebiscite for the approval of the constitution that approved its drafts by 91.87 percent. Specific articles of the constitution curbed the powers of the monarch and provided for the eventual restoration of multiparty democracy albeit under “state control.” See Stephen G. Xydis, “Coups and Countercoups in Greece, 1967-1973,”Political Science Quarterly89, no. 3 (Autumn 1974): 507-538.
38.
Diamantouros, “Prospects for Democracy in Greece,”151.
39.
Halil İnalcΙk, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973), 65-69.
40.
Both the Young Ottomans and Young Turks movements were composed of military and civil-bureaucratic elites, whose main aim was to save the (Ottoman) state from eventual disintegration. Furthermore, their composition, strategies, and aims are similar to the Military League in Greece.
Metin Heper, “The ‘Strong State’ and Democracy: Turkey in Comparative and Historical Perspective,” in Democracy and Modernity, ed. S. N. Eisenstadt (Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill, 1992), 142-169.
43.
For a typology of military regimes, see Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldier in Politics: Military Coups and Governments (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1977).
44.
Political terror around this period was organized along ideological, sectarian, and ethnic lines. Between 1975 and 1980, more than five thousand people died and three times as many were wounded.
45.
William Hale, Turkish Politics and Military (London: Routledge, 1994), 256.
46.
These parties were the Nationalist Democracy Party, the Populist Party (whose leaders were hand-picked by the military), and the Motherland Party of Turgut Özal.
47.
Ümit Cizre Sakallioğlu, “The Military and Politics: A Turkish Dilemma,” in Armed Forces in the Middle East: Politics and Strategy, ed. Barry Rubin and Thomas A. Keaney (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 195.
48.
Gencer Özcan and Ofra Bengio, “The Decade of the Military in Turkey: The Case of the Alignment with Israel in the 1990s,”International Journal of Turkish Studies7, no. 1-2 (Spring 2001): 93.
49.
The main points of concern for the military were the amount of capital owned by Islamic companies, the religious education given in the Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools, and Koran Courses.
50.
On January 16, 1998, the European Court of Human Rights also decided in favor of the closure of the party by stating that the Welfare Party supported political aims that were inconsistent with the rules of democracy.
51.
and Kevin Featherstone, “The Challenge of Liberalization: Parties and the State in Greece after the 1993 Elections,”Democratization1, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 280-294.
52.
Jose M. Magone, “Party Factionalism in New Small Southern European Democracies: Some Comparative Findings from the Portuguese and Greek Experiences (1974-82),”Democratization2, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 90-101.
53.
Vassilis Fouskas, “The Muffled Voice of the New PASOK: Reflections on Neo-revisionist Socialism in Greece,”South European Society and Politics3, no. 1 (Summer 1998): 130-141.
54.
Diamantouros, “Prospects for Democracy in Greece,”196.
55.
Vicky Randall and Lars Svåsand, “Introduction: The Contribution of Parties to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation,”Democratization9, no. 3 (Autumn 2002): 1-10.
56.
Kosta Messas, “Greece,” in The Political Role of the Military, ed. Constantine P. Danopoulos and Cynthia Watson (London: Greenwood, 1996), 166.
57.
and Vassilios Tsingos, “Underwriting Democracy: The European Community and Greece,” in The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas, ed. Laurence Whitehead (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1996), 325.
58.
Ever since 1948 the Communist Party (KKE) was banned from any political activity.
59.
Diamantouros cited in Kevin Featherstone, “Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Greece,” in Securing Democracy: Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe, ed. Geoffrey Pridham (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), 184.
60.
Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 133.
61.
Andreas Schedler, “Taking Uncertainty Seriously: The Blurred Boundaries of Democratic Transition and Consolidation,”Democratization8, no. 4 (2001): 12.
62.
Diamantouros, “The Political System in Postauthoritarian Greece,”191.
63.
Messas, “Greece,”162.
64.
Tsingos, “Underwriting Democracy,”331.
65.
Ibid., 330.
66.
Nikiforos P. Diamantouros, “Transition to and Consolidation of Democratic Politics in Greece, 1974-1983: A Tentative Assessment,”West European Politics7, no. 2 (April 1984): 50-71.
67.
Civilian rule was last threatened by an unsuccessful military coup in February 1975.
68.
Verney and Couloumbis, “State-International Systems,”118.
69.
Pridham, “International Context,”190.
70.
Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 132.
71.
Verney and Couloumbis, “State-International Systems,”109.
72.
Tsingos, “Underwriting Democracy,”318. By 1973, prominent Greek politicians, such as Karamanlis, as well as figures like the former governor of the Bank of Greece Zolotas, were publicly calling for a restoration of democracy to allow for EU membership.
73.
However, there is an argument claiming that holding swift elections gave no time to his political opponents to organize and present a credible alternative. See Diamantouros, “The Political System in Postauthoritarian Greece.”
74.
Susannah Verney, “To Be or Not to Be within the European Community: The Party Debate and Democratic Consolidation in Greece,” in Securing Democracy: Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe, ed. Geoffrey Pridham (London: Routledge, 1990), 207.
75.
Susannah Verney, “Greece and the European Community,” in Political Change in Greece: Before and after the Colonels, ed. Kevin Featherstone and Dimitrios K. Katsoulias (London:CroomHelm,1987), 259.
76.
Verney, “To Be or Not to Be,”208.
77.
Felipe Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians and Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 33.
78.
Pridham, “International Context,”171.
79.
Initial opposition to EU membership from the socialist PASOK and the Communist Party was very strong. Gradually, however, both parties accepted the new rules of the game. See Susannah Verney, “To Be or Not to Be.”
80.
It is worth bearing in mind, however, that a universally applicable definition of democratic consolidation does not exist and that distinguishing between the transition and the consolidation phases is a formidable task. See Schedler, “Taking Uncertainty Seriously,”7.
81.
Tsingos, “Underwriting Democracy,”341.
82.
Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians and Democracies, 34.
83.
Ümit Cizre Sakallioğlu, “The Anatomy of Turkish Military’s Political Autonomy,”Comparative Politics29, no. 2 (1997): 157-158.
84.
Tanel Demirel, “The Turkish Military’s Decision to Intervene: 12 September 1980,”Armed Forces & Society29, no. 2 (Winter 2003): 253.
85.
Metin Heper and Aylin Güney, “The Military and the Consolidation of Democracy: The Recent Turkish Experience,”Armed Forces & Society26, no. 4 (Summer 2000): 642.
86.
To put it differently, according to the typology of military regimes drawn by Norlindger(see note 43), the Turkish military fluctuated between moderator (veto) regimes, where the military exercises a veto power over the government (by staging a “displacement coup”) to preserve the status quo and balance of power, and the guardian regime, where the military takes over political power, without the intention of exercising it indefinitely, to displace “corrupt” politicians. The ruler type of military regime, which is more determined to exercise a greater degree of political control for an extended period and with the ultimate aim of changing significant aspects of the sociopolitical and economic system, could not find much resonance among the Turkish military cadres.
87.
One exception could be the period of 1987 to 1993, when military authority was seriously challenged by Prime Minister Özal.
88.
Commission of the European Communities, 1998 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession (Brussels: Author, November 1998), 14; also available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_11_98/pdf/en/turkey_en.pdf.
89.
Ali Resul Usul, “International Dimension of Democratization? The Influence of the European Union on the Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey 1987-2002” (Unpublished Ph.D. diss., Bilkent University, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, May 2003), iii.
90.
FüsunTürkmen,“TheMilitaryEstablishmentin Turkey: A Historical Overview of Its Socio-political Role” (Unpublished paper presented at the 2001 IUS Conference), 29.
91.
See http://www.bianet.org/2004/09/01_eng/news40974.htm.
