Abstract
This paper establishes the nexus of roles and policy from the perspective of foreign policy role theory. This relationship has been usually assumed but rarely unpacked theoretically, despite its analytical importance to understanding processes of domestic contestation over foreign policy. Thus, shown is the importance of policy decisions and their implementation for giving direction and bringing to life a state’s foreign policy roles. Also analysed, accordingly, is how domestic policy contestation affects role enactment. Two intertwined questions are answered herewith: How does the relationship between roles and policy unfold in the foreign policy realm? How does policy contestation shape international role enactment? We illustrate our theorisation with the examples of Germany and the United Kingdom’s behaviour following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, with both NATO members deepening the ‘faithful ally’ role vis-à-vis Ukraine.
Introduction
Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, German Chancellor Olaf Scholtz (2021–present) reinforced his country’s existing role of ‘faithful ally’ to the latter and to NATO members. In his speech to the Bundestag on 27 February 2022, Scholz announced a set of policies to make sense of the ‘faithful ally’ role in light of this new geopolitical context. These included military aid to Ukraine, supporting the agreed package of European Union sanctions against Russia and Germany’s commitment to NATO’s collective defence to prevent the conflict from spilling into member states’ territory. Similarly, the United Kingdom also reinforced the enactment of the same role vis-à-vis Ukraine and other NATO members. Under Prime Minister Boris Johnson (2019–2022) the UK adopted a series of policy measures to support Ukraine, spanning military support, aid allocation, economic sanctions and help to refugees.
If one zooms-in on these two cases, it is possible to observe contestation in parliament and among domestic political actors as soon as these countries reinforced the ‘faithful ally’ role internationally. However, contestation was not over the role per se but rather how to make sense of it via policy decisions and implementation, as key constitutive parts of policy. This relationship between roles and policy has always been present and assumed in foreign policy role theory. Despite the importance of this relationship to understanding processes of domestic contestation regarding foreign policy, the relationship has not been explicitly unpacked in theoretical terms to date.
Thus, this article shows the importance of policy decisions and implementation to give direction to and guide real-world action regarding a given role, while it also analyses how domestic contestation over policy affects role enactment. How does the relationship between roles and policy unfold in the foreign policy realm? How does policy contestation shape international role enactment? These two questions guide the following, relying on the illustrative examples of Germany and the UK regarding their respective responses to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Cantir and Kaarbo, in studying domestic contestation over role conceptions and role selection of foreign policy decision-makers, mention that establishing the relationship between ‘roles’ and ‘policy’ as two distinct yet intertwined concepts is a pending task in role theory research. 1 They hint at policy contestation even when there is overall agreement on the role to play. It is from here we build our theoretical contribution, adding this can also be the case when there is a crisis situation: ‘In other words, political actors may disagree about which policy best serves a national role but may still agree on what the national role should be’. 2 Roles are brought to life by policy, the former conceptualised as the type of actor it is possible to be in a given social context (e.g. leader, follower, mediator and ally) and as a social position within an organised group. 3 Policy involves all types of government actions which span goals and the means to achieve them, while policy decisions and implementation are key dimensions of the policy process. 4 In fact, policy implementation is a cornerstone and constitutive part of policy decision-making. 5
We argue that policy decisions and the type of policies encompassed by that decision are key to giving direction and meaning to the foreign policy role selected by decision-makers. While the selection of a specific role delimits the possible policies able to be adopted, it is the types of policy selected and how they are implemented (including setbacks in their implementation) which gives the role direction and life when being enacted internationally. Further, if policy decision-making is a politically contingent phenomenon and thus politically contested, then policy contestation is likely to impact the playing of the role in question. As political contestation is most salient during crisis situations, contested policy decisions at these critical junctures are of high stakes for role enactment.
Bringing these two intertwined arguments to the cases of Germany and the UK regarding their respective responses to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, then the enactment of the ‘faithful ally’ role seen in both instances was policy-driven. The role became affected by contestation of the types of policy decisions taken and the nature of their implementation to activate the role at the international level. Based on our theoretical framework, our empirical claim is that the reinforcement of the role of ‘faithful ally’ by both Germany and the UK in light of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine triggered a set of domestic dynamics consistent with what we call ‘policy contestation’ over how to fulfil a specific role. The role of ‘faithful ally’ to Ukraine was reinforced in the wake of the events of February 2022, and the role met with broad consensus among different political and societal actors in both countries. However, the enactment of the role was challenged by what those domestic actors variously deemed to be the most appropriate set of policies. All these policies can be considered consistent with the parameters of what a ‘faithful ally’ is supposed to be, however, making these cases ones of policy contestation rather than role contestation.
Our cases are illustrative examples and thus plausibility probes, with the two cases bearing witness to empirical manifestations of our theoretical propositions. 6 We zoom in on Chancellor Scholz’s approach at the outset of this full-scale war and on domestic contestation over providing Ukraine with Leopard 2 tanks. We also analyse the UK’s parliamentary contestation over the appropriate financial response to Russia’s full-scale invasion under PM Johnson. The issue of the severity and timing of sanctions meant some domestic actors questioned the policy informing the ‘faithful ally’ role in the first few weeks of the war. As mentioned, in both cases this role was reinforced by the respective countries’ leaderships, being shared across the board by political actors and the general public from the outset, making the policy debate salient and key to role enactment.
These two cases are representative of actors showing a clear commitment to supporting Ukraine from the very beginning. Both states have been highlighted as examples of close support for Ukraine, albeit for different reasons. The German government has faced resistance to incremental increases in the type of supplied military equipment while being the leading donor of humanitarian aid. 7 On the other hand, the UK was congratulated for its early supplying of military equipment to Ukraine and for being the driving force behind European partners’ own increased military assistance. 8 Throughout the conflict, both states (as NATO members) have kept up the ‘faithful ally’ role. 9 At the same time, both Germany and the UK have experienced a degree of change in their foreign and security policy due to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. 10 This has tended towards taking the form of greater disengagement with Russia 11 and increased material support for Ukraine. 12 Finally, both the German and UK governments have experienced domestic and international pressure to advance policies showing an increased strengthing of the ‘faithful ally’ role vis-à-vis Ukraine. Although Germany is subject to greater international pressure, domestic pressure from diverse political parties is salient in both countries. As we highlight later, this pressure (domestic and international) is the source of policy contestation over providing greater support to Ukraine as part of the ‘faithful ally’ role.
To start, we show how the role theory literature addressing the foreign policy realm, including that on role contestation, usually makes reference to policy, but the latter always remains more of an empirical venture without theorisation of its relationship to roles. Second, we introduce our theoretical framework, via which we establish the relationship between roles and policy accordingly, before bringing this nexus to the issue of policy contestation and its implications for role-playing. Third, each illustrative example is analysed. We focus on the ‘faithful ally’ role, and, when pertinent, we include other roles (such as leader) which were called into question as a spillover effect from policy contestation of the ‘faithful’ ally role. Consequently we only refer to other roles as instrumental to the analysis of the ‘faithful ally’ role. Fourth and finally, we briefly compare the cases, showing the value of our theoretical elaboration and present potential avenues for future research.
Role theory and policy: domestic contestation
Roles as properties of both agents and structures involve Ego’s (self) definition vis-à-vis Alter’s (other) role expectations coming from another state, international actor or systemic cues. 13 Ego (self) refers to the social actor at the centre of the interaction and who experiences the social world from its own perspective and from its self-definition of roles. In this sense, Alter (other) encompass actors that complete the role of Ego in the forms of direct significant actors or socialisers, systemic cues and demands. Thus, roles are relational, as any role needs a corresponding counterrole, and roles reflect the expectations and demands of other actors. 14 Role enactment refers to possible behaviours when performing a role on the international stage 15 and the set of feasible actions shaped by the policies a given role encompasses.
Analytically, symbolic-interactionist role theory in foreign policy has mainly focused on the role conception process. 16 Most of the role theory literature has concentrated on the types of cultural material and identity aspects which give a particular role conception social credibility, identification and legitimacy. 17 The set of role conceptions embraced by an actor has been used as the basis for empirical analysis, as a snapshot of its full identity. 18 This is also the case for roles as a type of status: namely, the ‘master’ and ‘auxiliary’ roles which underpin a particular actor’s standing. Such master and auxiliary roles have been beneficial to understanding the socialisation dynamics of international actors. 19
Holsti, in his seminal contribution on role theory in foreign policy, states that policy decisions and roles go hand in hand: ‘Individual foreign policy decisions and actions can be seen as attempts to enact national role conceptions; typical decisions are at least consistent with these conceptions’. 20 He also defines some of the roles using the language of policy. For instance, the same ‘faithful ally’ role is driven by actively accepting and supporting the policy of an ally rather than being a social position driven by counterroles. 21 In role theory, roles and policy co-exist as two distinct concepts, as roles delimit the possible policy choices available to a given actor. In fact, most role theory works analyse different policy decisions in their empirical work. Leaving aside the pure foreign policy domain (indeed a policy field), 22 other role theory works focus on economic crisis, 23 the security realm 24 and intercountry adoption, 25 to name just a few. All these issue-areas are policy spaces. Thus the role conception and role-playing analysed in these works are based on policy preferences, decisions and forms of implementation. For instance, Breuning has engaged with how roles and policy are intertwined. 26 She examines cross-national differences in policy behaviour regarding overseas assistance, as driven by the respective role conceptions held by decision makers in Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK.
Despite the presence of these policy dimensions within their empirical analyses, there is little theoretical elaboration on how the roles–policy relationship unfolds in practice. For instance Cantir and Kaarbo, in their work on the domestic contestation of roles, differentiate between ‘roles’ and ‘policy’, mentioning the need to unpack the relationship between the two concepts. Yet they seemingly asked the contributors to their edited volume to focus only on roles and to leave aside the policy preference dimension. 27 Similarly, discussions on role change do not include change in policy as a factor in the process of role adjustment or more radical changes in a given actor’s enacted roles. 28 Breuning investigates the factors inhibiting role change when Belgium decided to innovate on developmental-aid policy by selecting the role of ‘partner in development’. 29 This new role was seen as at odds with the country’s traditional ‘trading state’ one, within which its development-aid policy had previously been embedded. While this work focuses on roles and policy, it mainly contributes to our understanding of role contestation as inhibiting role change. The relationship between roles and policy is certainly present in this particular work, but does not form a central feature and aim of it.
It is on the basis of this gap in foreign policy role theory we seek to unpack the relationship between roles and policy. In this, we focus on the rich area of role theory research and domestic role contestation, aiming to reveal how policy disagreements affect role enactment. Roles rarely enjoy homogeneous support from domestic actors, as previously assumed. 30 Role contestation can come from citizens (i.e. vertical role contestation) and from elites and political institutions (i.e. horizontal role contestation), such as interest and pressure groups, legislatures, political parties, bureaucracies, ministries and ministers and within the same executive office.
Subsequent works have zoomed in on each of these different dimensions of role contestation to show how a lack of domestic consensus around a particular role affects the role conception process, focusing for example on the cases of Mexico and Chile 31 or on Germany’s pertinent roles. 32 Other works have focused on role dissonance, role conflict and the effects of polarisation on roles, 33 and on the level of consensus behind a state’s grand strategy. 34 The study of role contestation has also brought together role conflict and role contestation as a form of second order contestation with implications for foreign policy positions. 35 Most of these works on contestation have emphasised that over role conceptions, leaving aside or only touching tangentially on contestation of role enactment or when the actor is actively playing the role internationally. Hagan illustrates the process of role contestation through a policy dimension of the ‘ally’ role. He focuses on how leaders navigate the competing role expectations of domestic actors with their own set of policy convictions. 36 While Hagan also studies the ‘faithful ally’ role, this is done in tandem with examining a ‘restraining ally’ and a mediator role.
Brummer and Thies also work on role contestation using the case of Australia’s domestic debates on selecting a ‘faithful ally’ role vis-à-vis the US or an ‘active independent’ role after World War II. 37 While policy forms the backdrop to this contribution, the chapter prioritises the analysis of foreign policy orientations. These works show policy is important for roles but the relationship between them has become secondary and more an empirical task in the study of role contestation. Policy contestation is also embedded in the category of role contestation. Finally, the work of McCourt analyses political processes of contestation that are non-role based but still induce roles to be contested nonetheless. 38 He shows contestation is a much broader process than a merely role-related one and that policy can be subject to it too, affecting role relationships in foreign policy (more in the next section).
Thus, studies on role theory and role contestation have produced relevant findings amplifying the explanatory power of this approach in its symbolic-interactionist form. However, such studies have only tangentially touched upon the roles–policy relationship, and how policy disagreements affect role enactment. To provide a compelling account of how policy decisions affects role enactment (in this case, of the ‘faithful ally’ one), we now flesh out this relationship.
Policy, roles and domestic contestation
Policy decisions and implementation
Policy, as the course of action of a given government, spans goals and the means to achieve them, independent of the quality of said policy in terms of its origin, identification, justification and implementation. 39 Government policies are decisions to act (or not to), as well as to change (or maintain) one’s current trajectory. 40 Dye defines ‘policy’ as anything a government chooses to do or not to do. 41 This definition puts the focus on policy as the property of any given government as a conscious process and choice of governments to adopt a particular course of action. 42
In the policy process, the agent is the government – but within it are key actors who decide to invest part of their political capital in pushing for a specific decision and its real-world implementation. These actors are policy entrepreneurs 43 ; those in the right place at the right time to push for a specific course of action and initiative. 44 Regarding foreign policy, the political protagonist can act as both a policy leader and entrepreneur. 45 Policymaking has its own cycle, different stages including agenda-setting, formulation, decision-making, implementation and evaluation. In the different stages of the foreign policy cycle, the leader is expected to be the key decision maker and driving force behind translating policy into action. 46
Thus policy is full of contestation, especially when a salient issue is pressing. Policy usually goes along with politics and the power relations enjoyed by political actors who have vested interests and a stake in an issue-specific area. For example, they can act as veto players regarding foreign policy. 47 Political actors may also invoke policy traditions to marginalise different policy propositions. 48 Policy contestation can also be politicised, namely when divergence between political actors’ positions also becomes part of public discussion and debate – that is, when public opinion and actors outside the decision-making circle exert additional pressure on those making policy choices. A likely condition for policy contestation to be politicised is the salience of the issue at hand. 49 In other words, the policies selected in the foreign policy domain experience contestation from domestic political actors, which affects the external relations of one state vis-à-vis another, a set of them or multilateral institutions – and hence the roles played.
Roles and role contestation
Role conception not only involves Ego’s definition of its own social position but also the expectations from Alter on the role Ego should enact. 50 Such expectations relate to the roles Alter expects Ego to enact to establish a role relationship. 51 This can take the form of direct demands from a Significant Other (alter) on the Self (ego), or from cues coming from the social system and anticipate what is expected of Ego. 52
As roles reflect the type of actor it is possible to be internationally, they are a type of identity marker which tells other parties what kind of actor they face in a specific context. 53 A role set, or the number of roles an actor possesses, has been identified as a snap shot of the identity of a given actor. 54 Role and identity are intertwined, yet they capture different aspects of the social life of an (international) actor. 55 While identity is more about who the actor is, each role in play concerns what the actor should do in terms of concrete behaviour. 56 Identity does not speak conceptually to behavioural dispositions, and thus agency has to be imported into identity-based accounts. 57 Agency is given to a particular identity by roles adopted, as the latter implies action and behaviour forming part of its conceptual properties. 58 Roles thus mediate between identity and action, as they serve to incorporate the shared behavioural expectations of Ego and Alter. 59 While roles reflect part of the social identity of a particular actor, they can also be stretched and manipulated with the purpose of justifying strategic ways, ends and means in foreign policy terms. Thus, roles reflect the type of actor Ego is; they also have a material and strategic dimension for the state in question, helping facilitate the achievement of its foreign policy goals. 60
Further, role conception and enactment are usually constrained by divergence and contestation from societal and political actors. Role contestation is about diverging preferences over which roles to select and how to enact them. The domestic contestation of a particular role can be exploited by external actors pushing the Self to adjust one in play or to select a new one altogether. 61 While roles are recurrently contested by domestic actors, the role is not always the main focus of contestation. Other political processes generating divergence can impact foreign policy-related roles; what McCourt calls ‘non-role-based contestation’, with role implications. 62 This author’s approach to contestation does not dismiss the fact roles can still be contested, as documented in a number of different works, 63 but notes instead how sometimes roles are impacted by other processes of contestation – such as policy divergence regarding a given role enjoying overall consensus support among societal and political actors. This understanding of contestation as something broader but with a clear impact on roles opens the door to further theorisations. In the case of this paper’s scope, it is about how enactment of the ‘faithful ally’ role finding broad support from said actors is shaped by the contestation of related policy decisions and implementation.
The relationship between roles and policy
As mentioned, roles delimit the types of policy preferences and options available to an actor when, for example, conceiving those of ‘democracy promoter’ and ‘security provider’. The enactment of these roles is sometimes about what type of policies the actor in question is bringing to the social interaction between Ego and Alter. Hence roles, as well as policy decisions and implementation, tend to interact in one of two ways. First, policy decisions and implementation in the foreign policy realm may be the driving force behind the role selection process and modes of subsequent enactment vis-à-vis another state. For instance, the decision to become a NATO member involves a set of policies in terms of budget, military personnel and equipment, which together can elevate a potential candidate to the standards set by this institution. Most importantly, policy decisions and implementation drive the subsequent enactment of the role of ‘faithful ally’ to NATO and its various members states. Once officially a member of NATO, the role location process is completed within the scope of this institutional setting.
The second way policy decisions and implementation interact with roles is when the latter are selected due to the pressures and demands of the situation at hand, which leads to decision makers selecting a set of policies relatively consistent with the established role conception. This is precisely the case with most European actors following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, declaring they are on Ukraine’s side and thus reinforcing the ‘faithful ally’ role. Reinforcing this role came with a series of (contested) policy measures and decisions aiming to be consistent with the choice made. Thus, while a role can be selected before any policy decisions have been made and delimit the available policy choices suited to the one in question, the reverse is also true in that policy decisions can also shape the role to be selected and then internationally enacted.
Like roles, 64 however, policies are usually subject to disagreement among respective political actors. Not all instances hereof lead to role contestation. Yet, when the actor is enacting the role, and their partners and the audience of international states demand, accordingly, increased defence spending and the greater allocation of military equipment during a given crisis, then their real-world behaviour may be impacted by the type of policy decisions taken and their implementation in terms of giving direction and life to the role in question. While we agree in principle with Cantir and Kaarbo that not all policy contestation leads to role contestation, 65 we expect that when a role has been selected further to its form of enactment not matching the expectations of domestic actors and external demands of significant others alike, then policy contestation will affect role performance.
Thus, policy decisions and implementation can bestow roles with intention, direction and life when selected prior to the related policies; or the latter come first, and in consequence shape the nature of the subsequent role selection process. However, policy decisions and implementation are also subject to contestation, which can affect the enactment of broadly agreed upon roles most appropriate to play in a specific context. Policy is a contested space, as there are plenty of possible grounds on which to make sense of a specific role in foreign policy. In the case of Ukraine and the ‘faithful ally’ role, policies can include one or a variety of measures such as rhetorical and diplomatic support, the provision of intelligence information, economic aid, humanitarian assistance and the supplying of military equipment. The latter may more broadly include defensive as much as offensive military armaments, or even full engagement in military action against another state to show support to the ally. This interpretation of roles as shaped by policy and roles shaping policy still needs to resonate with domestic and international audiences, especially to reflect the type of actor Ego is socially – helping it therewith enact a credible role in line with the demands of Significant Others.
Role contestation in Germany’s approach to the War in Ukraine
Chancellor Scholz outlined Germany’s position regarding Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in a speech given to the Bundestag on 27 February 2022. It became known as the ‘Zeitenwende speech’, as Scholz framed Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine as a historic turning point necessitating a different strategic approach from Germany in a new security era. In it, Scholz selected and reinforced the role of ‘faithful ally’ to both Ukraine and to NATO, the latter stressing Germany’s commitment to preventing the conflict from spilling over into members states’ territory.
The role selection of ‘faithful ally’ was broadly supported by German societal and political actors. For Mello, 66 this watershed moment represented a more transformative change in the country’s security strategy; for others, it represented more of an adjustment to German foreign policy. 67 Ostpolitik (‘détente with the former Eastern Bloc’) and Wandel durch Handel (‘transformation through trade’) have been revised priorities in the country’s foreign policy of late, while other principles have remained relatively stable – such as Germany’s commitment to multilateralism, the EU project and even its hesitancy to adopt a more assertive leadership role internationally. 68
At first, Germany’s approach to Russia in light of the latter’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine was driven by inertia and reactiveness. 69 The subsequent reinforcement of the ‘faithful ally’ role vis-à-vis Ukraine meant leaving behind the erstwhile policy of directly engaging with Russia. 70 This reinforcing of the ‘faithful ally’ role involved new domestic debates on the set of policies best able to make sense of and address this turn of events, and thus of the role at hand. Some have questioned whether the watershed moment of Zeitenwende has come with decisive actions backing it up, 71 while others focus on the intra- and interbureaucratic problems and strategic culture around security matters hindering the implementation of promised policies. 72 The reinforcement of the faithful ally role can also be interpreted as a process of path dependency in Germany’s foreign policy process. Zeitenwende is a reaction to the critical juncture of Russia’s full-scale invasion. While a new security policy emerged as a consequence of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, this new security dimension is not totally new as it brings together Germany’s previous foreign policy traditions, dilemmas, options and cumulative changes regarding the historic relationship with NATO and Russia, and most recently Germany’s position and policies to support Ukraine since Crimea. 73
Some scholars have also mentioned the somewhat unfairness of criticisms of the German government, as the country has continued to be one of the main actors providing monetary and military support to Ukraine and NATO members. 74 This interpretation of unfair treatment of the German government is for us a consequence and result of the politicisation and visibility of domestic contestation over the types of possible policies shaping the enactment of the ‘faithful ally’ role.
As soon as that role was located, Scholz framed Germany’s decision as grounded in European partnerships, outlining a series of policies to give the role renewed consistency and enabling the emerging situation to be met. The German Chancellor mentioned a series of economic sanctions against Russia, and announced increased defence spending for new German military capabilities to be developed in cooperation with France and other EU members. In the same speech, Scholz stressed the importance of keeping open channels of communication with Russia to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict. 75
What perhaps struck domestic audiences the most with his Zeitenwende speech and its proposed enactment of the ‘faithful ally’ role was the decision to allocate 100 billion euros to the Bundeswehr for developing arms projects. 76 All the policies envisaged by Scholz to support Ukraine and NATO started to be domestically contested, as shaping the ‘faithful ally’ role. They even spilled over into other roles, such as playing a more ‘assertive leader’ one both regionally and internationally during the conflict and the type of role relationship existing with Russia going forwards. In other words, policy decisions Scholz outlined in his Zeitenwende speech affected Germany’s ‘faithful ally’ role.
One of the key problems facing the German Chancellor is that members of his Social Democratic Party (SPD) prioritise values associated with pacifism (especially left-leaning factions within the SPD) and a foreign policy of restraint. 77 Conversely, his coalition allies such as the Greens (die Grünen) and Free Democratic Party (FDP) prefer more assertive support given to Ukraine and other NATO members. Opposition parties such as the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian Social Union (CSU) advocate for a more assertive Germany in world affairs, especially in Europe; in the case of Ukraine, they believe Germany should be more proactive in delivering on its promise of being a ‘faithful ally’. 78 Thus, the domestic preferences of the country’s respective political actors are very fragmented.
Moreover, the role relationship with Russia has traditionally been driven by the Ostpolitik developed by then-Chancellor Willy Brandt in the 1960s given the historical legacy of World War II (Nie Wieder). 79 Ostpolitik concerns bringing Russia closer to Europe by managing the relationship between Russia and the West. At the same time, the trade policy towards Russia has created a strong domestic interest regarding the need to maintain an overall fluid commercial relationship. 80 With Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Germany along with other allies imposed a series of economic sanctions on the former, but it remained hesitant about cutting its energy dependency thereon, creating contestation over this policy decision and its implementation. The more decision makers delayed ending energy dependency on Russia, the more this lack of action impacted the type of ‘faithful ally’ Germany was being vis-à-vis the role demands of Ukraine, international peers and its own domestic audiences. In September 2022, the government announced compensation mechanisms to businesses losing out from cutting ties with Russia in the energy sector, reducing said domestic resistance and policy contestation. 81
All domestic political actors had their own policy preferences for how to reinforce and enact the ‘faithful ally’ role regarding Ukraine and other NATO members. But the role expectations of Significant Others became a pressing force when President Volodymyr Zelensky requested Leopard 2 tanks from NATO members, which were seen as key to initiate a counter-offensive against Russian forces. Germany is the producer of these tanks, so a key veto player for other ally countries seeking to re-export them to Ukraine. Any policy decision to do so needs Germany’s approval.
Contested policy decisions and a delay in deciding on and implementing the course of action to be taken regarding the tanks thus affected the enactment of the ‘faithful ally’ role. Scholz showed hesitancy on resolving the issue due to strong domestic contestation, as the role was clear and broadly agreed upon by German societal and political actors. The latter were divided, rather, on whether such a move could also be interpreted as an act of open aggression towards Russia. Scholz thus decided to ‘wait and see’ (no decision and action, a type of policy decision, too) regarding what other key partners from NATO (such as the US) would themselves decide on the matter.
Other political actors such as the Greens and Liberals questioned Scholz’s apparent policy irresolution on the Leopards. CDU members also started to frame his hesitancy as affecting Germany’s international image, appealing directly to the Greens and Liberals to withdraw from the governing coalition as their desired position was to show a decisive commitment to Ukraine and its plans for a counter-offensive. 82 For these groups, the concerns of locating a new role relationship of ‘enemy’ vis-à-vis Russia did not have substance, as Germany had already de facto enacted that role the moment it decided to be on Ukraine’s side as ‘faithful ally’ – leaving behind therewith its erstwhile engagement with Russia. For these parties, the policy measures adopted previously by the government to give substance to the enactment of the ‘faithful ally’ role were not enough; new ones were needed.
At the same time, external expectations of peer states from NATO put additional pressure on the German government and gave more strength to diverging domestic voices over its policy decisions and implementation. For instance, Poland’s sending of Leopards to Ukraine impacted Germany, as the latter was dragged into approving the transfer. At the same time, the UK decided to send its own tanks to Ukraine which put another layer of pressure on Germany. 83 The US also made clear its role expectations on Germany’s need to allow the re-exporting of these tanks to Ukraine. Scholz navigated these respective policy demands of domestic and international actors, deciding on the most appropriate course of action to adjust the way his country was enacting the ‘faithful ally’ role.
Domestically, voices of the opposition and governing parties questioned Germany for not enacting the role in full, as well as for showing hesitancy on taking the lead among European partners in the EU and NATO. In fact, these voices criticised Scholz for adopting a de facto ‘follower’ role vis-à-vis the US regarding military aid to Ukraine. Political parties and some media outlets framed the public debate by depicting the German Chancellor as lacking the necessary skills to resolve pressing policy matters, while those from the pacifist tradition questioned the policy decision of transferring military equipment to Ukraine for offensive operations. 84 For the advocates of this tradition within the SPD and general public, the Leopard 2 issue ran the risk of open conflict between Germany and Russia.
Domestic public opinion played its part as well. While overall support for Ukraine is the dominant tendency in Germany, the envisaged policy means to that end differ. When it came to the Leopards, public opinion was divided. 85 For Scholz, understanding the wider mood was key as support for his party would wane among the German population in light of these events. 86 In the end, Scholz justified his late policy decision and implementation on the Leopards using rethoric still consistent with Germany’s role as a NATO member. He mentioned that sensitive policy issues around supporting Ukraine needed coordination with the rest of NATO and thus required time. Nonetheless, Scholz was still depicted by domestic political actors as irresolute in his policy decisions and implementation, affecting the enactment of the ‘faithful ally’ role.
In the Leopard 2 tank episode, we observe the following elements as conditioning Scholz’s policy decisions, with implications for role enactment. First, the German political landscape was highly fragmented in the sense the respective parties, the governing coalition, interest groups and even public opinion diverge from each other on the type of policy decisions preferred to give new meaning to the ‘faithful ally’ role. They all have different sets of policy preferences on how it should be enacted, while this role was already located internationally and broadly agreed upon by domestic actors as the right one to play in principle. They also expected that other roles would be played differently too. Domestic actors demanded from Scholz he enact more decisively a ‘leader’ role in the context of Russia’s full-scale invasion, as part of being a ‘faithful ally’ to Ukraine. German media also contributed to domestic policy contestation, with some outlets portraying Scholz as dubitative on adopting consistent policies regarding Ukraine’s demands of its allies, while public opinion was divided on the best policies to give direction to the role selected.
Second, the fragmentation of domestic policy preferences started to increase costs for the Chancellor, as delaying (a decision-making policy option) shaped perceptions of Scholz as a leader who does not make decisions. He justified his approach by referring to Germany still playing the ‘faithful ally’ role, saying such policy decisions and their implementation were to be coordinated with Ukraine’s other allies – that is, NATO members. In other words, he tried to show to his domestic audience that the coordination of policy decisions and their implementation were part of being a ‘faithful ally’ as a way to reduce the dissonance between the expectations of domestic actors and external others. Yet this justification was still questioned by media and political figures at home, as the UK had decided to send its own tanks to Ukraine without much delay, adding extra pressure on Scholz. Third, the policy contestation process also spilled over into other roles such as an expected ‘leadership’ one, as Germany was seen by domestic actors as a ‘follower’ and not even as a ‘reluctant leader’ of European peers within NATO.
Thus, in this episode of the Leopard 2 tanks, we see the diverging policy preferences of a diverse set of actors at play, and both the domestic and international demands decision makers have to simultaneously navigate and balance. Expectations were always present and pressing from Ukraine and NATO, and they were exploited not by external peers but by domestic actors when it came to the type of policies being selected and implemented. These policy decisions and their implementation were recurrently contested, impacting and shaping how Germany reinforces and enacts the ‘faithful ally’ role: policy contestation was thus the key driver affecting role enactment.
Role contestation in the United Kingdom’s approach to the War in Ukraine
The UK showed overall parliamentary support for enhancing the role of ‘faithful ally’ to Ukraine following Russia’s full-scale invasion. PM Johnson proposed the UK enhance the role by imposing strict costs on Russia and limiting its ability to fight: ‘Now we have a clear mission: diplomatically, politically, economically and eventually militarily, this hideous and barbaric venture of Vladimir Putin must end in failure’. 87 Members of the House of Commons agreed the UK should go further than before in enacting the role of ‘faithful ally’ to Ukraine via different policy dimensions. This included supporting the country with military equipment and imposing a series of financial sanctions on Russia, with these punitive measures to be developed in partnership with European and NATO peers. Yet the policy of imposing financial sanctions experienced systematic contestation within parliament between the governing Conservative Party and the Labour opposition. Members of each party expressed a preference for stronger measures than those proposed by the government, to illustrate their greater support for Ukraine. Meanwhile, the provision of military equipment experienced a lower degree of contestation. Contestation within parliament, accordingly, had implications for the policy direction and enactment of the otherwise agreed upon role of ‘faithful ally’ to Ukraine.
The UK’s role as a ‘faithful ally’ became prominent following Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine’s Crimea and Donbas regions. The following year, the ‘National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review’ outlined Britain’s commitment to playing this role. 88 From a policy perspective, the role of ‘faithful ally’ to Ukraine established a legacy of coordinated sanctions against Russia and saw the provision of military training and equipment to Ukraine as part of Operation Orbital. 89 In the ‘Integrated Review’, the post-Brexit review of British foreign policy, the ‘faithful ally’ role focuses on the NATO alliance and bilateral partnerships within Europe, including with Ukraine. 90 As Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, the UK was already well-positioned to strengthen the enactment of the role via enhanced financial sanctions punishing Russia and providing material support to Ukraine’s military. At the same time, the Conservative government reduced its emphasis on working with the EU, with the Integrated Review downplaying the EU as a Significant Other to the UK’s ‘faithful ally’ role in its wider FP 91 .
Despite consistent enactment of the role of ‘faithful ally’ to Ukraine through policy, policy contestation over the type of punitive financial measures and sanctions to be imposed on Russia was driven by persistent issues in the UK’s relationship with the latter. It abandoned most cooperation with Russia following the 2018 Salisbury poisonings, with then-PM Theresa May emphasising the stronger punishment of Russia, as supported diplomatically by a broad coalition of allies including the EU. 92 Following Salisbury, the UK-EU maintained cooperation on sanctions policy regarding Russia, more so than on any other security issue area despite the EU’s downgraded standing in UK foreign policy. 93 With the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, the UK automatically copied EU sanctions until the end of the Brexit transition period (31 December 2020) whilst autonomously implementing and enforcing said sanctions. Following a short hiatus from of full alignment with EU sanctions in 2021, Russia’s full-scale invasion returned the UK to automatic alignment with EU sanctions designations. 94 The Salisbury poisonings thus established the baseline policy cooperation (with a brief blip in 2021) needed to continue enacting the ‘faithful ally’ role vis-à-vis Ukraine.
May’s emphasis on strong punitive measures after Salisbury received some policy contestation from Jeremy Corbyn, then leader of the opposition. The then-Labour leader, who characteristically upheld the pacifist tradition in foreign policy, 95 emphasised avoiding quick attribution of responsibility for the Salisbury attacks, cooperating with Russia in the investigation and tackling Russian financial influence in London and UK politics at large. 96 Although Corbyn’s policy preferences were marginalised, his legacy for Labour persisted as a reference point in future parliamentary debates, often being used by political opponents to undermine his successor, Keir Starmer.
The 2020 Intelligence and Security Committee ‘Russia’ report highlighted that ‘Russian influence in the UK is “the new normal”, and there are a lot of Russians with very close links to [Vladimir] Putin who are well integrated into the UK business and social scene, and accepted because of their wealth. This level of integration – in “Londongrad” in particular – means that any measures now being taken by the Government are not preventative but rather constitute damage limitation’. 97 The scale of said influence undermined the Conservative government’s claims to be imposing the strictest possible financial sanctions on Russia. The issue also opened the Conservative Party (and to some extent Labour) to criticism about it directly benefitting from Russian wealth. 98
The above context highlights several factors within the UK parliament shaping policy contestation over the role of ‘faithful ally’ to Ukraine in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion. These refer to the record of the two main parties historic relations with Russia as well as the institutional relationship between the UK and European partners. Leader of the opposition Starmer battled to overcome Corbyn’s perceived legacy of being ‘soft on Russia’, particularly following policy contestation over sanctions being imposed in response to the Salisbury poisonings. At the same time, the ruling Conservative Party had to contend with continual questions around the influence of Russian money in the UK and the apparent lack of action in response. 99 The UK’s relationship with Europe also means discussion of the ‘faithful ally’ role has spillover effects onto the ‘leader’ one, namely from comparing the UK’s own response to the EU’s. 100 This contextual background to the UK-Russia relationship created an environment in which both the UK’s two main political parties sought to propose financial sanctions to display their stronger commitment to the ‘faithful ally’ role regarding Ukraine after February 2022.
The first policy area of focus during the debate on appropriate financial responses to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine was cross-parliamentary calls to remove Russia from the SWIFT (The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) banking system. MPs from across the House of Commons vocally demanded the government act on removing Russia from SWIFT in support of Ukraine. 101 Yet debates on this policy led to the conclusion that removing Russian banks from SWIFT was impossible for the government to fulfil on the technicality that the UK could not do this unilaterally. 102 In fact, this measure would require further coordination and agreement with peer states. The technical inability to implement this policy directly revised the content of the ‘faithful ally’ role by bringing cooperation with Europe back into related policy dimensions. Therefore, Johnson decided to work together with peers to implement the SWIFT sanctions policy. 103 The UK was able to block the first set of Russian banks from SWIFT on the 26 February 2022 in tandem with European partners, demonstrating its full commitment as a ‘faithful ally’ to Ukraine. 104 Contestation enhanced the scope of this role by bringing multilateral European collaboration back into play on an ad hoc basis, namely by furthering existing cooperation with Europe over sanctions. 105
However, implementing SWIFT-related punitive measures did not remove domestic policy contestation in the UK. The Conservative government experienced further calls from Ukraine and domestic actors alike to adopt an even tougher set of policies regarding economic sanctions. 106 For instance, one Labour MP highlighted Zelensky’s call for immediate and more restrictive economic and financial measures, pointing to the inadequate timing of the Economic Crime Bill and urging its debate be brought forward. Johnson acquiesced. 107 Both domestic and international pressure provided signals to Johnson as to how the ‘faithful ally’ role should be enacted policy-wise.
The UK also tried to locate a ‘leader’ role on sanctions, a key one in the country’s post-Brexit foreign policy. 108 Yet regarding SWIFT sanctions, leadership was functional in support of the salient ‘faithful ally’ role. After initial parliamentary debates on SWIFT, Johnson did try to locate a ‘leader’ role alongside ‘faithful ally’ to Ukraine by highlighting the UK’s insistence on expelling Russian banks from the SWIFT network. 109 Leading, in this instance, was more about moving faster and with greater severity in sanctions policy than European allies. Indeed, following Russia’s invasion the UK resumed replicating EU sanctions designations in its own autonomous sanctions regime. 110 This meant the UK could enact sanctions faster than the EU by avoiding institutional entanglement within EU processes. Yet automatically copying EU sanctions designations risked establishing the UK as ‘follower’ to the EU. 111 Dissonance between the UK’s post-Brexit FP and continued cooperation between the UK-EU on sanctions policy led Johnson to instead discount the ‘leader’ role in parliamentary debates by highlighting the inability of the UK to take unilateral action on SWIFT sanctions. 112 Johnson’s articulation of a prompt reaction and decision-making process instead focused on the policy field of military assistance to Ukraine. 113 He observed the military assistance from France and Germany to be moving slower than from the UK, associating the rapid transferral of military aid to a skillset consistent with the ‘faithful ally’ role. Yet this aspiration of being perceived as efficient on policy decisions regarding support for Ukraine, including those related to sanctions policy, was more for domestic consumption in being ‘contrasted with supposed EU inaction, which irked EU policymakers’. 114 The expectation from the audience of European states and NATO members was instead to give meaning and action to the ‘faithful ally’ role vis-à-vis Ukraine as a common effort rather than focusing on which ally was faster in implementing policies consistent with said role.
Another contested area which re-emerged during the conflict which shaped the enactment of the role of ‘faithful ally’ was about how to deal with existing Russian assets in the domestic financial sector. Criticism of government inaction here was nothing new, as Corbyn
115
and even the Intelligence and Security Committee
116
had previously brought up this issue. In the current circumstances, Labour considered this to undermine the UK’s claim of being a ‘faithful ally’ to Ukraine. Starmer stated that:
For too long, our country has been a safe haven for the money that Putin and his fellow bandits stole from the Russian people. It must now change. Cracking open the shell companies in which stolen money is hidden will require legislation. The Prime Minister should bring it forward immediately, and Labour will support it, along with the other measures that he has just outlined.
117
In short, the UK must clean its own financial sector through policy measures able to remove the ongoing presence of Russian assets affecting the enactment of the ‘faithful ally’ role. Johnson tried to divert the policy debate away from this financial link while also stressing the UK enjoyed the necessary freedom to decisively enact the role of ‘faithful ally’ to Ukraine. He attempted to move the focus to energy dependence on Russia instead. The then-Conservative government hence emphasised in its narrative that the UK lacks the same energy dependence on Russia faced by other European countries at the time. 118 In other words, UK policymakers could go further than European peers in the measures taken to support Ukraine.
Despite this strategic shift of policy focus by the government, it did not have an immediate effect on reducing criticism of extensive Russian assets in London. Crucial was the revelation that Russian financial influence had reached the heart of government, with the breaking story of Johnson’s personal connection to Lord Lebedev of Hampton, a peer in the House of Lords with ties to Russian intelligence. 119 This story forced Johnson to adopt a more confrontational defence of the UK’s performance of the role of ‘faithful ally’ to Ukraine. Johnson defended his government’s policies of imposing sanctions and providing military aid accordingly, highlighting Corbyn’s legacy regarding Labour’s failure to stand up to Russia – mentioned so to undermine Starmer’s credibility and his questioning of the government’s handling of national security. 120
Against this backdrop, we also observe a broad trend of policy contestation affecting and shaping role enactment here. The UK parliament showed consensus on enhancing policy and the enactment of the role of ‘faithful ally’ to Ukraine, which has remained stable over time ever since. However, policy decisions and their implementation as regards the financial sector became contested by the opposition and government actors over the type of economic sanctions to be used against Russia. Domestic political issues forged the dynamic: both the governing Conservative Party’s record on tackling Russian financial influence in the UK and Corbyn’s legacy alike. Moreover, as policy decisions on SWIFT-related measures could not be advanced unilaterally, the UK had to leave behind the aspired complementary role of ‘leader’ in this issue-area and to reconsider the place of the EU within that of ‘faithful ally’ to Ukraine.
The UK also began to emphasise its capacity to make and implement fast decisions, such as the speedy provision of weapons to Ukraine. External role expectations from the latter and NATO reinforced the UK government’s perspective on the appropriate enactment of the role of ‘faithful ally’. Nonetheless, Johnson’s strategic decision of prioritising other policy measures to make sense of the role did not negate the issue of extensive Russian assets existing in London nor did it make the policy decision and implementation of military aid to Ukraine a non-contested policy space. Overall, it was the policy content of the role – or the speed, scale and implementation of policy – and not the ‘faithful ally’ role itself which was contested. This impacted how the UK imagined, cast, and implemented this dominant international role.
Conclusion
In this article, we showed the theoretical relationship between roles and policy being key to understanding how contestation over policy affects role enactment. The main dimension to this relationship lies in policy decisions and their implementation giving meaning and direction to a particular role in the international, inasmuch as roles delimit the range of policy options available to an actor when the role is selected prior to policy formulation. We also revealed how contestation does not necessarily take place over roles per se; more important is how contestation regarding policy decisions and their implementation affects and shapes the role enactment process when domestic actors overall share consensus on the role to be played internationally.
In the German case, political and societal actors broadly agree on the country being a ‘faithful ally’ to Ukraine. However, contestation became salient over which exact policies should inform the role. Political parties and actors in the Bundestag diverged from Chancellor’s Scholz policy predispositions and followed cues and external expectations from both Ukraine and NATO. The case of the Leopard 2 tanks was illustrative of how the enactment of the ‘faithful ally’ role was shaped by policy debates and related decision-making and implementation phases. This policy contestation affected enactment of said role vis-à-vis Ukraine.
Similarly, the UK government reinforced the ‘faithful ally’ role post-February 2022, as a course of action broadly supported by the country’s respective societal and political actors. While ‘faithful ally’ was unquestioned, the type of economic sanctions to be imposed on Russia took centre stage, leading to tensions among MPs. The government tried to reduce policy contestation over economic sanctions by focusing on the policy space of military aid instead, as another way to enact the ‘faithful ally’ role. Again, contestation arose but over the type of policies to give most life to the role – namely, sanctions and military aid. Thus, in both of our illustrative country cases contestation was pressing in the policy decision-making and implementation phases alike, giving direction to the role of ‘faithful ally’ but not on this role per se.
This contribution to foreign policy role theory on the relationship between roles and policy opens further avenues of research. New studies can expand on subsequent episodes of enactment of the ‘faithful ally’ role to Ukraine, for example the provision of missile systems such as Taurus in Germany and Storm Shadow in the UK. Unpacking these type of policy episodes can further test the assumption of how contestation over policy decisions and implementation affects a political and socially shared role. The analytical focus on other empirical cases regarding the ‘faithful ally’ role to Ukraine, and other types of roles and foreign policy situations can also enrich the study of how domestic contestation on policy decisions and implementation constrains a specific role broadly shared across the political and societal spectrum of a country. However, future studies should also test the theoretical value of our approach when a set of policies are selected even before deciding on the roles to be played in the foreign policy realm, further examining the effects of such policy decisions and their implementation on role performance.
We also hinted at the importance of political struggles and divergence over policy decisions and their implementation as power- and interest-driven. This opens the possibility to develop role theory in foreign policy analysis, as a policy field concerned with questions of domestic constellations of power vis-à-vis the external expectations of Significant Others and their audience of states.
Thus, this article has established an explicit relationship between ‘roles’ and ‘policy’ addressing especially how policy contestation affects role-playing. Both are intertwined but distinct concepts, ones whose theoretical relationship has been previously mentioned but not theorised in its full sense in the literature.
Footnotes
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
