Abstract
Contemporary scholars routinely argue colonialism and imperialism are indistinguishable. In this essay, I challenge this argument. While it is true the “colonial” and “imperial” overlap and intersect historically, I argue there is a central thread of modern colonialism as an ideology that can be traced from the seventeenth century to mid-twentieth century that was not only distinct from—but often championed in explicit opposition to—imperialism. I advance my argument in four parts. First, I identify key ways in which the colonial can be distinguished from the imperial, including most importantly the specific kind of productive power inherent in colonialism. Second, I examine how colonialism and imperialism evolve in meaning and are redefined by both champions and critics, in relation to each other in the late nineteenth/early twentieth centuries. Third, I examine the historical moment when colonialism and imperialism fully conflate after WWII through the UN process of decolonization as the “salt water thesis” delimits colonialism to mean foreign racialized domination, and it thus becomes synonymous with imperialism. I conclude with an analysis of why the distinction still matters in both theory and practice.
Contemporary scholars routinely argue colonialism and imperialism are difficult if not impossible to distinguish. Kohn (2012) argues colonialism is the “practice of domination, which involves the subjugation of one people to another,” leading to “one of the difficulties in defining colonialism . . . it is hard to distinguish it from imperialism. Frequently the two concepts are treated as synonyms.” Pitts (2010) argues to “distinguish systematically between the imperial and colonial” is close to impossible because even if some argue the latter involves “extensive domination” and the former “substantial settlement,” the “official, popular, and even scholarly usage is unstable, and thus, the terms ‘colonies’ and ‘postcolonial’ are applied equally to spaces of significant settlement and to those without.” (213–14) Kumar (2021), in his article on possible differences between the colonial and imperial, concludes: “Colonies . . . are a part of empire [and] only have existence as manifestations of an imperial drive” (304). 1
While these scholars are correct that contemporary scholarship views them as indistinguishable, I argue colonialism not only can but should be distinguished from imperialism, even as they overlap and intersect historically and conceptually. To distinguish the two, we first need to define them. Some scholars 2 correctly argue it is impossible to posit a single definition for either. So, to be clear, the definitions I propose below are not definitive, exhaustive, or exclusive. Rather, I identify a central ideological thread in each, because if we do not define them, something profound is lost in our historical understanding of—specifically—colonialism since they became fully conflated following WWII, as I shall discuss. 3
My core argument is that a central
If colonialism and imperialism are distinct and recognized as such for centuries, my second goal is to explain when and why they became fully conflated, rather than accepting this simply as a given in contemporary scholarship.
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And I conclude by showing why the distinction still matters—in theory and practice. For political theorists, it allows us to identify specific and distinct threads of settler colonial, domestic colonial, and/or imperial arguments—and their opposites—combined in a variety of ways, in the writings of multiple key modern political thinkers. In
Two important points in defining imperialism and colonialism before we get to the substance of the argument: first, I define both as [There] are important analytical distinctions between . . .
While I recognize colonialism and imperialism—both in common parlance and academic scholarship—are used to describe practices/processes, I define them as ideologies for several reasons. First, because doing so is consistent with other “isms,” and second, to gain analytical purchase and focus on the specific written arguments political theorists advance to
The second important point in defining colonialism and/or imperialism is it requires, as Getachew and Mantena (2021) have argued, a “historically attuned and comparative approach” that incorporates non-Western, Black, and/or indigenous scholars and their critiques of empire and/or colonization (359). In this analysis, I try to adopt such a global/comparative approach and draw from the critical analyses of various non-European thinkers who were subject to colonialism and/or imperialism, along with thinkers seeking to justify either/both.
I advance my argument in four parts. In the first section, I identify key differences between the colonial and the imperial, beginning with their distinct etymological roots, before turning to what I see as the first comprehensive defense of modern settler and domestic colonialism, by John Locke and Jeremy Bentham, respectively. In both cases, they use the same three principles of segregation, agrarian labor on waste land and improvement of people and land through colonial processes and/or institutions and overseen by authorities living among/in close proximity to the colonized. Colonialism is defended by both Locke and Bentham in explicit opposition to imperialism—conquest and domination from above/afar.
To demonstrate the distance between imperialism and certain kinds of domestic colonies and colonialism, I turn to three domestic utopian colonialist thinkers: Washington (1912), who defends African American colonies in America, and Tolstoy (1900) and Kropotkin (1898), who defend Doukhobor colonies in Canada. Both colonies are seen as vehicles to fundamentally challenge racism or state power, militarism, and capitalism, respectively. And thus, for their champions, colonies can oppose rather than facilitate domination. I conclude with an analysis of the distinctive, productive form of power in colonialism, including both its psycho-affective and material dimensions via arguments advanced by both Fanon (1994) and Coulthard (2014).
In the second section, I examine how imperialism evolves in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as it shifts away from conquest and toward civilizing missions, development, and democratization—as it overlaps with the colonialist principle of improvement. I then analyze how Indian thinkers challenge civilizational narratives to instead embrace
A striking example of how these two distinct threads are brought together in the first half of the twentieth century is the Congress Against Colonial Oppression and Imperialism in 1927, which, in the end, created the League Against Imperialism
In the third section, I analyze how imperialism and colonialism became fully conflated. After WWII, leaders of formerly colonized peoples in Asia and Africa fought for emancipation from imperial masters through national self-determination within a newly minted UN system. This process led to the adoption of the “salt water thesis,” which required an ocean between the colonizer and colonized both by the UN and in Bandung. And colonialism is now redefined to mean—exclusively—
Distinguishing the Colonial from the Imperial
Colonia vs Imperare and Settler Colonialism vs Imperialism
The imperial and colonial have different etymological foundations that create distinct trajectories or path dependencies in their corresponding modern ideologies. Imperial originates in the verb
Rooted in these ancient foundations, imperialism seeks to justify the imperial metropole’s right to
John Locke is the first to develop a comprehensive
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defense of colonialism in his
Economically, agrarian labor on enclosed parcels of waste land produces food and wealth for those laboring on it, as well as profits for colonizers via the sale of cash crops and increased value of land—“a hundred-fold.” 9 Further financial benefits are reaped domestically in England as paupers and petty criminals are employed on ships for trade or become indentured servants/settlers in colonies. As they are made industrious, the money otherwise spent on workhouses, relief, and/or prisons is thus saved. Ethically, Locke argues idle/custom/habit-bound paupers and/or indigenous peoples also have “more conveniences” once transformed into industrious citizens.
While Locke defends colonialism, he simultaneously and explicitly rejects imperialism in at least three ways. 10 First, he argues imperial conquest—despite its popularity—provides no basis for claims “over . . . the possessions even of those who were actually engaged in [war].” He adds, “this, I doubt not, but at first sight will seem a strange doctrine, it being so quite contrary to the practice of the world . . . the practice of the strong and powerful, how universal soever it may be is seldom the rule of the right” (II ¶16: 178, 180). Second, he rejects imperialist claims to sovereignty and/or property rights over large swathes of territory based on conquest and instead repeatedly calls on settlers to limit property to what they can cultivate in Carolina, New York, and Virginia. Thus, in 1674, as Secretary to the Lord Proprietors of Carolina, he calls on the Council to be “observant of our orders . . . take up noe more lands than what they had use for” and avoid “scattered Settlement and large Tracts of ground . . . not like to bee planted these many years.” 11 Goldie (2021) argues, in his first Carlyle lecture, “Empire, Property and the New York Land Question,” that Locke does the same on the Board of Trade, denouncing those who claim large tracts of uncultivated land in New York. Thus, colonialists—at least in theory—argue for small allotments, limited land, and concentrated settlements while warning against dispersal of people and/or taking up too much land, especially when left uncultivated.
The final way Locke rejects imperialism is his repudiation of the hierarchical ordering of populations based on natural racialized superiority. Both Turner (2011) and David Armitage advance this argument based on the following sentence from the
Thus, it is Apochancana’s Powhatan “ways, modes and notions” that prevent him from being “improved” like English settlers. To facilitate improvement, Locke is clear he is to be educated “
Domestic Colonialism vs Foreign Imperialism
A second key difference between modern imperialism and colonialism is while the former is always directed at foreign peoples and lands, the latter could also be directed at domestic populations deemed to be backward—the idle poor and/or irrational of Europe—sent to domestic colonies within the borders of their own state, from the end of the eighteenth century until early twentieth century (Arneil 2017). Bentham (2010) provides the first comprehensive defense of domestic colonialism in his 1797 essay,
In his final two years, Bentham—realizing his pauper panopticons would never be built—writes a settler colonization proposal for Australia at the invitation of Edward Wakefield (Arneil 2021). This proposal parallels his domestic colony one: rooted in agrarian labor/waste land and run by a joint stock company, with the same claimed economic and ethical benefits. Even here, Bentham opposes imperialism, by which he means an imperial metropole (London) having authority to govern the colony from afar. He compares this to ruling from the moon. Instead, settler colonial powers—living among the colonized—have political authority. For Bentham, like Locke, it is the close daily management of land and people that is key to the success of colonies and thus he defends a physical concentration of settlers. Hence his proposal is subtitled, “Vicinity maximizing principle,” by which he means minimizing the outward spread of settlers. Bentham also defends colonial authorities’ right to “extirpate” indigenous people in Tasmania even when London—the imperial metropole—argues against it (Arneil 2021; Laidlaw 2022). 15
Perhaps the largest difference between colonialism and imperialism is found in the utopian domestic colonialism of people like Washington (1912), Tolstoy (1900), and Kropotkin (1898). For all three, colonies were vehicles used to challenge racism or capitalism, private property, and the state, respectively. Washington argues voluntarily segregated colonies by and for African American freed slaves allow them to not only cultivate their own private property in equality and freedom, apart from a profoundly oppressive white supremacist society in the American South, but also demonstrate their capacity of for all aspects of citizenship.
Doukhobor colonies in Canada—championed, financed, and negotiated by Tolstoy and Kropotkin and rooted in agrarian labor and improvement of “waste” land—were likewise a means to achieve radical political ends: anarchism, pacifism, and collective ownership and cultivation of land (Arneil 2017). Both examples show colonies, in a limited way, could be defended as the means to challenge, rather than facilitate, domination. 16 However, it should be noted such colonies also required settler colonization/dispossession of indigenous lands to exist at all. 17
Power in Colonialism vs Imperialism
The final, and most important, way colonialism is distinct from imperialism is the power animating each ideology, as alluded to previously. Imperialism, characterized by a foreign, overseas sovereign power dominating naturally inferior others from above and afar is rooted, at least initially, in conquest. European imperial powers, from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, use the natural law of war to claim
Colonialism, on the other hand, is animated by an internalized, productive form of power from its inception: colonizers live within and among the colonized—viewed as “backward” rather than inferior—meaning idle in body and/or custom bound/irrational in mind. Colonialism does not seek obedience so much as the improvement of idle bodies (becoming industrious) and irrational minds/souls (rejecting “backward” language, habits, customs, and/or spirituality and adopting more “improved” ways of being, knowing, and/or worshipping) via education, training, and labor. Just as idle bodies, whether indigenous peoples or European paupers, were transformed into industrious citizens through agrarian labor, waste land was transformed through cultivation and enclosure into revenues/profits. Resistance to settler colonial assimilation and/or the private property produced by colonization was met by redoubled efforts on the part of settler colonial authorities to effect the transformation of people and land. As settler colonization expands its reach and indigenous peoples continue to resist and attack the power exercised over them and their territories, colonial powers increasingly embrace policies of residential schools, genocide, extirpation, elimination, and/or disavowal. 18
The internalized nature of this productive power can, of course, be attributed—in part—to Michel Foucault,
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but its specifically colonial nature is best articulated through two key anticolonial thinkers. Frantz Fanon and Glen Coulthard analyze both the psychosocial aspects of internalized colonial power and the political economy of land and territory under colonialism. In
For Fanon and Coulthard, the internalized, psychological, and material dimensions of colonization must be critiqued, resisted, overcome, and expunged. Fanon sees violence as necessary to remove the colonizers, and the colonized must continue to purge themselves of negative self-understandings long after the colonizers are expelled. For Coulthard (2007), indigenous peoples must “turn inward and away from the master”—the settler state—to repair the profoundly internalized psychological damage of colonialism and rebuild indigenous relations, their collective sense of identity, and noncapitalist economics through “resurgent” indigenous praxis (454), with a goal to reestablish grounded normativity and healthy kinship between people, creatures, and land. While both provide profound critiques of colonial power, they also simultaneously create radical, universal, theoretical alternatives to Western colonial thought and practice.
Colonialism and Imperialism in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries
Colonialism and imperialism evolve in meaning with the changing context of global history in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, leading them to overlap and intersect in several ways. First, European imperialists increasingly replace conquest as justification for imperial power with appeals to civilizing missions, development, and/or democracy, thus moving toward the colonialist principle of improvement of those deemed to be backward. J. S. Mill’s argument that those living in a nonage must give up their customary ways and embrace individualism parallels Locke’s call for indigenous peoples to give up their ‘ways, modes and notions’ and be more like the improved English settlers. (Although Locke’s emphasis on improvement of waste land and agrarian labor makes his theory distinctly colonial).
Conquest does not disappear entirely (particularly in metropoles) but the ideas of “progress” and development become primary justifications for nineteenth-century imperialists, along with arguments rooted in commerce and trade. Chakrabarty (2000) argues improvement via civilization and against custom becomes endemic to European liberal and Marxist thought but articulated in different ways. Mantena (2010) argues as important as development and civilization were for liberal imperialists, by the late nineteenth century, the contradiction between domination and improvement creates a crisis, leading British imperialists to defend imperial power less in normative and ideological terms and more as “pragmatic . . . practical responses . . . accommodations” with “civil society,” leading to culturally pluralist indirect forms of rule within empire as alibis. (22)
The European imperialist emphasis on civilizing missions was challenged by South Asian intellectuals. “Indian political thinkers of the period questioned the civilizational language of their metropolitan counterparts” (Mantena 2010; Sultan 2020, 83). At the center of this fight was the principle of
At the beginning of the twentieth century, imperialism was again redefined, this time by European critics of imperial power—Hobson (1902) and Lenin (1917)—as an international system of late-stage capitalist exploitation and expropriation rather than a specific metropole’s domination of a particular “territorial possession” or colony. It is striking even as Lenin critiques imperialism that he still uses the colonial language of “backwardness” in describing colonized peoples and countries. In
In February 1927, the Comintern responds to such critiques by supporting a Congress Against Colonial Oppression and Imperialism in Brussels. This five-day meeting brought together “all forces against imperialism
The last three words in this organization’s title as well as the term “colonial oppression” in the title of the Congress that created it both speak to the distinction between a global south who, by the beginning of the twentieth century, increasingly saw their struggles as “anti
As Sultan argues, Jawaharlal Nehru, who attended the Congress, begins his anticolonialism in India with a “historical substantiation of the Lenin-Hobson thesis on imperialism.” By the 1930s, the geographic scope of “colonialism” was further narrowed. “[In] the interwar era, an overlapping consensus emerges . . . between metropolitan and anticolonial thinkers [that] the geographical reference of [the colonial is now limited to] Asia and Africa” (Sultan 2022). By the middle of the twentieth century,
In summary, I have tried to show how nineteenth-century European imperialists shift away from conquest, as justification, to civilizing missions/development, which leads imperialism as an ideology to increasingly overlap with the long-standing colonialist principle of improvement of custom-bound people through education (since Locke). At the same time, commercial and political interests in European metropoles justify empire in economic and/or “pragmatic” terms. By the twentieth century, a new definition of imperialism as an international system of capitalist economics championed by Lenin and Hobson is adopted by many Indian and African critics of imperialism who saw their own struggles as anticolonialist—expelling specific powers from their territories—within this larger system. Thus, in the first half of the twentieth century, despite various overlaps between colonialism and imperialism, the distinction between the two is still recognized in the title of the 1927 conference (Against Colonial Oppression and Imperialism) and the organization born out of it (League Against Imperialism and for National Independence), as European communists fighting imperialism came together with anticolonialists seeking liberation from overseas powers to fight both.
How and Why Do Colonialism and Imperialism Become Synonymous?
The question, therefore, is if the colonial and imperial were distinct and understood as such for most of modern history by those who both championed and challenged them, how did they become indistinguishable in contemporary scholarship? Building on the changes already underway described previously, I argue they are fully conflated after WWII, as the colonized peoples in Africa/Asia work toward decolonization and self-determination within a newly minted UN system.
UN Charter, Blue Water Thesis, Bandung Conference, and UN Resolution 1514
The creation of UN Article 1 (self-determination)
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and Articles 73 and 74 (“Declaration Regarding Non Self-Governing Territories” or NSGTs) create an international process through which those subject to imperial power could achieve national self-determination. The immediate question became who should be included in the category of NSGT? The “salt water thesis” was one proposed answer; it delimited colonized peoples to those with an ocean between themselves and their colonizers. While a longer history dating back to the nineteenth century can be found for a land/overseas distinction, the salt water thesis became a critical first step in conflating imperialism and colonialism within international law and practice. Importantly, for our purposes, this new definition of colonialism—
The second step in their conflation occurs in 1955, as the Bandung Conference with delegates from twenty-nine Asian and African states sought to advance decolonization and also championed “a definition of colonialism that took the salt-water theory as a main criterion [for] the main issue [which was] advancement . . . towards self-government and independence” (El-Ayoute 1971, 52). As Roy (1998) argues, anticolonialists in Africa and Asia believed the process would be quicker if “colonies located across the ‘salt water’ were able to gain independence without disrupting the territorial integrity of existing nation states”—meaning, in particular, settler colonial states like America (Roy:16).
In his speech on the opening day of the conference, host President Sukarno of Indonesia began by paying tribute to what he called the “League Against Imperialism and Colonialism” as the precursor to Bandung. He also underscored that colonialism is defined as overseas rule and anticolonialism the opposition to such rule when he claims: the “American War of Independence [was] the first successful
The statement is still noteworthy, however, for what it says about the new meaning of colonialism and its implications for indigenous peoples throughout the Americas. While it is true the American Revolution involved settler colonialists violently overthrowing British imperial rule and thus—in a narrow Benthamite sense—might be called “anti-imperial” (rejection of overseas rule). But to describe it as the first anti
While Bandung—understood through official channels—can be seen as a process of decolonization that reinforced state sovereignty, the international system, and settler colonial states, there are important alternative, subaltern schools of thought and scholars like Dipesh Chakrabarty 23 and Adom Getachew, among others, who provide a different historical narrative. Chakrabarty (2005) acknowledges some leading participants at Bandung engaged in an “uncritical emphasis on [catching up] with the west,” but others sought “decolonization . . . opposed to the territorial imagination of the nation state” in a world of “global, ‘deterritorialised’ identity” (4812).
Getachew (2019) likewise argues that many Black Atlantic thinkers understood that postwar “decolonization could not be limited to securing independence” and, instead, “began from the foundational role of New World slavery” (5) to address “conditions of unequal integration” and “international hierarchy that facilitated domination” and offered up a theory, instead, of “anticolonial worldmaking” and “international nondomination” (23). Such alternative visions challenged white supremacy as a foundational global phenomenon in the international system and intertwined forces of settler colonialism, imperialism, and slavery. Had these alternative visions been embraced, a different path would have opened up in global politics—away from state sovereignty and racial domination. Ultimately, however, the state system and salt-water thesis prevailed as the latter was adopted in UN Res. 1514 in 1960. A definition of colonialism as overseas domination is now formalized as international law—this is the third step in conflating imperialism and colonialism.
Finally, this new definition of colonialism as overseas domination also had an enormous impact on academia in the 1960s and ’70s, with scholars critical of colonial power coalescing around domination as the single most important characteristic of colonialism.
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Horvath (1972) sums this up: “[It] seems generally, if not universally, agreed that colonialism is a form of domination . . . control by individuals or groups over the territory and/or behavior of other individuals or groups” (47). In essence,
Before I analyze the problems created by this new definition of colonialism and its conflation with imperialism, it is important to first recognize how key this definition was at this historical juncture, both substantively and strategically, for the majority of the globe’s population (as Partha Chatterjee puts it, “most of the world” was represented in Bandung). Colonialism understood as overseas racialized domination was not only an accurate description of how the peoples of Africa and Asia experienced Europe in the imperial era, but it provided political leverage to facilitate national liberation, via the international system, in the mid-twentieth century. It should also be noted that domination is central to how contemporary settler colonial and indigenous scholars define colonialism. Veracini (2010) comments: “Settler colonial phenomena is premised on . . . domination.” Coulthard (2014) argues a “settler-colonial relationship” is one “characterized by a particular form of domination . . . where power . . . has been structured into a . . . set of hierarchical social relations” (6–7).
To argue colonialism is different from imperialism, therefore, is not to deny domination was/is an important aspect of colonialism (despite settler and domestic colonialists’ claim they reject domination). Rather, the distinction is important to help identify the
With this important caveat, I turn to outline four key problems of colonialism being defined as overseas domination and synonymous with imperialism:
1. Colonialism, understood through the salt water thesis, excludes
a) Settler colonies and indigenous peoples (Anaya 2004; Lightfoot 2016)
b) Domestic colonialism and those who were subject to it
2. The key principles of segregation, labor/waste land, and improvement that had long defined settler and domestic colonialism as ideologies disappear from anticolonial and postcolonial scholars’ analyses of colonial ideology and practice as well as theorizing about what constitutes decolonization.
3. The capacity to analyze the specific kind of power unleashed by colonialism, as distinct from imperial thought and practice, is circumscribed.
4. Colonialism, now defined primarily
Internal Colonialism Scholarship: Colonialism as Metaphor for Domination
While colonialism—for contemporary indigenous, postcolonial, settler colonial, and domestic colonial scholars—was and is largely used to describe
The first problem with “internal colonialism” is that it is being used to describe so many kinds of injustices
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(Hicks 2004; Hind 1984), leading some scholars to argue it is almost meaningless (Gonzalez 1974). The second problem with deploying colonialism as a metaphor for all forms of domination is that it marginalizes indigenous peoples from the center of scholarly analysis and/or makes them one of many groups in settler societies who were subject to domination. As Jodi Byrd notes: “The problems inherent within Hechter, Blauner, hooks and others who have tried to frame race as colonialism” is to obfuscate “ongoing processes of colonialism that continue to affect American Indians and other indigenous peoples . . . ‘internal colonialism’ is an empty referent . . . claimed by any marginalized group.” It turns “American Indians into a minority within a country of minorities” leading to the “
While this literature is problematic for the reasons described previously, the use of the term internal colonies/colonialism by African American scholars and activists (Carmichael and Hamilton [1967], Malcolm X, and Martin Luther King Jr.) seems to be different in the key sense that it had
Colonial versus Imperial: Why the Distinction Matters
Having shown in the preceding analysis how the colonial and imperial differed historically, even as they intersected over time and eventually conflated completely after WWII, I conclude with an analysis of why the distinction still matters in theory (to analyze distinct threads of colonial and imperial in the history of political thought) and practice (to analyze the specific colonial power unleashed on those subject to it in settler and domestic colonial processes and institutions).
Colonialism versus Imperialism in the History of Political Thought
In the history of modern political thought, once we recognize colonialism is distinct from—but overlapping with—imperialism, and that it has both a domestic and foreign face, a more complex picture emerges as to how key thinkers embrace and/or reject various threads of colonial/imperial thought. John Locke defends settler colonies in explicit opposition to imperialism (conquest, natural racialized superiority, and claiming large swathes of land). Jeremy Bentham defends domestic colonies in
J. S. Mill defends imperialism in India (Pitts 2005) and settler colonialism in Canada (Bell 2016) but utterly repudiates domestic colonialism: “The much vaunted ‘Home Colonization’ system of Belgium and Holland . . . plainly appears to be, what from general principles one might have predicted . . . a miserable failure” (Mill 1835, 2). Douglass (2000) defends certain kinds of domestic colonies for freed slaves but describes foreign colonies (Liberia) as “ultimate extermination” of African Americans (186). Alexis de Tocqueville defends imperialism in Algeria (Pitts 2000), settler colonialism in America (Dahl 2015),
At the start of the twentieth century, the anti-imperialism of Lenin and Hobson helps to define the anticolonialism of national liberationists from the global south as they create the League Against Imperialism and for National Independence—demonstrating that the distinction between colonialism and imperialism was recognized even as these groups combined to fight both together. And leading figures in Asia (Nehru) and Africa (Fanon) view themselves as anticolonialist in the sense of expelling a specific foreign metropole who has ruled over racialized peoples in particular colonies from afar. Fanon and Coulthard both argue decolonization means rejecting the psycho-affective and material aspects of colonial power.
By distinguishing the colonial from the imperial, historians of political thought can trace and analyze multiple threads across time, as well as explain how colonialism—rooted in improvement—could be strongly embraced by so many liberal, socialist, and anarchist thinkers from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries even as they forcefully rejected imperialism. Tracing these evolving meanings helps us to also explain how twentieth-century leaders in Africa and Asia seeking to expel overseas powers came to view themselves as anti
Colonialism in Practice: Colonial Institutions and Productive Power
The distinction of colonialism from imperialism matters in practice too as we can identify the specific kind of power animating domestic and settler colonial processes and institutions. Colonialism—characterized by an internalized and productive power, seeks to
Agrarian Labour
For colonialists—whether domestic or settler—they claim both poverty and unemployment are caused by the failings of individuals, rooted in their customs (indigenous peoples) or habits/character (poor/disabled), rather than a product of larger structural forces (racism, ableism, colonialism, and/or capitalism). To address these problems, therefore, individuals must be segregated from their communities and break them free from their idleness by engaging in agrarian labor. For settler colonialists, indigenous peoples can also be removed from “waste” land (as defined by colonial authorities), allowing settlers to claim it their own private property via agrarian labor. Thomas Jefferson thus rooted his settler colonial Indian removal policies in Locke (Arneil 1996), thus posing—in practice—a stark choice to indigenous peoples. In a letter to the Cherokee in 1809, he asks them to either “betake themselves to agriculture” or “remove across the Mississippi.” 28 Such policies, foundational to settler colonization, were fundamentally rooted in the ideological claim that indigenous people “fail” to labor on land and leave it waste.
The colonial defense of residential schools also relies on an ideological claim around labor as such institutions seek to transform “idle” indigenous children into industrious citizens. In 1920, Duncan Scott Campbell, superintendent of Indian education in Canada, argues “schools” should focus on “carpentry and farming” for boys and “housekeeping” for girls. The centrality of labor to such institutions is highlighted in chapter 14, “Student as Labourer: 1867–1939,” of the
Improvement
Colonialists, in theory, argue that idle and/or irrational people should not be conquered (settler colonialism) or punished in workhouses, prisons, and/or asylums (domestic colonialism) but improved and transformed from within—via training and education. Improvement from within requires close oversight and supervision by colonial authorities in purpose-built colonies and/or colonial institutions. The first step to improvement is for those subject to colonialism to first recognize—within themselves—their own backwardness, facilitated by segregation and the right kind of “education.” The changes wrought in the name of improvement are thus deeply internalized. In a similar but distinct way, the mentally ill, disabled, and paupers of Europe were required to understand their lives of misery to be a product of their bad habits and poor character—daily labor and routinized training would transform (improve) them.
The most extreme version of improvement from within is, of course, the residential “school” that explicitly sought—in the name of their “improvement”—to destroy indigenous language, knowledge, spirituality, and culture. “Education” means those living within such “schools” must expunge their peoples’ ways of being and knowing to become improved—that is, “civilized” as defined by colonial authorities. Indigenous children under colonialism were thus individual agents in these “schools” for extinguishing their own peoples’ collective identity, language, and culture. The implications in practice have been documented by survivors in the
Thus, an important distinction between domestic and settler colonialist institutions is while the former sought to improve the disabled/poor from within with all the attendant negative impacts, residential schools alone engaged in genocide. Settler colonialism is thus different not only in degree but in kind. But both domestic and settler colonial institutions were characterized by high levels of mental, physical, and sexual abuse, which can be traced, in part, to the principle of improvement. If the goal of improvement, as described previously, is to change bodies and minds
Segregation
Segregating the backward from their own families and communities is necessary according to colonialists to begin the process of breaking them “free” from bad customs and/or habits. The adjective
Segregation is harmful in and of itself but it also compounds the likelihood of physical, mental, and sexual abuse in such institutions, as described previously, exactly because staff and/or superintendents knew those in their “care” were completely beyond any oversight by society and thus they could engage in abusive behavior with impunity (something Bentham identified in his design of pauper panopticons and so built in the principle of surveillance of staff as well as residents; see Arneil 2021). Sexual predators and bullies would also likely be drawn to such institutions with guaranteed access to potential victims without consequences. It is not surprising, therefore, that two of the largest class-action lawsuits in Canada have been launched by survivors of indigenous residential “schools” and residents of what was once the provincial farm colony for the mentally disabled and ill in Ontario.
In the first case, the
Ultimately, the three key principles of agrarian labor on waste land, improvement, and segregation, which constitute this central thread of colonialism I have been describing, was embraced by many liberals, socialists, and anarchists exactly because it is seen as more humane—even emancipatory. But in practice, these same principles led to extraordinarily negative implications. Distinguishing colonialism from imperialism is thus important to identify different threads in the history of political thought and analyze, in practice, the power animating colonial processes and institutions as inherent to the ideology itself and its key principles.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for funding this research, and several commentators and audiences who provided useful insights and feedback on it through years of revision. I particularly want to thank the Oxford University Political Theory Group where I presented it first, Clare Hall Cambridge where I began it, and the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study where I finished it, as well as the editors of
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: The author would like to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Clare Hall Cambridge and the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study for financial support.
1.
Some scholars have pointed toward some kind of distinction. Said (1993) distinguishes the two but ultimately concludes colonialism “is almost always a consequence of imperialism.” (9) Wakefield (1830), Seeley (1883) and Finley (1976) argue British settler colonies are distinct from imperial dependencies. Bell (2013, 2016), Armitage (2012), and I (
) have all argued the colonial and imperial are distinct—from a more critical perspective.
2.
“[The colony is] always unstable and precarious, plagued by . . . becoming another sort of entity” (Stoler 2011, 2). “Attempts to establish general theories of colonialism . . . encounter problems . . . rooted in the ‘experiential plurality’ . . . overly stipulative definitions should be resisted” (
, 893).
3.
While the title of my article is “Colonialism versus Imperialism,” my focus is really on colonialism as I see it as the misunderstood term—the analysis of imperialism is really limited to identifying how it differs from colonialism and then also overlaps and/or diverges as both evolve.
4.
This argument has underpinned previous research (Arneil 2017,
), but this article represented the fully worked out analysis of exactly how they are different as well as how they became conflated and why this distinction still matters.
5.
6.
Kumar rightly argues empire is a category of the “world and not just Western history,” given the existence of imperial powers throughout the world. I focus on modern European colonialism and imperialism.
7.
I use scare quotes on “idle,” “backward,” “custom bound,” “irrational” people, “empty,” “waste” land, “improve,” and “improvement” because they are culturally loaded. For ease of reading, I drop them in the rest of the article but should be read in the same way when deployed in colonialist arguments.
8.
Locke, of course, is not the first to articulate these claims; he draws on arguments advanced by John Winthrop, Robert Cushman, Robert Gray, William Strachey, and George Peckham (see chapter four of my book
). But I call Locke’s argument the first comprehensive defense because he crystallizes a variety of these claims from previous tracts into a single argument anchored in private property and he integrates this into his larger political theory that has property at its core.
9.
The economic dimensions—capitalist or proto capitalist—are important. See Arneil (1994), Ince (2018), and
.
10.
Locke’s role on the Board of Trade in the 1690’s and the power he exercised with respect to both Ireland and American colonies as a representative of the London metropole can be seen as a form of imperial rule in practice even as he defends colonial principles. I want to thank Daniel Layman for this insight. See also Mark Goldie’s Carlyle lectures and
, who analyzes Locke’s views on Ireland as a board member.
11.
Letter from Lord Proprietors to Council at Ashley River, 18 May 1674, signed by Locke in the
12.
Apochancana has various spellings—most notably, Opechancanough (1550–1646). As chief of the Powhatans, he was central to the powerful Powhatan confederacy and led attacks against English settlers, including one at Jamestown in 1622. Locke deliberately uses his name in later editions of the
13.
14.
15.
16.
Important caveats: these utopian colonies were few in number, voluntarily chosen, failed quickly, and required settler colonization to exist at all.
17.
18.
Bentham defends the right of settler colonialists to engage in the extirpation of indigenous peoples in his Australian proposal. Wolfe (2006) and
see settler colonialism as “elimination of the native,” and Kevin Bruyneel sees it as the “disavowal” of indigenous peoples.
19.
20.
21.
After WWI, President
in his Fourteen Points, argued for an international organization and ‘impartial adjustment of all colonial claims’ with the ‘the interests of the populations concerned’ given equal weight to imperial governments; leading not to decolonization but the mandate system. This can be seen as a precursor of self-determination after WWII.
22.
The Americans who had supported Dutch rule in Indonesia immediately after the war changed course after Dutch “police action” in 1948 brutalized Indonesians fighting for independence. “American policy changed drastically” in support of Sukarno as they pressured the Dutch to yield (McMahon 2020). For more on the geopolitics of Bandung, see
.
23.
Chakabarty’s analysis emerges out a school of ‘subaltern studies’ which he, Partha Chatterjee, Ranajit Guha, Gayatri Spivak and others establish. Gramsci’s subaltern proletariat was replaced by agrarian peasants; while power has racialized and cultural dimensions. They sought to analyze history from the perspective of the masses in the global south and over time, gender, caste and/or religion were also integrated as they analyzed who can speak and for whom. I do not have the space to address this rich, complex, and evolving literature, but it was as a foundation for the alternative views on imperial power and decolonization I point to here.
24.
Balandier (1966, 54) defines it as ‘domination imposed by a foreign minority, racially. . . on an indigenous population’ (54);
as a ‘relationship of domination between an indigenous. . .majority . . .in pursuit of interests. . .defined in a distant metropolis.’ (16–17)
25.
27.
In 1928, a resolution on the “Negro Question in the United States” at the Third Comintern speaks to the oppression in the “Black Belt” as “semicolonial” and “worse than in a number of colonies.”
28.
Jefferson, Written Message to the Cherokee Delegation, January 9, 1809, cited in McLoughlin, 575.
