Source-Inconsistent News From Partisan Media: Expectancy Violations as a Way to Improve Attitudes Toward Out-Party Media

Abstract

Drawing on Expectancy Violation Theory (EVT), we predict that news content that is inconsistent with out-party media’s ideological stance forms a positive expectancy violation and thus leads partisans to view these outlets more favorably. To test this prediction, we conducted two online experiments where participants viewed source-consistent or source-inconsistent news headlines from in-party (CNN for Democrats, Fox News for Republicans) or out-party (Fox News for Democrats, CNN for Republicans) media. Study 1 showed that exposure to source-inconsistent news headlines from out-party media led to more favorable feeling thermometers through unexpectedness and positive valence. Study 2 further showed that these indirect effects through unexpectedness and positive valence were larger with a high dose of exposure, but still significant even with a low dose of exposure. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.

Keywords

expectancy violation theory partisan media polarization social media media trust

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