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Abstract

This paper analyzes the implementation of Sembrando Vida and Producción para el Bienestar, the principal rural programs of the López Obrador administration, paying particular attention to bypassing farmer organizations upon providing agricultural subsides. The main argument of this paper is that such elimination of intermediaries in providing subsidies has contributed to reducing clientelism by functionaries and farmer organizations. However, in 2019 both programs were characterized by deficiencies. Sembrando Vida required farmers to comply with requirements that were not appropriate considering their agricultural systems; excluded farmers with less than 2.5 hectares; and lacked marketing strategies. Meanwhile, Producción para el Bienestar involved many implementation problems and failed to provide funding on time.

Este trabajo analiza la implementación de Sembrando Vida y Producción para el Bienestar, los principales programas rurales del gobierno de López Obrador, prestando especial atención a la exclusión de las organizaciones campesinas en la entrega de subsidios agrícolas. El argumento central es que la eliminación de intermediarios en la distribución de los subsidios ha contribuido a reducir el clientelismo tanto por parte de los funcionarios como de las organizaciones campesinas. Sin embargo, en 2019 ambos programas presentaron deficiencias. Sembrando Vida exigía a los campesinos cumplir con requisitos poco adecuados para sus sistemas agrícolas, excluía a quienes tenían menos de 2.5 hectáreas y carecía de estrategias de comercialización. Por su parte, Producción para el Bienestar enfrentó numerosos problemas de implementación y no entregó los recursos a tiempo.

Keywords

Coffee farmer organizations Clientelism intermediaries

From the second half of the 20^th century until recent years, the Mexican state implemented multiple programs to support small coffee farmers in increasing their production. Nevertheless, despite the continuity of such programs, farmers, scholars, and development agencies strongly criticized them for the very low subsidies they provided; for having a flawed list of beneficiaries; for failing to consistently provide technical assistance and supervision; and for lacking marketing strategies (Hernández, 1992c; Renard, 1999; Robles Berlanga, 2011). Coffee programs in particular were also highly criticized because subsidies were distributed through farmer organizations through clientelistic mechanisms (Harvey, 1992; Henderson, 2020; Olvera, 1991).¹

In late 2018, upon taking office President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) stated that the coffee sector had been “abandoned” and blamed corrupt functionaries and leaders of farmer organizations for misuse of rural subsidies (AMLO, 2019a). He promised that his administration—which he termed the Cuarta Transformación (Fourth Transformation [4T])—would eliminate corruption and prioritize the well-being of the poorest (GOB, 2019). To accomplish these objectives, his administration launched two programs focused on small-scale farmers: Sembrando Vida (Sowing Life) under the Secretaría de Bienestar (Ministry of Well-being [BIENESTAR]) and Producción para el Bienestar (Production for Well-being) under the Secretaría de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development [SADER]; DOF, 2019a, 2019b). Furthermore, he emphasized that rather than channeling funds through organizations as had occurred in the past, his administration would provide subsidies to farmers directly, without intermediaries (AMLO, 2019a).

In addition to these programs and the elimination of intermediaries, AMLO announced that the Coordinación General de Programas para el Desarrollo (General Coordination of Development Programmes [CGPD]), under the Presidential Office, would be responsible for facilitating implementation of social programs, including Sembrando Vida and Producción para el Bienestar, and for carrying out the Censo del Bienestar (Well-being Census) which would be used to register the beneficiaries of his administration’s social programs (DOF, 2019e; GOB, n.d.).

This paper analyzes the implementation of Sembrando Vida and Producción para el Bienestar in 2019, focusing on the process of eliminating intermediaries. The aim of the paper is to understand the implications of AMLO’s rural policies on the livelihoods of small farmers and the (clientelistic) relationship between the state and farmer organizations. This analysis is based on data from 74 semi-structured interviews carried out from October 2018 to January 2020. Interviewees included: 1) beneficiaries of Sembrando Vida and Producción para el Bienestar (32 interviewees); 2) federal and local-level staff of BIENESTAR, SADER, and the CGPD (23 interviewees); 3) representatives of farmer organizations (15 interviewees); and 4) researchers specialized in coffee and Mexican rural policy (4 interviewees). Most data were obtained in Soconusco, a region of the state of Chiapas which produces high coffee yields, but also has a high level of poverty (CONEVAL, 2020c; Oviedo-Rodríguez et al., 2023; SADER, 2020a). Data were also obtained in Mexico City where the federal offices of BIENESTAR, SADER, and the CGPD are located and where some coffee umbrella organizations operate. Additional data were obtained in Xalapa, Veracruz, during a rally of coffee organizations. All data were examined using content analysis and Atlas.ti.²

This paper is structured as follows: Section two addresses the role of farmer organizations in the 20^th century, illustrating how the Confederación Nacional Campesina (National Peasant Confederation [CNC]) became one of Mexico’s largest clientelistic organizations subordinated to the authoritarian Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party [PRI]). It also discusses opposition by many farmer organizations to clientelism in the 1970s and 1980s, and their unification to push for economic and political autonomy. Section three provides additional information regarding the principal measures introduced by the AMLO administration in 2019 to improve the livelihoods of farmers—namely Sembrando Vida, Producción para el Bienestar, the elimination of intermediaries, and the role of the CGPD in supporting implementation of social programs. Section four describes the differences in operation between Sembrando Vida and Producción para el Bienestar during 2019, as well as their difference with respect to eliminating intermediaries, and the role of the CGPD in each program. The final section discusses the effects of AMLO’s rural programs and the elimination of intermediaries on the relationships among the state, small-scale farmers, and farmer organizations.

Clientelistic Organizations and the Response of Autonomous Organizations

Clientelism has occurred in rural Mexico for almost a century (Palmer-Rubin, 2019; Oviedo-Rodríguez, 2023). In the 1930s, President Lázaro Cárdenas implemented the largest land reform in Mexican history (INEHRM, 2020) and organized ejido members into the CNC with the purpose of representing their demands vis-à-vis the state (Garay et al., 2020; Sánchez Juárez, 2015). For many decades, the state channeled most agricultural subsidies through the CNC; however, this organization became a platform for clientelistic practices with the rural sector. Public functionaries allowed CNC leaders to make discretionary use of public funding as long as the organization ensured that their farmer members voted for the PRI and participated in political rallies, and contained farmers’ protests (Audelo Cruz, 2005; de Grammont and Mackinlay, 2006; de Grammont et al., 2009; Fox and Gordillo, 1989; Henderson, 2020; Hernández, 1992b).

These clientelistic practices began to be challenged during the 1970s and 1980s when new farmer organizations arose to struggle for political autonomy from the state (Oviedo-Rodríguez, 2023). These included the Coordinación Nacional del Plan de Ayala (National Coordination of the Ayala Plan [CNPA]), the Unión Nacional de Organizaciones Regionales Campesinas Autónomas (National Union of Autonomous Regional Peasant Organizations [UNORCA]), the Unión General Obrero Campesino Popular (General Popular Worker and Peasant Union [UGOCP]), and the Central Independiente de Obreros Agrícolas y Campesinos (Independent Union of Agricultural Workers and Peasants [CIOAC]). These organizations emerged as an outcome of farmers’ discontent with the clientelistic relations between state functionaries and the CNC, as well as unfulfilled promises of land redistribution in some regions, lack of state support for small-scale farmers, and inefficient bureaucratic programs. In contrast to the CNC, which centralized power in the hands of a few leaders, these organizations aimed to collaborate with each other in a horizontal democratic manner (de Grammont and Mackinlay, 2006; de Grammont et al., 2009; Fox and Gordillo, 1989; García, 1991).

Parallel to the establishment of these autonomous farmer organizations, in the 1970s and 1980s many organizations were created to promote coffee production. In Chiapas, these included the Unión de Uniones Ejidales y Grupos Campesinos Solidarios de Chiapas (Union of Unions of Ejido and Peasant Solidarity Groups of Chiapas)—which came to represent a large proportion of coffee farmers in Chiapas but suffered multiple ruptures and sub-divisions—the Unión de Ejidos y Comunidades Cafeticultores Beneficio Majomut (Majomut Union of Ejidos and Coffee Communities Processer), and the Indígenas de la Sierra Madre de Motozintla (Indigenous Peoples of the Sierra Madre of Motozintla [ISMAM]); in Veracruz the Unión de Productores de Café de Veracruz (Union of Coffee Producers of Veracruz [UPCV]); in Oaxaca the Unión de Comunidades Indígenas de la Región del Istmo (Union of Indigenous Communities of the Isthmus Region [UCIRI]), and the Coordinadora Estatal de Productores de Café de Oaxaca (State Coordinator of Coffee Producers of Oaxaca [CEPCO]); and in Puebla the Tosepan Titataniske (United, We Shall Overcome; Martinez-Torres, 2003; Sánchez Juárez, 2015; Venegas Sandoval et al., 2020).

Like the autonomous farmer organizations mentioned above, coffee organizations were quite critical of the clientelistic practices of the CNC and the state, including those of the Instituto Mexicano del Café (Mexican Coffee Institute [INMECAFE])—the public agency that from 1958 to 1989 oversaw coffee collection and processing (Cámara de Diputados and CEDRSSA, 2018). These organizations were particularly dissatisfied with the low prices that INMECAFE paid for coffee, as well as its deceitful methods of weighing it, delays in providing plants and fertilizers, highly bureaucratic processes, and inadequate infrastructure such as roads and electricity in rural communities (Celis, 1991; Hernández, 1992b). For many years, these organizations pressured INMECAFE to improve coffee policies to favor smaller farmers, albeit unsuccessfully.

Not until the late 1980s—when INMECAFE was dismantled and the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) that regulated the price of coffee was suspended (Renard, 1992; Renard and Ortega Breña, 2010)—did coffee farmer organizations begin to develop a variety of initiatives to increase pressure on the state and achieve autonomy from the “conventional market” and its very low prices (Sánchez Juárez, 2015). One such initiative was to improve the quality of cultivation and processing, and to establish collection and processing centers to access higher-paying markets, such as the organic and fair-trade markets (Hernández Navarro and Celis Callejas, 1992; Moguel, 1991, 1992; Renard and Pérez-Grovas, 2007). Another initiative was the unification of the existing coffee farmer organizations into the Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones Cafetaleras (National Coordinator of Coffee Organizations [CNOC]), which became the largest coffee farmer organization in Mexico and served as their principal mediator with the Ministry of Agriculture in negotiating policies, and their principal representative in international meetings (Celis Callejas, 2015, 2019; CNOC, 2019b, 2019e; Hernández, 1992a; Paré, 1991).

Despite the unification among autonomous farmer organizations and coffee farmer organizations, and their efforts to eliminate subordination to the state, clientelism continued (Celis Callejas, 2008; Quintana, 2008; Ramírez Cuellar, 2008; Ramirez Cuevas, n.d.; Ramos, 2008). Although the CNC’s power declined when the PRI lost the 2000 elections, the organization continued to manage subsidies due to its extensive territorial coverage and the permanence of PRI functionaries in state and municipal governments (de Grammont et al., 2009; Zeledón Zeledón, n.d.). Aside from the CNC, throughout the 20^th century other clientelistic organizations emerged, including Antorcha Campesina (Peasant Torch), Central Campesina Cardenista (Cardenist Peasant Union [CCC]), Central Campesina Independiente (Independent Peasant Union), and the Confederación Agrarista Mexicana (Mexican Agrarian Confederation; Bartra, 2020; Palmer-Rubin, 2019). Furthermore, the political independence proclaimed by some autonomous organizations such as CNPA, UGOCP and CIOAC became contested, and in contrast to their original principles, they also began to adopt clientelistic practices upon distributing subsidies to farmers (Bartra, 2020; Ramirez Cuevas, n.d.; Villafuerte Torrez, 2013). Thus, when AMLO took office in 2018, the agricultural sector was characterized by a diversity of organizations with access to public subsidies (Oviedo-Rodríguez et al., 2025).

The Amlo Administration: A Change in Direction

From the establishment of INMECAFE in 1958 until recent times, the state implemented many programs to promote small-scale coffee production by providing farmers with technical assistance, plants, fertilizer, and irrigation equipment to be able to apply pesticides to combat coffee leaf rust. However, farmers and researchers criticized the operation of state programs due to their inefficiency and clientelism between certain farmer organizations and public functionaries (Hernández, 1992c; Renard, 1999; Robles Berlanga; Senado, 2020). Upon taking office in 2018, AMLO (2019a) recognized that the coffee sector, and the agricultural sector as a whole, had been abandoned, and blamed this on “shameless” functionaries who corruptly managed subsidies, as well as farmer organizations that delivered subsidies with “moche” or “piquete de ojo.”³

AMLO assured that his administration would be different, that he would eliminate corruption, and that small-scale farmers would have support like never before (AMLO, 2019a). To accomplish these objectives, AMLO launched two programs that, unlike previous programs, provide a subsidy directly to farmers, without intermediaries: Sembrando Vida operated by BIENESTAR, and Producción para el Bienestar, operated by SADER. While both programs prioritize small-scale production, they differ significantly with respect to their operation, budget, and connection with previous coffee programs.

Sembrando Vida focuses on reforestation and provides $5,000 pesos (~$260 dollars) per month to farmers who cultivate any crop and who have 2.5 to 20 hectares to perform the following agroecology practices: 1) an agroforestry system, combining a crop with timber and fruit trees; and 2) Milpa Intercalada con Árboles Frutales (Milpa Interspersed with Fruit Trees [MIAF]; DOF, 2019a; GOB, 2019). Along with these practices, this program encourages farmers to produce organic fertilizer, save seeds, and reintroduce so-called traditional varieties. Furthermore, it aims to promote collaboration and solidarity among farmers through Comunidades de Aprendizaje Campesino (Peasant Learning Communities [CAC]) of approximately 25 farmers who organize agricultural and environmental tasks. In 2019, this program had a budget of $15,000 million pesos (~$778 million dollars; CONEVAL, 2020b; DOF, 2018) and had no connection to previous coffee programs.

Meanwhile, Producción para el Bienestar focuses on plant production. During the first few months of the program, support was limited to maize, beans, wheat, and rice farmers (DOF, 2019b), although sugarcane and coffee farmers were incorporated later, in May 2019 (DOF, 2019d). While the program allows participation by any farmer with less than 20 hectares, it provides a much lower subsidy than that of Sembrando Vida: $5,000 pesos per year (~$260 dollars; DOF, 2019b).⁴ In contrast to Sembrando Vida which promotes organic production and includes a strategy to promote collective production, Producción para el Bienestar initially promoted only “sustainable production” and lacked a particular strategy to foster social cohesion.⁵ In 2019 it received a budget of $9,000 million pesos (~$467 million dollars; CONEVAL, 2020a; DOF, 2018), and had a significant connection to previous coffee programs as all subsidies for coffee farmers were formerly managed by the Ministry of Agriculture.

Furthermore, to ensure proper implementation of AMLO’s social policies, the administration appointed the CGPD to be responsible for coordinating the implementation of social programs, including Sembrando Vida and Producción para el Bienestar (DOF, 2019e). In 2019, it oversaw the establishment of Centros Integradores del Desarrollo (Integrative Development Centres) in urban and rural areas in which CGPD functionaries, known as servidores de la nación (servants of the nation), assisted potential beneficiaries of social programs with their applications and provided beneficiaries with their bank cards to receive their subsidy (DOF, 2019c; STyPS, 2020). Additionally, in order to obtain trustworthy data regarding recipients of subsidies, in 2019, the CGPD was in charge of carrying out the Censo del Bienestar involving: identification of potential beneficiaries of AMLO’s social programs; and verification of the list of program beneficiaries during the previous administration (GOB, n.d.).⁶

Implementation of Sembrando Vida and Producción Para El Bienestar During the First Year of the Amlo Administration

During 2019, the AMLO administration extensively promoted Sembrando Vida. AMLO and the BIENESTAR Minister at the time, María Luisa Albores González, introduced this program in one of AMLO’s daily press talks, La Mañanera (Early Morning; AMLO, 2019b), and promoted it at public rallies held throughout the country, as well as on social media. During fieldwork in Soconusco, local-level BIENESTAR staff were continually seen holding meetings with farmers to present the program, helping them to establish organic coffee nurseries, selecting fruit and timber trees to be introduced in the future,⁷ and promoting cohesion among farmers. In Soconusco, many signs referring to Sembrando Vida were placed in rural communities.

Throughout 2019, the AMLO administration repeatedly played up the benefits of this program. Federal-level BIENESTAR staff interviewed emphasized that, unlike previous programs that focused either on food security or on increasing farmers’ income, Sembrando Vida’s MIAF contributed to improving food security and generating both short and long-term income. The staff celebrated the fact that the program was supporting farmers to produce organically, thus reducing their dependence on inputs from the market; that it was building social cohesion among farmers who had previously been divided; that its operation was based on close interaction between farmers and technical advisors; and that it provided substantial and timely payment. In general, federal-level staff referred to Sembrando Vida as a program “without precedents.”

BIENESTAR staff in Soconusco furthermore highlighted that unlike neoliberal administrations that had failed to support rural areas, the AMLO administration was approaching those who have the least, and that staff were recovering the trust that small farmers had lost in public programs. Soconusco staff also boasted that unlike previous administrations in which public functionaries and farmer organizations had “sucked up” public subsidies, Sembrando Vida was ending corruption by depositing subsidies directly to farmers and that through the CACs it was transferring the “power” of clientelistic organizations to small farmers. Finally, they assured that this was one of the “best” programs of its kind.

During 2019, coffee farmers in Soconusco were also quite enthusiastic about Sembrando Vida. Most if not all farmers were pleased with the subsidy they were receiving, which was more than what small farmers had ever received from a public program. Some farmers interviewed highlighted that the $5,000 pesos (~$260 dollars) they received monthly was a strong incentive to either resume activities they had left aside due to lack of funds, or to replace their old coffee plants. Some farmers indicated that the subsidy motivated them to improve the quality of their coffee; while others claimed that since receiving the subsidy they had stopped working for other farmers as they preferred to invest their time in their own plots. Farmers referred to Sembrando Vida as “real support,” a “good program that truly supports small farmers,” and a “program that provides a lot of help.” One farmer’s testimony clearly expresses this view:

The coffee sector has been abandoned for many years; there was no funding; the price of coffee was very low. There was no way to move forward. Due to the lack of funds, I reduced the amount of land I tended and let the weeds grow. Now with AMLO, the support is clear, and we’re resuming our activities. AMLO is taking us out of the hole where we were (Beneficiary of Sembrando Vida, interview, Unión Juárez, Chiapas, September 11, 2019).

Many farmers interviewed also celebrated the fact that the administration no longer provided the subsidy through intermediaries and that they now receive the full amount of their subsidies. As one farmer noted:

I was part of an organization where it was clear that the leader of the organization took advantage of farmers, that he used his position to his favor. If a subsidy was $5,000 pesos [~USD 260], the leader only gave us $2,000 pesos [~USD 104]. The organization had a warehouse with a drying machine, toaster, and mill, but the leader was the only one who used it; we had to look for our own way to process and sell our coffee. It’s better the way it is now, it’s more direct: government to farmer (Beneficiary of Sembrando Vida, interview, El Edén, Chiapas, June 27, 2019).

Regarding the elimination of intermediaries, some farmers informed that since the AMLO administration introduced this policy, their (clientelistic) organization disintegrated and farmers stopped having contact with the leaders. Others stated that unlike the previous farmer organizations to which they belonged, the CACs provided an opportunity to seek better markets. Some mentioned that presenting their documents and picking up the bank cards was bureaucratic, but that they preferred to do this themselves rather than leaving it to a leader they did not trust. Meanwhile, others were pleased to be able to go to the BIENESTAR office and sign their documents themselves, rather than entrusting the task to someone else.

Farmers of Soconusco seemed generally pleased with the technical assistance of Sembrando Vida. They expressed enthusiasm about participating in meetings with staff and other farmers, and were pleased to be receiving continual staff attention and that farmers were being motivated to collaborate with each other through the CACs. However, in contrast to BIENESTAR staff who portrayed Sembrando Vida as a model program, some farmers manifested concerns. For example, some said that they wished that the staff would incorporate more local knowledge, rather than prioritizing the expertise of technical staff.

Regarding the MIAF, farmers said that they embraced the idea of producing in a more sustainable manner. However, they indicated that they lacked the space to introduce the timber and fruit trees requested by the program; that they had no idea how to tend the trees that would be introduced; that they were afraid that these trees would not be suitable for their area (as had happened with state programs); and that they preferred not to have to intersperse timber and fruit trees with coffee as this would be more labor-intensive. Some farmers mentioned that reforestation, which is one of the pillars of the program, was not their priority. Others preferred not to have to produce organic coffee as they did not participate in this market. Finally, some farmers were reluctant to introduce the traditional coffee varieties proposed by the program due to their low level of resistance to rust.

Additional concerns indicated by farmers in 2019 included the fact that Sembrando Vida staff demanded rapid results, and thus staff and farmers were unable to properly attend to some agricultural tasks. For example, farmers indicated that due to time limits, the soil of a nursery was not disinfected, and many plants were contaminated with fungus. Some farmers indicated that those with less than 2.5 hectares were not permitted to join the program.⁸ Finally, participants also pointed out that the program did not provide any marketing strategies that year.

Producción Para El Bienestar

In contrast to BIENESTAR, which since the beginning of the AMLO administration clearly stated that it would support coffee farmers through Sembrando Vida, SADER took almost half a year to establish a defined strategy to support the coffee sector. While SADER announced Producción para el Bienestar in January 2019, this program only considered production of maize, beans, wheat, and rice (DOF, 2019b). Meanwhile, coffee fell under the Subcomponente Sustentabilidad y Bienestar para Pequeños Productores de Café (Subcomponent for Sustainability and Well-being for Small Coffee Producers [SUBICAFE]), which was also established by the AMLO administration but functioned in a similar manner to programs of previous administrations, providing plants and fertilizer to farmers through farmer organizations (DOF, 2017; SADER, 2019b).⁹ Not until May 15, 2019 did SADER announce that SUBICAFE would be eliminated and that the beneficiaries would be incorporated into Producción para el Bienestar (DOF, 2019d).

The elimination of SUBICAFE and the transfer of its beneficiaries to Producción para el Bienestar meant that coffee farmers would now be part of SADER’s main program. However, this change generated great tension among coffee farmer organizations, federal and local-level SADER staff, and CGPD staff. The change from SUBICAFE to Producción para el Bienestar also generated many operational difficulties. Both the tension among actors and the operational difficulties resulted from two interconnected phenomena: 1) the elimination of intermediaries and 2) purging the list of beneficiaries as a result of the Censo del Bienestar. The following section first illustrates the conflicts that emerged from the elimination of intermediaries and then further discusses the process of purging the list of beneficiaries.

The Elimination of Intermediaries

During SUBICAFE’s 2019 registration period (March 8 to April 8; SADER, 2019b), farmer organizations had signed up 150,000 farmers for the program through a total of 450 applications, and 100,000 farmers had applied on an individual basis. When SUBICAFE was eliminated and the coffee sector incorporated into Producción para el Bienestar, these applications were still on file. While AMLO had stated since the beginning of his administration that subsidies would be transferred directly to farmers, federal-level SADER staff contradicted each other with respect to the method by which subsidies would be provided to farmers whose SUBICAFE applications had been filed by farmer organizations; some SADER directors indicated that applications that had been filed by organizations would continue being processed, while others said they would not (CNOC, 2019a, 2019f). Not until late May and early June 2019 did SADER at the federal level emphatically state that all subsidies would be provided directly to farmers and that all applications would be considered on an individual basis (CNOC, 2019c, 2019d).

When SADER declared that subsidies would be delivered without intermediaries, the following farmer organizations¹⁰—which for decades had formulated agricultural policies along with SADER—strongly manifested their opposition: CNOC, which had been created in the late 1980s as an umbrella organization for multiple coffee organizations throughout Mexico; the Coalición Nacional de Organizaciones de Productores de Café (National Coalition of Organizations of Coffee Producers [CONAPROCAFE]), which was created following the 2012–2013 coffee leaf rust crisis by some of the autonomous farmer organizations that had formed in the 1970s and 1980s, including UNORCA, UGOCP, CIOAC, CNPA, and the CCC (Cafés de México, 2019); the Consejo Regional del Café de Coatepec (Regional Coffee Council of Coatepec), which has promoted organic coffee production in Veracruz; and the Unión Nacional de Productores de Café (National Union of Coffee Producers [UNPC]), which is a member of the CNC, one of the most clientelistic organizations in the history of rural subsidies.

Interviewed representatives of these organizations opposed the elimination of intermediaries for a variety of reasons. First, representatives of coffee organizations assured that not all organizations have misused subsidies—that not all farmer organizations are the same. As one CNOC member argued:

During the previous administration, the Ministry of Agriculture asked organizations what their ‘needs’ were and assigned funding without informing how much it spent, nor how funding was spent. A lot of discretion was used to favor relations between representatives of farmer organizations and the state. Yes, the sector was flawed, and rampant corruption was carried out by the Ministry and organizations, but not all organizations are the same (CNOC member, interview, Mexico City, January 21, 2019).

A second argument of organizations rejecting the elimination of intermediaries was that farmer organizations play an important role in improving small farmers’ livelihoods. Representatives of farmer organizations stated that since INMECAFE was established, they have pressured the state for policies to favor small farmers, including a larger budget and support to compensate for low coffee prices and crop diseases. Representatives of coffee farmer organizations also pointed out that for many decades they had provided farmers with plants, fertilizer, and technical assistance to increase production. They stressed that even without proper state support they had been able to channel small farmers’ harvests into the organic and fair-trade markets. They assured that bypassing organizations represented a setback for farmers and that the elimination of intermediaries would cause organizations to disintegrate.

Furthermore, these representatives stated that in contrast to previous coffee programs that contributed to increasing yields, Producción para el Bienestar was an “assistentialist” program that trained farmers to “extend their arm to receive cash,” implying that this program was not properly formulated to increase production. They stressed that now that farmers directly received their subsidies, nobody was overseeing whether farmers really invested their subsidies in their land or used it to cover daily expenses or even to purchase alcohol.¹¹

Upon voicing these concerns through direct meetings with SADER, public protests and social media, some representatives of coffee farmer organizations hoped the state would revoke the changes implemented by the AMLO administration, stating that they believed in AMLO’s “good intentions,” and assuring that he was simply being advised by the “wrong people.” However, federal-level SADER staff maintained a firm position to bypass organizations, as one federal-level SADER department head stated:

We’re delivering subsidies directly and we’re not contemplating participation of organizations at this moment. If an organization wants to provide farmers with plants, they must sell the inputs as if they were any other business. We’re not asking farmers to get the plants from a particular organization. These are presidential instructions and there’s no deal, so goodbye (Federal-level SADER staff, interview, Mexico City, December 12, 2019).

Surprisingly, this position strongly contrasted with that of SADER staff in Soconusco who defended their history of collaboration with coffee farmer organizations, as one local department head pointed out:

This administration does not want to have anything to do with organizations. Many leaders of farmer organizations have complained to us. Yes, there are many bandit organizations, but the 40 organizations that are here have done a good job. Organizations took inputs for combatting coffee leaf rust and fertilizer to the communities and had the ‘good will’ to organize farmers and deliver the inputs as close as possible to farmers’ communities. Organizations did this work and we verified that the inputs were delivered properly; if a farmer had any complaints, we pressured the organizations and made arrangements so that the farmers were satisfied (Local-level SADER staff, interview, Tapachula, November 12, 2019).

Additionally, SADER staff of Soconusco interviewed, criticized the elimination of intermediaries, questioning from whom and under what conditions farmers would now receive their plants and fertilizer, as the program would only provide subsidies, which the farmers would have to use to purchase these supplies. They warned that some farmers lived far from where agricultural supplies are sold and doubted that merchants would be willing to deliver them to individual farmers, and if they did, this would greatly elevate prices. They also questioned whether farmers who live in isolated communities would be able to travel to the closest SADER office to apply individually for the program given. Like coffee farmer organizations, SADER staff in Soconusco were also concerned that since neither state staff nor organizations would supervise use of subsidies, farmers would not invest their subsidy in coffee but rather use it for non-agricultural purposes.¹²

Purging The List of Beneficiaries

As mentioned above, by the time the coffee sector was transferred from SUBICAFE to Producción para el Bienestar, farmer organizations had signed up 150,000 farmers for SUBICAFE that year through 450 applications, and 100,000 farmers had applied on an individual basis. As a whole, these applications were submitted using farmers’ registration numbers from the Padrón Nacional Cafetalero (National Coffee Farmer List)—which had been compiled by previous administrations. Since the AMLO administration did not accept the veracity of the Padrón Nacional Cafetalero compiled by farmer organizations and former functionaries, SADER at the federal level demanded that farmers re-apply on an individual basis meeting new requirements, namely land ownership and georeferencing of their plots.

Some interviewees (such as CNOC and farmer organizations in Soconusco) in theory accepted verification of SUBICAFE’s list of beneficiaries, however, they had observed that the new requirements, which were imprecise, caused many operational difficulties. First, regarding proof of land ownership, interviewees indicated that SADER did not specify which particular document they required nor how the title of ownership could be obtained. Regarding georeferencing, they stated that little information had been provided regarding how to carry this out and that little consideration had been given to the fact that many farmers are computer illiterate.¹³

Conflicts regarding purging lists of beneficiaries also emerged with respect to the role of the CGPD, which along with SADER oversaw verification of farmers’ documents. CGPD staff interviewed said they were working in collaboration with SADER to verify the list of beneficiaries without blaming previous administrations. However, federal and local-level SADER staff had a different opinion. Federal-level SADER staff stressed that as the CGPD was strongly backed by AMLO, the servidores de la nación misused their power, and “mistreated” many people, including members of farmer organizations. Federal SADER staff also indicated that they had received reports from local-level staff indicating that the servidores—along with municipal presidents, state congress members, local-level SADER staff of different regions, and farmer organizations—had tried to incorporate their own beneficiaries into the updated list. SADER staff acknowledged that a variety of actors “got their hands into” the updated list of beneficiaries, but that they had no option other than to accept this list as they had no way of determining who had modified the list.

SADER staff of Soconusco also criticized the CGPD, pointing out its lack of experience with agriculture. However, in contrast to federal-level SADER staff, Soconusco staff defended the list of beneficiaries they had compiled during previous administrations. One SADER department head in Soconusco said:

We had a well-defined list of beneficiaries, but now the servidores come and include farmers who were never on our list. I don’t agree with that. We had the area well controlled, with more than 25,000 farmers on the list. The servidores say we’re the corrupt ones, but we’re the ones who know things. It’s not easy to be a coffee technical advisor. You need to know how rugged the land is; you need to know the farmers and the leaders of organizations. We have the capacity and over 40 years of experience, and they, the servidores, are staff who lack experience and knowledge. If you leave them in the field on their own, they will cry because they don’t know what to do” (SADER staff of Soconusco, interview, Tapachula, November 12, 2019).

Furthermore, in Soconusco, lower-ranking SADER staff expressed the rocky relationship they observed between SADER and the CGPD, indicating that many SADER staff members—especially department heads and unionized staff—are not used to receiving “orders,” and that CGPD treated SADER staff with arrogance. They claimed that they had witnessed sustained confrontation between SADER and the CGPD over firing staff members, use of offices and vehicles, and whether the Ministry of Agriculture or the CGPD sign should appear on the office.¹⁴

The year 2019 ended with a chaotic and disappointing interaction between Producción para el Bienestar and the coffee sector. Initially, the program aimed to support farmers in cultivating more sustainably, but during 2019 no technical advisory was evident in the field, nor was social cohesion promoted among farmers. Rather, most Soconusco SADER staff were occupied with administrative tasks such as informing farmers of changes in the program or reviewing farmers’ applications. Since SADER was unable to authorize payment to farmers until the list of beneficiaries was approved, only in September of 2019 did farmers begin to receive their first deposit—months after farmers required the subsidy to cover agricultural expenses. While some farmers interviewed indicated that they appreciated that the program paid the subsidies directly to them, they indicated their desire to join Sembrando Vida due to its greater subsidy.

Conclusion

This paper illustrated that one of the main problems with coffee programs under previous administrations was the high level of clientelism under which they were operated by public functionaries and farmer organizations (Harvey, 1992; Henderson, 2020; Olvera, 1991), leading to AMLO’s promise to eliminate intermediaries in order to end corruption (AMLO, 2019a). Through analysis of the operation of Sembrando Vida and Producción para el Bienestar, this paper revealed significant changes in small farmers’ livelihoods as a result of the elimination of intermediaries. For the first time in recent decades, farmers received their full subsidy, and were glad to have received it directly. Furthermore, while many farmers ended relations with the clientelistic organizations to which they had belonged, others became involved with new forms of organization through which farmers could develop new marketing alternatives (Sembrando Vida’s CACs).

Considering these developments, it is argued that the elimination of intermediaries appears to have successfully contributed to reducing clientelism by functionaries and farmer organizations; hence, this policy can be considered to be one of the most effective of the AMLO administration. However, despite this optimism, it should not be assumed that this policy in and of itself guarantees the eradication of clientelism, which may still occur through other mechanisms (for instance between public functionaries and farmers). Nor should it be assumed that elimination of intermediaries must necessarily be accompanied by the rupture of the relationship between farmers and those organizations that for many years have significantly supported them in improving their marketing conditions and their livelihoods. Farmers have not been prohibited from interacting with farmer organizations should they wish to do so. What has changed is that farmers now have the power to decide whether they want to belong to a particular organization, and what agricultural supplies they wish to purchase and under what conditions. As one informant manifested, this is a matter of justice.

Furthermore, the analysis of the elimination of intermediaries in Sembrando Vida and Production para el Bienestar shed light on the contrast between the ways in which this policy was implemented in the two programs. While Sembrando Vida appeared to have implemented this policy without significant conflicts, its implementation in Producción para el Bienestar resulted in great tension and operational difficulties. While SADER at the federal level had acquired the task of delivering subsidies to farmers without intermediaries, coffee farmer organizations and local-level SADER staff strongly opposed this. Participation of the CGPD in purging the list of beneficiaries also created tension with federal and local SADER staff, as well as with coffee farmer organizations. It is argued here that the contrasting outcomes of the two programs are due to the close connection of Producción para el Bienestar with previous coffee programs. The fact that such programs were previously managed only by the Ministry of Agriculture led to resistance by various actors to modifying the prevailing relationship between the state and farmer organizations.

A final reflection involves the operation of rural programs, aside from the issue of the elimination of intermediaries. This paper indicated that apart from clientelism, coffee programs were characterized by many other deficiencies, such as a low budget, lack of technical assistance, and deficient marketing strategies (Hernández, 1992c; Renard, 1999; Robles Berlanga, 2011). It also stated that with the implementation of Sembrando Vida and Producción para el Bienestar, AMLO aimed to ensure farmers’ well-being (GOB, 2019). The analysis of the operation of both programs in 2019 demonstrated that certain aspects of coffee programs have improved in comparison to those of previous administrations. However, rural programs are still characterized by deficient implementation.

Regarding Sembrando Vida, this paper showed that due to the substantial subsidy farmers were receiving, they decided to resume activities they had abandoned, and that they were pleased to be receiving continual technical assistance and that the staff motivated them to work with other farmers. However, they expressed resistance to some of the program’s demands, which included reforesting, producing organically, introducing native varieties, and intercropping. Farmers also pointed out that the program excluded those with less than 2.5 hectares and that it lacked marketing strategies. Regarding Producción para el Bienestar, farmers indicated that they appreciated the direct payment, but that they were negatively affected by many operational issues, including the need to reapply, failure to clearly explain program requirements, and late delivery of funding. Thus, it is argued that while the state’s handling of small farmers has improved somewhat, many deficiencies continue with respect to formulation and implementation of rural programs.

Footnotes

Notes

Claudia Oviedo-Rodríguez is a Director in Agrifood Systems at the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development in Mexico. She holds a PhD in Rural Sociology from Wageningen University, the Netherlands, and an MA in International Politics from Newcastle University, United Kingdom. The author would like to thank Kees Jansen and Sietze Vellema, Associate Professors from Wageningen University, for their guidance with this paper; the two anonymous reviewers selected by the journal for their suggestions; Jonathan Fox, Professor at American University, for reviewing the paper; and Ann Greenberg for editing the paper. This research received support from the Mexican National Council for Science and Technology (Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología [CONACYT]).

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n.d. “Surge la Confederación Nacional Campesina (CNC).” Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos (CNDH). Accessed June 6, 2022. https://www.cndh.org.mx/noticia/surge-la-confederacion-nacional-campesina-cnc.

A Shift in Mexican Coffee Policies: An Analysis of Rural Programs and the Elimination of Intermediaries

Abstract

Keywords

Clientelistic Organizations and the Response of Autonomous Organizations

The Amlo Administration: A Change in Direction

Implementation of Sembrando Vida and Producción Para El Bienestar During the First Year of the Amlo Administration

Producción Para El Bienestar

The Elimination of Intermediaries

Purging The List of Beneficiaries

Conclusion

Footnotes

Notes

References