The interventionist theory of causation has been advertised as an empirically informed and more nuanced approach to causality than the competing theories. However, previous literature has not yet analyzed the regression discontinuity (hereafter, RD) and the difference-in-differences (hereafter, DD) within an interventionist framework. In this paper, I point out several drawbacks of using the interventionist methodology for justifying the DD and RD designs. Nevertheless, I argue that the first step toward enhancing our understanding of the DD and RD designs from an interventionist perspective is to take advantage of the assumptions of common trend and continuity.
AngristJ. D.PischkeJ.-S.2009. Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist’s Companion. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
2.
AngristJ. D.PischkeJ.‐S.2014. Mastering ’Metrics: The Path from Cause to Effect. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
3.
BoumansM.2003. “How to Design Galilean Fall Experiments in Economics.” Philosophy of Science70 (2): 308-29.
4.
CartwrightN.2007. Hunting Causes and Using Them: Approaches in Philosophy and Economics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
5.
GreeneC.2020. “Nomadic Concepts, Variable Choice, and the Social Sciences.” Philosophy of the Social Sciences50 (1): 3-22. DOI: 10.1177/0048393119878783
6.
HesslowG.1976. “Two Notes on the Probabilistic Approach to Causality.” Philosophy of Science43 (2): 290–92.
7.
KnuuttilaT.2009. “Representation, Idealization, and Fiction in Economics: From the Assumptions Issue to the Epistemology of Modeling.” In Fictions in Science: Philosophical Essays on Modeling and Idealization, edited by SuárezE., 205–31. New York: Routledge.
8.
KowalenkoR.2017. “Manipulationism, Ceteris Paribus Laws, and the Bugbear of Background Knowledge.” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science31 (3): 261-83. DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2018.1463693
9.
MonetaA.RussoF.2014 “Causal Models and Evidential Pluralism in Econometrics.” Journal of Economic Methodology21 (1): 54-76. DOI: 10.1080/1350178X.2014.886473
10.
MorganS. L.WinshipC. (2007) 2014. Counterfactuals and Causal Inference: Methods and Principles for Social Research. 2nd ed.New York: Cambridge University Press. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781107587991
11.
NortonJ. D.2003. “A Material Theory of Induction.” Philosophy of Science70 (4): 647-70. DOI: 10.1086/378858
12.
OkashaS.2005. “Does Hume’s Argument Against Induction Rest on a Quantifier-Shift Fallacy?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society105 (1): 237-55. DOI: 10.1111/j.0066-7373.2004.00113.x.
13.
ReissJ.2009. “Causation in the Social Sciences: Evidence, Inference, and Purpose.” Philosophy of the Social Sciences39 (1): 20-40. DOI: 10.1177/0048393108328150.
14.
RunhardtR. W.2015. “Evidence for Causal Mechanisms in Social Science: Recommendations from Woodward’s Manipulability Theory of Causation.” Philosophy of Science82 (5): 1296-1307. DOI: 10.1086/683679.
15.
RussoF.2011. “Correlational Data, Causal Hypotheses, and Validity.” Journal for General Philosophy of Science42 (1): 85-107. DOI: 10.1007/s10838-011-9157-x.
16.
RussoF.2012. “On Empirical Generalisations.” In Probabilities, Laws, and Structures, edited by DieksD.GonzálezW. J.HartmannS.StöltznerM.WeberM., 123-39. Dordrecht: Springer. DOI: 10.1007/978-94-007-3030-4_9
17.
RussoF.2014. “What Invariance Is and How to Test for It.” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science28 (2): 157-83. DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2014.932528
18.
SteelD.2007. Across the Boundaries: Extrapolation in Biology and Social Science. New York: Oxford University Press.
19.
WoodwardJ.2003. Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. New York: Oxford University Press.
20.
WoodwardJ.2007. “Causal Models in the Social Sciences.” In Philosophy of Anthropology and Sociology, edited by TurnerS. P.RisjordM. W., 157-210. Amsterdam: Elsevier. DOI: 10.1016/B978-044451542-1/50006-4
21.
WoodwardJ.2015. “Methodology, Ontology, and Interventionism.” Synthese192 (11): 3577-99. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-014-0479-1
22.
WunschG.MouchartM.RussoF.2014. “Functions and Mechanisms in Structural-Modelling Explanations.” Journal for General Philosophy of Science45 (1): 187-208.
