Abstract
We tested the hypothesis that negotiators with unequal power (relative to equal power) would engage in more problem solving behaviors and reach agreements of higher joint gain when they had pro-social motivation. The design was a two (power differentials: equal versus unequal) by two (social motivations: pro-social versus proself) factorial design. Participants were 160 undergraduate students who took part in simulated face-to-face dyadic negotiations. The results showed that negotiators with unequal power reached agreements of higher joint gain than did negotiators with equal power, in general. Post-hoc analysis found that both high-low power dyads and high-high power dyads obtained higher joint benefit than low-low power dyads. Moreover, the interactive effects of power differentials and social motivations were non-significant on negotiation outcomes but significant on problem solving behaviors. The present study suggests that the pro-social motivation can promote the joint gain of unequal power negotiating dyads.
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