Disruption in the court community: Understanding the barriers to prosecution reform

Abstract

Sociolegal scholarship tends to emphasize the vast discretionary power of prosecutors. Yet, the election of progressive prosecutors raises the question of whether their power is absolute, or whether it is contingent on abiding by traditional prosecutorial norms. Using semistructured interviews with prosecutors and staff in two jurisdictions led by progressive prosecutors (n = 43), this study examines the barriers to prosecution reform posed by other actors in the court community. Results show that court community actors resist changes to standard case processing norms when progressive lead prosecutors are elected. These findings suggest the prosecutors’ power is contingent, rather than absolute, as other court actors—especially judges—respond to the election of a progressive lead prosecutor by asserting previously unused regulatory powers. In that way, the extent to which progressive lead prosecutors can achieve their goals depends, not only on buy-in from their staff but also on compliance from other court actors.